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This work uses the competing theories of regulation and ‘policy transfer’ analysis to examine why 
and how the global Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regime against money laundering 
emerged and was introduced in developing countries, particularly South Africa. It also examines 
the regime’s implementation efforts within South Africa’s banking sector. The popular explanation 
from the FATF is that this regime was introduced to help in dealing with issues of crime and 
protecting the financial system against abuse by criminals. The inquiry unfolds in the context of 
South Africa’s dual socio-economic conditions that straddle the developed-developing country 
divide. Findings of this study are that the global FATF regime did not primarily emerge for the 
proclaimed purposes of detecting or combating crime or to protect the global financial system from 
abuse by criminals. It may have instead emerged to deal with issues of competition, particularly 
regulatory and tax arbitrage. Evidence also clearly shows that the regime was imposed on many 
developing and small countries through the FATF’s strategies of naming, shaming and blacklisting 
those it labelled as Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories at the turn of the 21st century. The 
spread of the regime throughout the world at all costs appears to point towards a concerted drive 
to use or manipulate public sentiment about crime and to stigmatise mainly small and developing 
countries to the benefit of the narrow political and economic interests of some Western countries. 
Regarding the introduction of the FATF standards into South Africa, evidence shows that although 
the country was not blacklisted and was eventually made a full member of the FATF, the regime 
was, nevertheless imposed. In examining the imposition of these standards in South Africa, we 
found some of their crucial aspects were not designed for implementation under the socio-
economic conditions of underdevelopment. Evidence also shows that they are not effective in 
detecting and combating crime despite the great, yet uncalculated, cost of compliance that they 
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This thesis examines the emergence and adoption of the global Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) standards against money laundering and their implementation in developing countries and, 
in particular, South Africa. It identifies and examines the principal objectives and purposes of 
particularly the financial regulatory aspects of the FATF standards, questioning their design and 
aggressive implementation, high costs, especially the Know Your Customer/Customer Due 
Diligence (KYC/CDD) measures, when implemented under developing country socio-economic 
conditions. It also examines the impact and effect of reporting financial transactions of customers 
to the so-called financial intelligence units (FIUs) in trying to detect or combat money laundering 
and related crimes. Lastly, it examines the legitimacy of these standards, seeking to explain why 
developing countries continue to implement them despite their high costs and evidence that points 
to their failure to achieve their principal objectives and purposes. 
The FATF standards against money laundering were introduced after the formation of the 
FATF in 1989. At that time, they were called the 40 Recommendations against money laundering1. 
After what has become known as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US in 2001, nine special 
recommendations were added to the FATF standards, which led to them being called the 40+9 
Recommendations against money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CTF)2. We 
refer to these Recommendations in this thesis as the FATF standards. They are very broad and 
include recommendations aimed at detecting and combating money laundering by criminalizing 
it3, seizing and confiscating proceeds of crime4, fostering cooperation between countries5, and 
requiring financial and non-financial institutions and professionals to report ‘suspicious’ and 
‘unusual’ transactions and transactions above certain thresholds to the newly established FIUs6.  
                                                                
1 See FATF. 1990. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: Report 1990. Paris: FATF Secretariat 
2 See FATF. 2003. The Forty Recommendations: incorporating the amendments of 24 October 2004. FATF 
Recommendations, Paris: FATF Secretariat. 
3 Ibid. Recommendation 1 to 2  
4 Ibid. Recommendation 3 
5 Ibid. Recommendation 35 to 40  




Many scholars have written on the topic of money laundering7, some focusing on the 
phenomena itself, its impact, extent and quantification, some on the laws and regulations that were 
introduced to try and curb it. Due to its multidisciplinary nature, it has attracted input from diverse 
scholarly disciplines such as legal scholars, criminologists, economists, global governance and 
international relations, among others. It also easily lends itself to multidisciplinary research and 
interpenetration of various fields of law. This study focuses on the financial or business regulatory 
aspects of the FATF standards. These standards seek to regulate financial and non-financial 
businesses and require professionals to identify and verify residential addresses of their customers 
with a view of profiling them and reporting any of their transactions which may potentially be 
linked to criminal activities. This is done with a view to enlisting their assistance in uncovering 
and combating crime and of preventing them from being misused to facilitate crime, particularly 
serious revenue-generating crime and the financing of global terrorism activities8.  
This is therefore a study of ‘regulation’ at different levels, both global and national. At a 
global level, we examine the emergence of the money-laundering regulatory measures and their 
                                                                
7 Alldridge, P. (2003). Money laundering law: forfeiture, confiscation, civil recovery, criminal laundering and 
taxation of the proceeds of crime. Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing. Ashe, T.M. & Reid, P.L.L.M. (2000). Money 
laundering: risks and liabilities. Dublin, IR: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell. De Koker, L. (2002). Money laundering 
in South Africa. Centre for the Study of Economic Crime, Johannesburg, ZA:  Rand Afrikaans University. De Koker, 
L. (2006). Money laundering control and suppression of financing of terrorism: some thoughts on the impact of 
customer due diligence measures on financial exclusion. Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 13(1): 26-50. De Koker, L. 
(2008). Money laundering and terror financing risk management of low risk financial products and services in South 
Africa: a report prepared for FinMark Trust. The Centre for Financial Regulation and Inclusion (CENFRI), May 
2008. Hinterseer, K. (2002). Criminal finance: the political economy of money laundering in a comparative legal 
context. The Hague, HOL.: Kluwer Law International; Levi, M. 1991. Regulating money laundering: the death of 
bank secrecy in the UK. British Journal of Criminology. Vol. 31(2), pp. 109-12. Bosworth-Davies, R. (2007). Money 
laundering: the implications of the global money laundering laws-chapter five. Journal of Money Laundering Control. 
Vol. 10 (2), pp. 189-208. Bosworth-Davies, R. (2006). Money Laundering: towards an alternative interpretation-
chapter two. Journal of Money Laundering Control. Vol. 9 (4), pp. 346-364. Gold, M, & Levi, M. (1994). Money 
laundering in the UK: an appraisal of suspicious-based reporting. London, UK:  The Police Foundation. Goredema, 
C. (2005). Measuring money laundering in Southern Africa. African Security Review, Vol. 14(4). Hülsse, R. (2007).  
Creating demand for global governance: the making of a global money laundering problem. Global Society. Vol., 
21(2), pp. 155-178. Hülsse, R. (2009). Even clubs can’t do without legitimacy: why the anti-money laundering 
blacklist was suspended. Regulation and Governance, Vol. 2, 459-479. Mitsilegas, V. (2003). Countering the 
chameleon threat of dirty money: 'hard' and 'soft' law in the emergence of a global regime against money laundering 
and terrorist finance, in Transnational organised crime: perspectives on global security. A. Edwards and P. Gill. 
London, UK: Routledge.  pp. 195-209. Schudelaro, A. A. P. (2003). Electronic payment systems and money 
laundering: risks and countermeasures in the post-internet hype era. Nijmegen, NED: Wolf Legal Publications. 
8 FATF. 2003. The Forty Recommendations: incorporating the amendments of 24 October 2004. FATF 




spread to developing countries. At a national level, we focus on the adoption and implementation 
of these standards in developing countries with a particular focus on South Africa. With regards 
to their adoption we focus on whether this process was as a result of rational policy learning or 
through imposition, analysing the role played by various players and their interests. In other words, 
we adopt a ‘policy transfer’ analysis. At a national level, the regulation of private businesses to 
assist in the detection and combating of crime requires them to perform quasi-law enforcement 
functions which are not their primary business9.  
Since this is a study of regulation, we have developed a theoretical framework that is 
anchored in the theories of regulation, particularly the ‘public interest’ and ‘private interest’ 
theories of regulation. Regulation theories seek to explain why and how regulation emerges. Using 
this framework, we developed competing hypotheses concerning the emergence of the FATF 
regulatory regime. Based on the public interest theories of regulation, this study examines the 
hypothesis that the recommendations of the FATF that governments, throughout the world, should 
regulate their banks and other financial institutions, were primarily directed at detecting and 
combating money laundering and protecting the global financial system from abuse by criminals. 
It pits this against a competing hypothesis, anchored in the ‘private interest’ theories of regulation, 
which contends that these business regulations emerged primarily to prevent competition and 
regulatory arbitrage for US’s financial institutions.   
This thesis is made up of this introduction and a conclusion at the end, which contains some 
key recommendations. In-between these, there are 8 chapters. The last 4 (chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8) 
are directed at testing opposing hypotheses. This work is structured as follows. Chapter 1 
introduces our topic in more depth, particularly and broadly-- the global regime against money 
laundering. It ends by discussing the purposes and delimitations of the study. Chapter 2 looks at 
how we may think of the FATF standards of business regulation- which now form a central strategy 
of detecting and combating money laundering and its predicate offences in many countries. We 
argue that these regulatory strategies espouse the ‘situational crime prevention’ and the ‘risk 
                                                                
9 Levi, M. 1991. Regulating money laundering: the death of bank secrecy in the UK. British Journal of 





regulation’ strategies to detect and to combat crime. In regulating private businesses, these 
approaches do not focus on the offender directly, but indirectly-- by seeking to manipulate the 
situational settings which make it possible for crime to occur. We argue that these regulatory 
strategies have been widely used in dealing with crime in general and have their own weaknesses 
which may beset the achievement of the alleged public interest goals of detecting and combating 
crime.  
Chapter 3 discusses the regulation theories which were used in developing our competing 
hypotheses of public and private interest. We tie these with our empirical research methods, which 
involved archival research and fieldwork interviews with compliance officers, law enforcement 
officials, anti-money laundering regulatory supervisors and other private organisations and 
individuals. Chapter 4 discusses South Africa’s legislative, regulatory and institutional framework 
against money laundering and terrorist financing. These measures are still new in South Africa, 
having been implemented in just over a decade. In this part we discuss the provisions of the 3 main 
pieces of legislation enacted to deal with organised crime, money laundering and terrorist 
financing; the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA) of 1998, the Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act (FICA) of 2001, and the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and 
Related Activities (POCDATARA) of 2004. Our main focus is on POCA and FICA. POCA 
criminalises money laundering and provides for asset confiscation and forfeiture measures, which 
appear to have been pursued aggressively by South Africa’s Asset Forfeiture Unit, as attested to 
by case law (which we also discuss). FICA established South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Unit, 
the Financial Intelligence Centre, and provides for the business regulatory measures for combating 
money laundering and terrorist financing.  
In Chapter 5 we offer some critical analysis and explanations of the FATF regime’s 
emergence. Using our competing hypotheses of public and private interest we begin to examine 
how and why the global FATF regime emerged and why and how it was introduced into South 
Africa. We ask if this introduction was as a result of voluntary ‘policy learning’ by South African 
authorities or was it a result of ‘coercive policy transfer’. This chapter provides some firm evidence 
which points towards the latter. We argue that this brings into question the primary objectives and 




regulations within the financial banking sector in South Africa. We find that from the early years 
of implementation there were serious challenges with the KCY/CDD component of the 
regulations. These logistical and structural challenges in implementing KYC/CDD stemmed from 
the tensions between the country’s socio-economic conditions and historical spatial distortions in 
which a large section of the population would potentially be excluded from accessing basic 
financial services as they were unable to meet the documentary requirements for KYC/CDD. 
Examining this issue of socio-economic exclusion, we argue that implementing KYC/CDD could 
frustrate social cohesions as some sectors of the population, especially those that were excluded 
by apartheid would again be excluded in the name of adhering to ‘international best practice 
standards’ of the FATF.  
In Chapter 7 we ask whether implementing the FATF’s business regulations has helped in 
any way to detect and prosecute money laundering and terrorist-financing activities in South 
Africa. Here we analyse, among others, statistics emanating from the FATF’s mutual evaluation 
reports of South Africa between 2003 and 2008. We conclude that in South Africa, the reporting 
of suspicious customer transactions by regulated businesses to the FIC has so far not registered the 
attainment of the global regime’s goals of detecting and combating crime. This chapter also shows 
that the ineffectiveness of reporting customer transactions is not a unique phenomenon to South 
Africa, but it also occurs in the UK and the US. This chapter provides recommendations for South 
Africa to review its reporting regime in a bid to try and improve its effectiveness in detecting crime 
and to relook at the role of South Africa’s FIU, the Financial Intelligence Centre.   
In our final chapter, we step back to explain why South Africa, and other developing 
countries,  continue to implement a regime that does not yet assist them to detect and combat crime, 
(as found in Chapter 7), and may further lead to socio-economic exclusion, (as found in Chapter 
6)  thus detrimentally affecting the country’s socio-economic development. We question the 
legitimacy of the global FATF regime from its inception to its lack of the anticipated outcomes 
that it claimed, still arguing that it emerged to further narrow interests. We conclude by 





Regulating money laundering in developing countries 
 
Introduction and overview  
 
 In 2001, South Africa passed the Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001 (FICA) in what 
seemed to be the country’s resolve to cement its legislative and regulatory architecture for tackling 
serious and organized profit-driven crimes. This was seven years into the country’s transition from 
apartheid to democracy. The general explanation for the purposes of this transformative piece of 
legislation was that it was meant to establish South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Unit, the 
Financial Intelligence Centre, and to regulate private businesses to detect and combat the 
laundering of proceeds of crime. FICA was later amended to accommodate measures to counter 
terrorism, following the passing of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist 
and Related Activities Act, Act 33 of 2004 (or POCDATARA).  
The latter was enacted following the 9/11 bombings of the World Trade Centre in the US 
and international pressure that was put on all countries to fight so-called ‘global terrorism’. The 
popular and well-articulated accounts by some academics and governments alike for the rationale 
behind the enactment of the FICA regulatory regime are two-fold-- combating crime and 
protecting regulated businesses from being misused by criminals for illegal purposes10. It was said 
that FICA was enacted to arm South Africa with the necessary legal, regulatory and institutional 
instruments to tackle organized crime and its underlying motives11-- the income and profits it 
generates for the successful ‘crimepreneurs’.  
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To further justify the regulatory regime, it was argued that South Africa’s organized crime 
had intensified following the country’s political transition from apartheid to democracy, the 
subsequent opening up of borders and economic liberalisation12. Under apartheid, Mark Shaw and 
Peter Gastrow, particularly, argued, South Africa was isolated from the rest of the world due to 
the UN-imposed political and economic sanctions13. When South Africa opened up socially, 
culturally and economically, local and international organised crime groups saw an opportunity 
for the establishment of a ‘new’ market and entered to take advantage of it14. It was further claimed 
that these criminals benefited from, among other things, weaker law-enforcement institutions and 
inadequate laws as institutions were undergoing an inevitable political transition pursuant on the 
new democratic constitutional dispensation15. The country’s transformation of the state apparatus 
had led to high employee turnover which, accompanied by weaker or outdated laws, created a 
fertile ground for sophisticated and organised crime groups16. These weaknesses, we are told, 
coupled by the country’s acclaimed and sophisticated banking and transportation networks, 
combined to create a thriving environment for organized crime in a globalised world17. Given all 
these factors, the FICA regime would seem to have been a welcome and necessary effort for South 
Africa’s fight against organised crime.    
The central strategy for dealing with organised crime in South Africa has generally 
followed international trends of criminalizing and targeting the ‘proceeds’ and ‘instrumentalities’ 
of crime. To effectively deal with organized crime, it has become common to regulate private 
businesses and professionals, both financial and non-financial, such as banks, insurance brokers, 
accountants and auditors, casinos, lawyers, estate agents and dealers in high value goods- such as 
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automobile/motor dealers, dealers in precious stones and metals and foreign exchange bureaus. It 
is generally argued that all these businesses and professionals are vulnerable to misuse by criminals 
to facilitate crime by laundering proceeds from their illegal activities. They should therefore be 
regulated to monitor such laundering activities and to report these to the newly established 
Financial Intelligence Units.  
Money laundering was made an offence in South Africa when the Drugs and Drug 
Trafficking Act (or Drugs Act) was passed in 1992. The Drugs Act criminalised the laundering of 
proceeds of sales of illicit drugs and other drug-related offences. This was, however, not enough 
since criminals laundered proceeds of all sorts of crime18. In 1996, all proceeds of crime were 
criminalised under the Proceeds of Crime Act (PCA) of 1996 as money laundering. Asset 
confiscation and forfeiture measures were now put in place, still following international trends, to 
enable the state to seize ‘proceeds’ and ‘instrumentalities’ of all crime. It is generally believed that 
asset confiscation and forfeiture laws assist in the combating of crime by removing the benefits of 
crime as assets of criminal provenance are taken by government19.  This, it is argued, may also 
have a deterrent effect as the primary motive for engaging in such criminal activities tends to be 
financial gain.  
In 1998 South Africa next passed the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA), 
consolidating and expanding South Africa’s asset confiscation and forfeiture mechanisms. In 
doing this, it incorporated and repealed the PCA. FICA was therefore passed in 2001 to 
complement these enactments of the 1990s by introducing a regulatory or administrative scheme 
that would enlist the assistance of the business community in detecting and combating organised 
crime by tracing the flow of its proceeds and confiscating them—thus depriving criminals of 
income that could be used to finance their somewhat lavish lifestyles and criminal ventures20. 
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There is however another less widely known explanation for the enactment of South Africa’s FICA 
business regulatory regime. This explanation is that South Africa, like many other countries, was 
responding to political and economic pressure mounted by some global bodies on other countries 
to enact the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) global regulatory standards against money 
laundering. These FATF standards eventually grew to encompass counter-terrorist financing 
measures following the 9/11 attacks in the US. When South Africa enacted FICA, it was complying 
with the global FATF regime of business regulation. This may have coincided with South Africa’s 
interests of tackling its perceived, or real, rise in its own organised crime phenomenon. The paucity 
of critical analysis of this political and economic pressure to adopt the FATF standards in 
developing countries appears, as shall be shown in this research, to deprive us of a deeper and 
fuller appreciation of the challenges and some seeming failures of the FICA regime in uncovering 
and combating money laundering.  
A number of scholars have written about the country’s money laundering measures aimed 
at combating organised crime21. There has also been some very important research conducted that 
focusses on the implementation of South Africa’s AML measures, particularly within the financial 
sector22. Some of this research was completed during the course of this project. This study owes a 
great debt to this research. It offers an alternative and critical narrative and perspective on the 
origins, emergence, justification, implementation and, to an extent, enforcement of South Africa’s 
anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) measures.   
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Louis de Koker’s23 work entitled Money Laundering in South Africa and Pieter Smit’s24 
work entitled Clean money, dirty source: turning organised crime against itself are some of the 
early scholarly works on the FICA regulatory regime in South Africa. Smit’s report was published 
just before FICA was introduced for deliberations in parliament. Smit advised in his work that 
while South Africa was not a member of the FATF and therefore not obliged to implement its 
standards, it was in “South Africa’s own interest to take note [of the FATF standards] and to 
consider implementing them seriously” as FATF members assessed the “risk associated with 
investing” based on a country’s compliance with the these standards25.  
De Koker’s paper26, published just after the passing of FICA, focussed more on mapping 
out South Africa’s legal, regulatory and institutional framework against organised crime and 
money laundering. In his study27 published in 2006 and entitled Money laundering control and 
suppression of financing of terrorism: some thoughts on the impact of customer due diligence 
measures on financial exclusion De Koker, however, started to reflect on the challenges 
encountered in the implementation of Know Your Customer or Customer Due Diligence 
(KYC/CDD) aspects of the FATF business regulation standards. He warned that if they were not 
implemented cautiously, they could lead to, among other things, “financial exclusion”28. The 
KYC/CDD aspects of the regulations set requirements for documentary proof of identity and 
residence as a basis for providing banking services such as basic bank accounts to customers. In a 
developing country such as South Africa, strict KYC/CDD requirements literally meant that 
millions of residents would be refused access to basic banking services. This is because many of 
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them reside in informal settlements where there are no residential postal mail services that would 
enable them to provide proof of address or residence documents.  
This theme of financial exclusion as an unintended and undesirable consequence of 
implementing the FATF standards in developing countries has been picked up and increasingly 
researched over the past few years by such organisations as the First Initiative (which 
commissioned a research study that was conducted by a Johannesburg-based organisation known 
as Genesis Analytics)29, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)30 and some academics, 
most prominently Prof. Louis De Koker and others. One of the key findings of this new research 
has been that implementing the KYC/CDD standards in developing countries leads to financial 
exclusion. This has led to a number of recommendations to guide developing countries on how 
they should follow a ‘risk-based’ approach in gradually implementing and complying with the 
FATF standards31. In following this (risk-based) approach they could minimize or possibly 
eliminate the unintended and undesirable consequences of these standards. What has, however, 
been significantly lacking in all the explanations has been the causal relationship or correlation 
between the manner in which developing countries adopted the FATF standards and their 
unintended and undesirable outcomes.   
The general pattern in trying to account for and explain away these unintended and 
undesirable consequences has been to shift the blame to developing countries for having failed to 
interpret and adapt the FATF standards to their socio-economic circumstances. The Genesis study, 
for instance, found that all the developing countries (Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan and 
South Africa) studied in its comparative research tended initially to enact stringent KCY/CDD 
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requirements than they eventually implemented.  According to this latter study, enacting stringent 
requirements was not necessary since the FATF standards were flexible for adaptation to varying 
socio-economic circumstances. It is important to quote this finding at some length:  
‘The study found that…the implementation of AML/CFT controls in the five 
countries appears to follow a similar development path. A country would set out to 
comply with the FATF standards by promulgating a law and regulations which are 
typically based on international templates rather than domestic circumstance (phase 
1). As the financial supervisor and financial institutions seek to implement these 
controls, they would come up against capacity constraints and obstacles which 
either exclude or discourage clients from using formal financial services, or which 
tend to make it difficult for financial institutions to serve certain categories of 
clients (phase 2). In phase 3 regulators respond to these pressures by applying two 
types of adjustments: (1) existing controls are recalibrated on a risk-sensitive basis, 
and/or (2) sequencing the implementation of controls across sectors, transaction or 
entities based on the available resource envelope. This development path may 
repeat itself as different aspects of the AML/CFT regime are developed32.’    
 This pattern found by the Genesis study on the implementation of the FATF standards in 
developing countries, which included South Africa, resonates closely with the pattern found by 
this author in South Africa33. However, the Genesis study does not explain why developing 
countries tend to adopt stricter and detrimental measures than those that are necessary given the 
claimed flexibility and adaptability of the standards. This omission (deliberate or not) of any 
explanation as to why developing countries would act so unreasonably and adopt regimes that 
could cause undesirable consequences to themselves is, at least, surprising. In this study we go 
further to offer an explanation for this implementation pattern on the part of developing countries. 
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We explain why these countries have tended to outdo themselves, to the extent of acting against 
their interests, in seeking to comply with the FATF standards.  We argue that it is, among other 
things, the manner in which the FATF standards were introduced in developing countries which 
led them to over-comply. It was also lack of proper guidelines from which these countries could 
learn how to design their local regimes in a manner that suited their circumstances.     
This study traces the emergence of the AML regulatory regime from its original source, 
the US in the 1970s, to its subsequent spread to international and global organisations and then to 
incorporation in developing countries. While this study focuses on South Africa, it is 
comparatively informed34 and, to an extent, seeks to generalize, where appropriate, some of the 
experiences of the incorporation and implementation of the regime by South Africa to other 
developing countries. A few scholars within the legal and international relations disciplines, 
particularly Reiner Hülsse35, Daniel Drezner36, Bosworth-Davis37, and Jason Sharman38 have done 
some admirable work in explaining the spread of the global FATF standards throughout the world 
and to developing countries. My own work is inspired by this literature, but goes deeper to enquire 
into whether or not the manner and timing of the diffusion of the global FATF standards may have 
had any causal influences in producing unintended consequences experienced by developing 
countries, particularly South Africa, in implementing the regime. 
While the South African authorities might have enacted the FICA regime in order to 
respond to their perceived organized crime problems, there is another missed perspective which 
may illuminate our understanding of the regime’s seeming failures to bring about or to achieve its 
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alleged goals of detecting crime. This study brings this hidden perspective to the fore to try and 
enlighten our understanding and appreciation of the regime. South Africa’s FICA regulatory 
measures were ostensibly aimed at, (as they may genuinely have been by the South African 
authorities,) detecting and combating money laundering were borrowed from models designed for 
developed countries through the FATF. Implemented as they were in South Africa, they 
encountered a litany of challenges that became clearer under the socio-economic conditions of 
developing countries. We show that instead of helping to combat crime as intended by FICA, the 
FATF standards of business regulation may instead, as observed by others, have the potential of 
exacerbating crime39 and aggravating other old socio-economic challenges, especially for societies 
in transition. Below, we give some background to the global AML regime and briefly discuss its 
main aspects and the global efforts of the FATF to foster compliance. 
 
Background and context 
An increasing number of academics are questioning whether the complex global regime 
developed in the late eighties allegedly to fight the laundering of the proceeds of crime was 
successful or not in its goals40. This ‘extremely expensive new regulatory order’41 emanates, at a 
global level, from the FATF, an organisation established in 1989 by the G7 countries following 
the passing of the UN Vienna Convention Against Illicit Trade in Drugs and Psychotropic 
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Substances of 1988 (Vienna Convention). The Vienna Convention introduced, for the first time at 
an international level, the criminalization of the laundering of proceeds of crime. The FATF was 
established, allegedly, to research and recommend measures to be undertaken by its members in 
ensuring that the financial system is not used for the purposes of laundering the proceeds of 
crime42. Despite having been established by a few countries, the FATF (has) sought to persuade 
all countries, even those that were not its members, to adopt and enact laws and business 
regulations and to promulgate new criminal justice institutions in order to achieve the main goals 
mentioned above.   
This global initiation of crime policy seems to follow along other transnational forms of 
public policy in areas such as the economy, development, and environmental policy. In the case of 
crime, the global policies are allegedly aimed mainly at combating the illegal commercial activities 
associated with criminal groups (and individuals). We say allegedly throughout this work because, 
as this research will show, the FATF standards were primarily established for reasons other than 
for the combating of crime and protection of the global financial system. Criminal groups, like 
legitimate commercial businesses, however, have been viewed as increasingly taking an advantage 
of the transnational opportunities engendered by ‘globalisation’ to expand their national and trans-
border activities43.  
Over the past two decades, countries have increasingly been pressured to shape the 
behaviour of their communities, including those of private businesses that are regulated for anti-
money laundering purposes. This, they attempt to achieve through legislative enactments and 
regulatory prescriptions that attempt to control profit-driven crimes. Research and debates in 
various countries in Europe and elsewhere have, however, raised doubts about the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the global FATF standards as a means for doing so44. On efficiency and 
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effectiveness, these debates have raised concerns about the costs and benefits of these standards. 
The ‘cost-benefit’ implications relate to the costs of implementing the regulations versus their 
benefits, or lack thereof, in combating crime and achieving their goal of preventing criminals from 
using legitimate businesses for illegal means or ends45. Some scholars have, for instance, argued 
that the costs seem to far outweigh their intended outcomes or benefits46. This has raised questions 
about the design and usefulness of these regulatory standards.  
 There are two tiers to this research; the global and the local. The global tier focuses on 
where these global standards originated, looking at their design, promotion, justification and 
diffusion throughout the world, especially beyond the countries that crafted them. The second tier 
is at a national level where they were adopted and incorporated. At this level, they are being 
implemented and expected to achieve their ostensible public interest goal of detecting and 
combating crime. The context is that of a developing country’s socio-economic conditions of 
underdevelopment, particularly those of South Africa47. 
The FATF standards were also developed at a global level with the alleged goals of 
facilitating cooperation among countries on various cross-border crime problems (initially drugs). 
It appears however that in this quest for cooperation and policy harmonization, very little, if any, 
attention was paid to the varying socio-economic conditions of the countries that would later be 
expected to implement them. Although the FATF standards have been claimed to be flexible and 
adaptable to varying socio-economic conditions, the manner in which they were extended may 
have cancelled out their flexibility. In their development, a one-size-fits-all approach was adopted. 
This started with the seeming deliberate exclusion of developing countries in the development of 
the standards by the FATF and its principals48. This process, as a result, tended to assume 
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homogeneity between developed and developing country socio-economic conditions, capacities 
and resources. In respect of developing countries, Martin Minogue has made some very important 
observations with regards to development agencies. He has observed that development agencies 
were inclined to proffer to developing countries models based on conditions and practices 
benchmarked on high income economies49.   
According to him, these development agencies then became frustrated when such models 
did not seem to work there, or received little more than ‘diplomatic lip service’50. Minogue then 
advises that three main issues should be taken into consideration in ‘transferring’ foreign generated 
policies to developing countries. He signals the importance of critically evaluating the weaknesses 
and implementation costs of these models when they are adopted and used in developing 
countries51. He further observed that these policies entail ‘a transformative conception of the 
state.’52 He acknowledges that while the state in developing countries is much in need of 
transformation, ‘there is very little agreement on what kind of state this should be, or how such a 
transformation could be achieved’53. He then asks in this regard whether the developing state is 
ready for a transformation to minimalism or whether one should ‘be trying to build up its 
capabilities, powers and resources in order that it may achieve the developmental objectives 
required by its own citizens’54. Third, he notes that developing countries are ‘distinctively’ 
different in economic, social and political terms from industrialised economies55.  
He highlights variations between national cultures within these economic, social and 
political differences56. He further notes that in transferring globally generated neo-liberal policy 
models to developing economies, there is double transfer. Firstly, a transfer from the developed to 
the developing states. Secondly, there is a transfer ‘across the public-private boundary’57. He notes 
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that many view both these types of transfers as culturally problematic and this may reflect the 
‘sociological naiveté’ of those who promote them as they ignore or conflict with social and 
political dynamics of public service organisations and systems in developing countries58.   
In this study we take into account this advice from Minogue and other scholars59 in trying 
to analyse the incorporation of the FATF standards in developing countries. We ask if they have 
really been implemented or have they received nothing more than ‘diplomatic lip service’, 
especially given the clearly coercive manner in which they were disseminated to these countries60. 
We note that the FATF standards, as discussed above, were primarily designed for implementation 
in developed countries and it may be important critically to evaluate their weaknesses and their 
cost implications when implementing them in later developing countries. We therefore try to 
ascertain whether the adoption of these standards has had any positive impact in the fight against 
crime in these countries or not, especially as evidence seems to suggest that they have not done so 
in the originating developed countries61.  
In the case of the double transfer, from developed to developing countries traverses the 
public-private boundaries of governance, what is traditionally the role of law enforcement 
(criminal investigations) is made a responsibility of regulated private businesses. Such enterprises 
must, on a daily basis, monitor the behaviour of their customers for the purposes of detecting crime. 
This happens at a cost that regulated businesses must recover from somewhere, typically from 
consumers62.  
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In conjunction with these considerations, one must also take into account the latest and 
most complex developments in global governance as articulated by various scholars63. For 
instance, it has been said that states are increasingly resorting to multilateral cooperation, propelled 
by globalization, in order to try and find mutually beneficial solutions to transnational socio-
economic issues64. As we acknowledge this resort to multilateralism, it is also important to 
acknowledge and consider that it is influenced by a plethora of conflicting interests and power 
disparities between the rich and powerful states, on the one hand, and the developing and less 
powerful ones, on the other65. This imbalance of forces normally finds expression in global policy 
outcomes where the interests of the powerful states tend to overshadow and take priority over those 
of smaller or less powerful states.  
For instance, evidence presented in this study casts some doubt on the public interest goals 
that have been popularly advanced as the motives for the establishment of the FATF and its 
standards. This evidence offers a plausible alternative explanation which suggests that the FATF 
standards did not merely emerge in order to assist in detecting crime and to protect the global 
financial system from abuse/misuse by criminals. They may appear, instead, to have emerged to 
“govern through crime”66 some narrower competition and regulatory arbitrage67 issues of concern 
for certain Western countries that instigated the diffusion of the FATF standards throughout the 
world. That the global FATF standards could also be claimed to assist in combating crime may 
simply have been a political convenience. The crime rhetoric that was used to promote the regime 
globally may therefore have been employed primarily to govern some pressing issues of 
competition and arbitrage.   
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While the global measures to fight money laundering emerged through the adoption of the 
Vienna Convention, they have primarily been led by the FATF, a transnational ‘non-state’ body. 
The FATF is widely acknowledged for having played a significant role in diffusing the AML 
regime and developing, in this process, a complex network of similar transnational non-treaty-
based or non-convention-based organisations. Under the leadership of the FATF, more than 170 
countries and territories are reported to have adopted the FATF standards of business regulation68. 
A question must be asked as to whether many countries adopted these standards as a result of 
voluntary policy learning or as a result of other forces that were at play69. It is readily 
understandable that FATF members adopted and implemented standards proposed by a body that 
they established in their interest. As to how and why the many countries who were not part of the 
original scheme converged and adopted the regime becomes interesting in light of the known 
coercive strategies that were deployed by the FATF in introducing the regime to non-member 
countries that were named, shamed and blacklisted as Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories 
(NCCTs) at the turn of the century70.  
It is important to ask and find answers to this question as it has implications for the 
legitimacy of the FATF, as an organization, and its standards, an issue that we discuss in depth in 
Chapter 8. We now turn to a description of the global AML regime, starting with the UN 
Convention Against Illicit Trade in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 before 
going on to introduce the FATF and the global efforts set in motion to try and spread the regime 
throughout the world. We then conclude this introduction by discussing the purposes of this study, 
the research questions pursued and the hypotheses that guide it.   
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United Nations ‘hard law’ 
The global regulation of money laundering started earnestly in 1988, with the signing of 
the Vienna Convention. While there are UN conventions that predate the Vienna Convention on 
illicit drugs, these did not focus on the proceeds of crime. These old UN conventions include the 
Opium Protocol of 1953, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and the Convention of 
Psychotropic Substances of 1971. Other conventions predate the UN. These include the Hague 
International Opium Convention of 1912, the League of Nation’s Second Opium Convention of 
1925, the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs of 1931, the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs of 
193671. All these international conventions attest to the fact that international illicit drugs 
trafficking and sales issues are old. In recent decades they have evolved to accommodate new 
prevention measures focusing on drug proceeds.  New strategies are embodied in the Vienna 
Convention which added the dynamic of attacking the proceeds made from drug-related crime. 
The preamble of the Vienna Convention noted the extent to which drug-related crime had 
assumed a transnational character, generating “large financial profits and wealth enabling 
transnational criminal organizations to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of 
government, legitimate commercial and financial business, and society at all its levels”72. One of 
the main methods of fighting drug related crime was, according to the Vienna Convention, “to 
deprive persons engaged in illicit traffic of proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby 
eliminate their main incentive for doing so”73. The articles of the Vienna Convention required 
signatories to make legislative enactments in their domestic laws which would enable cooperation 
between countries in the form of mutual legal assistance (MLAs) and extradition of offenders74. It 
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also required the participating countries to criminalise the laundering of the proceeds of drug- 
related crimes and to enact legislation to provide for confiscation or seizure of proceeds of drug-
related offences. It came into force in 1990 and is the foremost international convention on money 
laundering control75. As of 2004, 168 countries had signed and ratified the Vienna Convention76. 
After the Vienna Convention, there have been several other UN conventions, protocols and 
resolutions that have emphasized money laundering control as a primary strategy to tackle crime. 
These include: the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime of 2000 (or Palermo 
Convention)77, the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
of 1999 which entered into force in April 2002, and the UN Convention against Corruption of 
2003, which came to effect in 2005. The common factor in all these international conventions is 
that they emphasise the criminalization, confiscation and forfeiture of proceeds of crime as one of 
the primary methods of fighting transnational crime. They also make certain offences ‘predicate 
offences’ of money laundering. This means that money laundering is a secondary offence which 
derives from the occurrence of other primary offences78. Before it can take place, these other 
offences such as corruption, fraud, illicit dealing or trafficking in narcotic drugs or many other 
offences should have taken place79. Money laundering is therefore a derivative offence. It derives 
its occurrence or execution from other primary crimes. 
As a criminal offence, it may be committed by others than the principals or co-principals 
who engage in the primary offences. It also can be committed by those who assist or collude, 
intentionally or through omission or negligence, with these principals, to launder the proceeds of 
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crime80. Money-laundering is defined as a method through which criminals disguise the origins of 
illegally obtained capital or income in order to use or benefit from it without raising the suspicions 
of law enforcement81. Money laundering, therefore, basically refers to the various strategies and 
techniques82 that criminals use to disguise the criminal provenance of their assets in order to avoid 
prosecution and imprisonment for the offences from which they have derived them. With money 
laundering criminalized, benefits (financial or otherwise) accruing from the commission of any 
predicate offence become proceeds of crime. In order to avoid detection, the reasoning goes, 
perpetrators would disguise the origins of these benefits by laundering them. As noted by the 
United Kingdom Threats Assessment of 2003: 
“Since their [organised criminals] activities are driven either directly or indirectly 
by the desire to make money, most serious and organised criminals look for ways 
to secure and safeguard the proceeds of their criminal ventures… Money may be 
banked or spent on valuable assets or a lavish lifestyle. Much of it may be used to 
fund further criminal activities, financing illicit trades, paying off associates and 
increasing the power and influence of individual criminals and groups…and 
tackling money laundering is fundamental to combating serious and organised 
crime”83.  
The UN Conventions that are cited above emphasise the focus on money laundering control 
as central to preventing and detecting organized, revenue-generating, crimes. They further 
emphasise seizure and forfeiture of these proceeds as a disincentive for committing crime or as a 
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means of denying criminals and terrorists access to financial resources that enable them to flourish 
or execute their plans, respectively84. The conventions also highlight interstate cooperation through 
mutual legal assistance and extradition, information-sharing, and harmonisation of systems and 
laws in order to facilitate better cooperation between countries. Another aspect is the new 
regulatory role that the implementing jurisdictions require of private financial and non-financial 
designated businesses. The most co-ordinated and detailed global initiative is laid out in the form 
of the FATF standards known as the FATF 40+9 Recommendations, to which we now turn.   
 
Financial Action Task Force’s ‘soft law’ standards 
On the heels of the Vienna Convention of 1988, in 1989, the ‘G7’, which includes the heads 
of governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany, Italy and Canada, 
and the President of the European Commission, established an ad hoc non-statutorily-based body 
known as the FATF85. The formation of the FATF was motivated, according to the G7, on the 
realisation that ‘the drug problem’ had reached ‘devastating proportions’ and ‘demanded urgent 
and decisive actions, both on a national and international basis’86. The objectives of the FATF 
were to evaluate both national and international measures being used to fight the problem of 
drugs87. It would also advise on how such measures could be enhanced in order to contain the 
problem of drug-related offences88.  
The 40+9 Recommendations are a detailed list of standards that FATF members and other 
interested countries are encouraged to adopt and implement within their national jurisdictions. In 
1996, 2001 and 2003 these standards were revised, according to the FATF, to accommodate new 
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criminal trends and laundering techniques. Over these years money laundering grew to become a 
secondary offence of not only drugs, as was originally envisaged in the formation of the FATF and 
the Vienna Convention in the late 1980s. It has gone on to become a predicate offence of virtually 
all revenue-generating crime and also of terrorist financing. Consequently, the reach of the 
regulatory recommendations is no longer limited to banking institutions as was the case initially, 
but covers instead many other financial and non-financial institutions. At the outset, the FATF 
focused on the use of financial institutions alone, especially banks, as vehicles for money 
laundering. However growing numbers of studies on money laundering techniques and typologies 
produced evidence that many other institutions besides banks were being used or were potentially 
vulnerable for laundering crime proceeds. For instance, attorneys, estate agents and securities 
brokers, among others, were cited as being used by criminals to facilitate money laundering based 
on the services they offer. Criminals could use estate agents to buy property, therefore 
transforming dirty money, perhaps earned through illicit drug dealing, into real estate which could 
later be sold for cash, disguising any obvious connection to criminal provenance or underlying 
offences of the now apparently legitimate money from the sale.  
The FATF standards have therefore continuously been extended in reach. All countries 
have continuously been encouraged by the FATF to update their anti-money laundering systems. 
The FATF standards can be divided into five broad categories. The first is based on criminal law 
and encourages countries to criminalise the laundering of the proceeds of crime and the financing 
of terrorism. As noted earlier, the criminalisation of money laundering is based on a number of 
premises. It is reasoned that many criminals commit profit-driven crimes for purposes of financial 
gain. The major concern, therefore, has been that through laundering the proceeds of their illegal 
activities, criminals open the way to enjoy the fruits of their crimes and this should be prohibited 
through criminalising money laundering.  
Linked to this is a second category of the FATF standards, which requires countries to 




criminals to forfeit proceeds or instrumentalities of crime, with the aim of removing incentives or 
facilitators of crime.89. The reasoning behind asset confiscation and forfeiture is not only to send 
a message that ‘crime does not pay’, but also to prevent criminals from reinvesting in subsequent 
crimes90. Asset confiscation and forfeiture carries some crime-prevention undertones but the actual 
procedures are grounded in civil law. In response to asset forfeiture requirements, a number of 
countries have enacted laws and formed institutions known as asset recovery or forfeiture agencies. 
Contemporary laws that facilitate the confiscation of such assets have been of two types-- in 
personam and in rem procedures91.  
The in personam procedures require an individual to be charged with a criminal offence 
and proven guilty ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, before the criminally derived assets are 
confiscated92. The in rem procedures allow for assets to be forfeit if it can be established, on the 
balance of probabilities, that they are proceeds or were concerned in or instrumental in the 
commission of a crime93. On the one hand, the in personam confiscation procedures, according to 
Naylor, provide standard safeguards in relation to the presumption of innocence, the right to 
counsel, and protection against double jeopardy or disproportionate punishment94. On the other 
hand, the in rem procedures allow for assets to be frozen in advance of a trial and forfeit even 
where there is no criminal case or an accused person but only on determination that on the balance 
of probabilities such property was likely to be the proceeds of a crime or an instrumentality of an 
offence95. The in personam procedures therefore are conviction-based while the in rem are non-
conviction-based96.  
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The third and seemingly one of the most controversial categories of the FATF standards 
addresses the ways in which money laundering could be minimised or curbed. These 
recommendations require countries to enact enabling legislation and regimes that regulate various 
types of private businesses. The businesses are regulated on the basis that they are vulnerable to 
misuse by criminals to launder crime proceeds. At the moment we can only offer, as an illustration, 
a preliminary summary of the regulatory regime on businesses as a thorough discussion and 
analysis follows in Chapters 4, 6 and 7. The business regulatory standards of the FATF require 
countries to regulate, primarily, banks but also other businesses to implement what is known as 
‘customer due diligence’ (CDD), which is also popularly known as “Know Your Customer” 
(KYC). KYC/CDD requires regulated businesses to profile their customers.  
This profiling of customers is believed to enable regulated businesses to monitor and report 
customer transactions, which they believe to be suspicious or unusual, to law enforcement 
authorities-- particularly to the so called Financial Intelligence Units. KYC/CDD requirements 
further demand that regulated businesses train their employees on how to fulfil their regulatory 
duties of money laundering control and to keep records of transactions and other customer 
information for extended mandatory periods of time. The institutions are also required to develop 
internal anti-money laundering control measures and to appoint what is referred to as Anti-Money 
Laundering Reporting Officers (AMLROs), who are basically compliance officers that deal with 
anti-money laundering compliance issues97. These regulatory requirements, in some countries, are 
accompanied by tough criminal sanctions in the form of fines and custodial sentences against 
employees who fail to perform their AML duties. These criminal sanctions make money 
laundering not only an offence that is committed by criminals when they launder their proceeds, 
but also an offence that can, as discussed above, be committed through complicity by regulated 
businesses or their employees when they fail to perform their regulatory duties. 
                                                                
97  See recommendations 4-25 of FATF. 2003. The Forty Recommendations: incorporating the amendments of 24 




 The fourth broad set of the FATF standards require countries to make legislative provisions 
for the establishment of what is referred to as Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)98. FIUs are new 
state institutions in the history of criminal justice and are established by governments to receive, 
analyse and disseminate financial information or intelligence that can be used to detect or combat 
money laundering99. At the time of writing, there were about 120 countries that had established 
FIUs based on the recommendations of the FATF100. In support of this initiative, the World Bank 
and the IMF, together with the FATF, have provided technical assistance to many countries in 
establishing their FIUs101. FIUs are custodians of very sensitive personal financial information 
reported or acquired by them from the regulated businesses. They disseminate this information to 
designated law enforcement agencies (LEAs). It is held that these reports help LEAs to investigate 
and solve crime. We cover this aspect of the anti-money laundering regime in Chapter 7 below.  
While these FIUs have existed for some time now, there is not much scholarly work on 
them. Evaluations conducted by the IMF and the World Bank have generally concentrated on 
whether or not countries have established them, with a view of encouraging them to102. More about 
how they operate, their powers and the implementation challenges, effectiveness and efficiency 
still beckons for study by scholars. A non-statutory inter-governmental body known as the Egmont 
Group of Financial Intelligence Units was established in 1995103. The Egmont Group’s main goal 
has been ‘to create a global network by promoting international cooperation between FIUs’104. It 
is the first international body to have been established directly as a consequence of the operational 
work of the FATF. The Egmont Group members are the FIUs of countries105.  
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  The final broad category of the FATF standards requires governments to enact legislation 
that will enable and encourage transnational cooperation between governments. The reasoning 
here is that many organised crime groups have taken advantage of globalisation and, as a result, 
operate transnationally. This, some argue, has enabled criminals to operate advantageously and 
with limited restriction, especially where law enforcement authorities are limited by jurisdictional 
boundaries. As a result, the FATF recommended that countries should harmonise their crime 
fighting laws, policies and systems to facilitate cooperation. This had to be done through what is 
referred to as mutual legal assistance (with regard to extra-territorial sharing of crime information 
and collection of evidence) and extradition treaties (which involve the extraterritorial exchange of 
suspects/accused persons). Issues of mutual legal assistance and extradition have their own 
complicated judicial procedures which must be followed106. As a result of these FATF 
recommendations and the UN conventions on crime, many states have had to establish and/or 
update their mutual legal agreements and extradition treaties. However the extent to which they 
have done that and the extent to which such assistance mechanisms are utilised in transnational 
crime matters is a research topic in its own right and is beyond the remit of this study.   
  The FATF standards, as already noted, are widely regarded as international ‘best practice’ 
standards. They have received support from a variety of international organisations such as the 
World Bank, the IMF, the UN, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, among others. All 
these organisations have continuously encouraged the national adoption and implementation of the 
FATF standards. The FATF standards and work have also led to the creation of a network of 
organisations whose primary objectives are to fight crime at a transnational level. These include, 
as discussed above, such groups as the Egmont Group, the Wolfsburg Group and several FATF 
style regional bodies (known as FSRBs). The Wolfsburg Group was formed in 2000 through an 
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association of 12 global banks107. The aims of the Wolfsburg Group are “to develop financial 
services industry standards…for Know Your Customer, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter 
Terrorist Financing policies”108. The FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) are mainly made up 
of countries which are not full members of the FATF109. There are currently eight FSRBs110 which 
include more than 140 countries as members111.  
All member-states of the FATF who are geographically located in the regional jurisdictions 
of the FSRBs concerned are also members of these regional bodies (FSRBs)112. The FSRBs and 
other international organisations can hold different kinds of membership status within the FATF; 
some are ‘associate members’ and some ‘observer members’113. For instance, South Africa is both 
a member of the FATF and of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group 
(ESAAMLG). Four FSRBs, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Council of 
Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures 
(MONEYVAL), Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America 
(GAFISUD) and the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENEFATF) 
are ‘associate members’ of the FATF.  
The other remaining FSRBs, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), 
Eurasian Group (EAG), Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group 
(ESAAMLG), and the Inter-governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in Africa 
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(GIABA) are ‘observer members’. There are several other international organisations114 which are 
‘observer members’ such as the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European 
Central Bank, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The FATF regards the FSBRs as 
partners who play ‘important leadership roles in their respective regions’ and who ‘constitute a 
global network against money laundering and terrorist financing’115. According to the FATF, the 
FSRBs consist of member countries that have committed themselves to implementing the 40+9 
Recommendations and have agreed to undergo ‘mutual evaluations’ (see discussion later) of their 
AML/CFT systems116.   
With this brief background, it is clear that a complex global network and a set of both 
public and private policy initiatives presently exist to fight various transnational crimes. It focuses 
on a central strategy of attacking the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. Below we look at 
attempts to implement these policies by the UN and the FATF. In doing this we also look at some 
critiques of this complex global system.     
 
Some global implementation efforts and debates  
As discussed above, the UN has been responsible for the development of a number of 
conventions and protocols. On the other hand the FATF has sought to articulate these through its 
recommendations. In so doing, it has added the business regulatory aspects and, later, the 
establishment of FIUs. We turn now to introduce the attempts to implement these measures. One 
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of the UN’s main role here has been the development of international law through conventions 
which member-states ratify or accede to voluntarily. They then become legally bound to 
implement and comply with these conventions. However, member-states may choose to not sign 
or ratify these conventions and protocols. This would leave them with no obligation to implement 
or comply. Even after signing such conventions, member-states can still withdraw their 
participation by notifying the United Nations of such withdrawal.  
Through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (hereafter UNODC), the UN has 
played a major role in promoting the ratification of the UN conventions and protocols through 
conferences, workshops and other means117. To encourage implementation, the UN has provided 
technical assistance to the signatory member-states on issues of legislative drafting and in updating 
and reviewing the implementation of such conventions. Other efforts of UNODC have included 
the training for law enforcement officials, producing and providing manuals and guidelines, 
encouraging signatory members to conduct self-assessments and to submit reports on their 
implementation efforts, initiating and running capacity building programs in regions that need 
assistance, and conducting research118. According to the UN there are 140 and 108 member-states 
that have, respectively, signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption, 139 have 
ratified the Convention on Transnational Organised Crime, and 108 have ratified the Vienna 
Convention on Drugs119.  
The FATF (which is central to this study), on the other hand, has used some innovative and 
controversial means to drive implementation of its recommendations. But before we look at them, 
we look at the work that is done by the FATF as such work seems to be linked to the nature of its 
implementation efforts. There are three main activities that the FATF has been involved in besides 
formulating and revising the recommendations. The first is what the FATF refers to as ‘mutual 
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evaluation’. This is a peer review mechanism which enables the FATF to ‘assess the overall 
effectiveness of AML/CFT systems’ of its members, evaluating whether the ‘necessary laws, 
regulations or other measures required are in force and effect’120. To do this, it follows a 
methodology known as the FATF’s AML/CFT Methodology of 2004. This methodology is also 
used by the FSRBs to evaluate the members in their regions121. According to the FATF mutual 
evaluations are conducted by a team of ‘four to six selected experts in the legal, financial and law 
enforcement fields from other member governments, with up to two members of the FATF 
Secretariat’ and takes approximately ten months to a year to complete 122. After an evaluation, a 
report is compiled. These reports, among other things, highlight areas for improvement123. They 
are also published after their formal adoption by the FATF plenary meetings, which are the 
decision-making forum of the 36 full-time members of the FATF124.  
 A considerable number of mutual evaluations are also conducted or led by the World Bank 
and the IMF, in collaboration with the FATF and the FSRBs, using the FATF’s AML/CFT 
Methodology of 2004125. Some scholars argue that this mutual evaluation process puts considerable 
moral and political pressure on governments that are in non-compliance with the FATF 
standards126. The World Bank and IMF are also known to be using the outcomes of these mutual 
evaluations as a criterion of conditionality in extending their loans and financial assistance to their 
clients127. The clients of these institutions have largely been developing countries. Such countries 
are therefore being pressurised to implement these standards, whether or not they are signatories, 
as they have now been made part of good governance measures128. 
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 Another key activity of the FATF is its review of the techniques, trends and typologies of 
money laundering and development of suggested ways of addressing them. This activity has 
culminated in a number of reports and the updating of its recommendations based on their findings. 
At the time of this writing, there were more than 16 typologies reports that had been published on 
a yearly basis since 1995 to be used in enhancing FATF standards in keeping with new crime 
trends. These reports are compiled by experts who sit on or are commissioned by the FATF’s 
Working Group on Typologies (WGTYP).    
The third and most controversial work of the FATF is that on Non-Cooperating Countries 
and Territories (NCCT) which it started in year 2000. The NCCTs were those countries and 
territories the FATF assessed between 2000 and 2003 and judged not to meet its standards. 
Between 2000 and 2003, the FATF published a blacklist of 23 such countries129. These countries 
were removed from the list once they implemented or made efforts to comply with its 
recommendations. There was an annual review process to determine which countries and 
territories had made progress in complying130. By 2007, no countries or territories remained on the 
FATF blacklist, indicating that all the blacklisted countries had made progress in implementing 
the FATF standards131.  However, the FATF continuously monitors countries and publishes 
warnings on those it deems to be failing to meet its standards. Some such warnings were published 
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in its February 2008 Public Statement where several countries including Iran, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Cyprus, and Sao Tome and Principe were named132.  
The NCCT blacklists, which were basically a ‘naming and shaming’ tool, raised issues of 
legitimacy and accountability concerning the FATF. Some have viewed the NCCT process as 
arbitrary and illegitimate since it targeted countries that were not members of the FATF133.  
Bosworth-Davis134 has described the FATF as a ‘gentleman’s club’ questioning its legitimacy as 
a body with no international convention-based status, not enshrined in statute, and with an 
‘exclusive’ and therefore non-democratic membership. To the extent this is true, it means that the 
FATF is a non-legally mandated body under international law. He further notes that the FATF’s 
staff is non-elected and made up solely of career civil servants from its member states, with no 
representatives from the regulated businesses affected by its recommendations.  On the same issues 
of legitimacy, Mitsilegas points out that one particularly controversial issue about the FATF’s and 
its work is that it 
“...represents the interests of the developed world and thus its policies may fail to 
take into account the specific needs of countries outside this club. The unilateral 
imposition and evaluation of standards by an ad hoc body differs significantly from 
negotiations and agreement of sovereign states within the auspices of an 
international organisation…FATF standards are not only linked with the formation 
of economic policy, but have major implications for the receiving countries’ legal 
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systems, which have to implement guidelines that may still be controversial in the 
exporting countries.” 135 
FATF’s work on NCCTs has culminated in various theories regarding its strategies to 
ensure compliance, especially with countries which were not its members. Some academics have 
argued that the blacklisted countries had not complied with the FATF standards voluntarily, but 
only subsequently through coercive means which involved naming and shaming and sometimes 
threats of economic sanctions136. Blacklisted countries were forced to comply with this externally 
imposed regime in order to regain their original status137. For instance, in its 2006 report on NCCTs 
the FATF removed two countries that were still on its blacklist, Nauru and Nigeria, and expressed 
satisfaction with their progress138. Nauru had abolished its 400 shell banks, which were viewed as 
a ‘money laundering risk’ by the FATF and Nigeria had implemented the regulatory reforms139. 
The NCCT reports carried some serious warnings which were widely publicised in the 
media and on the FATF’s internet website detailing alleged weaknesses the FATF’s assessments 
had identified within the blacklisted countries. Proposals were also advanced on what they needed 
to do to address these shortcomings. For instance, in its report, the FATF would list the countries 
that were non-compliant and then issued a warning. One of the alerts read as follows: 
“The FATF calls on its members to update their advisories requesting that their 
financial institutions give special attention to businesses and transactions with 
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persons, including companies and financial institutions, in those countries or 
territories identified in the report as being non-cooperative”140.  
Further, it warned the blacklisted countries, 
“Should those countries or territories identified as non-cooperative maintain their 
detrimental rules and practices despite having been encouraged to make certain 
reforms, FATF members would need to consider the adoption of counter-measures 
against such jurisdictions”141.  
These apparent threats have been backed by the G7 countries142, which issued similar warnings 
backing the FATF143. The Finance Ministers of the G7, a forum representing some of the richest 
countries in the world, issued a warning as follows: 
“We are prepared to act together when required and appropriate to implement 
coordinated countermeasures against those NCCTs that do not take steps to reform 
their systems appropriately, including the possibility to condition or restrict 
financial transactions with those jurisdictions”144.  
While these threats have attracted criticisms from the countries targeted and from some 
academics, the NCCT process has been acknowledged as having gone a long way in encouraging 
the world-wide adoption of the FATF standards. The expansion of AML/CTF standards 
throughout the globe through the FATF and the FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs), policy and 
strategy buy-in and collaboration from the World Bank and the IMF, the UN, the development of 
inter-governmental cooperative networks like the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, 
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and the development of private cooperative networks like the Wolfsburg Group of Financial 
Institutions, has produced a complex network of global governance in the fight against 
transnational organised crime. While issues of legitimacy raised by Bosworth-Davis145 and 
Mitsilegas146 suggest some of the potential shortfalls of the FATF regime, there appear to be signs 
that the FATF processes are slowly becoming more inclusive of other countries through the 
establishment of FSRBs which cover all the world regions.  
 Perhaps the critics of the FATF may need to pause and consider whether the strategies of 
blacklisting NCCTs were entirely reprehensible when they could achieve such enormous policy 
convergence among nation-states. It is highly questionable whether such convergence could 
otherwise have been achieved by means of the ‘soft’ voluntarism approach of UNs’ ‘hard law’. In 
any case, an argument may be advanced that what the FATF did was merely to encourage countries 
to adhere to the UN ‘hard law’ measures, which many of them had already signed up to and ratified 
when they acceded to the Vienna Convention. What the FATF, perhaps, did was simply to collect 
information and to expose those countries that had not put systems in place to support their UN 
obligations. In other words, the FATF ‘soft law’ measures could be seen as having complemented 
UN ‘hard law’ measures.  
Slaughter147 has argued that ‘government networks’ herald a new and attractive form of 
global governance by enhancing the ability of states to work together to address common problems 
without the centralised bureaucracy of formal international institutions. However, the FATF 
system may still be accused of being insufficiently democratic and insufficiently expert by not 
having democratic participation and expertise from all sectors affected by its regulations, 
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respectively, i.e. developing countries and private sector institutions within its working groups that 
formulate its standards. In Chapter 8, we examine issues of legitimisation in this regards.  
An important issue of our research is the extent to which the global anti-money laundering 
policies take cognisance of the varied socio-economic conditions of different nation-sates. Recall 
Vaslamis Mitsilegas’s message: “FATF standards are not only linked with the formation of 
economic policy, but have major implications for the receiving countries’ legal systems.”148 The 
global AML/CTF standards seem to expect nation-states to adopt similar policies in rather 
dissimilar socio-economic conditions without regard for the implications that such policies may 
have. In some European countries, a growing number of researchers have attested to the lack of 
effectiveness of the FATF standards in combating crime149. They argue that these standards may 
have increased the cost of doing business and have also become very intrusive on civil liberties150. 
The shortcomings of these standards, having been observed in well-to-do countries like Germany, 
Singapore and Italy beckon scholars to examine their practical weaknesses and the costs that 
implementation imposes. Both problems may be amplified amidst socio-economic conditions of 
developing countries.  
It should be clarified that it is not the intention of this research to suggest that the global 
FATF standards should not be implemented in some countries because they are poor. The aim is 
instead to look at those developing countries that are implementing them, in this case South Africa, 
and to query whether any shortcomings in the design and implementation mechanisms could be 
corrected, minimised or better managed. It is also to examine whether the alleged noble intentions 
and possible contribution of these standards could be adjusted to enhance the interests of South 
Africans.  
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Purpose of the Study 
The goals and objectives of this study, therefore, include an examination of: (a) the 
emergence, (b) justifications and (c) implementation of the FATF regulatory standards against 
money laundering in South Africa. The objectives deriving from these goals are as follows:  
1. An historical examination of the emergence and justification of the anti-money laundering 
business regulations of the FATF both at a global and national level (South Africa). 
2. A critical examination of South Africa’s experiences with the implementation of anti-
money laundering regulations.  
3. An analysis of whether or not developing countries can fully comply with the global AML 
regime as developed by the FATF without compromising some of their developmental 
goals and needs. 
 
Research questions 
The research questions arising from the above objectives are as follows; 
 Objective 1 is addressed by the questions: (a) Why and how did the global regulatory 
regime against money laundering emerge? (b) How and why was this regime introduced 
and legitimated in South Africa? 
 Objective 2 is addressed by the following questions; (a) Have the regulations against 
money laundering been implemented, has compliance been sought and enforced in South 
Africa and if so, how? (b) In the implementation of these regulations what have been the 
successes, challenges and failures? 
 Objective 3 is addressed by the following question; (a) What have been the unintended 
consequences of these global AML regulations in South Africa? (b) Should South Africa 






This is the study of regulation at both global and domestic levels. As a result of this, the 
theories of regulation were used to develop two competing hypotheses during the preliminary 
phases of this project in order to guide data collection and analysis151. The following two main 
competing hypotheses were developed using the ‘public interest’ and the ‘private interest’ theories 
of regulation152. The main public interest hypothesis reads as follows: 
The global FATF standards emerged to serve public interest goals of detecting and 
combating crime and to protect the interconnected global financial system from being 
misused for illicit purposes. Where these standards are implemented, they may be expected, 
if successful, to start to show positive signs of detecting crime and thus contribute in 
protecting and preserving the integrity of the global financial system.  
A competing hypothesis which is based on the private interest theories of regulation is as follows: 
The global FATF standards did not emerge primarily to detect and combat crime, but 
rather to serve some narrow interest including and especially those of Western countries 
that instigated the formation of the FATF and its standards. The implementation of these 
standards may or may not result in an effective and efficient regime that positively 
contributes to the achievement of the alleged public interest goals of detecting or 
combating crime and protecting the stability of the global financial system as that is not 
their primary purpose. 
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Delimitations and limitations of the study 
This is not a study of organised crime, either globally or in South Africa, but rather of 
responses to it. It is a study of the means to control it, or rather its regulation, through the business 
regulatory strategies of the FATF. We do not claim to exhaustively interrogate the global AML 
policies for they are broad. We focus specifically instead on the emergence and incorporation of 
these business regulation strategies and the experiences with their implementation in South Africa. 
Although they emerged as soft-law standards, they have found their way into both international 
hard law conventions and protocols and into the legal, regulatory and institutional framework of 



















FATF regulations as crime prevention and risk regulation strategies 
 
Introduction  
The focus on money laundering and the financing of terrorism in many countries and at a 
global level has expanded on the traditional methods of combating crime. Over the past two 
decades, new methods focusing on ‘regulation’ have evolved, regulating not criminals directly, 
but rather seeking to shape their behaviour through ‘hardening their targets’ and ‘controlling the 
facilitators’ of crime. During this period, private institutions and professionals have begun to be 
co-opted in order to enlist their assistance in controlling crime when conducting business with their 
customers. These parties include banks, insurance companies, money transmitters, brokers, 
lawyers, accountants, casinos, estate agents and dealers in high value goods such as vehicles, 
jewellers and fine art dealers.  
This chapter focuses on two main issues; one, the emergence and two, the contents of this 
important type of regulation on businesses (and professionals). The introductory chapter has 
already given some background regarding this regime and its strategies of fighting crime by 
restricting resource flows both by deterring the ‘laundering’ of dirty money into clean  and 
legitimate resources and by criminalising this and by seizing crime proceeds and instrumentalities. 
These business regulatory systems also seek assistance in uncovering crime, especially serious 
organised crime and terrorism, through the traces of money flows.  This chapter aims critically to 
examine the substantive contents, the ideological influences and values behind such content or 
form of regulation. Secondly, we aim critically to examine the reasons advanced for the emergence 
of this type of regulation. We do this by probing the reasons advanced by particularly the FATF, 
at a global level. In doing these two tasks, this chapter is divided into two sections. In the first 




money laundering, we argue that these standards are influenced by two basic techniques. These 
are; one, the ‘situational crime prevention’ technique and; two, the risk management approach to 
combating crime. Both these techniques are interlinked and have both advantages and shortfalls in 
the combating of crime, especially for money laundering and for the financing of terrorism.  
We argue, therefore, that grounding the design of the global FATF standards on these 
techniques may be ill-advised and may compromise the goals and the ends sought by the regime. 
This means that the regime, theoretically, may struggle to achieve its alleged goals. It may instead 
exacerbate the problems it seeks to curtail. However, before indulging in this analysis, we start 
first by describing at a conceptual level the regime itself -- the rules and institutions it has set in 
place. Then, we move on to probe the contents of these FATF standards, particularly their goals 
and rationales.     
 
Anti-money laundering: contextualizing the regulations 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the business regulatory measures of the FATF are just 
one aspect of a broader regime developed at a global level with the aim of fighting organized crime 
at national and transnational levels. The global appearance of these regulations is generally traced 
from the United Nations’ Vienna Convention against Trade in Illicit Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988153, hereinafter called the Vienna Convention. The Vienna Convention, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, advocated the criminalization of proceeds of drug-related 
crimes, their confiscation and forfeiture. This technique of attacking the proceeds of crime was 
followed by the establishment of the FATF by the Group of 7 countries in 1989154.  In this chapter 
we argue that this technique of dealing with crime through seizing and forfeiting its proceeds is 
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premised on ‘situational crime prevention’ and the ‘risk management’ techniques of crime 
combating.  
The global AML standards are very broad and cut across various scholarly disciplines. This 
includes aspects premised on criminal law, civil law, international cooperation (international law 
and international relations), governance, business regulation and risk management. The main, but 
not exclusive, focus of this work is on the business regulatory aspects. The regulatory aspects of 
these standards, as shall be shown below, require countries to regulate private businesses to assist 
in the combating or detection of crime. We have already briefly discussed the five key components 
of the global regime against money laundering and terrorist financing as promoted by the FATF 
in Chapter 1.The first main component of the global AML policies is based on criminal law and 
requires countries to criminalise the laundering of proceeds of crime.  
The second component relates to asset forfeiture of ‘proceeds’ and ‘instrumentalities’ of 
crime155. They complement the criminal law aspects that criminalise proceeds of crime by 
prompting for legal mechanisms through which proceeds and instrumentalities of crime should be 
forfeit. A third component includes a series of requirements for countries to promulgate laws that 
would facilitate international cooperation in criminal matters, especially those relating to 
transnational organised crime, terrorism, corruption and money laundering156. This takes the form 
of what is referred to as ‘mutual legal assistance’ and ‘extradition’ treaties157.  
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 While the first three components of the global regime emanate from the Vienna Convention 
of 1988, the last two components were developed by the FATF, borrowing mainly from the US158. 
They involve, fourth, the creation of new criminal justice/intelligence organizations/ regulatory or 
administrative bodies known as the Financial Intelligence Units (or FIUs) by states159. The last 
component requires, fifth, governments to regulate some private businesses to perform various 
anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism roles. These include; the reporting of 
‘suspicious’, ‘unusual’ and ‘cross-border’ and ‘threshold’ transactions of customers by regulated 
businesses to FIUs, the training of staff of regulated businesses to identify and report such 
transactions, CDD/KYC, record keeping of customer identification, proof of residence and 
transaction data for extended periods of time and to appoint senior staff as Anti-Money Laundering 
Reporting/Compliance Officers160. We discuss these business regulatory measures in greater detail 
below.  
Before doing so, we begin by examining the two main goals of these regulations and their 
justification by the FATF. The first goal is the one of combating or controlling crime by means of, 
we suggest, situational crime prevention techniques of regulating private businesses.  The second 
goal is aimed at combating the misuse of businesses by criminals to preserve prudential soundness. 
This second leads to a risk management rationale for the regulations.  
 
Combating crime: situational crime prevention theory 
Crime prevention measures have from time to time embraced various strategies. They have, 
among others, included the rehabilitation of convicted offenders and prevention of crime through 
social programmes aimed at curing the social causes of crime. However other measures aim to 
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deter offending absolutely through heavy sentences or to decriminalise the behaviour completely. 
Still others seek to prevent crime by reducing the opportunities to commit it by manipulating the 
situational environment in ways that make offending less possible. Anti-money laundering policies 
have, we suggest, embraced this last strategy of crime detection and prevention. They highlight 
the situational settings and seek to prevent crime by manipulating them.  
Within criminology, most academic work on situational crime prevention has generally 
focused on the so-called ‘street’ or property crimes such as robbery161, theft/shoplifting162, 
vandalism163 and burglary164. Much of the work has focused on architectural design, seeking to 
design out crime or to make it difficult or more risky to commit crime. Situational crime prevention 
basically concentrates on two main aspects; (i) reducing the opportunities for offending through 
making crime more difficult or increasing the chances of an offender being caught and (ii) denying 
criminals the benefits of committing a crime165. This involves reducing opportunities for crime 
and improving security measures (or what is referred to as ‘target hardening’ or ‘controlling 
facilitators’ of crime) so that criminals find it difficult or more risky to commit crime166. Through 
more stringent security measures, it also assumes that criminals are more likely to get caught when 
they commit a crime167.  
Situational crime prevention is premised on two main theories: the rational choice theory 
and the routine activities theory168.  The routine-activities theory presumes that for a crime to occur 
there has to be ‘a likely offender, a suitable target and the absence of capable guardians’169. The 
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rational choice theory posits that offenders take reasoned decisions to commit crime based on 
anticipated gains and costs170. These include the risks of being caught, the effort they have to put 
in to committing the crime, and also the assessment of whether or not the utility of the anticipated 
reward/benefit is worth the risk they would take to commit that crime171. Situational crime 
prevention, unlike traditional crime prevention approaches which focus on curing the social causes 
of crime, has been seen as very practical to implement, with ‘more prospects of shorter term and 
measurable success’172. However, this may not always be the case, especially applied to money 
laundering (see discussion below).  
It is important to recap the justifications given by particularly the FATF in promoting the 
imposition of the regulatory regime on private businesses. The first is that by regulating private 
businesses to perform a plethora of regulatory tasks, as discussed below, this will assist law 
enforcement agencies in detecting money laundering and its predicate crimes173. This has been 
based on the reasoning and evidence that criminals do indeed use products like bank accounts for 
criminal ends174. For instance, they do transfer money between each other and to various 
jurisdictions. They also purchase goods and services using money earned from criminal activities. 
There are input costs to criminal activities and as a result of this, it is plausible that profit-driven 
criminals do often reinvest their criminal proceeds to committing more crimes in trying to 
maximise their gains. As a result these business regulatory measures are premised on the view that 
some vulnerable businesses become ‘facilitators’ of crime or ‘targets’ of criminals for money 
laundering purposes. The regulated businesses, in the context of situational crime prevention, 
could therefore be viewed in two ways; (i) as ‘targets’ and/or (ii) as ‘facilitators’ of money 
laundering, and therefore its predicate crimes.  
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If regulated businesses are viewed as ‘targets’, this connotes a view of them as (possible) 
victims of crime. On the face of it there might seem to be a contradiction. This is because these 
businesses offer a variety of services to their customers and stand to benefit through the charges 
and service fees they impose. Instead of becoming victims of crime, the opposite holds as they 
benefit through transaction fees from such criminal transactions. As a result, regulated businesses 
could be viewed not as victims, but rather as benefiting ‘facilitators’ of crime. They may facilitate 
crime (perhaps unintentionally) by providing convenient services for criminals to launder their 
crime proceeds or to transact with each other.   
In this nexus, regulated businesses become the targets of criminals, not necessarily as 
victims of crime, but as (unknowing or unsuspecting) facilitators of crime. For the sake of clarity, 
we give an example of this. Mr. A based in London pays for a consignment of drugs from Mr. B 
in Colombia, South America. He instructs his bank (Bank A) in London to transfer £10,000 to the 
bank account (in Bank B) of Mr. B in Colombia. Bank A in London does as instructed and transfers 
that amount to Bank B. Bank A charges its fees for that transaction, and Mr. B receives his money 
in Colombia. Bank B in turn charges him for the service. Both these banks would not know that 
their customers were exchanging drug-money through that transaction. They would not even be 
interested, as long as they receive their charges or transaction/service fees. However, both Mr. A 
and Mr. B have easily and conveniently concluded a criminal transaction.   
Both these banks have not lost anything, but have instead gained in transaction fees for the 
use of their services by both these criminal customers. However they have just (unknowingly) 
facilitated a criminal transaction. We return to this example below to give a picture of what is 
expected of these banks with the FATF business regulations in place in both these countries. There 
is another explanation of how businesses may become ‘victims’ of money laundering activities. 
This explanation postulates that regulated businesses may be exposed to a variety of ‘risks’ which 
arise from their ex post association with criminal activities. These ‘risks’, which make regulated 




maintaining the prudential soundness of financial institutions. These ‘risks’ are analysed from the 
perspective of risk management which is discussed below.  
The situational crime prevention technique upon which the FATF business regulatory 
standards are based, could therefore be viewed as a form of ‘target hardening’ or as a means of 
‘controlling facilitators’ of crime175. Both ‘target hardening’ and ‘controlling facilitators’ are two 
of the many techniques advocated by the proponents of situational crime prevention.  These 
techniques, it is believed, serve to reduce opportunities for crime to occur176. It is important at this 
point to summarize the main anti-money laundering business regulatory requirements as proposed 
by the FATF and implemented in many countries. These requirements were discussed in the 
previous chapter and in Chapter 4 and as a result they are but briefly outlined here. The primary 
requirements177 are that the affected businesses must put in place:  
 Customer Due Diligence (CDD) or Know Your Customers (KYC) measures and 
procedures of identifying and verifying residential addresses of customers;   
 internal systems, procedures, policies and guidelines to monitor for signs of money 
laundering and appoint responsible employees to execute duties in relation to such 
internal systems; 
 training programmes for employees to implement and comply with AML/CTF 
requirements; 
 Record keeping mechanisms of ‘know your customer’ information and customer 
transactions for specified periods of time, normally five years in many jurisdictions; 
and  
 Transaction-reporting mechanisms (i.e. report to the FIUs ‘suspicious’ or ‘unusual’, 
and cross-border and local transactions that exceed threshold amounts as set out in 
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national regulations of many countries)  
There are a number of unclear elements and challenges arising from these regulatory 
requirements in many jurisdictions. However these are not discussed here, but in more detail in 
subsequent chapters. But to give an example of the challenging elements of these regulations, we 
return to the drug consignment example given above. With these regulatory requirements in place, 
Bank A in London would be expected to examine whether Mr. A’s payment to Mr. B in Colombia 
represent any criminal activity. This may include some searching and questioning of why Mr. A 
transferred money to Mr. B in Colombia. Has he performed transactions like that before? Could 
there be any legitimate reason for such a payment? After evaluating all possible questions about 
this transaction, the regulations would expect that Bank A makes a finding on whether this 
transaction is suspicious or unusual or not. If it is suspicious or unusual to Bank A’s subjective 
judgment, then a report must be made to the designated Financial Intelligence Unit.  
In Colombia, Bank B would be expected to perform the same exercise. All these activities 
of determining the legitimacy of transactions of customers mean that regulated businesses now 
have to spend more resources than they would have done in the absence of the AML regulations. 
Problematic with the recommendations is that there appears to be no jurisdiction that has managed 
to give an ultimate definition of what is meant by the term ‘suspicious’ transaction178. This function 
calls for subjective judgments which may not be uniform between regulated businesses, even those 
providing similar services such as banks. Some transactions may appear suspicious to one, while 
they look quite normal to others179.  
There are a number of other challenging elements in the AML business regulations. For 
instance, there are difficulties about the KYC/CDD requirements of client identification and 
address verification. Some countries such as the UK, for instance, do not have a national identity 
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card/document. There are difficulties on what to use in establishing a client’s identity accurately 
as not everyone owns a passport or driving license which are widely accepted as forms of 
identity180. As mentioned above, one of the main goals of all these business regulatory measures 
is crime detection or prevention. It is anticipated that regulatory compliance by regulated 
businesses would assist law enforcement in detecting and preventing crime. This will occur as 
regulated businesses file reports of suspicious and threshold transactions to their designated 
FIUs181. There is also an expectation that law enforcement agencies would investigate such reports 
and in the process uncover money laundering and its underlying offences182. The expected effect 
of this on the behaviour of rational and calculating criminals is that they would desist from using 
regulated businesses to launder money as they are more likely to get caught.    
The business regulations complement other requirements of the global FATF regime such 
as asset seizure and forfeiture, which are aimed at removing the benefits of offending. The latter 
is linked to the reasoning that criminals should not benefit from the proceeds of their criminal 
activities183. The regulations assist in this process by generating information on transactions and 
providing such to the FIUs. Where assets are successfully seized and are forfeited to the state, this 
tool could be seen, in the language of situational crime prevention, to have some ‘diffusion of 
benefits’184. This is because it not only removes benefits but also prevents criminals from 
reinvesting their proceeds in further criminal activities. This is much like hitting two birds with 
one stone. The intent is to reduce the rates of other predicate acquisitive crimes that necessitate the 
laundering of their proceeds185.  
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The main criticism against situational crime prevention has been on the issue of crime 
‘displacement’ or ‘deflection’. It has been argued that situational crime prevention does not 
necessarily prevent crime but simply deflects or displaces it in any of the six ways186, as follows: 
“…Temporal- where offenders commit crimes at different times of the day; tactical- 
where offenders adopt a different modus operandi; target- where offenders select a 
different type of target; type of crime—where offenders choose to commit a new 
type of crime; spatial—where offenders target new locations; and perpetrator- 
where apprehended offenders are replaced by new ones.”187 
The business regulatory techniques of situational crime prevention may suffer from the 
same criticisms. Geiger and Weunsch’s work188, although not mentioning situational crime 
prevention, provides what we may effectively use to critique the business regulatory techniques of 
situational crime prevention. In their work, The fight against money laundering: an economic 
analysis of a cost-benefit paradoxon189, they examined a survey conducted on Banks in 
Switzerland, Germany and Singapore. They claim that during the two decades through which AML 
business regulations were implemented in these countries, organised crime has continued to 
flourish because criminals have alternative unregulated informal channels through which to 
launder money190. They also claim that the anti-money laundering regulations do not tackle the 
predicate offences (such as drugs) and the demand side that necessitates these predicate offences 
and subsequent money laundering191. They further claim that instead, the business regulations have 
imposed an unrealistic regulatory cost burden on society. These costs include what they term 
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‘direct costs’ and ‘collateral damages’. They argue that these costs carry some undesired side 
effects for both the economy and society192.  
By direct costs they refer to both the production and transaction costs of the regulatory 
regime which they argue have a severe impact on the economy. This is because the AML 
regulations push up transaction and production costs for the use of regulated businesses. They 
argue that regulated businesses pass down to consumers the costs of compliance in the form of 
increased fees and charges. By collateral damage, they refer to indirect costs to society, such as 
issues of loss of civil liberties and what they consider as some flawed uses of the AML business 
regulations193. They further argue that these business regulatory measures may even militate 
against the fight against organised crime as criminals build and cement sophisticated underground 
laundering techniques through such alternative informal remittance systems such as hawala or 
hundi (the Asian informal banking networks)194. According to these authors, the use of the 
informal systems may competitively challenge the formal sector of the economy195. They point 
out that, even in developed countries, the size of the informal sector of the economy is estimated 
at 10 to 30 percent of the GDP196. 
 We now highlight four fundamental weaknesses in the situational crime prevention 
approach of AML business regulations. We argue that these four weaknesses may make the design 
and implementation of the regulations unsustainable. The first is that a focus on regulating private 
businesses may deflect crime into the unregulated sectors of the economy, even as it raises costs 
in the formal regulated sector. The expansion in nature and scope of the AML business regulations 
has extended their reach over the past twenty years (see below). This expansion seems to attest to 
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their situational crime prevention weakness of crime deflection/displacement. While the initial 
focus of the global AML business regulations was on drug-related offences and only focused on 
financial institutions such as banks; all that has changed over the years. The predicate offences of 
money laundering are no longer only drug-related, but a range of other revenue generating crimes 
such as corruption, fraud, tax evasion and many more197.  
After the 9/11 terrorist bombings in the US, terrorism -- which clearly seems not to be 
motivated by any financial gain, has also been lumped into the predicate crimes of money 
laundering. This was because of the popular belief among some that terrorists use the same 
laundering methods as criminals to transmit funds destined to finance terrorist activities198.  As a 
result of this belief, the traditional focus of AML business regulations has been diluted to more 
politically-motivated crimes such as terrorism and ‘weapons proliferation’, where financial gain is 
difficult to discern.  
Over and above that, nowadays it is no longer only banks that are regulated to combat 
money laundering, but also a range of other businesses and professionals such as estate agents, 
lawyers, dealers in high value goods, casinos, auditors and accountants. Is it possible that the initial 
regulation of only banks deflected money laundering to these other types of regulated businesses? 
If that is the case, this may support a criticism of crime displacement/deflection of the AML 
business regulations. But it could also be that the expansion of these regulations beyond banks has 
little to do with crime displacement, especially where criminals have always used these other 
newly regulated businesses even before the initial regulation of banks.  
One major question, however, is how far the AML business regulations will possibly be 
extended in the future to try and deal with the (potential or real) problem of crime displacement 
and what the cost implications and practicality of such expansion would be. For instance, might 
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educational institutions be expected to consider whether tuition fees of their students emanated 
from criminal proceeds of their parents/sponsors or not? Could health institutions and 
supermarkets be similarly regulated in the future? There are also debates as to whether attempts 
should be made to regulate informal banking systems like hawala and hundi. How this might be 
done is unclear since not much is known about these underground banking systems and, where 
there is information, Passas has claimed, it has often been based on a ‘false sense of knowledge’199.     
The second point is that the AML regulations focus on businesses, not on criminal 
behaviour and criminal markets and market demands. This emphasis on regulating businesses 
seems to assume that such a strategy will indirectly shrink the demand-side for criminal products 
and services and rehabilitate the criminal behaviours of criminals. However, according to Geiger 
and Weunsch, there is no evidence that this occurs200. Predicate offences and criminal markets 
seem to thrive despite these business regulatory endeavours. This could be truer when newer 
instruments such as civil asset forfeiture, which do not depend on criminal convictions in order to 
seize assets, are more broadly implemented and encouraged. Rational offenders may read this 
simply as a form of tax, where the state is either not or less concerned with proving criminality 
and sending criminals to prison, but with seizing some share of their income. More generally, civil 
forfeiture raises criticisms that it may violate civil liberties201. James Sheptycki has described the 
forfeiture laws, in general, as extortionate and as a system of ‘resource extraction’202. 
The third point is related to the second. Money laundering is only a secondary offence. By 
this is meant that it depends on the occurrence of other underlying offences such as drug 
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trafficking, fraud and many others to generate the moneys that become the proceeds of crime. 
Without the occurrence of these underlying offences there will be no need for laundering money. 
Therefore, simply focusing on money laundering does not necessarily tackle the underlying 
offending behaviour. For instance, when law enforcement agencies seize proceeds related to drug 
money laundering, they have not necessarily seized the drugs themselves, but the proceeds. These 
drugs may continue to be consumed somewhere, although criminals would have lost their income 
as a result of asset forfeiture. The situational crime prevention measures put in place to disrupt the 
laundering of proceeds leaves undisturbed the demand-side of illegal products (i.e. drugs) and 
services and the circumstances through which they may be provided. The detection of money 
laundering, therefore, does not equate to curing addiction for illegal drug users on whose demand 
drug manufacturers and dealers feed.  
The last point that can be made in critiquing the situational crime prevention approach is 
that there are seemingly disproportionate effects of AML business regulations on civil liberties 
and the regulatory costs they bring about. While the regulations are intended to impact on criminals 
and criminal behaviour, they seem disproportionately to impinge on non-criminals as well. For 
instance, if regulated businesses pass down the costs of regulation to consumers, everyone using 
their services, whether criminal or not, suffers from these increased costs. While focusing on the 
facilitators of crime may seem justifiable on a number of grounds, such situational crime 
prevention regulatory strategies have their weaknesses as discussed above. This suggests that the 
current design of the global AML business regulations may be flawed and may be inhibited from 
achieving the crime detection and prevention goals while exerting enormous economic and 
collateral costs to regulated businesses and, ultimately, to society. We now turn to the second 






Fostering prudential soundness: the risk management approach 
To foster the second goal of the AML business regulations, a risk management strategy 
was introduced which was normatively aimed at preserving the financial integrity of mainly 
financial institutions by preventing them from being misused or abused by criminals to launder the 
proceeds of crime. Above, we discussed how - within the situational crime prevention approach, 
regulated businesses could be viewed as ‘targets’ of criminals and an impression could be created 
that they are potential victims of money laundering or crime. However the fees or service charges 
they earn from such transactions make their victim status controversial. There is another powerful 
line of reasoning that reasserts that victim status portrays money laundering as a risk to the integrity 
of regulated businesses. Recommendations 4 to 25 of FATF standards focus on how businesses 
should be regulated within countries203. They cite as a goal not only the combating of crime, but 
also the protection from risk to the wellbeing of regulated businesses204. The reasoning behind a 
strategy of risk management has been that money laundering is a serious hazard to the financial 
system205. Thus, while regulated institutions may benefit by levying fees or charges for 
transactions carried out by criminals, they end up facilitating money laundering activities. As a 
result they may face various forms of sanction from regulators and the courts where and when 
charges are brought against them. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has 
argued that the AML business regulations, especially those focusing on KYC/CDD, are “critical 
in protecting the safety and soundness of banks and the integrity of the banking systems”206.  
In its report on Customer Due Diligence for Banks, the BCBS has argued that sound 
KYC/CDD procedures should be seen “from a wider prudential, not just anti-money laundering, 
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perspective”207. Such procedures must be seen, the Basel Committee argues, “as a critical element 
in the effective management of banking risk”208. From this perspective, the AML business 
regulations are seen as a risk management tool for financial institutions. However, this may extend 
to other categories of regulated businesses such as lawyers, accountants, brokers and others who 
may be struck-off their professional rolls of practice if criminally convicted or administratively 
sanctioned for money laundering related lapses. The BCBS, in the same report, identified four 
interrelated ‘customer and counterparty risks’ which it lists as “reputational, operational, legal and 
concentration risk”209. According to the BCBS, these risks ‘can result in significant costs to banks’ 
such as bank runs, termination of interbank facilities, claims against the bank, loan losses, and 
asset confiscation and forfeiture. In this sense, banks become ‘victims’ of money laundering 
activity. However, it is important to note that most of the risks mentioned by the Basel Committee 
are not directly caused by money laundering. Instead they are as a result, directly or indirectly, of 
regulation. They arise from the failure of regulated businesses to comply with their regulatory 
obligations.  
Reputation risk involves ‘the potential that adverse publicity regarding a bank’s business 
practices and [criminal] associations, whether accurate or not, will cause a loss of confidence in 
the integrity of the institution’210. The reasoning here is that if regulated businesses (especially 
banks) are associated with money laundering activity (and therefore criminals), such associations 
may harm their credibility or reputation ‘since the nature of their business requires maintaining the 
confidence of depositors, creditors, and the general market place’211. Therefore complying with 
the KYC/CDD procedures would limit their exposure to money laundering and its perceived 
associated harms to reputation. Operational risks are identified in the Basel Committee report as 
the ‘risks of direct or indirect loss resulting from failed internal processes, people and systems or 
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from external events’212. This risk relates to institutional failures or weaknesses in implementing 
internal anti-money laundering regulatory programmes, therefore exposing banks to money 
laundering.  
Legal risks refer to adverse judgments that the regulators and the courts may impose on 
regulated businesses. Beyond these costs, there may be added reputational effects. Lastly, the 
report refers to ‘concentration’ risk. Concentration risks contain elements of credit and liquidity 
hazards. On the credit and liquidity side, it entails banks not properly profiling their customers. 
This means that banks may lend money in excess of what is sound or lend to the same group of 
customers under hidden webs of linked identities, if they have not properly profiled them. 
Alternatively, they may unknowingly have larger deposits than they realize, from the same group 
of customers, which may expose them to liquidity problems should that group of customers decide 
to withdraw their investments. The risks identified by the Basel Committee’s report are highlighted 
in order to encourage banks to comply with the AML business regulations. In part, but not 
exclusively, these risks would tend to arise when banks are investigated by regulators, and found 
to be non-compliant. If this happens, then reputation could be at stake (reputational risk), costs 
implications could come into play as non-compliant institutions are fined (legal liability risks), and 
their systems could be exposed as weak (operational risk) and susceptible to concentration risks.  
Bartlett has extended this risk thesis in a report compiled for the Asian Development 
Regional Technical Assistance Project, funded by the World Bank, entitled Countering Money 
Laundering in the Asian and Pacific Region: The negative effects of money laundering on 
economic development213. He basically argues that money laundering activity has got negative 
consequences on economic development in developing countries. His focus is much more on the 
role that financial institutions such as banks and capital markets play in economic development214. 
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He argues that financial institutions provide access to capital for borrowers and 
confidence/certainty for lenders that they stand a reasonable chance of returns on their 
investments215. He argues that in developing countries, financial regulation and supervision is 
generally less rigorous and therefore there is not enough confidence provided for investors to 
entrust financial institutions with their investments216.  According to him, faster growing 
economies do not only have stronger financial institutions, but also prudentially sound institutions 
which drive economic growth. Therefore regulated financial institutions, which AML regulations 
contribute to, would play a major role in economic development in developing countries where 
capital is normally scarce217.    
 This scarcity of capital in developing economies has historically led to large financial 
institutions’ over-reliance on public/government funds, rather than private deposits, which are 
equally important218. Bartlett highlights the central role of sound financial institutions for access 
to capital for ‘private entrepreneurs to emerge, for business to flourish, and for local people and 
investors from abroad to find the confidence to invest, create wealth, income and jobs’219. He also 
notes how recently the IMF and the World Bank have made compliance with the FATF standards 
a precondition for grants and loans for many developing countries. According to him, the AML 
regulations support financial institutions by fostering enhanced financial prudence, promoting 
good governance and exerting ‘positive secondary effects on economic development’220.  
On this point he cites the KYC due diligence measures which may assist financial 
institutions to mitigate ‘concentration risks’ through avoiding over-exposure to particular clients.  
Contrary to arguments by Geiger and Weunsch221, Bartlett claims that while, in the short term, 
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compliance costs may seem cumbersome; these costs should be measured in the context of the 
long-term goals of the regime. He admits that compliance costs may prove burdensome if there is 
no uniformity in implementation, compliance and enforcement. This is especially the case where 
some institutions comply and bear the costs while some do not at all and such non-compliance is 
neither rectified nor punished.   
Another argument made by Bartlett is that money laundering has direct negative effects on 
economic growth222. This is based on his assumption that laundered funds are normally diverted 
to less productive activity like facilitating corruption and furthering crime. For Bartlett, laundered 
money may even be ‘placed outside financial institutions and end up in sterile investments or 
investments that do not generate additional productivity for the broader economy’. In this regard 
he cites investments on real estate, art, jewellery and other high value consumption assets such as 
boats and luxury vehicles223. Although it is difficult to understand how investment in real estate 
and other luxury goods depresses growth, Bartlett makes an example about sterile investments in 
real estate. He argues that money launderers can, ‘hypothetically’, drive up the prices of real estate, 
for instance, causing overpayment for these assets and therefore distorting real estate market 
prices224.  
The last argument that Bartlett makes is that money laundering can increase the risk of 
macro-economic instability, distort capital and trade flows225. On the issue of macro-economic 
stability, he argues that money laundering flows through a particular region are often triggered by 
specific episodes of political flux such as an overthrowing of a corrupt dictator. He says such 
events may lead to unstable financial flows, which, when accompanied by money laundering 
activity, may contribute to instability of exchange rates, monetary aggregate and general price 
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levels226. Further on the point of macro-economic stability, he notes that some money laundering 
transactions take place in the informal sectors of the economy. As a result such transactions do not 
appear in official monetary and financial statistics, thus distorting the real picture of these statistics 
for monetary policymakers in their management of economic variables such as monetary levels, 
interest rates, inflation and exchanges rates227.  
On the issue of money laundering distorting capital and trade flows, Bartlett mentions the 
laundering of outbound funds (meant for offshore/another country) which may, where extensive, 
encourage capital flight and therefore worsen the scarcity of domestic capital for developing 
economies228. It would therefore seem, according to Bartlett’s arguments, that the solution for all 
these problems that money laundering may cause to developing countries is for them to adopt the 
‘prudential’ risk managing AML business regulations. According to Bartlett’s analysis, these 
measures do not only seek to prevent crime and maintain the prudential soundness of the regulated 
businesses, especially financial institutions, but could be seen as a means of encouraging economic 
growth and development by assisting in the building of sound financial institutions. However, the 
risk management approach, as articulated by the BCBS and Bartlett, may be overly optimistic in 
encouraging financial institutions to comply with the AML regulations.  
After all the BCBS is made up of countries (the Group of 7 countries) who formed the 
FATF. These countries cannot be seen to be communicating different messages to those of the 
FATF. Bartlett’s report was commissioned by the World Bank to encourage compliance with the 
AML standards in developing countries of Asia. Both the BCBS and Bartlett’s reports, in their 
drive to promote the global FATF standards, tend to overlook a number of additional problems 
that may beset their design and implementation. We have discussed Geiger and Weunsch work 
above which raised some criticisms on the administrative and compliance costs of the regime. 
Other academics have also highlighted these. For instance Alexander et al. have argued that the 
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AML regulations dramatically increase ‘the cost of doing business in the financial sector”, 
especially in developing countries229. According to them, these regulations 
…may have the effect of weakening many financial systems by driving liquidity 
out of the formal market and into the underground economy…This will undermine 
the crucial role that banks are expected to play in generating economic growth in 
developing countries…230 
 
The credo that injecting money from criminal activity into the economy is dangerous to the 
economy has therefore not been explained. We can however find an answer from the 1970 US’s 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisation (RICO) Act’s provisions, where these financial 
regulations originate. RICO says that 
“It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly 
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of 
unlawful debt …. to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, 
or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the 
establishment or operation of, any enterprise, which is engaged in, or the activities 
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the 
open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or 
participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not 
be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the 
purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in 
any pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such 
purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities 
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of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one 
or more directors of the issuer.”231 
It can be seen from this provision that the US government was trying to prevent organised crime 
from engaging in interstate or foreign commerce or from taking a controlling interest in a 
securities-issuing corporation. 
Another point that dislodges Bartlett’s argument of economic developmental potential of 
the global AML standards is raised by Louis De Koker232. De Koker argues that the AML 
regulations, if not implemented carefully, may have adverse effects of economic exclusion and 
consequent failure of human capital formation, which may depress economic development, 
especially in developing countries. De Koker’s argument is based on the stringent anti-money 
laundering regulatory requirements of ‘know your customer’ embedded in the global AML 
standards of the FATF. According to the ‘know your customer’ requirements, regulated 
businesses, particularly financial institutions, are expected to ‘identify their customers, obtain 
information regarding the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship’233. In many 
jurisdictions, institutions such as banks develop ‘risk-based’ bank account opening procedures 
which require particular forms of identification. These ‘risk-based’ systems used by banks also 
rate customers as high, medium or low risk234. The expectation of the ‘know your customer’ 
requirements is that regulated businesses should not open accounts or provide their services to 
customers who do not satisfy their risk-based identification procedures235. It follows also that those 
with more verifiable ‘know your customer’ documentation would score high points, therefore be 
low risk customers in terms of client identification and verification requirements.  
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Those customers without enough documentation may tend to score low and be placed into 
the ‘high risk’ customer categories. De Koker argues that such procedures may unfairly exclude 
some sectors of society, especially the poor and immigrants, from accessing financial services. To 
illustrate his point, De Koker cites a study conducted by the Financial Services Consumer Panel 
in the UK in 2002 which showed that due to the ‘know your customer’ requirements, a number of 
people (19% of the sampled applicants) were refused basic bank accounts due to inadequate 
identity information236. One of the traced applicants commented as follows   
They said “Are you working?” I said no, I'm looking for work now. “Any 
identification?” I said I’ve got my medical card that's all I've got. They said I need 
three forms of identification before they can do anything for me. Like a driving 
licence, passport, birth certificate. Which I haven't got237.  
Clearly, driving licenses are for driving vehicles and passports are normally for travelling. It is 
highly doubtful that everyone in society drives or plans to travel abroad in order to satisfy the basic 
bank account opening procedures. Such requirements, according to De Koker, may have 
implications of ‘financial exclusion’ or hinder access to financial services. These implications may 
further mean lack of access to financial products such as insurance, credit and savings facilities. 
This is especially so on immigrant populations, including economic ‘illegals’, which make up large 
percentages of some cosmopolitan cities in many countries. Contrary to what Bartlett argues 
above, the net effect of the AML business regulations of ‘know your customer’ requirements could 
be considerable levels of financial exclusion and perhaps more reliance on underground/alternative 
remittance systems such as hawala, especially for the excluded groups. This could also mean that 
such transactions elude the official monetary and financial statistics and distort the judgments of 
monetary policy-makers.   
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This chapter has looked at two related strategies that are employed by the global AML 
standards of the FATF to combat/detect crime and to prevent the misuse of legitimate institutions 
by criminals. Our analysis of these strategies suggests that they, in their present form and design, 
may contain features that not only militate against the outcomes they seek to achieve but may even 
exacerbate such problems or create new ones. Two strategies were discussed relating to these 
goals, and some literature discussed in relation to them. Having looked at the two regulatory 
strategies employed, we now turn to the regulation literature to theoretically locate the emergence 
of this regime at a global level. In the next chapter we fuse the regulation theories that were used 
to develop the competing hypotheses that guided this study with the research methodologies that 



















In this chapter we discuss the research methodologies that were used to test our hypotheses 
as outline in the first chapter. These are tested on the strength of evidence gathered from secondary 
and primary sources. Robert Alford has decried the gap between theory and method in the general 
conduct of research238. He bemoans the fact that much work seems to consist of either ‘abstract 
theoretical speculation, methodological analyses of the properties of various statistics, or rigorous 
empirical analyses that lack theoretical substance’239. Our study is empirical and an effort was 
made to infuse the research methods with the theoretical substance that Alford finds lacking. In 
the previous chapter, we examined the AML business regulatory standards. We argued that they 
were purportedly established to encourage cooperation between countries through persuading 
nation-states to shape or modify the behaviour of criminals by regulating private businesses within 
their jurisdictions. This complex multi-level regulation, on the one hand, has affected states which 
are at different levels of development (developed and developing countries). On the other hand, 
various types of businesses have been regulated within states to observe the newly enacted 
domestic codes which emanate from these global standards. These regulated businesses have 
ranged from financial to non-financial institutions. We have and continue to use the term of 
‘regulated businesses’ throughout this study to refer also to regulated professionals such as 
lawyers, auditors and brokers. 
The alleged normative goals and rationales of all this regulatory intervention has been to 
detect and combat crime in technologically advanced environments and, in a globalizing world, to 
                                                                





protect from misuse for criminal ends, the legitimate and interconnected financial and non-
financial systems. This is being done through situational crime prevention and risk management 
techniques that we discussed in Chapter 2. The AML business regulatory measures are therefore 
behavioural modification technologies of governance whose seeming end-goals are to mitigate 
against the risk of criminal conduct, albeit indirectly, through leveraging the somewhat traditional 
law-enforcement duties of detecting and combating crime on everyone that can possibly be reached 
in society. In this research we use the economic and political theories of regulation to interpret and 
explain the origins and emergence of this global regulatory regime of the FATF and to probe more 
critically into its founding goals and rationales.  
Regulatory scholarship has in the past few decades gained prominence in such disciplines 
as law, politics, economics and the broader social sciences. Scholars in this multi-disciplinary field 
have been concerned with a variety of issues such as the privatisation of public services, 
competition, economic policy formulation and implementation, democracy, legitimacy and 
accountability of non-elected independent regulatory bodies in conditions of delegated mandates. 
They have, among other things, sought to study ‘why regulation emerges, which actors contribute 
to that emergence and the typical patterns of interaction between regulatory actors’240.  
Regulation theories provide us with some fascinating competing hypotheses which have 
enabled us to seek alternative interpretations or explanations241 and they provide evidence of the 
publicly interested goals of the FATF regime. The private interest hypothesis leads us to tread a 
less travelled path in this area. It prods us critically to search for and examine evidence to the 
contrary and to continuously search for hidden interests behind the emergence of the regime.  
These theories lead us to question the somewhat orthodox and seemingly publicly interested goals 
and rationales for the emergence of the regime and its incorporation in the developing world and 
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in South Africa, in particular. They further compel us to question the costs and benefits of the 
regime, especially evidence and a growing body of work which suggests that the regime is not 
achieving its alleged goals, not only in the developing world, but also in the originating 
countries242. Further, as we analyse the manner in which the regime came about and how it was 
disseminated throughout the world, we begin to appreciate the dynamics and typical patterns of 
interaction among various actors in its rise and to question why and how other countries played 
and continue to play a leading role and others, mainly developing countries, continue to follow. 
This is especially so when evidence suggests that they were deliberately excluded in shaping and 
designing the regime while, at the same time, they were being coerced into adopting and complying 
with it.   
It seems that criminological scholarship has paid little attention to the AML initiatives 
through the theoretical lens of regulatory scholarship. Nor have scholars of regulation paid enough, 
if any, attention to or examined how regulation theories could apply to the global AML regime. 
While the main AML standards were largely influenced by criminal law, through the 
criminalisation of proceeds of crime, the AML business regulations represent a significant shift in 
the fight against crime. The obligations they place on regulated businesses are not traditional 
criminal law instruments, but socio-economic regulatory ‘technologies’ of governance. They 
interfere with the political and market economy by dictating the manner in which regulated 
businesses conduct their day to day affairs with their customers/clients, with great and yet 
unquantified cost implications. Businesses affected by the AML regulations are already subject to 
various forms of socio-economic and/or professional regulation. AML regulations, may we 
suggest, expand and transform the traditional roles of law enforcement such as criminal 
investigations, surveillance and crime prevention and extend them to the boardrooms and service 
counters of regulated businesses. They do this by assigning to business the traditional law 
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enforcement roles of detecting and preventing crime243. Could regulation theory help us to interpret 
and explain this transformative scheme in law enforcement roles? In venturing into this exercise 
of merging regulation theory with our research methods, we first look at what contemporary 
scholarly literature understands ‘regulation’ to mean.  We then look at the various theories of 
regulation which Morgan and Yeung244 have conveniently classified into the public interest 
theories and private interest theories.   
 
What is Regulation?  
Regulation, as a public policy tool, dates back centuries in many countries in the world245. 
As observed by John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos,246 
States have always been objects of regulation, regulators and regulatees. States 
were regulated by the Fuggers in the sixteenth century, the British East India 
Company in the eighteenth century, the Rothschilds until the 1930s, and today by 
business organisations like the Big Five accounting firms, IATA, the Societe 
Generale de Surveillance…international organisations like the IMF and World 
Bank… 
However, regulation has only gained currency in academia, as a form of policy making, 
governance or social control in the past couple of decades. This was due to the regulatory reforms 
that were tied to the state-market changes associated with privatisation, contracting-out and 
delegation of powers of government to non-elected bodies for purposes of supplying public 
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services such as electricity, water and transport247. These regulatory reforms, which became 
popular under the Ronald Reagan’s administration in the US and Margaret Thatcher’s Britain, 
heralded a “movement away from state ownership and reliance on private markets to supply goods 
and services”, including those traditionally supplied by the state248. Some have interpreted these 
shifts to imply the retreat of the power of the state249 or “hollowing out”250, referring to the 
weakening of state authority and the increasing power and dominance of private authority in public 
affairs. 
These shifts have indeed led to the reconfiguration of the role of the state in the economy, 
as many have observed, from that of being a provider of services or what is popularly known as a 
‘welfare state’ or “provider state” to the role of regulating, through a variety of ways, the supply 
of such services and hence the designation of a ‘regulatory state’251 or, as some have said, a ‘night 
watchman state’252. Although the market plays a major role in supplying goods and services, it is 
widely agreed, at least in democratic societies, that the state still owes its citizens access to such 
services. In order to ensure access, the role of the state has shifted to one of regulating the provision 
of these services. According to Paul Cook et al, (2004) state regulation extends to many areas 
including employment terms, competition, health and safety, food safety, environmental regulation 
and other specific industry regulatory measures253. However, it is important to decipher what 
regulation has been understood to mean in the academic circles. As many scholars have noted, 
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there is a lack of clarity and precision as to what regulation means254. Since there are varying 
conceptual approaches to the meaning of regulation, this paper will not attempt to reinvent the 
wheel, but scans the contemporary academic literature and brings to the fore some of the current 
definitions of the concept of ‘regulation’. We suggest a functional definition for the purposes of 
this analysis, borrowing from the existent ones.  
According to Morgan and Yeung, narrower definitions of regulation “tend to centre on 
deliberate attempts by the state to influence socially valuable behaviour which may have adverse 
side-effects by establishing, monitoring and enforcing legal rules”255. According to such narrower 
definitions, regulation refers to “the promulgation of an authoritative set of rules, accompanied by 
some mechanism, typically a public agency, for monitoring and promoting compliance with these 
rules”256. This narrower definition is classified as a legislative approach to regulation. Martin 
Minogue describes this approach as espousing a “traditional view of government as a command 
and control regime operating in the public interest”257.  
Another narrow approach in defining regulation is biased towards the economic aspect with 
regulation being defined as ‘all efforts of state agencies to steer the economy”258. This second 
approach views regulation as a means of creating ‘conditions for efficient markets’259. Many 
scholars have incorporated both of the legal/legislative and economic approaches in defining 
regulation. They view regulation, therefore, as ‘both a form of public policy and a means of 
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constituting markets’260. However some scholars such as Julia Black view the combination of both 
these legal and economic conceptual approaches still as too narrow. 
Morgan and Yeung highlight three assumptions which make the legislative approach 
narrow261. These assumptions are that: 1) the state is almost the only source of articulating the 
collective goals of the community; 2) the state has a final authority; 3) ‘the centrality of rules as 
‘command’ is the primary mode of shaping behaviour’. They note that the primary assumptions 
have been correspondingly challenged in that there is: 1) an increasing role played by non-state 
institutions like non-governmental organizations and commercial enterprises, among others, in 
shaping regulation; 2) an emergence of multiple levels and sites of governance that operate 
concurrently or in overlapping ways and that therefore challenges the assumption that the state has 
the final authority; 3) an increasing observation of the limitations to the effectiveness of legal rules 
and an increasing recognition for alternative techniques of policy formulation and 
implementation262.    
On the other hand, the economic approach to regulation is critiqued for failing to recognise 
that regulation is also used for a variety of motives other than correcting market failure263. For 
instance, since ‘regulation redistributes resources and rents, politicians often use it to secure 
political gains rather than correct market failures’264. As a result of limitations of both these legal 
and economic approaches, contemporary regulatory scholarship has increasingly adopted a 
broader approach which entails the understanding of regulation as “rules enforcement and 
monitoring”, or “any form of direct state intervention in the economy” or “all mechanisms of social 
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control of behaviour”265. In this line is a definition of ‘decentred regulation’ referred to by Julia 
Black as the ‘cybernetic’ approach which defines regulations as:  
“…the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to 
defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified 
outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, 
information-gathering and behaviour-modification”266.  
Or rather, in a recent re-formulation by Julia Black, regulation means  
“…sustained and focused attempts to change the behaviour of others in order to 
address a collective problem or attain an identified end or ends, usually through a 
combination of rules or norms and some means for their implementation and 
enforcement, which can be legal or non-legal”267. 
While the former economic and legal approaches place emphasis on the state and formal 
rules, the ‘decentred’ or ‘polycentric’ regulation approaches place an emphasis on the multitude 
of actors who play regulatory roles268. They also draw attention to the multi-level platforms 
through which regulation occurs; the sub-national, national or transnational, highlighting ‘the 
nature of state-society and intra-state and intra-society relationships’269.  Lastly, they appreciate 
regulatory strategies as ‘hybrid’ or ‘combining governmental and non-governmental actors’, 
‘multifaceted’ or ‘using a number of different strategies simultaneously or sequentially’ and 
‘indirect’270. Morgan and Yeung have emphasized that the broader ‘cybernetic’/ ‘decentred’/ 
‘polycentric’ approach to regulation does not seek to dislodge the state and the law271. Instead it 
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appreciates the role of the state and the law in shaping people’s behaviour while also ‘enlightening 
the understanding of regulation and its contemporary realities on the relationship between the state 
and the range of other actors, institutions and techniques’272. 
 In the sense of this broader approach, its expanse could make the concept of regulation 
rather too porous. However, this broader definition seems to sit comfortably with the nature and 
scope of the AML business regulations that we study here. These regulations are a result of both 
‘state’ and ‘non-state’ actors, a product of both formal (hard law) and informal (soft law) 
mechanisms of control, and originate separately from the nation-state, although the expectations 
are that states implement and enforce them. It is also required within nation-states that private 
regulated businesses and professions will implement and comply with the regulations. To 
distinguish between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ actors we borrow from Julia Black273. ‘State’ actors 
refer broadly to those organs of government/state with a legal mandate to regulate274. ‘Non-state’ 
refers broadly to those inter-governmental regulatory bodies or standard-setters (such as the FATF 
and its range of networks of FATF style regional bodies) with no legal mandate in the form of 
national and international formal or legally binding conventions and treaties275.  
 
Theories of Regulation and Hypotheses Generation 
We have mentioned before that in this work we have adopted the convenient categorization 
of regulation theory into the three broad categories of public interest theories, the private interest 
theories and the institutionalist theories276. Our focus is on the competing public and private 
interest theories. Theories of regulation are a ‘set of propositions or hypotheses about why 
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regulation emerges, which actors contribute to that emergence and the typical patterns of 
interaction between the regulatory actors’277. These theories cut across various disciplines such as 
law, sociology, economics and politics. All these theories have a common concern. This is to 
uncover the processes that lead to the adoption of particular regulatory regimes278.  
Theories of regulation are a central vehicle to the purpose of this research as they help us 
examine why the global FATF standards emerged and the manner in which they did. This goal 
speaks directly to our first research question and the hypotheses linked to this question as outlined 
in Chapter 1. To reiterate, our first research question asks why and how the global anti-money 
laundering regime of the FATF emerged and why and how it was disseminated and incorporated 
in developing countries; particularly South Africa . The purposes of this is to examine the key 
explanations advanced in order to account for the emergence of this type of regulation in countries 
(global regulation) and in private businesses (business regulation) within national jurisdictions. In 
Chapter 2 we identified two key main goals for the emergence of the global AML standards.  These 
key goals are to combat (transnational) organized crime and to prevent legitimate businesses from 
being used to perpetuate crime. Using regulation theories, we seek to further enlighten our 
understanding and interpretation of these goals/objectives, critically probing beyond the publicly 
articulated or official explanations and justifications.  
We also use the available literature to highlight some competing explanations for the 
emergence of this regime globally and nationally, particularly within developing countries - as 
there are other explanations to the emergence of the global FATF standards. The AML regulations 
at the national level, as discussed above, regulate private businesses to perform a number of 
regulatory functions. At a global level, they focus on regulating nation-states —in other words, 
countries as objects/subjects of regulation. Below, we turn to the exploration of regulation theories, 
starting with the public interest and then the private interest theories. Using the research questions 
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and hypotheses outlined in Chapter 1, we test them with evidence presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 
7 of this work. 
 
Public interest theories  
The public interest theories “attribute to legislators and others responsible for the design 
and implementation of regulation a desire to pursue collective goals with the aim of promoting the 
general welfare of the community”279. The public interest theories can be subdivided into two main 
streams; 1) those that articulate regulatory goals in terms of economic efficiency and; 2) those that 
include political goals other than the economic ones280. The economic approaches of public interest 
theories hold that the market ‘works well under normal circumstances and should be interfered 
with only when it does not function properly’281. The ‘regulation of economic activity is justified 
only when the market is incapable of producing social optimum’282. This refers to when the 
unregulated market fails to allocate its resources and services efficiently as expected of it by 
society. Regulatory intervention is therefore justified, in the ‘public interest’, to correct the failure 
of markets to maximise social welfare. Anthony Ogus has listed a number of economic 
circumstances which may lead to market failure. These are as follows; (i) existence of monopolies 
and natural monopolies, (ii) public goods (iii) other externalities, (iv) information deficits and 
bounded rationality, (v) co-ordination problems, and (vi) exceptional market conditions and 
macro-economic considerations283.  
We do not go into details with regard to all these reasons given by Ogus and others, but 
shall explain those that are considered to be relevant to this analysis. In this regard we may point 
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out that the goals or objectives of regulating countries for the purposes of combating crime and 
protecting the inter-connected global financial system are public interest goals of the FATF 
standards. Further, the purposes of regulating private businesses within countries to play a role in 
the combating of crime and to maintain their soundness and integrity from abuse by criminal 
elements are public interest goals. We say this because regulated businesses provide valuable 
services that can be considered as for the ‘public good’. They provide professional services and 
products (such as banking and transactional facilities) the benefit of which is shared by society. 
The AML regulations focus on the services and products that these regulated businesses offer to 
their clients. Since these services and products are public goods, their regulation would therefore 
be justified, in the public interest. However, these services and products are being misused for 
criminal purposes. Therefore, there are some elements of ‘externalities’ in their provision.  
The concept of ‘externalities’ particularly refers to the negative or unintended outcome in 
provision of a service or product284. For instance, firearm safety regulations may require firearm 
owners to have a firearm safe and exercise some minimum standards of care due to the dangers of 
firearms. In this case the ‘externalities’ in the services and products provided by the AML regulated 
businesses manifest themselves in their exploitation by criminals to launder money and conduct 
(criminal) transactions. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 2, without regulation, they become 
unintentional or negligent facilitators of crime through allowing their services to be misused for 
criminal ends. Public interest theorists would therefore argue that regulation is justified to correct 
these externalities or market failures. 
 Morgan and Yeung have regarded the market failure approach as narrow in its focus.  It is 
narrow in that it overlooks other goals and values which may be used to justify regulation285. Some 
scholars have therefore come up with more reasons as to why regulatory intervention may, in the 
public interest, be justified. Such ‘substantive goals and values’ are social and political, such as 
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‘distributional justice’, ‘paternalism’286 , ‘collective desires and aspirations’, ‘endogenous 
preferences’ and many others287. However one of the main problems of these substantive 
justifications that have correctly been pointed out is that in modern societies ‘moral disagreements 
and value pluralism’ may complicate the ‘substantive visions of values that regulation can 
legitimately pursue’288.  
This means that a universal conception of what constitutions the ‘public interest’ may be 
slippery289. However, Morgan and Yeung have suggested, as a solution to this quagmire, that such 
substantive goals and values might still be rescued and be made part of the regulatory agenda 
through adopting a more ‘procedural approach’, thus making these goals and values more 
acceptable to society. This procedural approach emphasises ‘deliberation, mutual interchange, 
dialogue and collective processes’ where various interests and sectors of society participate in 
defining and shaping the regulatory goals and agenda290.  We turn, now, to look at the private 
interest theories which are actually a critique of the assumptions made by the public interest 
theories.  
 
Private interest theories   
Private interest theories emerged in response to the public interest theories in the late 
1960s291. They are not just a critique of the public interest theories, but a critical body of thought 
on their own. As Anthony Ogus explains, a theory was needed to explain why regulatory 
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interventions that had taken place sometimes failed to fulfil the public interest of promoting social 
welfare292. While the public interest theories emphasise ‘market failure’ as a prima facie case for 
regulation, private interest theories, on the other hand, stress ‘regulatory failure’ and ‘regulatory 
capture’293. Regulatory failure happens when the regulatory outcomes tend to be swayed by and to 
benefit narrow private interests rather than promote the collective welfare of society.  
Regulatory capture happens when those charged with taking regulatory decisions abandon 
the collective interests of society in favour of narrow private interests of those groups who stand 
to benefit from the regulatory decisions. Private interest theories argue that regulation emerges 
from the actions of individuals or groups motivated to maximise their self-interests294. If particular 
regulatory decisions ever reflect the interest of the public, according to the private interest theories, 
such convergence is only accidental295. Like the public interest theories, there are variants of the 
private interest theories ranging from the economic to the political versions. According to the 
political versions of private interest theories, also called neo-pluralists, ‘regulatory outcomes are 
the result of interest group pressures, in a regime in which different groups press their many 
different interests and concerns upon regulators”296.   
Regulators, according to this theory, ‘function largely as conduits and aggregators for the 
preference and demands of private groups’297. Since private groups may have incompatible 
interests, they therefore compete for the regulatory decisions that would favour their own positions. 
Such interests may be economic and/or political. This means that regulatory decisions may not 
favour all the contending groups; some may emerge as winners and some as losers298. This 
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competition may be determined by resource and influence factors299. Under private interest theory, 
the regulatory outcomes may more often than not, mirror the interests of the most powerful groups 
in society300.  
The economic private interest theories, or the so called ‘public choice’ theories, treat 
legislative, regulatory, and electoral institutions as an economy in which the relevant actors—
including ordinary citizens, legislators, agencies, and organised interest groups most affected by 
regulatory policies—exchange regulatory ‘goods,’ which are demanded and supplied according to 
the same principles governing the demand and supply of ordinary economic goals301. According 
to this theory, ‘firms bring to government their demands for regulation that will confer monopoly-
type benefits upon them” while, on the other hand, those who make decisions (legislators, 
politicians and bureaucrats) confer favourable regulatory decisions in exchange for resources that 
will secure their positions (i.e. re-election to office)302. According to this ‘rent-seeking’ theory, as 
it is also referred to, politicians and bureaucrats who take regulatory decisions are seen as interested 
in securing their jobs or creating future career opportunities, perhaps in the same industries they 
regulate. Therefore, in taking regulatory decisions, they are guided by their personal, private 
interests.  
While the private interest theories seem to focus on the national level scenario, this research 
also deals with matters at a global level where countries are subjects or objects of regulation by 
institutions they help to establish, especially in the absence of a global government. We have 
therefore, using the broad definition of regulation, used these theories at both global and national 
level to try and explain the private interests of states (as actors) and also as subjects of regulation 
in the emergence and diffusion of the global FATF standards. This point becomes clearer in 
Chapter 5 and other subsequent chapters when we pit the publicly interested goals of the global 
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FATF regime with the somewhat hidden private interests of some actors in the extension of the 
regime throughout the globe. Having established the theoretical domain of this study as regulation, 
we turn to the methodology used for data collection and analysis. 
 
South Africa as a unit of analysis 
South Africa was chosen as the unit of analysis with respect to which regulatory enactment 
and implementation is studied.  The choice was made for a number of reasons. One of the reasons 
was that it was one of the first developing countries to enact the FATF standards of business 
regulation. Since these measures were recently introduced globally and with regards to developing 
countries, it made good sense to select a country that had adopted these standards and had made 
some effort to implement them. South Africa had passed FICA, set up the FIC and regulated a 
variety of businesses in compliance with the global FATF standards. South Africa was also one of 
a few developing countries that were made full members of the FATF (in 2004) while many 
developing countries have so far failed to achieve this status. It is the only country in Africa that 
is currently a full member of the exclusive FATF club.  
Another reason was based on South Africa’s socio-economic conditions of a ‘dual 
economy’ which traverses both developed and developing country conditions in a very peculiar 
way. Emerging from apartheid into a constitutional democracy in 1994, South Africa’s 
implementation of the FATF standards took place around this political transition. Issues of 
financial exclusion which arise from such aspects of AML business regulations as KYC/CDD are 
prone to make South Africa a “critical case” study as the majority of the country’s citizens were 
previously and legally excluded by apartheid from participating in the economy and residentially 
segregated along racial and ethnic lines. Could, perhaps, the implementation of the KYC/CDD 
components of the global AML standards undermine social cohesion and, to some extent, stymie 




How could these policy initiatives aimed at such noble goals of combating crime and 
protecting the financial system end up colliding with South Africa’s post-apartheid attempt to 
create a more inclusive society? Another crucial factor, among others, was this researchers’ 
familiarity with South Africa. This research is qualitative rather than quantitative in nature.  It uses 
both primary and secondary sources of data.  Of greatest importance were a series of semi-
structured expert interviews conducted in South Africa between September and November 2009. 
As mentioned above, we examined beyond the global regime’s incorporation, probing its 
implementation and compliance by regulated businesses as well as enforcement. By probing these 
outcomes, we look towards the achievement, or lack thereof, of the alleged goals/objectives of the 
regime.  
While the effectiveness and efficiency of the regime are beyond the scope of this thesis, 
this project does in its focus on implementation begin to provide preliminary information in that 
regard. In other words, we ask whether there is evidence that the adoption of the FATF’s business 
regulations has had any effects in detecting money laundering and counter-terrorist financing in 
South Africa.  We have used available statistical evidence from the FIC and the FATF’s mutual 
evaluation studies of South Africa. Our primary focus, however, remains on adoption and 
implementation.  While the study focuses on South Africa, it is comparatively-informed as it 
compares, in some of its analysis of specific points, South Africa with other jurisdictions such as 
the US, Australia and the UK. We say more about both the interviews and the archival research 
and use of other secondary sources of data below.  
 
Archival research and use of secondary sources   
 In collecting data for this study, we have relied heavily on archival materials as well as on 
secondary sources ranging from books, academic journals, newspapers, annual reports and other 




countries used for comparative purposes such as the UK, US and Australia), international and 
global institutions. These sources were consulted on their coverage of issues of money laundering, 
financial intelligence, organized crime and the governance or criminal justice responses to these 
phenomena. Among the archival and other secondary materials used were: FATF Annual Reports 
and Reviews on Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories; FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports; 
FATF’s Reports on Money Laundering Typologies; reports of FATF-Style Regional Bodies; Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision’s Reports on Banking Regulation; Special Reports/Studies 
Conducted by the US’s Government Accountability Office; Egmont Group’s of Financial 
Intelligence Units Reports; FIU Reports of US, UK and Australia; legislation and case law on 
money laundering and asset confiscation and forfeiture from South Africa and legislative 
developments in the UK and US; Financial Intelligence Centre Annual Reports, Guidance Notes 
and Circulars; South African Reserve Bank’s Banking Supervision Division Annual Reports; 
published research and academic articles; World Banks and IMF research and country reports 
relating to money laundering and observance of various governance codes and standards; South 
African Law Reform Commission Issue Papers, Discussion Documents and Annual Reports; 
South African Banking Association or Banking Council of South Africa Media Releases; Padraig 
O’Malley’s303 Political Interviews which are hosted by the Nelson Mandela Centre for Memory 
and Dialogue, a programme led by the Nelson Mandela Foundation.  
 Of particular help were South African parliamentary records which are recorded by the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG).  We drew on those relating to: parliamentary 
deliberations, public hearings and other standing committee processes on legislation relating to 
organized crime, financial intelligence, asset forfeiture and confiscation. These included minutes, 
audio recordings- which were transcribed by the author, written representations by interested 
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bodies/individuals on legislative public hearings on our subject matter, particularly the 
parliamentary committees that handled the legislative processes of the making of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act 2001 and the FICA Amendment Act of 2008, The Prevention of Organized 
Crime Act of 1998, National Prosecuting Authority Act and other relevant legislation such as 
POCDATARA.  
 
Field research: semi-structured interviews 
There is a dearth of academic research when it comes to the implementation, compliance 
and enforcement of the AML business regulations in South Africa. A decision was therefore made 
to supplement publicly available secondary data with a series of semi-structured expert interviews.  
Respondents were actors familiar with the history and current workings of the AML regime within 
South Africa. These persons were chosen for their unique knowledge and expertise.  Semi-
structured interviews were chosen because they give an expert space to reframe questions and to 
convey a sense of their area.   
These parties were identified broadly as the regulators, regulatory supervisory bodies, 
regulated businesses, and law enforcement agencies. All these parties play some role in the 
governance of anti-money laundering and financial intelligence as given a role or legal obligations 
by FICA304. Other relevant organisations and individuals involved in or with expert knowledge of 
these regulations and governance in South Africa were also identified. However, not all the 
identified players could be reached for various reasons (see below).  The objective was to select 
respondents whose interviews presented triangulated perspectives on the events under study.  We 
sought out persons whose views were likely to conflict with the normally accepted views in order 
to gain a more comprehensive insight and to find out where we needed to dig deeper into the issues.   
                                                                




Most of these interviews were conducted in the Gauteng Province - Johannesburg and 
Pretoria. This is because most headquarters of banks, regulatory agencies and relevant government 
departments are based there. Other interviews were conducted in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal. The 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, the Faculty of Law, graciously provided access to its facilities and 
the use of Library. Interview protocols were developed with key themes to be covered with the 
various identified sources; regulators, regulatory supervisory bodies, regulated businesses and law 
enforcement agencies/officers and experts. 
The total number of participants formally reached during the field work was 20 (See 
breakdown in Table 1 in Appendix 1.1.) and issues canvassed were dictated by the nature of the 
institution or the individual that was to be interviewed. This could be viewed as a good response 
for the study although a number of anticipated interviews did not take place. For instance, 
interviews were organized with the Department of Finance, a government department directly 
responsible for the AML regime and under which the FIC reports. With the Department of Finance, 
an interview was agreed upon (date, venue and time set), but on arrival we were informed that it 
was a mistake for the Department to agree to our interview because the Department never 
participates in student-led research. While we did express our disbelief in these claims, our strategy 
was not to compel any participant to partake in research against their will.   
The Financial Intelligence Centre did not respond to numerous emails and telephone 
messages sent to some of its personnel, including its Director, Mr. Murray Mitchell. However on 
speaking to other participants about other issues, it emerged that the Director and many of his 
senior managers are constantly very busy, sometimes with international duties of the FATF and 
were constantly outside the country on such duties. Other regulatory supervisory bodies such as 
the Financial Services Board (FSB), the Estate Agency Affairs Board (EAAB), and Law Society 
of South Africa were also contacted several times without success.  What compensated for not 
meeting anyone at the FIC were their official annual reports and reports done by the FATF and the 




Finance of the National Assembly which were found and personally transcribed by the author from 
the Parliamentary Monitoring Group’s archives.   
While the focus on business regulations was on the banking sector, an effort was made to 
appreciate the implementation efforts in various other sectors such as the accounting, auditing, 
insurance, legal, and estate agencies. Although efforts did not succeed in some industries, others 
were forthcoming with information, which helped this researcher to appreciate the dynamics and 
complexities of South Africa’s implementation efforts of the FATF standards outside of the 
banking sector. Some complementary information was also available through other secondary 
sources such as media statements and written representations submitted to the South African 
parliament during legislative deliberations. This study could not possibly cover all these sectors in 
its analysis and a decision had been made prior to field work to focus on the banking sector as it 
affects more individuals, businesses (some of whom are regulated to comply with the AML/CTF 
standards) and households in the country, as they all use banking services. More reasons for 
choosing to focus on the banking sector are given in Chapter 6.  
 
Selection of Respondents 
Respondents were chosen by means of convenience and snowball sampling.  This is a 
technique used where the population of persons eligible to be interviewed is unknown. In 
snowballing, the researcher starts with a few key contacts and, from each one, seeks the names of 
other knowledgeable persons who might be contacted for interviews.  The researcher must take 
care to move beyond friendship groups and to diversify those being interviewed.  In this case, the 
networks explored spanned several different kinds of expert. A first group of respondents were 
regulators.  The central institution responsible for the regulation of private businesses to combat 
money laundering in South Africa is the Financial Intelligence Centre, which reports to the 




a Director. It shares its role of regulating private businesses for anti-money laundering purposes 
with various sector-specific regulatory bodies.  
These sector-specific regulators are not only responsible for co-supervising AML 
compliance together with the FIC, but also for a range of other regulatory requirements emanating 
from other laws. Since the focus of this study was on banking institutions, the key supervisory 
body that our data collection focused on was the South African Reserve Bank’s Banking 
Supervision Division, which is responsible for prudential regulation of all banking institutions 
operating in South Africa. The Banking Supervision Division is headed by the Registrar of Banks 
who is responsible for the overall regulation under South Africa’s Banks Act, Act No. 94 of 1990. 
The next group was regulated businesses.  
There are two forms of regulated businesses under FICA. Some are referred to as 
‘accountable institutions’ and others as ‘reporting institutions’. ‘Accountable institutions’ are 
listed in Schedule 1 of FICA and include such institutions as banks, estate agents, lawyers, brokers, 
casinos and many more. ‘Reporting institutions’ are listed in Schedule 3. The main difference 
between accountable and reporting institutions is that the former perform more regulatory 
functions than reporting institutions that are only regulated to identify and verify customers and to 
report suspicious and threshold transactions to the FIC. Accountable institutions do more including 
such functions as training staff members, appointing money laundering compliance officers and 
keeping records for a mandatory 5 year period305. In this study we refer to both accountable and 
reporting institutions as regulated businesses. This is merely because it is the business services and 
products that they provide which make them the subjects of AML regulations.  
For the purposes of this study, a decision was taken to focus only on banking institutions. 
The reasons for choosing the banks are discussed in Chapter 6. The target for interviews was a 
convenient sample of the major local banks operating in South Africa, which are regulated by 
                                                                




FICA and its regulations, the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations (AMLRs) of 2002. Law 
enforcement agencies were a third group of respondents. They are, in a way, key to the 
administration of the AML regulations. This is simply because the FIC must feed them with 
financial intelligence that it collects or receives. This is expected to assist LEAs in their 
investigations by either initiating or providing intelligence and evidence leads on ongoing 
investigations306. A number of individuals and organisations were also identified as relevant in 
providing relevant information when it comes to the implementation and compliance with the 
AML businesses regulations. Some of these institutions included SABRIC, other supervisory 
bodies outside banking such as the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors and professional 
associations and organisations such as the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants, the 
Estate Agency Affairs Board, the Financial Services Board, the Law Society of South Africa, 
among others, academics and expert practitioners.  
 The main themes covered with regulators and regulatory supervisory bodies included: 
understanding their role and mandate; the history of the regulatory regime and efforts made to 
implement it within the banking sector; the successes and challenges of implementing AML 
regulations in various sectors in South Africa, particularly the banking sector; and South Africa’s 
role in ensuring compliance within the Southern Africa region and its interactions with other 
international bodies. The main themes covered with regulated businesses’ compliance officers 
included the legal and regulatory requirements; how their banks have, since the coming into force 
of the regulations, tried to implement and comply with them; understanding the successes and 
challenges encountered with implementation ab initio; current challenges in the working of the 
regime; costs incurred by banks in implementing the regime since inception; organizational 
compliance or governance structure and the place of AML compliance within the whole 
‘regulatory universe’ of the bank. This included such issues as various job positions and seniority, 
experience of staff, recruitment, training and other internal logistical and compliance issues.  
                                                                




Other themes included the working relationships between the bank and the AML regulators 
and the supervisory body (the FIC and the South African Reserve Bank respectively); and 
understanding the working relationship between the bank and the various law enforcement 
agencies, especially in the exchange of information needed for investigative and prosecutorial 
purposes. With the law enforcement agencies (LEAs), the following themes were covered; the 
organised crime situation in the country; the legal mandate, functions and powers of specific LEAs; 
organised crime related laws and opinions on their adequacy or gaps in dealing with the country’s 
organized crime situation; organisational working relationship with the FIC and regulated 
businesses on issues of financial intelligence; examples of cases that have been solved through 
using financial intelligence emanating from the FIC; opinions on regulated businesses’ compliance 
with the AML regulations, asset forfeiture and confiscation successes and challenges. Another 
important issue was the one of transformation within the criminal justice system, especially in the 
wake of the disbandment of the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) by the South African 
government in 2009, following a resolution taken by the ANC to disband it at its Polokwane 
Conference in December 2007. This issue is somewhat relevant but it requires a research study on 
its own.  
Themes covered with other actors that fell outside of the above categories were on the 
general crime situation in the country, particularly organized and commercial crimes; the country’s 
political authority and will, legislative and regulatory capacity to deal with these crime 
phenomena; opinions on implementation, compliance and enforcement of the AML business 
regulations by various regulated businesses; and participant’s roles or involvement in fighting 







Data Collection  
Most of the secondary data was collected in libraries in London and South Africa, internet 
websites of organisations mentioned above and subscribed databases, particularly of the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group, an organisation which monitors and records portfolio committee 
proceedings in South Africa.  Archival research was conducted in South Africa as well. Interview 
data was collected through face-to-face interviews which were conducted in South Africa in 2009. 
The interviews were mainly of 1 hour duration, but since they were semi-structured, others took 
quite long, over an hour, but mostly not more than 2 hours. Many of the interviews were conducted 
at the offices of the participants, but others were conducted in public places such as cafes or 
restaurants.  While some were conducted during working hours, a few took place after hours or on 
weekends in public places. Only one interview was conducted at a private residential home of a 
participant.  
Data was stored in a password-protected digital recorder. All interviews were recorded, but 
notes were also taken by hand as a backup to occasional failures in technology. The recorded 
interviews were then downloaded into a password-protected hard drive for backup and were 
listened to and transcribed, word-for-word, by the author. This was a very laborious exercise given 
limited resources and also involved ethical issues. Transcription started during field research in 
South Africa, but a large part of it was undertaken in London.   
 
Data Analysis  
Our data analysis scheme followed the causal and interpretive approach. This entailed 
grouping data according to themes that helped us to test our competing hypotheses. We were trying 
to test the extent to which the public and private interest hypotheses explain the emergence and 
eventual incorporation of the regime. We were also trying to interpret how the FATF model was 




to what was implemented.  Data analysis was continuously undertaken from the beginning of the 
project as the study not only relied on interviews but also upon documentary research. With field 
research, the first step after the interviews involved organizing and preparing data for analysis307. 
The recorded audio data was listened to several times (sometimes while travelling) and was 
transcribed by the author. Although time-consuming, this enabled us to reflect on the data while 
transcribing. Key conceptual and analytic categories were identified and data selected according 
to relevance to those topics.  N-vivo software was considered as an option but early testing led to 
its replacement by a manual process.   
Using typed electronic format transcripts made it easier to sort out the data later according 
to different themes. Most interview data is reported in Chapters 6 and 7, where it is not just used 
on its own, but it is presented together with other documentary data collected from various sources. 
Here, most of the interview data emanated from both regulated and law enforcement agencies and 
covered such themes as the use and management of suspicious transaction reports for law 
enforcement purposes.   
 
Ethical Issues  
Prior to conducting the field work, this study received an ethics approval from Kings 
College Research Ethics Committee under protocol number REP-L/08/09-10. Research ethics 
approval is required for all studies that involve human participants. This is done to protect the 
wishes of participants and their rights. Participants in this research participated either as 
representatives of institutions or in their individual capacity. They were handed out an ‘information 
sheet’ which explained the basic purposes of the research and their role in the study. It also 
informed them that their participation was voluntary and that they were under no obligation to 
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participate in the study. We also gave them an opportunity to withdraw their participation from the 
study at any time before a specified date (February 2010).  None of the participants withdrew from 
the study. They were assured of the confidentiality of their identities in any publications produced. 
The participants were given the information sheet to keep - with contact information of the 
researcher and of Kings College London. They were also made to sign a ‘consent form’ authorizing 
the recording of interviews and the keeping and usage of their data in this study and subsequent 
publications by this researcher. During the data collection phase there was a perception on the part 
of this researcher that issues of money laundering and financial intelligence are often regarded as 
highly secretive when some of them are clearly not, especially issues covered by this research 
which mainly had to do with governance rather than money laundering and specific financial 
intelligence itself. The public perceptions of secrecy made many of my informants to elect not to 
be referred to by name in any publication.  They also wished that no structural information be 




In this Chapter we located the study within the domain of regulation, discussing the concept 
of regulation and the competing regulation theories of public and private interest. We then weaved 
these theories, which were also used to develop our research hypotheses, with the research 
methodologies and also discussed our case study research design. The research methods used in 
this study use a causal and interpretive logic that relied largely on documentary and interview data. 
In the next Chapter we begin to describe the AML legal, regulatory and institutional framework in 






South Africa’s AML/CTF regime: laws, regulations and institutions 
 
Introduction 
The fight against the proceeds of crime, or money laundering, has become synonymous 
with the fight against organised crime in many countries where legislative and policy measures, 
are underpinned by a philosophy that organised criminals commit crime primarily and mainly for 
financial gain.  In other words criminals are seen as entrepreneurs and their organisations as 
enterprises. In a similar way that legitimate businesses that do not make profits collapse, the 
solution goes; criminals should be made insolvent and liquidated through such schemes as asset 
confiscation and forfeiture. As a result of such reasoning, one of the key strategies used by many 
governments in fighting organised crime has been to attack the criminal proceeds through seizing 
them.  
In this chapter we describe the legal, regulatory and institutional framework that South 
Africa has developed to deal with organised crime, money laundering and terrorist financing. The 
main focus is on the laws, regulations and institutions/agencies that South Africa has put in place 
or given powers to in order to deal with these issues of crime. It has sometimes been argued that 
the country’s problem of organised crime, or its increase, could most probably be explained 
through the country’s transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994308. However, a look at the 
legislation developed, starting from 1992 onwards, does not suggest this to be the case. Instead, 
legislative developments show a pattern similar to that in many other neighbouring countries that 
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did not have apartheid rule309. We start by taking an historical look at the development of the 
offence of money laundering as a central strategy or technique of dealing with organised crime in 
South African law. Building from that, we then look at the legal, regulatory and institutional 
framework that has been developed over the years.  
 
Problems in the struggle against organised crime 
South Africa’s organized crime situation was generally viewed as having escalated 
following the country’s transition from apartheid to democracy310. There were, at the same time, 
issues of weakness of institutions and lack of a comprehensive statutory framework to fight 
organised crime311. It was argued that criminal laws on their own were very weak to deal with 
organised groups who made large profits from their crimes312. While some laws existed to try and 
deal with the problem of both drug-related crimes and money laundering they were regarded as 
outdated and as not bringing South Africa into line with the UN Vienna Convention against Illicit 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988313. This led the new South African government to 
embark on a concerted legislative drive to reform both the institutions and the laws that would be 
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used to fight organised crime. Central to these reforms were new laws which were aimed at 
criminalizing the possession, exchange or use of proceeds of crime. With these new laws, new 
state institutions were also introduced to ensure implementation and enforcement.  Below, we look 
at the development of these laws. 
 
The criminalisation of money laundering in South African law 
The offence of ‘money laundering’ in South African law was formally introduced by the 
Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act, (Act 42 of 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Drugs Act). In the 
Drugs Act, the offence of money laundering only addressed the proceeds of drug-related offences. 
It should be noted that even at a global level, this was the trend at that time. The UN and the FATF 
initially sought the criminalisation of possession, use or exchange of drug-related crime proceeds. 
In 1996, the new South African democratic parliament passed legislation known as the Proceeds 
of Crime Act, (Act 76 of 1996, hereinafter referred to as the PCA).  The PCA broadened South 
Africa’s legislative focus on money laundering beyond the drug-related offences to include all 
types of predicate offences. However, a much broader overhaul of South African law was soon 
introduced by the Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the 
POCA), which introduced ‘civil forfeiture’ of proceeds of crime (see later below).  This piece of 
legislation repealed the money laundering provisions of the Drugs Act and incorporated the whole 
of the PCA. Alongside the POCA, another key legislation known as the Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act of 2001 (or FICA) was promulgated.  
These two statutes, POCA and FICA, form the backbone of South Africa’s current legal 
and regulatory framework against organised crime and, as shall be shown below, focus on a central 
strategy of attacking the proceeds of crime. They also brought into line the country’s legal and 
institutional systems with the recommendations of the FATF. Alongside POCA and FICA, it is 




(hereinafter referred to as the NPAA). This is because it was in the NPAA where some critical law 
enforcement institutions to enforce the provisions of POCA were set out. In speaking of such 
institutions we refer to such bodies as the Asset Forfeiture Unit, the then Directorate of Special 
Operations (popularly known as the Scorpions, now disbanded) and the office of the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions, who exercises extensive powers given to him by POCA (see later 
below). There are also a number of other enactments that complement POCA and FICA such as 
the Extradition Amendment Act (Act No. 77) of 1996, the International Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters Act (No. 75) of 1998, the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and 
Related Activities Act (No. 33) of 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the Terrorism Act of 2004), and 
the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (No. 12) of 2004. Below, we start by 
discussing the provisions of POCA. In doing so, we also discuss legislation that it amended or was 
amended by, such as the PCA, the Drugs Act of 1992 and others mentioned above.  
 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998 
POCA was enacted to introduce measures to combat organised crime and money 
laundering314.  It provides for: ‘the prohibition of money laundering’; ‘recovery of proceeds of 
unlawful activity’; and ‘civil forfeiture’ of criminal property that has been used to commit an 
offence or ‘instrumentalities of crime’315. It also provides for ‘civil forfeiture’ of ‘property that is 
proceeds of unlawful activity’ or property that is ‘owned or controlled by, or on behalf of, an entity 
involved in terrorist and related activities’316. POCA further provides for the establishment of the 
‘Criminal Assets Recovery Account’. It also amended the Drugs Act of 1992, and repealed the 
PCA by incorporating its provisions, although with some modifications (see below)317.  POCA 
came into force in January 1999 and below we discuss in some detail some of its key provisions.  
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General money laundering offences  
POCA does not define money laundering318, but creates two sets of offences that prohibit 
it, namely: 1. offences involving ‘possession, use or exchange’ of ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’ 
and 2. offences involving ‘possession, use or exchange of proceeds of a pattern of racketeering 
activity’319.  Offences involving ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’ are found in Chapter 3 of POCA, 
while offences involving a ‘pattern of racketeering activity’320 are dealt with in Chapter 2 of 
POCA.   
 
Offences relating to ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’ 
The first set of money laundering offences is crimes involving the proceeds of unlawful 
activities. Section 1 of POCA defines the ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’321 as ‘any property or 
any service advantage, benefit or reward which was derived, received or retained in connection 
with or as a result of any unlawful activity carried on by any person’322. Such proceeds could have 
been ‘derived, received or retained, directly or indirectly, in the Republic or elsewhere’, and ‘at 
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any time before or after the commencement’ of POCA323. These provisions put an emphasis on 
the extraterritoriality and retrospective nature of the offence of money laundering (see below). The 
basis for extraterritoriality appears to emanate from the fact that POCA is also directed at fighting 
transnational crime as money laundering and organized crime are regarded, in the preamble of 
POCA, as ‘international security threats’ which require South Africa to adopt ‘extra-territorial’ 
measures to deal with them324. This could also be explained in line with South Africa’s 
international obligations of co-operation with other countries in the fight against transnational 
crime as a signatory to the UN Vienna Convention of 1988 and as a country that has committed 
itself to comply with the FATF standards.  
The issue of retrospective application of the ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’ definition, and 
other aspects of POCA, was raised in the Carolus325 judgment in 1999.  The initial definition of 
the ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’ did not make provisions for the retrospective nature of some 
parts of POCA, leading to the state losing some of its early applications for forfeiture326. The state, 
in the Carolus case, appealed against two decisions in the lower courts dismissing its applications 
for forfeiture orders of criminally acquired property on the grounds that such property was acquired 
before the commencement of POCA. POCA was mute on this issue. This led Judge Farlam AJA, 
at paragraph 31 Carolus judgment, to reject the NDPP’s appeal as follows: 
...no statute is to be construed as having retrospective operation (in the sense of 
taking away or impairing a vested right acquired under existing laws) unless the 
legislature clearly intended the statute to have that effect… 
As a result of this adverse decision for the state, the words “...at any time before or after 
the commencement of this Act…” were added to the definition of ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’ 
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and other provisions, in the POCA Amendment Act of 1999. ‘Unlawful activity’ is defined in 
POCA as ‘conduct which constitutes a crime’ or ‘which contravenes any law of South Africa’327. 
This definition makes the reach of POCA very wide as many offenses which are actually minor 
misdemeanours and not organised crime are also covered. For instance, it is a criminal offence to 
drive a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in many countries. However such conduct 
could hardly be categorized as constituting organised crime, but merely as a traffic offence. One 
major question has been whether traffic offences should also be regarded as organised crime or 
not for purposes of forfeiting cars of drunken drivers as ‘instrumentalities of an offence’328. We 
return to this later but for now we are still on the POCA definition of ‘unlawful activity’ which is 
‘conduct which constitutes a crime’ or ‘which contravenes any law of South Africa’. POCA 
provides that such conduct may have occurred before or after the commencement of POCA and 
may have occurred within South Africa or elsewhere (thus emphasizing the retrospectivity and 
extraterritoriality of POCA).  
POCA broadly defines ‘property’ as ‘money or any other movable, immovable, corporeal 
or incorporeal thing and includes any rights, privileges, claims and securities and any interest 
therein and all proceeds thereof’329.  An additional definition of ‘property’ was added to POCA in 
2003 following South Africa’s enactment of the Terrorism Act (POCDATARA). This additional 
definition defines ‘property associated with terrorist and related activities’ as property which  
a) ‘was acquired, collected, used, possessed, owned or provided for the benefit of, or on 
behalf of, or at the direction of, or under the control of an entity which commits or 
attempts to commit or facilitate the commission of a specified offence as defined in the 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 
2004; or 
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b) has provided financial or economic support to an entity in the commission or 
facilitation of an offence referred to in paragraph (a)’.  
Offences specified as relating to ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’ are covered in Section 4 
of Chapter 3 of POCA which provides that a person ‘who knows’ or ‘ought reasonably to have 
known’ that ‘property is or forms part of the proceeds of unlawful activities, commits an offence 
if he enters into any agreement [whether such agreement is legally binding or not], arrangement or 
transaction in connection with the property or performs any other act in connection with the 
property which has the effect or is likely to have the effect of  
(i) ‘concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, disposition or movement of the 
property or the ownership of the property or any interest in that property; or  
(ii) enabling or assisting any person who committed an offence to avoid prosecution or to 
remove or diminish any property acquired as a result of an offence’330.  
Secondly, an offence is also committed if a person ‘knows or ought to have reasonably 
known that another person has obtained the proceeds of unlawful activities and enters into any 
transaction, agreement or arrangement in terms of which  
(i) ‘the retention or control by or on behalf of that other person of the proceeds of unlawful 
activity is facilitated; or  
(ii) the proceeds are used to make funds available to that person, to acquire property on his 
behalf, or to benefit him in any other way’331.  
Another money laundering offence is also committed, under Section  6, if a person 
‘acquires, uses or possesses property’ and that person ‘knows’ or ‘ought reasonably to have 
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known’ that ‘such property is or forms part of the proceeds of unlawful activities of another 
person’332.  
In the above Chapter 3 offences, there is a recurrence of the phrases ‘knows’ or ‘ought 
reasonably to have known’. This denotes that these offences, as Smit has correctly pointed out, 
can only be committed by a person ‘who knows’ or a person ‘who ought reasonably to have 
known’ that the property concerned constituted the proceeds of unlawful activities333.  As Smit 
says, the definitions of these phrases in POCA leave no doubt that the criteria required to establish 
guilt would be either ‘intent’ or ‘negligence’334. POCA states that in order to determine this 
‘knowledge’, a person ‘knows’ if he/she ‘has actual knowledge of the fact’ or the court is satisfied 
that;  
i) ‘the person believes that there is a reasonable possibility of the existence of that 
fact, and  
ii) he or she fails to obtain information to confirm the existence of that fact.’ 
(omission)  
In other words, ‘an individual who believes that there is a possibility that the property dealt 
with is the proceeds of criminal activities, but turns a blind eye to the possibility, may expose 
him/herself to criminal liability’335. A person ‘ought reasonably to have known or suspected a fact 
if the conclusions that he or she ought to have reached are those which would have been reached 
by a reasonably diligent and vigilant person having both:  
i) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that may reasonably be expected 
of a person in his or her position; and  
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ii) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that he or she in fact has336. 
As noted by Smit, the definition of ‘ought reasonably to have known’ emphasizes the 
negligence aspect of the offence of money laundering337. This places a duty of diligence on every 
person or organization that may be at risk of coming into contact with the proceeds of criminal 
activities338. This means that regulated persons and businesses under FICA, as discussed later, are 
duty bound to acquire the knowledge, skill and experience and to undergo the training that will be 
necessary to identify situations where they may be dealing with the proceeds of crime. This duty, 
as Smit puts it, requires that persons or organizations ‘constantly apply their acquired knowledge, 
skill and training and experience to ensure that they are alert when coming across something out 
of the ordinary or suspicious’339. 
 
Offences relating to ‘proceeds of a racketeering activity’  
The second set of money laundering offences relate to proceeds of a ‘pattern of racketeering 
activity’340 which is defined in POCA as a ‘planned, ongoing, continuous or repeated participation 
or involvement in any offence referred to in Schedule 1’341 of POCA. Such participation or 
involvement should include at least two offences listed in Schedule 1, of which one of the offences 
should have occurred after the commencement of POCA and the last offence must have occurred 
within 10 years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of such prior 
offence. Schedule 1 of POCA lists a number of such predicate offences such as fraud, kidnapping, 
robbery, extortion and many others. The offences relating to the proceeds of a pattern of 
racketeering activity are contained in Chapter 2 of POCA. This chapter, among other things, 
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provides for offences relating to ‘receipt, use or investment’ of proceeds of a pattern of 
racketeering activity.  
 
Assets Forfeiture 
One of the main objectives of POCA is to prevent criminals or anyone else (except the 
state) from benefiting from the proceeds of criminal activities342. (Many of the cases referred to 
here are summarized in Appendix 4.1.). In the R O Cook Properties343 case Judges Mpati DP and 
Cameron AJA, sum up (at par 18) the purposes of POCA as interrelated and including (a) removing 
incentives for crime; (b) deterring persons from using or allowing their property to be used in 
crime, (c) eliminating or incapacitating some of the means by which crime may be committed 
(‘neutralising’ property that has been used and may again be used in crime) and (d) advancing the 
ends of justice by depriving those involved of the property concerned. In another judgment O’ 
Reagan ADCJ of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, confirms the general understanding of 
purposes of asset forfeiture laws. She says the two main purposes of these provisions are: 1. 
‘deterrence: to ensure that people are deterred in general from joining the ranks of criminals by the 
realisation that they will be prevented from enjoying the proceeds of the crime they may commit’, 
and 2. ‘prevention: the scheme seeks to remove from the hands of criminals the financial 
wherewithal to commit further crime’344.     
We argued that these instruments of asset forfeiture and the whole scheme of fighting 
organized crime through criminalization of proceeds reflect a particular approach to crime 
prevention; the situational crime prevention approach as made popular by Ronald Clarke in the 
1970s and 80s (see Chapter 2 above). These inter-related purposes as outlined by Mpati DP and 
Cameron AJA of the Supreme Court of Appeal and O’Reagan ADCJ, at the Constitutional Court 
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are consistent with various UN conventions aimed at fighting organized crime and the FATF 
standards. A related sentiment that flows from the judges’ analysis of POCA’s provisions for asset 
confiscation and forfeiture is that their primary purpose is not to punish offenders. O’Reagan 
ADCJ sums this up succinctly where she says that the ‘primary purpose seems rather to be to 
ensure that criminals cannot enjoy the fruits of their crimes’345. She adds that ‘it may well be that 
the achievement of this purpose might at times have a punitive effect, but that is not to say that the 
primary purpose is punitive’346.  
Consistent with the purposes referred to above, the provisions contained in Chapter 5 and 
6 of POCA provide for the forfeiture of proceeds of unlawful activities and ‘instrumentalities of 
an offence’. Chapter 5 provides for the ‘restraint’347, ‘confiscation’348 and ‘realisation’349 of 
property constituting the proceeds of crime. Chapter 6, on the other hand, provides for 
‘preservation’ and ‘forfeiture’ of proceeds of unlawful activity and ‘instrumentalities of an 
offence’ (see later). Chapter 5 is used where a defendant in a criminal case has been charged and 
is subsequently convicted of a criminal offence, while Chapter 6 requires no criminal 
charge/conviction. The latter means that criminal property or property that has been ‘concerned 
in’ the commission of a crime may be seized without convicting or even charging anyone with a 
criminal offence (see discussion of ‘instrumentalities of an offence’ below).  
POCA states that all asset forfeiture procedures in South Africa are ‘civil proceedings’, 
whether invoked in terms of Chapter 5 or Chapter 6. This means that in these proceedings, the 
standard of proof that needs to be satisfied is ‘on the balance of probabilities’ that the property to 
be confiscated or forfeit is more likely to be the benefit from proceeds of an offence or 
instrumentalities. All these proceedings are mainly initiated by the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions or his subordinates, through his/her written consent. The institution responsible for 
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asset forfeiture in South Africa is the Asset Forfeiture Unit, which was established in 1999350. The 
initial proceedings of restraining or preserving, freezing and confiscating of property take the form 
of an ex parte application brought by a prosecutor before a judge. Below we look at the provisions 
of Chapter 5 (restraint, confiscation and realisation orders) and then Chapter 6 (preservation and 
forfeiture orders).       
 
Restraint, confiscation and realisation orders 
Restraint, confiscation and realisation orders are provided for in Chapter 5 of POCA, which 
deals with conviction-based forfeiture of proceeds of unlawful activity. The conviction-based 
forfeiture is tied to a parallel criminal case. This means that forfeiture can only be successfully 
finalised (in favour of the State) once there is a criminal conviction in that case and other processes 
such as appeals have been finalised. The process of seizing assets could be initiated prior to or at 
any time during the course of the criminal proceedings, but before sentencing. There is a number 
of ways in which conviction-based forfeiture proceedings, in terms of Chapter 5, may commence. 
There are however two main ones which POCA provides for. These are restraint and confiscation 
orders. 
POCA empowers the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) to make an ex-
parte application to a High Court for a restraint order of property representing the value of benefit 
the defendant might have enjoyed from his or her criminal activities351. These are criminal 
activities he/she is about to be charged for, or has already been charged for or has been convicted 
of. Restraint orders effectively freeze the property concerned. When the NDPP applies for a 
restraint order, s/he seeks relief that prohibits the defendant or anyone else ‘from dealing in any 
manner with any property’ which may later be realised or paid to the state as proceeds of his/her 
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criminal activity. The purpose here is to ensure that such property does not disappear or get 
disposed of by the defendant or anyone else prior to the finalization of the criminal trial and the 
confiscation proceedings. There are a number of issues arising out of restraint orders. These 
include, for the most part, practical issues of living and legal expenses of the defendant and his 
family or dependants352.  
Section 26 (6) (a) allows the court to make an order to provide for use of some restrained 
assets for ‘reasonable living expenses’ of the respondent and ‘his or her family or household’. 
Provision is also made for ‘reasonable legal expenses’353. The respondent/defendant may apply to 
the court for the provision of these expenses. The court must also be satisfied that the respondent 
cannot meet his/her legal or living expenses without access to property that is under restraint. This 
means therefore that the respondent must as part of his or her request make a ‘full disclosure’ of 
all his assets and liabilities under oath354.  One other issue that has been litigated was the issue of 
rights of creditors of defendants whose property has been frozen, which was settled by the 
Constitutional Court in Fraser vs. ABSA Bank Limited. The question was whether or not the 
defendant (Fraser) could be allowed access to the frozen property even if that jeopardised ABSA’s 
concurrent claim on the frozen property. Judge Van Der Westhuisen held that the court had 
discretion to allow the defendant access to frozen property for reasonable legal expenses and such 
should not be ‘ring-fenced’ on the claims of concurrent creditors, turning down the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal355.  
When a criminal trial has been finalized and the accused is found guilty, the court making 
a conviction may, in terms of section 18 of POCA enquire into whether a benefit was derived from 
the offences or from other related criminal activity. If, after the section 18 enquiry, the court finds 
that the defendant did indeed benefit, it may order payment to the state of any amount it considers 
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appropriate. A confiscation order, therefore, is a ‘civil judgment for payment to the state of an 
amount of money determined by the court’356. It is ‘additional’ to criminal sanctions which ‘a court 
may impose following a criminal conviction’357. O’ Reagan ADCJ, correctly points out that the 
order that a court may make in terms of Chapter 5 of POCA ‘is not for the confiscation of a specific 
object, but an order for the payment of an amount of money to the state’358.  For instance, the 
defendant may fulfil a confiscation order by using other means of payment instead of having his 
restrained property executed against. 
  One of the thorny issues with confiscation orders has been the issue of determining the 
amount of benefit that should be confiscated. For instance in S v Shaik 359, the Constitutional Court 
had to decide on an appropriate amount to be forfeit following Mr. Shaik’s conviction on 
corruption charges. Shaik and his group of companies were, as the court found, corruptly given 
shareholding which earned them dividends over a period of time. The question was whether the 
net amount (value) of shareholding or the dividends as well should be confiscated. O’Reagan 
ADCJ held that POCA permits that all benefits that have arisen from the commission of a crime, 
whether directly or indirectly, may be confiscated by the trial court after a conviction. She further 
held that the trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate amount in any given case. 
Confiscation orders, as mentioned above, are civil judgments for payment to the state of amounts 
of money determined by the court. When this order is made, the respondent would, normally, pay 
such an amount as directed by court. Failure to do so would ultimately result in the state seeking a 
relief through a ‘realisation’ order.   
A ‘realization order’ is practically an execution order. The use of a realisation order would 
ordinarily flow from the defendant’s failure to comply with a confiscation order. In other words, 
the defendant’s failure to pay the state the amounts the court has determined as benefits from 
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criminal activities s/he has been convicted of. The main question around the realisation of property 
orders is what property can be sold to satisfy a confiscation order. ‘Realisable property’ means any 
property held by the defendant concerned or by any other person on his or her behalf360. This is 
property in which the defendant has an interest. It could be his/her house, car, shareholding in 
companies, savings or anything of value that could be used or sold to pay for his/her debt as in 
normal civil proceedings.  
This goes further to include property that the defendant has given to third parties, i.e. 
friends, family, even if such property was given to them as gifts. For instance, if the defendant had 
bought a house and registered it in the name of his/her spouse or another family member, such 
property could be executed against as an ‘affected gift’361. POCA defines, in section 12 (1), an 
‘affected gift’ as any gift made by the defendant concerned not more than 7 years before the 
institution of his/her prosecution or the institution of a restraint order application, whichever is 
earlier. The idea of affected gifts was meant to get around the hiding of criminal property by 
registering or keeping it under the names of third parties such as family, friends and private 
companies or other legal entities. Having looked at POCA Chapter 5 proceedings, particularly 
restraint and confiscation orders-- which are triggered by criminal charges and convictions, now 
we turn to look at Chapter 6 proceedings—which do not rely on criminal charges or convictions. 
 
Non-conviction based preservation and forfeiture orders 
Both preservation and forfeiture orders apply to the ‘in rem’ forfeiture proceedings and are 
found in Chapter 6 of POCA. The ‘in rem’ asset forfeiture orders are non-conviction based and 
are claimed to be against property, rather than a person. They do not depend on the charging or 
conviction of the respondent (or owner of such property). This means that any property could be 
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seized and forfeit to the state without charging anyone with any criminal offence, but by just 
proving, on balance of probabilities, that such property was instrumental in the commission of an 
offences by anyone, typically the target of an investigation or that such property is likely to be the 
proceeds of unlawful activity (including terrorism financing).  
Not all jurisdictions with asset forfeiture laws use the non-conviction based forfeiture 
mechanism362. There are currently a few countries that are reported to be using this system. These 
include the United States, some provinces of Canada and Australia (South and West), the UK, Fiji, 
South Africa and a few other countries363. However there are reports that many other countries are 
looking at adopting the non-conviction based forfeiture regimes, which are highly recommended 
by FATF. While the conviction-based forfeiture system, as discussed above, is controversial, it is 
eclipsed by the controversy of the non-conviction based forfeiture system in countries that run this 
model. In countries like the United States it has provoked extensive lobbying, leading, according 
to Gupta, to some toning down in US laws including especially the enactment of the Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000364.   
In South Africa, preservation orders serve a similar purpose as restraint orders. Their aim 
is to preserve property from being disposed of pending the finalization of forfeiture procedures. 
POCA gives the NDPP powers, under Section 38, to make an ex parte application for an order 
‘prohibiting any person from dealing in any manner with any property’. The High Court can issue 
such an order if it has ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that the property concerned; is ‘an 
instrumentality of an offence’, is the ‘proceeds of unlawful activities’ or is ‘associated with 
terrorist and terrorist-related activities’365. This order must specify what is to happen to the 
property while it gives a chance to all affected parties to contest the order or subsequent forfeiture. 
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The court may, therefore, order that such property be taken custody of by a police officer or be 
placed under the administration of a receiver or curator while these processes unfold. POCA gives 
the courts discretion to vary or rescind a preservation order on application by any party affected 
by it366. The grounds for such rescindment or variation could be that the operation of the order will 
‘deprive the applicant of the means to provide for his or her reasonable living expenses’ and may 
‘cause undue hardship’367.   
Further, the onus is on the applicant(s) to show that the hardship s/he may suffer, as a result 
of the order, ‘outweighs the risk that the property concerned may be destroyed, lost, damaged, 
concealed or transferred’368. Preservation orders expire in 90 days from the date in which they are 
granted, but are extendable through a new application to the issuing court. It is within this period 
of 90 days in which the NDPP, through the Asset Forfeiture Unit, must apply for a forfeiture order. 
The granting of a preservation order does not automatically or always translate into the granting 
of a forfeiture order. Protracted battles between those affected by these orders and the state usually 
ensue, as loosing property may not be a generally pleasant experience. Asset freezing and restraint 
orders are heavily litigated, according to Adv. Hofmeyr, who explained to us that 
“It’s just a problem that when you take people’s money, they would, frankly, rather 
spend the money paying lawyers to fight you than just to surrender meekly…It is 
still a frustration of how much of the money that’s frozen ends up being used up in 
litigation. In other countries the courts have started being serious about limiting 
how much can be used [on legal expenses] but our courts are still quite generous.” 
A forfeiture order serves the same purpose as a confiscation order under POCA’s Chapter 
5 proceedings. In making a forfeiture order a court may exclude some interests if it finds on the 
balance of probabilities that the party contesting the order had acquired the property concerned 
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legally and did not know or had no reasonable grounds to suspect that such property had been used 
to commit crime, or was proceeds of a crime or associated with terrorist activities369. However, the 
onus is on the respondent to convince the court on the balance of probabilities. This has become 
known as the ‘innocent owner defence’, following Judge Ackerman J’s reference in the Mohamed 
case370. The court makes a forfeiture order if it finds that, on ‘balance of probabilities’, the property 
concerned is an ‘instrumentality of an offence’, or ‘proceeds of unlawful activities’, or is associated 
with terrorist and related activities371.    
There is a difference between a confiscation order in terms of Chapter 5, and a forfeiture 
order in terms of Chapter 6 of POCA. While in terms of Chapter 5, a confiscation is not tied to any 
particular property, but on the value or amount of benefit that the defendant might have enjoyed 
as a result of criminal and associated criminal activities s/he had been convicted of, a forfeiture 
order is tied to a particular property. The NDPP must prove on ‘balance of probabilities’ that a 
particular or a specific property concerned is ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’ or is an 
‘instrumentality of an offence’. The courts have gone to great lengths in trying to clarify both these 
concepts as provided for in POCA. Three particular Supreme Court of Appeal judgments stand out 
in the clarification of these concepts: the NDPP v R O Cook Properties Limited372, the NDPP v 37 
Gillespie Street Pty (Ltd) and another373 and the NDPP v Seevnarayan374.  All these three 
judgments were handed down as a single judgment in the Supreme Court of Appeal by Judges 
Mpati DP and Cameron JA. They concerned appeals by the NDPP after various High Courts 
refused to grant the NDPP with forfeiture orders on the grounds that he had failed to prove that: 
the properties concerned were ‘instrumentalities of offences’, and had not succeeded in proving 
either that they were ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’.  
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While the NDPP appeals failed at the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), these three cases 
provide the guiding principles of the court’s interpretation of both these phrases; the 
‘instrumentality of an offence’ and ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’375. The court’s interpretation 
draws the line on what the authorities may cause to be forfeit and what they may not. This is 
because it appears that the authorities in South Africa, with the coming into force of POCA, have 
been overzealous, seeking to lay their hand on any property (even where it is unrelated to organised 
crime), including vehicles, as instrumentalities of an offence of driving under the influence of 
alcohol376. This seeming over-interpreting of forfeiture laws by the AFU has had the effect of net-
widening. For reasons of space we are unable to discuss the court’s interpretation of the proceeds 
of unlawful activity in the main text. We however attach Appendix 4.2. for our analysis of these 
two concepts of ‘instrumentality of an offence' and of ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’.   
 
Criminal Asset Recovery Account (CARA) 
 Chapter 7 of POCA provides for the establishment of a Criminal Assets Recovery Account 
(or CARA), within the national revenue fund377. It is in this CARA account where all moneys 
derived from the fulfilment of confiscation and forfeiture orders and proceeds of foreign forfeiture 
orders as contemplated in the International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act of 1998 are 
finally deposited. Chapter 7 also provides for the establishment of a Criminal Assets Recovery 
Committee. This Committee, among other things, advises the Cabinet on the utilization and 
allocation of funds in the CARA account (see the section on Asset Forfeiture Unit below for the 
amounts deposited in the CARA account and Chapter 7 on general AFU statistics). 
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POCA’s amendment of laws 
 Other issues worth noting about POCA are that it repealed a number of provisions from 
the Drugs Act of 1992 and also that it repealed and incorporated the whole of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act of 1996. POCA also amends some parts of the International Co-operation in Criminal 
Matters Act of 1998.  Since it came into force in 1999, it has been amended by about six pieces of 
legislation378. Below we look briefly at those important legislative enactments that POCA either 
amended or repealed before going on to look at the ones that significantly amend it.   
 
Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act of 1992 
The Drugs Act379 remains in force, having had some of its parts amended not only by 
POCA, but also by the now repealed Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996. Since the latter Act was 
repealed, the provisions that related to the Drugs Act got incorporated into POCA, although with 
improvements or variation. As mentioned elsewhere above, the Drugs Act of 1992, which came 
into operation on 30 April 1993, was the first South African legislation to introduce the offence of 
money laundering into South African law. However, money laundering activities, according to the 
Drugs Act, only related to proceeds of specific drug-related offences. This mirrored the narrow 
pattern of similar developments of anti-money laundering laws at a global level,  
Up until 1990, only a few countries such as the United States, Australia and the UK had 
criminalized the laundering of proceeds of serious crimes other than drugs. The Drugs Act also 
provided for the reporting of suspicious transactions involving the proceeds of drug-related 
offences. According to this Act, a director, manager or chief executive officer of a financial 
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institution was obliged to report his/her suspicions to a designated police officer of the South 
African Police Service380. The financial institutions obliged to report were banks, insurance 
companies, stock brokers and traders in financial instruments381. Another major new contribution 
of this Act was its provision for mechanisms for the restraining and confiscation of such proceeds 
by the police. Also important to note is the potential extra-territoriality of the offences relating to 
proceeds of drug-related crimes. The Drugs Act also provided for international assistance 
regarding the enforcement of foreign confiscation orders in respect of the proceeds of drug-related 
offences.   
There are a number of weaknesses that were identified in the Drugs Act382. The first and 
most obvious one is that it was only confined to drug-related crimes383, while organized criminals 
did not so confine themselves. The second is that the reporting regime introduced by the Drugs 
Act was only confined to financial institutions, while a number of other non-financial institutions 
could be used to launder criminal proceeds. According to the South African Law Commission, the 
Drugs Act did not provide any comprehensive measures through which money laundering could 
be controlled or combated384. According to Pieter Smit, now a senior manager at the Financial 
Intelligence Centre, the Drugs Act, by 2001, had not produced a single money laundering 
conviction385.  
This has been attributed to capacity problems in the South African Police Service and an 
absence of a coordinated transaction reporting and related regulatory scheme in the form of a 
                                                                
380 See SALC. 1996. Money laundering and related matters. South African Law Commission, Project 104: Issue Paper 
1, Pretoria. http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers/ip01_prj104_1996.pdf, SALC. 1996. Money laundering and 
related matters. South African Law Commission, Project 104: Discussion Paper 64, Pretoria. 
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385 See Smit, P. (2001). Clean Money, Suspect Source: Turning Organised Crime Against Itself. Pretoria:  Institute of 




financial intelligence unit386. The South African Law Commission was delegated to look into how 
South African law could be reformed in order to provide for a comprehensive legislative, 
institutional and regulatory scheme for dealing with money laundering387. The Law Commission 
came up with two consultative papers in 1996 that would later lead to the enactment of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001 (see Chapter 5).  
 
Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996 
The Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996 (or PCA) extended the offence of money laundering to 
non-drug related predicated crimes, such as common law and other statutory offences388. It also 
provided for the freezing, confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds of all types of crimes. The 
PCA provided for a general reporting obligation for businesses coming into possession of 
suspicious property. This reporting obligation extended the reporting net beyond financial 
institutions to include every individual in charge or involved in a business undertaking, which was 
indeed very broad and lacked clarity in various aspects. The PCA did not handle many applications 
as it was soon repealed and incorporated (with some amendments) into POCA of 1998. Before it 
was repealed, its forfeiture procedures were used at least three times389. However, an institutional 
regulatory scheme such as a financial intelligence unit was lacking390. This was only rectified when 
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001 was enacted—establishing, for the first time in South 
Africa, a financial intelligence unit as envisaged in the FATF standards.  
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Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 
While all the other Acts discussed above are mainly concerned with criminalizing money 
laundering and providing for confiscation and forfeiture of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, 
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as FICA) supplemented such 
objectives by establishing the institutional and regulatory framework for South Africa’s regime 
against money laundering. FICA, while it amended POCA, also complemented it in a number of 
ways. It was enacted in order to establish the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) and the Anti-
Money Laundering Advisory Council (AMLAC) in order to combat money laundering activities 
and the financing of terrorist and related activities391. It imposes certain duties on private 
businesses and persons who might be used for money laundering purposes and terrorist 
financing392.  It also creates a number of criminal offences for failure to comply with the 
obligations it creates. For all the obligations that FICA creates, there are corresponding offences 
which are backed by custodial sanctions or punitive fines which run to millions of rands. However 
it is important to note that all these criminal custodial sentences and heavy fines seem to have been 
provided for as a last resort so that they are there when the authorities need to use them in order to 
enforce compliance and to encourage cooperation or instead to make an example of some regulated 
bodies or individuals who show a cavalier attitude or laxity towards compliance.  
Unlike POCA where there is a growing body of case law, FICA’s criminal provisions 
remain largely untested in South Africa. There has only been one case where the FICA provisions 
achieved a conviction393. Even this conviction did not flow from a contested prosecution but rather 
from a plea-bargain agreement394. FICA came into force on February 2002, although some of its 
                                                                
391 See the long title of FICA. From now on, for ease of reading, I drop the phrase ‘and related activities’ when referring 
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and reading. We also use the phrase ‘terrorist financing’ and ‘financing of terrorism’ interchangeably. 
392 See FICA. 
393 Financial Intelligence Centre. 2008. Annual Report 2008, Pretoria, p. 4.  These convictions were a result of a plea 






provisions only came into effect in 2003, five years after POCA was enacted. Chapter 1 of FICA 
makes provisions for the establishment of the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), and Chapter 2 
provides for the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering Advisory Council (AMLAC). 
Chapter 3 outlines the Anti-Money Laundering Control measures while Chapter 4 establishes a 
number of offences and penalties. We start by discussing Chapter 1 provisions. Since Chapter 1 
provides for the creation of FIC, we merely outline what the law provides for. Later in this chapter, 
we discuss the institutions it established and those that interact with its provisions.   
 
Financial Intelligence Centre 
Section 2 of FICA establishes the FIC as ‘an institution outside the public service but within 
the public administration as envisaged in section 195 of the Constitution of South Africa395. As a 
result of this constitutional caveat, the FIC is one of several independent administrative bodies 
reporting to the Minister of Finance, but enjoined by Chapter 10 of the Constitution to uphold the 
administrative values embedded in it. The principal objective of FIC is to assist in the identification 
of proceeds of unlawful activities and the combating of money laundering activities and terrorism 
financing396. The second objective of the Centre is to make the information it collects available to 
investigating agencies, intelligence services and the South African Revenue Service for law 
enforcement purposes397. The last main objective is for the Centre to exchange information with 
similar bodies in other countries regarding money laundering activities and similar offences398.   
The Act also provides for the functions399 of the FIC, which are to:  
a) process, analyse and interpret information disclosed to it and obtained by it within its 
operational mandate;  
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b) inform, advise and cooperate with investigating authorities, supervisory bodies, the 
South African Revenue Service and the intelligence services;  
c) monitor and give guidance to accountable institutions, supervisory bodies and other 
persons regarding the performance by them of their duties and their compliance with FICA 
provisions; and  
d) retain the information it collects or receives.    
Section 5-16 provides for general powers of FIC ranging from the appointment of its staff and its 
head to its responsibilities, security screening of staff, management of funds and accountability 
mechanisms as an independent body400. 
 
Anti-Money Laundering Advisory Council  
The Anti-Money Laundering Advisory Council (or AMLAC) is established in terms of 
section 17 of FICA.  Its functions are to advise the Minister of Finance, under which the FIC falls, 
on policies and best practice to identify the proceeds of unlawful activities and to combat money 
laundering activities. AMLAC is tasked with advising the Minister of Finance on discharging 
his/her powers as entrusted in him/her by FICA401. The Council is further charged with advising 
the FIC concerning the performance of its functions. AMLAC is supposed to act as a forum in 
which the FIC, associations representing categories of regulated businesses, organs of state and 
supervisory bodies can consult one another402. The FIC is expected to provide AMLAC with 
administrative and secretarial support.  
AMLAC is made up of the FIC Director and the executive heads of the following state 
agencies: the National Treasury, South African Police Services, Department of Justice and 
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Constitutional Development, the National Prosecuting Authority, the National Intelligence 
Agency, South African Secret Service and the South African Revenue Services. It is also 
composed of representatives of the various categories of regulated businesses, supervisory bodies 
or any other bodies as nominated by these groups and requested by the Minister of Finance. The 
Minister of Finance appoints the chairperson of AMLAC from these representatives.  
 
Regulatory supervisory bodies 
 The supervisory bodies are industry regulators responsible for industry-wide regulation of 
their sectors. They were given powers by FICA to co-supervise AML /CTF compliance of their 
specific industries or professions with the FIC. FICA lists only 8 Supervisory Bodies in Schedule 
2 of the Act. These are the Financial Services Board which supervises various types of financial 
services providers; the South African Reserve Bank which is responsible mainly for banks and 
foreign exchange dealers; the Registrar of Companies, the Estate Agency Affairs Board - real 
estate agencies, the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors (IRBA) - for auditors, National 
Gambling Board - for casinos, the Law Society of South Africa for legal professionals and the JSE 
Securities Exchange for securities and commodity dealers. This Schedule of supervisory bodies is 
outdated as it refers to bodies which do not exist anymore (such as the Public Accountants and 
Auditors Board, which was replaced by the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors (IRBA)) 
and required or was in the process of getting amended during our field work403. While FICA gives 
these bodies functions to supervise regulated businesses, it initially did not give them powers to 
enforce compliance404. However, the FICA Amendment Act of 2008 has, according to the FIC, 
closed this gap by giving supervisory bodies more powers to ensure compliance within their 
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various sectors.  However, the Amendment Act seems to have been met with some stiff opposition 
by some supervisory bodies and regulated businesses405.  
 It is important to mention that there are a number of regulated businesses or professions 
which do not have a supervisory body under FICA. One of these involves motor vehicle dealers, 
who do not have an industry-specific regulatory authority that can be appointed under FICA to 
supervise them. Even with those FICA regulated industries with supervisory bodies, there are some 
challenges. For instance attorneys are regulated by their provincial law societies, which are not 
listed as supervisory bodies under FICA but only the Law Society of South Africa -- a national 
body which does not supervise lawyers directly but through autonomous provincial societies.  
 
Money Laundering Control Measures (AML business regulations) 
Consistent with its objective of imposing certain duties on institutions and other persons 
who might be used for money laundering and terrorist financing, Chapter 3 of FICA sets out 
measures to control money laundering. It is divided into five parts. Part 1 deals with the duty to 
identify clients, part 2 with the duty to keep records, part 3 with reporting duties and access to 
information and part 4 with measures to monitor compliance by ‘accountable institutions’. Part 5 
deals with the referral of suspicious transactions to investigating agencies and with the supervision 
of ‘accountable institutions’ by the supervisory bodies and the FIC.  The obligations imposed by 
FICA on regulated businesses or ‘accountable institutions’ are detailed in the Anti-Money 
Laundering Regulations of 2001 (as amended) which complement FICA.  
It is the regulatory functions that FICA and its regime imposes on private businesses that 
are at the core of this research. This is because it is these control measures which are the AML 
business regulations in South Africa. These control measures are FATF-inspired. They require 
                                                                




private businesses to perform quasi-policing functions in order to help in detecting money 
laundering and terrorism financing. We have made an appendix406 of a discussion of these 
regulations as they are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. These are regulatory duties to: identify clients 
and verify their residential addresses (KYC/CDD); mandatory keeping of records for extended 
periods of time; report various types of customer transactions to the Financial Intelligence Centre; 
establish internal compliance systems which include the training of staff and; appoint compliance 
officers407. Failure to comply with any of these duties is a criminal offence and may lead to fines 
and custodial sentences against employees. These offences and penalties are covered in Chapter 4 
of FICA, sections 46 to 71408.  
FICA amended a number of pieces of legislation, but particularly POCA. The main 
provision of a duty to report transactions was incorporated into FICA from section 7 of POCA, 
removing such duty from POCA. This duty had been inherited by POCA from the Proceeds of 
Crime Act of 1996 and the Drugs Act of 1992. In FICA, this duty to report transactions is 
accompanied by comprehensive regulatory obligations for businesses such as staff training, record 
keeping, appointment of compliance officers and so on. FICA has also been amended by two 
pieces of legislation; the POCDATARA (Terrorism Act of 2004) and the Financial Intelligence 
Centre Amendment Act of 2008.  
 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004     
One event that led to the passing of this Act was the twin-tower bombings in the US on 
September 11 2001. After these bombings, the UN Security Council made a resolution prompting 
its member countries to fight international terrorism and its financing409. The Financial Action 
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Task Force also added nine special recommendations urging its members and other countries to 
incorporate the terrorism measures within their anti-money laundering legislation. The underlying 
reasoning for this, as expressed by the FATF, is that terrorists (although their motivations are not 
primarily profit making) use legitimate businesses like profit-motivated criminals in order to 
finance their activities, cleanse funds and move them across borders. As a result of this, they should 
be monitored and reported on like organized criminals, by private businesses. In response to these 
global developments and South Africa’s first mutual evaluation410 by the IMF and the FATF, the 
South African parliament passed the Terrorism Act in 2004. What this Act does is to append the 
responsibilities of fighting terrorist financing into FICA and its regulations. It also appends these 
responsibilities to POCA’s asset forfeiture regime. 
 
Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act, 2008 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act of 2008 (or FICA Amendment Act) was 
initiated by the Centre through a discussion document circulated in 2006411. There were a number 
of concerns which the IMF and the FATF raised in their first mutual evaluation of South Africa 
which required some enactment and improvement412. These pointed to loopholes in the 
administration, compliance and enforcement mechanisms of South Africa’s AML regime413.  The 
FIC published a discussion document in 2006 which pointed to lack of adequate powers to 
encourage and enforce compliance with the regime. The amendments create more powers for the 
supervision and enforcement of compliance which were considered lacking from the original Act. 
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Amongst the changes is the introduction of administrative sanctions for non-compliance by 
regulated businesses414.  
In ensuring compliance, the Amendment Act provides for the appointment of inspectors 
and provisions for inspection of regulated businesses415. This is done in order to ensure and enforce 
compliance by regulated businesses. It also gives the supervisory bodies and the Centre 
sanctioning powers in the form of both non-financial penalties and fines416. It also provides for the 
lodging of appeals following administrative sanctions417 and creation of an Appeals Board418, 
where regulated businesses can contest the regulatory decisions and fines imposed on them. The 
Amendment Act was gradually phased in from 2010. However, during its enactment it faced some 
open opposition from some regulated businesses and supervisory bodies in the public hearings in 
parliament419.  There were also complaints about proposed enforcement fines and the general 
broadening of the role of the FIC420. So far we have focused on the legislation. We now turn to 
institutions that have been given powers, functions and roles to implement, ensure and enforce 
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This section seeks briefly to discuss the regulatory players in South Africa’s AML regime. 
In discussing POCA and FICA above, a number of players have emerged. However, only two 
institutions were discussed above; the FIC and AMLAC.  Below we start to outline the regulatory 
and institutional framework more broadly, albeit not exhaustively, to encompass all bodies that 
have a role in the implementation of the laws and regulations against money laundering and 
terrorist financing in South Africa421. The first group of these role-players includes new institutions 
specifically created by FICA. As discussed above, these are the FIC and AMLAC and the 
Regulatory Supervisory Bodies of regulated institutions or persons.  
The second group of institutions involves those that receive or request information from 
the FIC for purposes of investigations, law enforcement, prosecutions and asset forfeiture422. These 
institutions are comprised of traditional law enforcement agencies of South Africa; the South 
African Police Services (SAPS). They are also made up of specialized units in the National 
Prosecuting Authority such as the Directorate of Special Operations (now disbanded and replaced 
by the Directorate of Priority Crimes Investigations (DPCI) which falls under the SAPS) and the 
Asset Forfeiture Unit. Among these groups of institutions are also the country’s national 
intelligence/security institutions such as the National Intelligence Agency, which covers domestic 
security threats and its counterpart, the South African Secret Service, which covers external 
security threats and interests.  
Another institution in this cluster is the South African Revenue Service (SARS). Foreign 
financial intelligence units can also be classified under this group of institutions as they can share 
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information with South Africa’s FIC423, especially where they have signed agreements (such as 
Memorandums of Understanding or Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties) for such information 
sharing. The last group is the regulated businesses and the reporting institutions that must comply 
with FICA and FIC Regulations. Above we have already discussed FIC and AMLAC. We will 
now discuss the second group of institutions which is the investigating agencies who use the 
information they receive from the FIC for law enforcement purposes.  
 
 South African Police Service 
The SAPS is charged with the general functions of policing and investigating any crime 
within the republic of South Africa. However due to the specialized nature of many offences, the 
South African Police Services has got various specialized units within itself. For instance, it has 
detective branches that investigate organised crime. These are the Commercial Branch, the 
Organised Crime Branch and the Serious and Violent Offences Branch. All these are supported by 
the Crime Intelligence Division which is responsible for crime intelligence gathering and analysis.  
A Proceeds of Crime Investigation Desk was established at the Commercial Branch Head 
Offices in Pretoria on January 2002 to receive, evaluate, analyse and distribute the Suspicious 
Transaction Reports and other relevant information referred to it by the FIC424. A new specialized 
division was formed within the SAPS, known as the Department of Priority Crime Investigations 
(or DPCI). The DPCI, also known as ‘the Hawks,’ was established in 2009/10 following the 
disbandment of the Directorate of Special Operation of the National Prosecuting Authority.  
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South African Receiver of Revenue 
SARS is one of the supervisory bodies under FICA. While the main task of the revenue 
services is the collection of taxes, it also investigates violations of the revenue laws. It forms an 
important pillar of South Africa’s fight against money laundering, especially when it comes to the 
predicate offence of tax evasion. See more discussion of SARS in Chapter 7. 
 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) 
The National Prosecuting Authority is an independent state body established in terms of 
the National Prosecuting Authority Act of 1998. The NPA and its statute are contemplated in 
section 179 of the Constitution of South Africa, which provides for the establishment of a single 
prosecuting authority for South Africa. Before 1994, South Africa had a fragmented system of 
prosecutions headed by regional Attorney’s General. The latter system was viewed as lacking in 
centralized coordination and policies. It was phased out with the introduction of the NPA. The 
NPA is headed by the NDPP. There are four very important components of the National 
Prosecuting Authority that need to be mentioned in relation to South Africa’s AML regime. First 
of these is the NDPP and the National Prosecution Service.  There are also two units located within 
the NPA which are the Asset Forfeiture Unit and the former Directorate of Special Operations.  
 
National Director of Public Prosecutions  
The NDPP is supported by four deputy National Directors of Public Prosecutions and 
Directors of Public Prosecutions who are appointed for each seat of the High Court throughout the 
nine provinces of South Africa. The deputy national directors of public prosecutions head various 
specialized units under the NPA. These components include the National Prosecution Service, 




of crime. The second deputy headed the former Directorate of Special Operations, which was a 
specialized unit formed in 1999 to investigate and prosecute organised crime and corruption. The 
third deputy heads the Asset Forfeiture Unit and the last one is responsible for personnel and other 
special projects. The position of the NDPP is very senior within the criminal justice system since 
s/he is responsible for prosecution of all criminal offences on behalf of the state. POCA gives the 
NDPP a number of exclusive powers, which s/he may delegate to subordinates as permitted by the 
law. S/he is appointed by the president of the country for a renewable period of seven years.  
 
Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) 
The AFU was established in 1999, under the office of the NDPP. It was specifically 
established to implement Chapters 5 and 6 of POCA. We have, at length, discussed the provisions 
of these Chapters of POCA. The AFU was formed to ensure that the powers given to the NDPP to 
seize proceeds of crime are used to their maximum effect to combat especially organised crime425. 
The AFU drafts all the paperwork that is used in the civil proceedings to seize the proceeds or 
instrumentalities of crime. It liaises and works with the investigating agencies and prosecutors to 
identify all cases where asset forfeiture procedures should be considered or have commenced. 
Detectives from the South African Police Services are seconded to work in the AFU offices with 
the intention of identifying and bringing potential cases from their units to the AFU’s attention, 
conducting financial investigations and preparing court applications for them in conjunction with 
prosecutors.   
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Since its formation, the AFU has been headed by Adv. Willie Hofmeyr426, a deputy NDPP. 
The AFU has prioritized two major strategic objectives; 1. to develop the law through test cases 
and  to create legal precedents that allow for the effective use of the new asset forfeiture laws and, 
2. to increase its volume of cases to enable itself to make a real impact against organised crime427. 
In a report to Parliament in 2008, Adv. Hofmeyr detailed the successes of the unit. Since 1999, the 
AFU has established offices in all the nine provinces of South Africa, increased its volume of 
cases428 and seized assets worth millions of Rands429 and has also made deposits to the Criminal 
Asset Recovery Account (CARA)430. For the first time, in 2008, the funds in the CARA were paid 
out to various law enforcement agencies and to organizations and causes supporting the victims of 
crime431.   
 Most of the AFU cases emanate from the South African Police Services432. The rest arose 
from the South African Receiver of Revenue and the Directorate of Special Operations 
investigations. DSO investigations contributed more than 60% (monetary) value of all the seized 
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431 Ibid. The victims of crime supported by the CARA funds may not directly or necessarily be victims of organised 
criminal activities. For instance some of the beneficiaries are the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Victims, 
Centre for Rape Crisis and Battered Woman, specialised equipment for sexual offences courts, among others.  




assets, despite its 13% share of cases compared to the 83% of cases emanating from the South 
African Police Services.  
 
Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) (‘Scorpions’)  
The DSO was established, like the AFU, in 1999 under former President Thabo Mbeki’s 
administration. In his first State of Nation address to parliament in 1999, Mbeki announced that a 
specialised and adequately staffed and equipped investigation’s unit was to be established urgently 
to deal with all national priority crimes433. It would later appear that the national priority crimes 
that Mbeki referred to were mainly organised crime and corruption, following from the 
conceptualization of the DSO. While Mbeki made the announcement in June, in July the Minister 
of Justice announced the formation of the DSO to start operating in September 1999. When the 
DSO started operating, it existed through various presidential proclamations, up until 2001 when 
it was legally established and officially accommodated within the National Prosecuting Authority, 
through the National Prosecuting Authority Act of 1998.  
Section 7 of the NPA Act established the Directorate of Special Operations as a unit within 
the NPA. The objectives for the establishment of the DSO as contained in Section 7 (1) (a) of the 
NPA Act were to: (i) investigate, and to carry out any function incidental to investigations, (ii) 
gather, keep and analyse information; and (iii) where appropriate, institute criminal proceedings 
and carry out any necessary functions incidental to instituting criminal proceedings relating to:   
(aa) offences or any criminal or unlawful activities committed in an organized fashion; and 
(bb) such other offences or categories of offences as determined by the President by 
proclamation in the Gazette. 
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Section 7 (1) (b) of the NPA Act defined crimes that are committed in an ‘organized fashion’ as 
encompassing planned, ongoing, continuous or repeated participation, involvement or engagement 
in at least two incidents of criminal or unlawful conduct that have the same or similar intents, 
results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission, or otherwise related by distinguishing 
characteristics. 
The DSO, as contemplated in the NPA Act was led by a deputy National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, assisted by an Investigating Director, who were both appointed by the President. 
These officials were given a number of statutory powers by the NPA Act and reported directly to 
the NDPP. The Investigating Director was given powers to institute and conduct investigations 
where s/he had reason to suspect that a ‘specified offence’434 had been or was being committed435. 
Another manner in which an investigation could be instituted was through referrals by the 
NDPP436. The DSO did not last for more than 10 years as it was disbanded by the ruling African 
National Congress through a conference resolution taken in its Polokwane Conference in 
December 2007. This disbandment followed from accusations, among others, that the DSO was 
selectively targeting leaders of the ANC in its corruption investigations437. One such leader who 
was supposedly targeted438 was the current president of the ANC and country, Jacob Zuma, who 
had been charged with several counts of corruption, racketeering, and money laundering. There 
were strong views from my respondents that the DSO was used by a faction, within the ANC, that 
was linked to the then President Thabo Mbeki, to target his deputy, Jacob Zuma in a race for the 
leadership of the ANC and the country.  
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“Too many people within the ANC were being investigated by the Scorpions 
[DSO], that’s the problem. It fed this campaign; it was a major factor feeding the 
campaign against Mbeki because Mbeki was seen to be close to [Adv. Bulelani] 
Ngcuka439…and this relationship was seen to be driving the prosecution of [Jacob] 
Zuma. It was seen to be driving the prosecution of [Ngoako] Ramathlodi440 and 
various other people. So it was about “we are being persecuted and Mbeki is using 
the Scorpions to persecute us”…So I don’t know but to me, certainly it was a 
platform… because one prominent Zuma supporter told me, while we were talking 
about the events leading up to [the ANC Conference in] Polokwane that if it wasn’t 
for that persecution, Zuma probably would not have been president. So it was like 
everybody thought this poor man was being persecuted by the Scorpions and there 
is nothing like persecution to get a lot of people to sort of fighting for you.”441 
Another participant echoed similar sentiments.  
“My personal view is that the DSO was used as a political pawn and I am being 
very honest here…If you look at the race for power [within the ANC] and you look 
at the association of [Leonard] McCarthy442, look at the association of certain other 
individuals, having a direct line to the President [Mbeki] in terms of the timing of 
when to arrest and place before court president Zuma. That in my view constituted 
interference.”443 
The general feeling was that this ‘capture’ of law enforcement institutions for narrow, 
factional political ends was damaging to the criminal justice system. However, most of the 
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participants felt that it was too drastic of the ANC and government to disband the DSO following 
the ANC’s Polokwane Conference of December 2007. One of my interviewees said the move to 
disband the DSO was a radical one.  
“One would have imagined that if there were problems within the organisation 
[DSO], such problems would be identified and dealt with…If there were 
people…they would have been identified and dealt with… They [DSO] did of 
course a lot of good work, good cases, tackling obviously your big targets that had 
a financial muscle, you know, to withstand and fight. They were really under 
pressure for a long time. They were really under pressure because of the cases that 
they carried. So really, what is important for me would be, you know, whichever 
formation is set up will be as effective as the DSO was, but I can tell you now that 
this is one setback that, you know, is going to take a while to fix.”444 
When the decision to disband the DSO was made by the ANC, they were eventually 
disbanded. The charges against Zuma were eventually withdrawn by the then acting NDPP, Adv. 
Mokotedi Mpshe, after the incumbent (Adv. Vusi Pikoli), was mysteriously suspended445. Adv. 
Pikoli, in fighting for his reinstatement as NDPP at the Ginwala Commission of Inquiry which had 
been set up to determine his fitness to hold office, argued that it was his refusal to take political 
instructions from the former President Mbeki and the former Minister of Justice, Bridgette 
Mabandla, on some criminal matters which led him to be unceremoniously suspended446 and 
eventually dismissed447.  
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The disbandment of the DSO was highly challenged by opposition parties and other sectors 
of society. One Hugh Glenister, a private citizen and businessman, opened a case where he 
challenged the government’s disbandment of the DSO as unconstitutional and in contravention of 
South Africa’s international obligations to have a specialized and independent corruption fighting 
agency448. He argued that the DSO was independent and was more effective in fighting organized 
crime and corruption as compared to the police. He further alleged that the ANC-led government 
had disbanded the DSO in order, among other things, to protect corrupt cadres and interests within 
its ranks.  A general view therefore was that the disbandment of the DSO was “a less great idea”, 
“emotional”, “took the country several steps back” and was largely influenced by “bad motives at 
various times”449.  
“…the fact that the DSO was effective in corruption cases did become part of the 
motive [for their disbandment]. There was a chorus of people who were being 
investigated who did not want the DSO there and hoped that their cases would go 
away…I think the Hawks (DPCI) will face the same pressure in a couple of years’ 
time.”450 
In 2011, the Constitutional Court heard the Glenister case and handed a split judgment, 
with the majority of judges finding in Glenister’s favour and directed parliament to take corrective 
measures to ensure that the new Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (and nicknamed the 
Hawks), was independent from political influence and interference451. The Constitutional Court 
found that the legislation that established the Hawks was constitutionally invalid and gave 
parliament 18 months to rectify it452.  The disbandment of the DSO did, according to some 
interviewees, have some impact in crime investigations as, for instance, most of the high value 
cases of the AFU came from the DSO in terms of assets frozen or seized. I asked Adv. Knox 
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Molelle, the Head of the Assets Forfeiture Unit in KwaZulu-Natal, about the impact that the 
disbandment of the DSO had on the work of the AFU.  
  
 Author: On a percentage basis, how much of your work came from the DSO? 
 Adv. Molelle: A bulk of our high value cases came from the DSO. In terms of values we 
got high value cases from the DSO. In terms of volumes, of course, we had a lot of volume 
but relatively small value cases from the police. Ja, so it was really that balance that we 
were dealing with. 
Author: So in the meantime, you just have to rely on your present workload as far as the 
high value cases are concerned? 
 Adv. Molelle: Well at the moment, we still have cases that we carry on from the DSO that 
we will be carrying forward and all that. We do have some cases from the organised crime 
unit (of the SAPS) that are keeping us relatively busy. But of course there is that sort of a 
break from the influx of high value cases453.  
The disbandment of the DSO did not only affect the cases but also investigative powers of 
the AFU which were repealed under section 18 and 19 of the NPA Act of 1998454. AFU 
investigators were appointed under the same provisions as the DSO investigators. These powers 
were repealed in the process of disbanding the DSO455. The AFU now largely depends on the 
seconded police officers who now perform the investigative functions to support AFU work456.   
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South Africa’s Intelligence Services 
Both the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service are listed as 
law enforcement agencies in terms of FICA. They are entitled to receive reports from the FIC, 
especially those that relate to both internal and external national security threats, including 
terrorism and crime. It is however not clear what these agencies do with such referrals. They also 
appear to receive a very minimum number of such reports (See Chapter 7 for the number of reports 
referred to NIA and SASS by the FIC between 2003 and 2008).  
 
Foreign Financial Intelligence Units 
South Africa became a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units in 
2003. This Group was founded in 1995 and is a non-statutory transnational network of FIUs from 
about 120 countries. One of its objectives is to encourage international cooperation and enable 
FIUs to share financial intelligence on cross-border cases. Section 3 (a) of FICA provides that the 
objectives of establishing the FIC in South Africa is “to exchange information with bodies with 
similar objectives in other countries regarding money laundering activities, the financing of 
terrorist and related activities and other similar activities”. The FIC is therefore entitled by law to 
share information it collects with FIUs of other countries. The exchange of this information is, 
according to the Egmont Group, ‘reciprocal’ meaning that no court orders are required in order for 
one FIU to share information/intelligence with another.  
Section 40 of FICA provides that no person is entitled to information held by the FIC except 
the designated law enforcement agencies of South Africa, as discussed above, and  
‘an entity outside the Republic performing similar functions to those of the Centre, 
or an investigating authority outside the Republic which may, at the initiative of the 




believes is relevant to the identification of the proceeds of unlawful activities or the 
combating of money laundering or financing of terrorist and related activities or 
similar offences in the country in which that entity is established’457   
This formulation by FICA ensures that the FIC shares intelligence with other outside FIUs 
without any requirement of a court order or subpoena. There are however some ‘safeguards’ in 
FICA for this information sharing. Intelligence can only be shared with a FIU of another country 
if there is a ‘written agreement’ between the FIC and such an FIU458. This written agreement 
should be approved in writing by the Minister of Finance459 and does not permit the FIC to 
“provide any category of information to the entity in respect of which the agreement is concluded 
which that entity is not permitted to provide to the Centre”. In its last report (2009/10) the FIC 
reported that it contributed to 83 international investigations by responding to information requests 
from foreign FIUs.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to map out the legal, regulatory and institutional architecture of South 
Africa for dealing with organized crime through a central focus of attacking the proceeds of crime. 
Although not exhaustive, it started by discussing South Africa’s organised crime phenomenon and 
by dispelling some myths on the early literature on organised crime in South Africa. It then 
discussed the provisions of POCA, FICA and the Terrorism Act of 2004. We noted that there is 
no jurisprudence in respect of the latter two laws and a growing body of case law under POCA. 
POCA’s interpretations by the courts confirm our theorized situational crime prevention and risk 
management approaches (see Chapter 2) of the AML regime in the combating of crime. We also 
noted a somewhat disturbing trend of over-interpreting the provisions of POCA by the authorities 
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and the courts such as extending organized crime legislation to traffic violations (as in NDPP v 
Van Staden) and extending it to regulate private individuals to play a ‘stewardship’ role which 
may potentially get them into trouble460.  We also argued that this stewardship role is not clearly 
defined in law, as discussed in the R O Cook Properties case461. The purpose of this chapter was 
to lay a foundation for a discussion and analysis that follows in the next chapters. While this 
chapter was largely descriptive and sought to map out the legal, regulatory and institutional 
framework of South Africa, the following chapters start to test our hypotheses on the emergence 
of the regime and whether or not it is achieving its alleged goals of detecting and combating crime; 
thus protecting the integrity/soundness of financial institutions and global financial system. The 
next chapter examines why and how the regime emerged at a global level and got incorporated 
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Chapter 5  
The global emergence and incorporation of the FATF standards in South Africa: voluntary 
‘policy learning’ or coercive ‘policy transfer’? 
 
Introduction 
In seeking to solve their internal problems of various kinds, countries often learn from 
others how they have dealt with old and emerging problems462. In this process of learning they 
either ‘copy’, ‘emulate’, ‘synthesise’, or get ‘inspired’ to  develop their own domestic solutions463. 
These solutions normally come in the form of policy, which is then translated into laws and 
regulations. These then culminate into institutions, practices and programmes that enable or 
facilitate implementation and enforcement. This learning, which a growing literature on public 
policy, political sciences and law variously refers to, has gained considerable attention and study 
by scholars over the last three decades. It seeks to explain how and why policy, institutions and 
practices get ‘transferred’ or ‘diffused’ to other jurisdictions. Is it perhaps as a result of rational 
policy making or as a result of other forces, including coercion? In doing this there has also been 
a focussed attention on examining the role played by various actors, both state and non-state, in 
the transfer of policy and institutional models developed elsewhere.  
In this chapter we draw on this burgeoning literature to explain how (deliberative 
processes) and why (structural and ideational factors) the global AML regime has, over the past 
three decades, gained so much convergence in developing countries, looking particularly at South 
Africa. In drawing on this literature, we use interviews and archival data collected in South Africa 
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to examine and explain how and why the global AML standards of the FATF have become a 
central feature in tackling organised crime.       
We have argued, in the previous chapters, that the AML/CTF regime has emerged, in the 
last three decades or so, as the central strategy in the fight against organized crime, terrorism, 
money laundering and other similar high profile crimes. There appears to have been a shift from a 
narrow focus of traditional law enforcement methods such as imprisonment. The central focus 
lately has extended into enquiring into the financial benefits that sophisticated criminals derive 
from their illegal activities. This has been marked by asset confiscation and forfeiture laws and the 
wide-scale regulation of private businesses to report ‘suspicious’ and ‘threshold’ customer 
transactions to the so-called financial intelligence units (FIUs). All these new measures have been 
very transformational and profound, leading to a proliferation of many new institutions at both 
national and global levels, advocating and spearheading these new strategies.  
It is reported that there are now more than 116 FIUs and over 170 countries and territories 
are claimed to be observing or implementing the FATF standards against money laundering and 
terrorist financing. The FIUs collect or receive and analyse financial intelligence, mainly from the 
transaction reports made by various regulated businesses. The primary goal of this has been, we 
are told, to detect and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. There has also been an 
emergence of Asset Forfeiture Units/Agencies whose role in many countries has been to identify, 
confiscate and seize suspected or known proceeds of crime.  These novel institutions within the 
criminal justice family have been complemented by a wide scale regulation of private businesses 
to perform various roles aimed at detecting or combating crime. All these efforts combined have 
taken law enforcement to a new level when it comes to fighting sophisticated ‘profit-driven’ 
criminals and their activities.   
On top of this, many countries have developed specialised law enforcement agencies of 
many forms; some operating as special units or divisions within the police, prosecuting authorities 




modelled on the ‘elitism’ of the US’s FBI, such as SOCA in the UK and the now defunct DSO in 
South Africa) has been on the high end of the market of criminal activity. Some of their crime-
fighting initiatives involve proactive targeting of known criminals and the ‘disruption’ of 
organized crime syndicates.     
The justifications for the strategy of regulating private businesses from particularly the 
FATF464 and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision465 have been that business regulation, 
particularly of financial institutions, is not only vital for the combating of money laundering and 
its predicate crimes, but also crucial in maintaining a sound and stable global financial system. The 
reasoning is that the mere usage of financial institutions for criminal ends (i.e. money laundering) 
compromises their integrity and the confidence that legitimate users may expect of them466. This 
loss of confidence and integrity, it is argued, may have deleterious effects on these regulated 
institutions and may ultimately lead to their collapse467.  
In this chapter, we examine why and how South Africa adopted the AML/CTF standards 
of the FATF. Regarding the ‘why’, we focus mostly on the broader political and economic factors 
which caused South Africa to adopt its AML/CTF regime in the manner and form that it did. In 
respect to the ‘how’, we examine the deliberative processes followed in incorporating the regime, 
with a particular emphasis on the players that shaped South Africa’s AML regime. It is important 
to stress the importance of looking at these why and how questions. This is because of the manner 
in which the regime developed at a global level and spread throughout the world. This raises 
fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the FATF regime and its incorporation in 
developing countries, which is discussed in more depth in Chapter 8. 
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Many scholars have argued that the diffusion of the regime to developing countries was 
irrational and illegitimate as it involved a number of coercive strategies by the powerful G7 
countries who formed the FATF in 1989468.  On top of that, developing countries were systemically 
excluded in the deliberative processes of the FATF, while at the same time expected to adopt and 
implement its standards under the intrusive scrutiny of the FATF and its principals469. Looking at 
South Africa, this chapter seeks to determine whether the country’s incorporation of the regime 
was coerced or voluntary. In other words, was there any external political and/or economic 
pressure exerted on South Africa to adopt the FATF standards? Were there any political and 
economic consequences for not adopting this framework? If so, what were those potential 
consequences and impacts? If there was pressure, we shall conclude that South Africa’s adoption 
of the regime was coercive. It is also important to examine the sources of such pressure and how 
these manifested themselves in the whole process of South Africa’s incorporation of the global 
FATF regime. Whose interests, would such political and economic pressure serve?  
While we use regulation theory, we fuse it with ‘policy transfer analysis’ to explain why 
and how South Africa adopted the regime in the manner that it did. There are two strands of 
competing hypotheses which are based on regulation theory. These are what Morgan and Yeung 
have conveniently classified as ‘public interest’ and ‘private interest’ theories of regulation470. To 
explain the incorporation of the regime in South Africa, these two opposing strands of theory offer 
competing hypotheses. On the one hand, the public interest theory leads to a hypothesis that the 
South African government incorporated the global AML regime in order to solve its growing 
organized crime problems and to modernize its outdated laws and institutions, in the context of its 
transition from apartheid to democracy and its economic liberalization which brought about, as 
argued by some, increased organized crime opportunities or risks in a globalised world.   
                                                                
468 See Ibid. 
469 Ibid. 
470 See Morgan, B., & Yeung, K. (2007). An introduction to law and regulation: texts and materials. New York: 




On the other hand, the private interest theory suggests a hypothesis that South Africa’s 
incorporation of the FATF regime emerged to serve various particular interests-- notably those of 
the ‘great powers’ who championed the regime’s establishment and diffusion to developing 
countries. According to this hypothesis there may well be valid claims that these interests were not 
necessarily aimed at combating organised crime and money laundering. If the regulatory regime 
also served South Africa in combating crime and maintaining the integrity of its financial 
institutions (which are the explicit goals of the FATF AML/CTF regime), such a convergence of 
interests was, according to this line of argument, just mere coincidence. The above two competing 
hypothesis help us address both the why and the how explanations of the emergence and ultimate 
incorporation of the AML regime. In order to test the public interest hypothesis, this chapter will 
explore whether South Africa’s incorporation of the AML/CTF regime was voluntary and was 
done without any undue political and economic pressure/influence by the FATF and/or those 
behind it and its standards. On the other hand, to test the private interest hypothesis, we will 
consider the extent to which South Africa adopted the regime under pressure from the FATF and/or 
those representing it and/or those who stood to benefit from the diffusion of its regulatory standards 
and outcomes.  
  Five key questions emerge from this: 1. Who are the agents of the AML/CTF policy 
transfer? 2. What exactly was transferred, from where and why? 3. When did this transfer occur? 
4. Why did South Africa adopt the AML/CTF policies in the manner that it did? 5. How did the 
transfer take place (in other words, was it coercive or voluntary)? We do not answer these questions 
sequentially as their explanations overlap. However before we set out to answer them, in the first 
part we start by examining the concept of ‘policy transfer’, how it developed and the sort of the 
empirical work conducted using ‘policy transfer analysis’ thus far. It appears that the bulk of 
empirical literature and theorising has been largely focussed on developed countries learning from 
each other. We argue that while both theoretical and empirical work on ‘policy transfer’ has 
focussed on developed countries, it has missed some rich theoretical and empirical contributions 




In the second part we examine the practice of policy transfer in relation to developing 
countries. In this regard, we argue that while developing countries normally get ‘spoon-fed’ with 
models developed elsewhere, particularly by donor countries of the West and their international 
financial institutions (e.g. the Bretton Woods Institutions), there are instances where ‘policy 
transfer’ occurs voluntarily without any external and undue coercive pressure. We do this by 
borrowing from the thin empirical literature on policy learning and transfer in developing 
countries. The third part examines the practice of policy learning by South African authorities 
post-1994. Finally the fourth part addresses the core questions mentioned earlier.  
 
What is Policy Transfer? 
The contemporary study of ‘policy transfer’ is traced from ‘policy diffusion’ studies within 
the political science literature and spans from the late 1960s and early 1970s471. In the literature 
on political science, international studies and law, the concept of ‘policy transfer’ has been referred 
to using various and sometimes overlapping terminologies such as ‘lesson-drawing’, ‘policy 
convergence’, ‘policy diffusion’, ‘policy transfer’, ‘policy harmonisation’ and ‘legal transplants’. 
This varying terminology and the focus of studies in these fields refers to a  
“process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the 
development of policies, arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political 
system”472.   
This means that one country borrows from ideas, institutions, experiences and processes of 
other jurisdiction(s). This definition of policy transfer seems not broad enough to capture the 
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overarching and multi-level pathways of policy transfer in an increasingly globalised world. Evans 
offers an alternative and broader definition. According to him policy transfer is a  
“…process or set of processes in which knowledge about institutions, policies or 
delivery systems at one sector or level of governance is used in the development of 
institutions, policies or delivery systems at another sector or level of governance”473  
This broader definition appreciates the role played by various parties including state and 
non-state actors, the multiplicity of processes through which policies could be borrowed or 
transferred and the multi-level nature of governance in the 21st century.  
A number of scholars from various fields of social sciences have developed policy transfer 
analysis both theoretically and empirically. Some of the theoretical literature includes work by 
Rose474 on ‘lesson-drawing’, Dolowitz and Marsh475, Mossberger and Woolman476, Evans and 
Davis477, and Evans478 on ‘policy transfer’, Bennett479 on ‘policy convergence’, Walker480, 
Gray481, Savage482, and Berry and Berry483 on ‘policy diffusion’, Newmark484 on ‘policy transfer’ 
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and ‘policy diffusion’, Page485 on ‘policy transfer’ and ‘lesson-drawing’ and Oliver486 (2009) on 
the ‘transfer process’, Hoberg487 on ‘emulation’, Waltman488 on ‘copying’, Studlar and Layton-
Henry489 on ‘policy borrowing’.  
There has also been a critique by James and Lodge490 on the limits of some of the 
theoretical analytical models developed by some of these scholars, particularly on ‘policy transfer’ 
and ‘lesson drawing’. There has also been substantial empirical work conducted on various forms 
of policy. Tim Newburn’s study491 focussed on the ‘transfer’, from US to Britain, of crime control 
policies. Bennett’s492 cross-national study focused on the transfer of instruments of bureaucratic 
accountability such as the institution of ombudsperson, access to information legislation and data 
protection laws.  Dolowitz’s493 work dealt with the transfer between Britain and the US, during 
the Thatcher-Reagan administrations, of employment, welfare and child support policies. 
Majone494 wrote on the impact of US regulators on European anti-cartel legislation and 
Eccleston495 on the global diffusion of Value Added Tax policies in the past couple of decades. 
Instead of examining particular policy areas, other work has looked into the role of various players 
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in the process of transfer. This includes the work of Stone496 on the role of ‘think tanks’ and 
epistemic communities and Ladi’s497 on policy research institutes.  
Policy transfer can either be coercive or voluntary498. A voluntary transfer takes place 
when, for instance, a government seeks to bring about change and learns from another country499. 
This may include vertical500, horizontal501 and multi-level502 transfers. The empirical literature on 
voluntary transfer cited above focussed on developed countries. There is however a very thin body 
of empirical literature on developing countries (see below). This does not suggest that developed 
countries are immune from coercive forms of transfer503. However, many scholars are quick to 
assure and point out that coercive policy transfer is not the norm in developed countries504. This 
seems to suggest that developed countries still generally enjoy some measure of sovereignty and 
autonomy in policymaking as compared to developing countries. In other words, developed 
countries learn voluntarily from each other while developing countries generally incorporate 
models which largely do not fit their socio-economic needs and, more often, under duress from 
donor countries and international financial institutions that are largely controlled by developed 
countries505. However there appears to be a thin line between coercive and voluntary transfer. For 
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instance, ‘formal to state’ (see below) transfers could be some form of a coercive transfer, although 
these are normally “negotiated” transfers506. Many authors observe that the EU directives to EU 
member states are a form of coercive (formal to state) transfer, although they are negotiated.  
Evans507 classifies coercive policy transfer as either ‘negotiated’/’indirect’ or ‘direct’. A 
‘negotiated/indirect transfer’ involves a “process in which governments are compelled…to 
introduce policy change…”508 Examples of negotiated transfers would be such regimes as the EC 
system, which binds member states to abide by its Directives as much as the UN does to signatories 
of its conventions or treaties. Other common examples used in the literature are the structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) of the IMF and World Bank. These are prescribed for mainly 
developing countries which many have been, since the early 1980s, regular recipients of 
conditional funds or loans from the World Bank and IMF509. Such loans or aid packages normally 
come with what is referred to as ‘conditionalities’ that recipient countries have no  choice but to 
accept when desperate for funding. Some of these ‘conditionalities’ have involved ‘wholesale 
privatisation of state assets’510. The latest ‘conditionality’ is  directly related to this study. This 
requires loan and aid recipient countries to develop domestic AML/CTF measures511. ‘Direct 
coercive transfer’ refers to situations where a government is forced by another or other 
governments and/or actors to introduce constitutional, social and political changes against its 
will512. An example of this could be the pressure which the US is exerting on Iran, for instance, to 
stop its nuclear enrichment programme.    
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Policy transfer literature refers to various forms/types of transfer. These include copying, 
emulation, hybridisation, synthesis and inspiration513. Copying is when a policy, programme or 
institution is adopted without modification514. This is generally regarded as a rare phenomenon. 
Emulation involves situations where a governmental organisation, for example, “accepts that a 
policy, programme or institution overseas provides the best standard for designing a policy, 
programme or institution at home”515. Such an organisation would therefore use a foreign 
programme as a benchmark in designing its own. Hybridisation happens where a governmental 
organisation, for an example, combines elements of programmes found in two settings to develop 
a policy that is culturally sensitive to the needs of the recipient516. Synthesis is like hybridisation, 
but involves multiple settings rather than only two517. Inspiration takes place where an idea inspires 
fresh thinking about a policy problem and helps to facilitate policy change518.   
The next question is what the drivers of policy transfer are. What inspires this 
hybridisation, copying, emulation or inspiration that the literature identifies as processes of policy 
transfer? According to the literature, there are a number of structural forces that shape these 
processes. These include the increased phenomenon of globalisation. It is argued that there are 
patterns of increased internationalisation that pose significant constraints on the ability of most 
countries to craft independent and autonomous economic strategies519. This has led to the 
emergence of global multi-lateral governance initiatives. The concept of governance here is used 
to denote the role of both ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ activity at a global level. This arena of governance 
is replete with a variety of structures that emanate from cooperative legally binding treaties and 
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conventions of states, to more ‘informal’ non-legal activity of soft-law regimes that continue to 
emerge and to colour the global governance landscape, sometimes with similar impacts and 
implications to that of hard law regimes. Another driver of policy transfer is identified as ‘state 
centred forces’520. These are, according to Evans, rooted in transformational theories that see 
policy transfer as a key strategy for transforming the state521.  The third driver is seen as the policy 
transfer networks such as ‘think tanks’522 or policy research institutes523  that have recently 
expanded their operations from nation-states to global and trans-national domains524. These, 
according to Stone, involve collaborative decision structures comprised of state and non-state 
actors that are set up with deliberate intentions of engineering policy change525. Evans argues that 
these think tanks or research institutes are carriers of particular belief systems and use their 
membership of formal and informal international policy networks to disseminate international 
policy agendas526. Evans concludes that  
“The content of policy transfer is often informed by notions of best practice 
disseminated by international organisations, knowledge institutions and think tanks 
in the international domain, suggesting that ideological considerations play a key 
role in informing the content of policy transfers. These agents of transfer play a key 
role in facilitating policy-oriented learning through imparting technical 
advice…where indigenous state actors lack expertise”527.  
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Evans528 points out that while all these organisations offer great opportunities for solving 
problems of common concern, the ‘processes that emanate from them can also act as sites of 
struggle for competing conceptions’.  Up until now, it appears that countries do borrow policies 
from each other in order to enhance their governing strategies at home or to solve new problems, 
or perhaps even old ones. There is however a dearth of empirical literature on policy transfer in 
developing countries; either learning from each other or from developed countries.   
 
Developing countries and policy transfer 
Many developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa included, have 
just emerged from a recent and long history of colonial domination and imperialism. The sub-
Saharan region of Africa is the poorest in the world and it is a region where democratic governance 
after colonial independence has been largely unbalanced and uncertain. It is a region marred by 
many armed civil conflicts and bloody struggles for power, dictatorial and military regimes, 
accompanied by underdevelopment. There have been a number of theories and explanations as to 
why the Sub-Saharan Africa region lacks development and progress since colonial independence. 
Socio-economic indicators have largely painted a gloomy picture. The most salient prerogative of 
constitutionally elected and representative democratic parliaments is to make policies that would 
better the lives of their citizens. After all, in a democracy, it is these electorates that give 
governments authority and legitimacy to govern. In most post-colonial societies struggles were 
waged for liberation, independence from foreign domination, sovereignty, universal suffrage, 
democratic governance, self-determination and similar kinds of values, principles and rights.  
Such struggles were undertaken by those who believed that after liberation those who were 
elected would bring about not only political change, but also economic and social change. A salient 
feature of this economic and social change is that it should occur through the governance 
                                                                




mechanisms which are founded on policy. The governing elite, might, therefore, be expected to 
adopt policies, enact laws and institutions and implement programmes that would bring about this 
change of enhancing people’s livelihoods. However, soon after national liberation, many of these 
societies, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa have been faced with a stark reality. It is that their 
aspirations may be just an illusion. While many promises were made about development, these 
often end up as pipe dreams.  
There appears to be a gap in the study of the spread of policy to developing countries after 
independence. The gap can be attributed to the fact that policy transfer analysis has almost 
exclusively studied Western countries learning from each other. Therefore policy transfer analysis 
has been largely developed to study voluntary schemes of policy transfer, or what Rose529 refers 
to as ‘lesson drawing’, between developed countries. Alou explains the history of Sub-Saharan 
Africa and development policy admirably in his paper Policy Transfer or Policy Learning: 
Interactions between International and National Skills Development Approaches for Policy 
Making530.  He explains that post-colonial Sub-Saharan African governments, in the 1960-1970s, 
had state-centred development policies531. The focus of such policies in these newly independent 
states was on building the state apparatus that actively drove economic development. However 
this was not much of a success, leading them to question the role of the state in the late seventies, 
after the international oil crisis532.  
The focus was redirected, under the Washington Consensus, to a neo-liberal, market-led 
development, with states ideologically discouraged from playing too active a role in development. 
Developing countries during this period were forced into adopting structural adjustment 
programmes. Development aid and loans from the IMF and the World Bank were conditional upon 
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such adoption.533. This has made policy making, according to Alou, boring and predictable as 
policymakers just have to implement policy as directed by donor countries and the IFIs based on 
the conditions set for them534.  There is a thin but growing body of empirical literature that has 
studied policy transfer in developing countries. This literature offers some valuable theoretical 
contribution into policy transfer analysis. Below we briefly look at the work of Barcham535, 
Siddiquee536, and Gonzales537.  
Barcham studied the institutional transfer of the Ombudsperson’s Office between Papua 
New Guinea and Vanuatu, both small developing island countries in the Pacific region. What 
appears in his study is that while the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea might have 
borrowed from a developed country, the transfer of such an institution to Vanuatu from Papua 
New Guinea (South-South transfer) seems to provide solutions to some major problems which 
have been identified in the North-South policy transfers. Two major problems, according to 
Barcham, are associated with North-South policy transfer. First is the problem of capacity538. The 
capacity issue lies in the disparity between developed and developing countries. This is because 
“institutions created in developed countries are often designed, implicitly or explicitly, with certain 
levels of capacity in mind” and when they are transferred to developing countries with “lower 
levels of state capacity they often do not work”539  
The second problem of North-South transfer is the problem of cultural misfit540. This 
means that institutions developed for different cultural contexts are adopted in a totally different 
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one; leading to them getting rejected541. Barcham recognises that many institutions in developing 
countries are often a result of a North-South transfer. Where these have been successful, Barcham 
suggests, other similar countries may not need to reinvent the wheel of North-South transfer, but 
emulate the second hand experience from a similar country, thus making it a South-South 
transfer542. Another important contribution comes from the work of Gonzales543. Gonzales’s work 
dealt with the voluntary transfer of budgeting processes by the Phillipines from Australia. 
Gonzales’s study highlights both the problems identified by Barcham, concerning North-South 
policy transfer. He offers solutions as well, which are somewhat similar to Barcham’s. First, 
Gonzales notes that local conditions generate either acceptance or resistance to imported policies 
or practices, whether such policies have been modified or not544. He therefore argues that imported 
lessons should be learned in ways that reinforce more than they transform local practices545. 
This could be achieved, according to Gonzales, through capacitating local policy makers 
to analyse their own situation and tailor policy to fit the domestic context, rather than simply 
applying standard models546. He argues that well-capacitated policy makers would be able to know 
what questions to ask in establishing a clear understanding of how the policies they intend to import 
work in their country of origin547. They would also be able to understand how such policies were 
fashioned by ‘social, economic, political and institutional settings, and how well they work in 
practice’ in the exporting country548. Further, policy makers need to know ‘the comparable aspects 
of the policy situation in their own country—a process of reflection and self-examination”549. 
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Gonzales suggests an establishment of ‘regional policy networks’ that could help solve common 
problems between similar countries.  These are networks of ‘technical experts in similarly situated 
countries, who have distinctive but interdependent interests, and who are striving to solve similar 
problems’550. Lastly, he suggests that policy makers need to take a long-term perspective because 
it takes some time before foreign innovations are ‘“domesticated” as local institutions and policies 
shape their development’.  
Secondly, he suggests that benchmarking should not be limited to highly developed 
countries, since ‘best ideas and projects are now increasingly coming from smaller countries’551. 
Learning from smaller or similar countries would allow decision makers to shape the importation 
‘more than they will be shaped by it’552.  This last point is similar to Barcham’s where he suggests 
South-South forms of policy transfer. Siddiquee, looking at the Malaysian experience of the New 
Public Management, where the political leadership encouraged or pioneered the ‘Look East 
Policy’, suggests something along similar lines553. The ‘Look East Policy’ was an attempt to 
encourage Malaysia to change its ‘traditional perspective’ on Western countries as ‘role models’ 
and instead learn from other countries such as Japan and South Korea which had succeeded in 
achieving remarkable economic progress; high productivity, claims to strong ethical standards and 
management philosophy and practices554.  
It appears from the empirical work, cited above, of Barcham, Gonzalez and Siddiquee that 
they do not view North-South policy transfer as necessarily bad or something that needs to be 
abandoned. It is, however, something that should be undertaken with caution; to attempt to get 
around the problems identified in such kinds of transfer. Countries do often learn from each other. 
However since most of the empirical and theoretical literature has been biased towards North-
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North transfers, we hardly learn about the problems that North-South transfers bring about and 
solutions to unintended outcomes. North-South empirical work provides a welcome contribution 
to enriching the theoretical literature. The work referred to above, relating to developing countries, 
addresses voluntary policy transfer. From the case-studies of Barcham, Gonzales and Siddiquee, 
we get a sense that the importing countries wanted to deal with practical problems of improving 
governance in their localities. This dispels the impression created by some literature where 
developing countries are portrayed only as passive recipients of developed country models. Some 
of the policy changes they adopt have been thought through as much as some of them have been 
occasioned by structural and external coercive forces. If there is anything to be observed it is that 
developed countries themselves are more and more becoming subjects of coercive policy transfer.  
While some scholars are quick to point out that coercive policy transfer is rare in developed 
countries555, it seems that it is more and more becoming the norm. Although some transfers, such 
as the austerity measures being implemented by such countries such as Greece, Ireland and Spain 
in the wake of the global recession EU/IMF bailouts, are negotiated, they may be argued to be 
coercive in nature. These troubled countries appear to have no choice but to accept the 
bailouts/loans with the stringent and unpopular conditions attached to them. They have been 
damned to face the wrath of the masses when they implement these austerity measures as shown 
by the wave of protests against the introduction of such bailout conditions. They would also have 
been damned if they did not accept them as their economies were on the brink of collapse. We now 
turn to the third part of this chapter, where we examine the phenomenon of policy learning and 
transfer by South African authorities. 
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South Africa and policy transfer 
South Africa gained its political freedom in 1994, after a 40 year internal rule by the 
apartheid government and several decades of British colonial rule. Modern forms of governance 
were obviously inherited from these regimes. When the new government came into power it 
inherited laws, institutions, civil service bureaucrats from the apartheid state and its homelands 
which had been created for various ethnic groups and in line with the racial and ethnic segregation 
laws of the British and the Afrikaners. After 1994, there was a drive to transform the whole state 
apparatus to try and conform to the new constitutional values and principles underpinned by 
democracy and the rule of law. This led to the consolidation of separate apartheid administrations 
into a unitary state with one central/national government, nine provincial governments and about 
243 municipal councils556. This transformation also entailed the same process with the bureaucratic 
state apparatus, where eleven separate police forces, attorney-general’s offices, education systems, 
health departments and so on, which had been divided along ethnic lines by the apartheid state, 
were consolidated into single departments at the national level and mostly with parallel 
functionalities at the provincial level and overlaps at the municipal level. 
 The democratic government of 1994 was a result of a negotiated settlement by mainly the 
liberation movements, prominently the African National Congress, and the apartheid government 
and its elite. The negotiations included what was referred to as the ‘sunset clause’, which 
guaranteed apartheid employees their jobs in the democratic dispensation. While a small 
percentage of civil servants of the apartheid state left state employment for a variety of reasons, 
many remained and some occupied very senior strategic jobs. There have been some defining 
political changes in South Africa. One such was the enactment of the transitional/interim 
Constitution of 1993, which came into force in April 1994, after the first democratic elections.  
                                                                




The final constitution was deliberated upon by a democratically elected parliament. Under 
the transitional constitution, a Government of National Unity, led by the ANC and Nelson Mandela 
was established. This transitional arrangement accommodated opposition parties in the executive 
(Cabinet). A Constitutional Assembly (parliament) was established to draft, deliberate on and pass 
the final constitution. The South African Constitution, Act 106 of 1996, was passed in May 1996. 
This Constitution paved the way for the structure of government, its role, powers and institutions. 
Due to inequalities inherited from apartheid, one of the major tasks for the new democratic 
government was to come up with policies that would uplift the socio-economic standards of living 
for the previously marginalized majority. This had to be done while also encouraging economic 
growth557. South Africa’s socio-economic policies are generally viewed by the ANC government 
to be explicitly designed to be more inclusive and to advance the interests of the so-called 
previously disadvantaged groups in society. To this end, South Africa has sought to drive policy 
change through its constitutionally established structures. While much policy has developed from 
within, it seems that there has been some measure of policy borrowing/learning from other 
democratic jurisdictions, particularly Western countries, and, to a lesser extent, from other 
developing countries in crafting the new policies of the post-apartheid state.  
With political transition, the country got accepted back into the international community 
following the ending of UN-imposed apartheid sanctions. Democratic South Africa has then 
sought strategically to position itself as part of the global community in a variety of ways from 
sports (hosting the Rugby World Cup in 1995, Cricket World Cup in 2004 and the FIFA World 
Cup in 2010, among others), tourism, trade and involvement in formal and informal regional, 
international and global governance structures558. There are a number of seemingly obvious 
reasons for this strategic positioning. Key among them is that South Africa is an economic 
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powerhouse of the generally impoverished Sub-Saharan Africa. The problematic issues of this 
region are well chronicled and among them is the fact that successive measures of socio-economic 
development and political stability have, for a variety of reasons, often floundered since the wave 
of independence from colonial rule swept across Africa from the late 1950s onwards.  
South Africa’s role in the region, post-apartheid, is noticeable. In trying to encourage good 
governance and democracy, former President Thabo Mbeki is credited for coming up with the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and in driving the process for the revival of the 
former Organisation of African Unity into the African Union559. South Africa has also played a 
vital role in resolving conflicts in the region, from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan 
to Zimbabwe where it is still involved. South Africa has also managed to find its way, some 
argue— punching above its weight, into some key decision-making global forums such as the G20, 
G8+5 and BRICS, among others. It continues to seek membership in the OECD.  
While many Sub-Saharan countries are deeply affected by debt and dependence on IMF 
and World Bank aid and loans, which impose on them structural adjustment requirements, South 
Africa has managed to avoid over-indebtedness and has not desperately sought rescue by these de 
facto policymakers for most of the Sub-Saharan Africa region. This was despite debt accumulated 
by the apartheid government, which had to be serviced by the new democratic government560. In 
the area of foreign policy, South Africa appears to have shown some measure of autonomy by not 
seeking to appease the hegemonic powers. This is partly borne out of the relationships that South 
Africa openly developed with countries that were not in the good books of the US such as Cuba, 
Iran, Palestine and Libya561. South Africa’s development of these relationships in the early years 
under Nelson Mandela raised some concerns on the part of its Western allies.  
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The ANC under Nelson Mandela emphasised autonomy and sovereignty of South Africa 
when it came to foreign policy and self-government. After all, it is hard to imagine how the ANC 
could sever ties and relationships that it had established with these countries during its liberation 
struggle and from whom it had received support.  In 1999 when Mandela retired, the ANC under 
Thabo Mbeki continued to emphasise this autonomy and sovereignty. As the largest economy in 
sub-Saharan-Africa, it also has perceived its role as being one of representing the continental and 
regional interests, especially under Mbeki’s African Renaissance, AU and NEPAD projects562.    
Under these circumstances, it would seem that South Africa enjoys some considerable 
measure of autonomy in its policy-making decisions and processes. Its policy content and adoption 
would be expected to be less externally directed as compared to some of the developing countries 
in the sub-Saharan Africa region whose budgets are de facto drawn up by the IFIs and donor 
countries. However, is that the case? This study cannot answer this question fully as it looks at one 
particular policy issue of the incorporation of the FATF standards. There have been only a few 
studies conducted in South Africa to examine these issues of policy transfer. The closest study was 
a policy transfer exercise itself, conducted by the Small Business Project (SBP)563 consortium and 
the Centre for Regulation and Competition at the University of Manchester564.  
It is important, briefly, to draw from some findings of this study as it also studied South 
Africa’s policy-making process. This study shows various platforms and stages of policymaking 
in South Africa, which we believe highlight the points of entry for policy learning and transfer. 
The SBP study was commissioned by the South African Presidency and the National Treasury to 
enquire into the relevance of using the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) tools when establishing 
the country’s regulatory framework in various issue areas. The study is entitled Investigation of 
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the Possibilities for Regulatory Impact Analysis in South Africa. RIA is reportedly widely used in 
the OECD countries565.  The OECD has guidelines, which were published in 1995, for use by its 
member countries when implementing new or evaluating old regulatory measures566. The main 
aspects of RIA are geared to assessing the costs and benefits of regulation. Its proponents believe 
that RIA assists in minimising the costs and the negative, undesirable and unintended 
consequences of regulation, while enhancing positive regulatory outcomes and benefits567. The 
SBP study arose from, among other things, concerns that small businesses had to comply with a 
lot of costly business regulations, thus disadvantaging them as compared to larger businesses that 
could easily internalise such costs568. These concerns by businesses are reflected in a survey 
conducted by the SBP consortium in 2004 entitled Counting the Cost of Red Tape for Business in 
South Africa569.  
The SBP study for the Presidency and the Treasury involved interviews with about 50 
government officials570. Among other things, it enquired into the departmental regulation-making 
processes in South Africa. The study found that there are four main ‘triggers’ for regulation in 
South Africa. These were ‘political instructions’ from the minister or cabinet, ‘stakeholder 
approaches’, ‘the need to meet international standards’ or departmental research571. With respect 
to ‘political instruction’, the study notes that sometimes a political instruction to regulate could be 
the outcome of any of the latter three triggers rather than a cause for regulation572. However, when 
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this ‘political instruction’ is issued “it is more in the nature of a political ‘go-ahead’”573 following 
from either stakeholder approaches or the need to meet international standards or based on 
departmental research. However these three triggers may sometimes result in a decision not to 
regulate574.  
On the policy-making process, the report finds that after the ‘triggers’ are ‘pulled’, so to 
speak, a political decision to regulate is often taken. Then there is an initial process that takes place 
within the department concerned, where sometimes departmental task teams are formed to 
“translate the broad policy commitment[s] into detailed policy goals”575. The SBP study does not 
mention what the sources of such policies are. In South Africa, as in many other modern 
democracies, the source of policy is the democratic process of the election. Prior to an election, 
political parties generally host elective conferences where they draw up resolutions and election 
manifestos. The missing ‘trigger’ in the SBP study is therefore the ruling party policy conference 
resolutions which highly influence policy positions/changes. These broad political party policies 
are translated into departmental Green and White policy papers. The SBP study’s policy-making 
process therefore starts at a departmental level, which should in effect be the second phase.  
The SBP study emphasises that the lawmaking process is not uniform for every department 
and may depend on issues that are being tackled. It finds that during the initial departmental 
processes of lawmaking, the South African Department of Health, for instance, often relies on 
international partners such as the World Health Organisation and the Codex Alimentarius for 
research, while the Department of Justice relies on research conducted by the South African Law 
Reform Commission576. This latter finding is important because the AML regime was, at the early 
stages, researched by the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC). These initial 
departmental processes involve consultation with stakeholders, research and sometimes 
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international study tours, which then culminate in the production of various papers (Green and 
White Papers, Discussion Documents, Issue Papers) and draft legislation (Bills)577.  
In the drafting of Bills, a number of actors are involved. These include line function 
officials, departmental legal drafters, sometimes outside consultants, or even drafters instructed by 
a ‘social partner’578. The latter is followed by ministerial approval, after which Bills are gazetted 
or recorded in the ‘Cabinet Memorandum’ and are approved by the Cabinet (which comprises the 
President, Deputy and various portfolio Ministers and their Deputies). The gazetting of a Bill 
introduces it to the parliamentary process where the wider public is called upon to make an input579.  
This process is followed by deliberations in the two houses of parliament, the National Assembly 
(NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). The general and main role of parliament is 
to make laws. The South African Constitution bestows the national legislative authority to the 
national parliament580. The Constitution also gives some limited law-making authority to 
provincial and local government581, but the focus here is on the national level. In the parliamentary 
process, there are many deliberative processes that are followed which transform a Bill into an Act 
of Parliament. Once in the national parliament, many different interests colour the law-making 
process582.  
The National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces represent and accommodate 
different interests. The National Assembly is filled through proportional representation from party 
lists after an election and is taken ‘to ensure government by the people’583. The National Council 
of Provinces, on the other hand, is filled proportionally from provincial lists and taken to represent 
the interests of the provinces at national level law making processes, particularly on areas of 




580 See Sections 42 (1), 43 (a), and 44 (a) of the South African Constitution, Act 106 of 1996. 
581 See Sections 104 and 151 (2) ibid. 
582 SBP. 2005. Investigation of the Possibilities for Regulatory Impact Analysis in South Africa. A Study Prepared for 






concurrent legislative authority584. Both these houses of parliament have got what is called the 
portfolio committees for various exclusive and concurrent legislative functional areas585. In the 
law-making process, where the proposed laws affect the provinces, they must be deliberated upon 
in both the houses of parliament586.  
Sections 55 of the Constitution gives powers to the National Assembly to, among other 
things, initiate or prepare legislation, except money bills587  and to consider, pass, amend or reject 
any legislation before it588. More or less similar powers are given to the National Council of 
Provinces by Section 68 (a) and (b).  In the law making process of South Africa, there is an open 
invitation to the public and interested parties to make an input on proposed legislation. This 
invitation is not voluntary, but a duty of parliament to ensure that ‘the people’, and other interested 
parties, participate in the law making process589. These constitutional provisions provide that the 
NA and the NCOP ‘must facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes’ of 
parliament and its committees590.  No new law in South Africa, therefore, can pass constitutional 
muster without any form of public involvement in its making.  
This was recently clarified in a Constitutional Court case of Doctors for Life v. Speaker of 
the National Assembly, 2006591. In this case, an international advocacy group (known as Doctors 
for Life) operating in South Africa alleged that the NCOP did not invite public participation and 
deliberation before passing two pieces of legislation592. These two pieces of legislation were 
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declared invalid by the Constitutional Court pending redress on public participation by parliament. 
The Court held that public participation is a constitutional duty that parliament must ensure in the 
lawmaking process. However, the Court noted that the Constitution does not appear to prescribe 
what public participation should entail and gives parliament some discretion on how to discharge 
this obligation593. The general practice by parliament has been to receive written and/or oral 
representations from the public and interested parties. The public would make representations on 
proposed Bills through the time-frames published in the government gazette.  These 
representations would then be discussed by the relevant committees of both houses, mainly in joint 
sessions, or individually. Public hearings are also held, where both oral and written submissions 
are considered. The experts or departmental officials who drafted legislation are also invited to 
assist with clarifying issues and responding to representations, and in amending and/or rejecting 
the points made during representations.  This involves accepting and making amendments to a Bill 
or rejecting such recommendations.  
In these portfolio committees are parliamentary members of different political parties, who 
proportionally represent the interests of their constituencies (parties). They may hold markedly 
different views due to the multi-party composition of parliament.  However, depending on the 
number of ruling party voting members in any of the committees, the ruling party always has its 
way, especially where the ANC has commanded majorities above 60% since 1994 and the voting 
is mainly along party-lines. In South Africa, where the ruling party commands such huge 
majorities, quite often, opposition parties abstain from voting if they do not like particular 
legislation or parts of them, or vote against such legislation.  
The opposition almost stands no chance when it comes to voting. The minority parties’ 
influence may after all rest on their lobbying and persuasion in the parliamentary deliberations and 
other platforms, not on voting, due to their numbers (even when all opposition parties are 
combined). As a result, what comes out from these processes may largely be influenced by the 
                                                                




ruling party policies, whatever inspires them. However, there may obviously be instances where 
opposition parties are in agreement with the ruling party on a number of policy decisions and where 
law-making tends to be unanimously achieved through consensus. 
Other findings of the SBP study on the law-making process in South Africa are that, in the 
initial phases, departments make use of departmental task teams. These task teams conduct 
research and develop policy discussion documents and, sometimes, Bills that are later deliberated 
upon in parliament. It is also in the initial phases in which external consultants, such as academics, 
international regulators and experts are engaged. Departments also engage in ‘study tours’ to 
foreign countries to learn more about how such countries have dealt with the problems at hand or 
other ends sought. It is therefore at these initial levels where policy transfer takes place. The study 
conducted by SBP for the Presidency and the Treasury appears to be a clear example of ‘lesson 
drawing’ by South Africa, driven by various actors from within. This may support the point that 
not all policies in developing countries are imported without contextualising them to local 
conditions and needs.  
There are also very key provisions of the Constitution which appear to encourage policy 
transfer in South Africa. These are the provisions of Chapter 14 of the Constitution which refer to 
international agreements594, customary international law595, and to the application of international 
law596. With reference to international agreements, Section 231 and its subsections give the 
national executive, which is the Cabinet, the responsibility of negotiating and signing all 
international agreements. It further states that ‘an international agreement binds the Republic only 
after it has been approved by resolution in both’ the houses of parliament. However, not all 
international agreements are subject to approval by parliament (see below).  
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Section 231 (3) provides that “an international agreement of a technical, administrative or 
executive nature, or an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered 
into by the national executive, binds the Republic without approval by [parliament], but must be 
tabled in [both the houses of parliament] within a reasonable time”. This provision seems to give 
carte blanche powers to the executive and it is quite interesting when it comes to the FATF AML 
standards because they could easily be legitimited through mere tabling in parliament, as they do 
not require accession or ratification, are considered technical or administrative, and are a product 
of non-binding international soft-law. This provision reads like the Constitution allows the country 
to be bound by such technical agreements, subject to the Cabinet entering into them and without 
the approval of parliament. However, such agreements, technical or administrative as they may 
be, may have very profound implications for the country.  
Section 231 (4) provides that any international agreement becomes law of the Republic 
when it is enacted into law through national legislation. This subsection further provides that “a 
self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the 
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament”. The last provision 
in relation to international agreements is that South Africa is ‘bound’ by agreements which were 
entered into before the Constitution came into effect on May 1996. Indeed, South Africa signed or 
entered into a number of agreements with other countries prior the elections of 1994 and soon 
thereafter but before the final Constitution came into force597.  
Section 232 provides that ‘customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. Lastly, the constitution appears to give 
unfettered powers to the judiciary in terms of section 233. This section provides thus:  
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“When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation 
of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation 
that is inconsistent with international law.” 
This seems to elevate international law above national legislation and allows the judiciary 
to play an active role of transplanting and creating law through legal precedent.    
 
Policy transfer and the global AML regime 
The literature on policy transfer has hardly examined the dissemination of AML/CTF 
policies to developing countries. However, over the past couple of years there has been some 
intellectually stimulating work on why the AML regime spread throughout the globe so quickly. 
This includes prominently the work of Drezner598, Hülsse599, Sharman600, Mitselegas601, 
Bosworth-Davis602, among others. Drezner, Hülsse and Sharman have sought to analyse, albeit in 
different ways, how the AML regime expanded from the US into the rest of the world in the past 
two and half decades. Bosworth-Davis603, on the other hand, has traced the spread of these policies 
from an earlier period than these three authors (Drezner, Hülsse and Sharman). He traced it to the 
1970s, when the US first introduced financial regulations through the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. 
The work of these authors is directly linked to my analysis here. Before we review this work, we 
start by offering a short history on the origins of AML policies.  
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While some scholars604 have merely focused on the role played by the FATF, they have 
failed to enquire into where these AML policies originate from. We contend that they have missed 
or ignored the rhetoric and threats of economic sanctions which was later to be used by the FATF, 
thus attributing some great achievements to it (the FATF), when it was merely a conveyor belt of 
US policies. The analysis of these authors (Drezner, Hülsse and Sharman), therefore, tends to 
conflate the role played by the FATF which, we argue, merely represented US and other interests 
in the global diffusion of the AML regime. We further claim that the US interests that the FATF 
represented were not necessarily and primarily directed at the combating of money laundering. 
Bosworth-Davis605 has offered some analysis in this respect, which we concur with, although not 
done in the context of policy transfer analysis. What we do here is to link this history to policy 
transfer analysis. We then briefly review the work of Drezner, Hülsse and Sharman and from this 
we define a scheme for determining whether South Africa’s incorporation of the FATF standards 
could be viewed as voluntary or coercive. The importance of determining the nature of South 
Africa’s incorporation of the FATF regime informs our argument, in Chapter 8, concerning the 
regime’s legitimacy crisis.    
While we use the policy transfer literature, which Sharman606 also uses, our approach is to 
examine the history of the global AML regime (its ideas, techniques, strategies, and experiences), 
not only from a global level, but from the viewpoint of the AML regime’s exporting country, the 
US. We argue that the UN Vienna Convention on Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, 
which introduced money laundering as an offence to the rest of the world, and the FATF’s 40 
Recommendations on Money Laundering, represent different pathways of policy transfer; that is 
                                                                
604 See Drezner, D. W. 2005. Globalisation, harmonisation, and competition: the different pathways to policy  
convergence. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(5), 841-859. Hülsse, R. 2007. Creating demand for global  
governance: the making of a global money laundering problem. Global Society, 21(2), 155-178. Sharman, J.C.  
2008. Power and discourse in policy diffusion: anti-money laundering in developing countries. International  
Studies Quarterly (52), 635-656. 
605 Bosworth-Davies, R. 2006. Money Laundering: towards an alternative interpretation-chapter two. Journal of  
Money Laundering Control, pp.346-364. 
606 Sharman, J.C. 2008. Power and discourse in policy diffusion: anti-money laundering in developing countries.  




transfer from the US to other developed countries, and from the US to the global level  We argue 
that the UN Vienna Convention and the FATF standards did not invent anything substantive, but 
exported, in a very coordinated, systematic manner—existing US policies and made them global 
standards, which were then transplanted in various ways to the rest of the world and imposed on 
developing countries. Without the organized crime policies of the US, which we describe below, 
there would probably be no global AML regime. The question that needs to be addressed, 
therefore, is why the US wanted its internal policies to be replicated globally, even through use of 
force— where persuasion failed? What and whose interests would the global diffusion of its crime 
control policies serve?  
We, in this regard, incorporate the theories of regulation to enquire into the interests 
involved in the US’s drive for the worldwide exportation of its policies and laws. We contend that 
this could best be explained by looking at the history of the AML financial regulations in the US 
in the 1970s, which resulted from decades of US’s inclinations to fight organized crime from the 
late 1920s onwards.  ` 
 
The origins of global AML policy ideas, contents and experiences  
As mentioned above, for Drezner, Hülsse, and Sharman the analysis of the diffusion of 
AML standards either start in 1986, when the US passed the Money Laundering Control Act of 
1986 to the UN Vienna Convention against Illicit Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (the 
Vienna Convention) which required signatories to criminalize the laundering of proceeds of crime 
and the formation of the Financial Action Task Force and its Forty Recommendations of 1990. 
This narrative however misses the origins of what had influenced the culmination of the global 
AML regime and does not assist in explaining the interests involved in the dissemination of the 
regime. The UN and the FATF were merely conveyor belts or agents of the transfer of US policy 




in the Vienna Convention had been developed and harnessed for years in the US. Also, the FATF’s 
40 Recommendations were copied from the policies, ideas, and experiences which had for years 
been in operation in the US.  
Scholars such as Michael Woodiwiss have chronicled the US’s war against organized 
crime, which can be traced back to the 1920s. In the late 1920s, the prohibition on alcohol was 
depicted as having “introduced the most difficult problems of law enforcement in the field of 
organized crime” in the Illinois Crime Survey of 1929607. Commentators suggested that “organized 
crime was one of the unfortunate products of unfettered capitalism” which required “more rigorous 
business regulation” to minimize its penetration of “legal markets”608. Michael Woodiwiss has 
argued that despite this rhetoric and the US’s analysis of organized crime, the US never pursued 
“policies that reduced opportunities for successful organized crime activity”609. This rhetoric was 
revived in the 1950s, with a report by Senator Estes Kefauver’s Senate Investigating Committee 
into Organised Crime610. This report depicted the Italian Mafia as ‘dominating organized crime’ 
and as a “coherent and centralized international conspiracy of evil”611. The declamations and 
explanations that Hülsse612 admirably describes in analyzing the FATF’s discursive strategies in 
spreading the AML regime throughout the globe can be observed from these early years (1920s to 
1950s) in the US.  
The Mafia, in the US, was depicted as a “threat to America’s political, economic and legal 
systems dominating “gambling and drug trafficking” and branded as having “weakened the vitality 
and strength of the nation”613. In the late 1960s, under President Johnson, a Crime Commission 
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was formed and released another report in 1967614. This report described organized crime as “a 
society” that sought “to operate outside the control of the American people and their governments” 
involving “thousands of criminals, working within structures as complex as those of any large 
corporation” and involved in “conspiracies…aimed at gaining control over whole fields of activity 
in order to amass huge profits”615. All this rhetoric of official Commissions and reports led to the 
passing of the very first laws in the history of AML. The first law was the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968616. The major contribution of this latter law was its provisions for 
electronic wiretapping and eavesdropping617. Finklea writes that this Act immediately provided 
US ‘law enforcement and policymakers with an indication of organized criminal activities, 
especially their involvement in illegally importing and distributing narcotics’618.  
In 1970, two further major statutes were passed on which the global strategies for fighting 
money laundering evolved. These were the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA) and the Bank 
Secrecy Act (BSA). The OCCA gave powers to federal US law enforcement agencies to seize the 
financial assets or proceeds of crime through its Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO) provisions619. Although the OCCA focused on offences beyond drugs, the UN Convention 
only required criminalization of proceeds of drugs620. The criminalization of proceeds of other 
offences at a global level was gradually introduced by the FATF and other later crime-related UN 
Conventions. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 was enacted to ‘facilitate Federal financial 
investigations of illegal activities, such as drug trafficking and tax evasion’621. It required 
individuals and financial institutions to report domestic currency transactions of US$10000.00 and 
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above622. It also required the filing of reports on importation and exportation of currency or 
monetary instruments above US$5000.00623. Currency reports were filed by the US’s domestic 
financial institutions to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)624. In 1979 the US’s General 
Accounting Office made three reports to the Congressional House Committee on Banking, Finance 
and Urban Affairs.  
The first one was presented to the House’s Subcommittee in April 1979 and was entitled 
Better Use of Currency and Foreign Account Reports by Treasury and IRS Needed for Law 
Enforcement Purposes. It reviewed IRS’s use of currency transaction reports, international 
transportation of cash or currency reports and reports of foreign banks, securities, and other 
‘financial accounts’625. The main finding of this report was that the customer transaction reports 
that were filed with the IRS were “not useful to IRS as the Congress might have expected when it 
established the reporting requirements”626. It further opined that an improved use of the reporting 
forms “alone would not resolve such problems as tax evasion and drug trafficking” but could help 
the federal agencies to “deal with these problems”627. This report further recommended that instead 
of the reports being made to the IRS, they should instead be filed with a central agency to be 
located within the US Treasury, which will analyse and disseminate them to the relevant law 
enforcement agencies for investigations628. The latter task is more or less what is done by the 
Financial Intelligence Units in most countries that adopted the FATF’s 40 Recommendations.  
The second report, published in October 1979 and entitled Gains made in controlling 
illegal drugs, yet the drug trade flourishes assessed the Federal Government’s drug enforcement 
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and supply control efforts for the years between 1969 and 1979629. It is important to refer to this 
report in some length because it shows that already around that time (1979) the US officials were 
proposing the exportation of US’s drug control strategies, ideas and experiences abroad in a very 
coordinated manner. This report chronicled many of the problems that the US had with illegal 
drugs, but most importantly, made some suggestions on how the US could deal with them. One of 
these problems was that the social, economic and political realities of drug-growing countries 
made it  
“…difficult to prevent cultivation of illicit crops and stop trafficking at the source. 
Most producing nations are poor, underdeveloped, struggling countries presenting 
problems that are too complex for a predominantly law enforcement approach to 
be effective in reducing drug supplies”630. 
Another finding was that there were enormous profits in drug trade, to the extent of between 
US$35 billion to 51 billion per annum in the US alone631. One of the recommendations said that 
governments of developed countries and international financial institutions must provide “no 
support for illicit drug production”632. The report further cautioned that  
“The United States has been the prime force in efforts to control illicit drug 
production, but increased commitment of developed countries is needed if we are 
to have a great impact on the problem…the Secretary of State, with the support of 
the Congress, [must] promote a world conference and the formation of a consortium 
of victim countries that would develop a plan of action to fight the global drug 
problem in a unified way”633  
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Michael Woodiwiss has argued that the intentions of the US to internationalise its drug 
prohibition policies was “a response to its own organized crime problems”634. The drug issue, at 
that time, was already an international concern with three previous anti-drug international 
conventions already signed before the UN Vienna Convention of 1988. These conventions 
included one by the then League of Nations in 1925635 and another two conventions developed by 
the UN in 1961636 and 1971637. Even the second GAO report recognizes that  
“Foreign governments have long recognized the international implications of drug 
abuse by entering into international treaties and conventions, and by supporting 
international organizations such as UNFDAC. Within their own countries, 
narcotics laws have been passed, enforcement efforts have disrupted drug 
trafficking, and some radical measures, such as eradication and crop substitution, 
have been undertaken”638  
If foreign governments had long recognized and taken action to solve the problem, what 
then was the problem this time? The GAO report expressed reservations as to whether the  
“…international community is seriously committed to resolving the drug abuse 
problem. Foreign countries provide little assistance in helping the United States 
prosecute fugitives, traffickers, and financiers who live or conduct business in their 
countries…and their bilateral and multilateral support is insufficient to achieve the 
needed impact…”639 
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The US officials at GAO felt that they were not getting the cooperation they needed. This 
is one of the emphases of the Vienna Convention of 1988; cooperation in the form of mutual legal 
assistance, extradition treaties, extraterritorial offences and harmonisation. The FATF also 
emphasises this cooperation in its recommendations 35 to 40 of its standards.  
The third report was a statement made by Associate Director, Richard Fogel, of the General 
Government Division, which fell under the GAO, to the House Committee on Banking, Finance 
and Urban Affairs in November 1979 entitled The Use of Currency and Foreign Accounting 
Reports to Detect Narcotic Traffickers.  In this statement, GAO advised the Committee on how 
the Bank Secrecy Act reporting provisions could assist federal law enforcement agencies in 
detecting financial transactions related to drug trafficking activities640. In this statement Fogel 
maintained that ‘[e]ffective law enforcement in the drug area requires that major traffickers be 
immobilized…and seizing their financial resources—the key element to immobilization…’641. He 
then went through the astonishing and unverifiable figures of a US$51 billion drug industry in the 
US and concluded that “the large amounts of income from drug sales probably most often go 
unreported for income tax purposes…up to US$24 billion in unreported income in 1976 came 
from illegal drug activities”642. He observed further that  
“Large amounts of cash are essential to the illegal drug business but create problems 
for traffickers. Cash must be transported when dealers engage in transactions or 
stored securely so as not to be detected, yet it must be readily available when 
needed. Thus, knowledge of money flows along with other information is essential 
to identifying and immobilizing drug traffickers.”643 
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From 1970, there were concrete steps put in place by the US to attack the proceeds of crime 
with the coming into force of OCCA and the BSA. However the three review reports, cited above, 
compiled by the GAO show that US officials were unhappy with the progress made. They had 
problems when it came to cooperation, the usefulness of the regulatory reporting requirements on 
financial institutions and cross-border flows of cash and they abhorred the profitability of the drug 
industry and the fact that it brought about billions of losses to the taxman in unreported income 
tax. Another Presidential Commission to investigate organized crime was appointed by President 
Reagan in 1983644. This Commission was to  
“make a full and complete national and region-by-region analysis of organized 
crime; define the nature of traditional organized crime as well as emerging 
organized crime groups, the sources and amounts of organized crime’s income, and 
the uses to which organized crime puts its income”645  
It was also to advise the President and the Attorney General on “actions which can be 
undertaken to improve law enforcement…”646 After three years of deliberations, which included 
public hearings, the Commission published its report in 1986. It is the findings of this Commission 
which came up with the offence of ‘money laundering’ and which led to the amendment of title 
18 of the US Code to create a federal offence under the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. 
All these features of the US law, policies, ideas and experiences, as discussed above, would shape 
the Vienna Convention of 1988 and the FATF standards. It is important to go through what was 
copied/emulated by the Vienna Convention and the FATF from the US and elsewhere. We start 
here with the Vienna Convention. 
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Vienna Convention: policy learning and transfer 
The Vienna Convention was a result of the UN deliberative processes initiated in 1984647. 
This was the period when the US was busy with its public hearings by the Reagan Presidential 
Commission on Organized Crime which had started in 1983. Around this time, the FBI had 
achieved some major breakthroughs with the trials of the Italian Mafia throughout the US648. These 
trials had received so much publicity and earned a special attention from the movie-makers in 
Hollywood.  The Vienna Convention of 1988 was formulated against the backdrop of these US 
breakthroughs when it came to dealing with organized crime and drug trafficking. It is important 
to note that the Convention emphasized only three core features of the global AML regime, 
because the US appears to have either failed to export the whole regime through the Vienna 
Convention or deliberately chose a different platform, the establishment of the FATF, to champion 
further regime transfers (see below). 
 The Vienna Convention dealt with the criminalization of money laundering, the seizure 
and forfeiture of proceeds of drugs and international cooperation649. All these issues had been 
chronicled by the US officials in the reports and laws discussed above, particularly the report 
dealing with drugs650. The Vienna Convention was therefore highly influenced by US laws, 
policies, experiences and strategies in dealing with organized crime and drug trafficking. 
Nadelman, for instance, points out that;  
“The modern era of international law enforcement is one in which U.S. criminal 
justice and U.S. models of criminalization and criminal investigation have been 
exported abroad. Foreign governments have responded to U.S. pressures, 
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inducements, and examples by enacting new criminal laws regarding drug 
trafficking, money laundering, insider trading, and organized crime…”651 
Michael Woodiwiss observed that while drug trafficking was only one of several illegal 
activities that transcended national boundaries “the American war on drugs has provided the 
crucial impetus for a host of actions and agreements that otherwise would never have occurred”652. 
However there are two key features of the global AML regime that were not dealt with in the 
Vienna Convention. These are the proposals for the establishment of financial intelligence units 
and the regulation of, primarily, financial institutions and intermediaries in combating drug-related 
money laundering.  
While these had been a key feature of the US’s onslaught on organized crime and drug 
trafficking since the 1970s, they did not form part of the articles of the Vienna Convention of 1988 
which begs the question:   Why did these two key features of the global AML regime not become 
part of the Vienna Convention?  This appears to be because the US wanted financial regulation to 
form part of the regime. The signs of this are that soon after the Vienna Convention, the FATF 
was formed on US’s instigation and the only new features it proposed were the financial 
regulations and the establishment of Financial Intelligence Units.   
 
FATF standards: policy learning and transfer  
The FATF was formed shortly after the UN Vienna Convention was adopted. The question 
is why would the FATF be formed to deal with similar issues that the Vienna Convention had just 
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tackled; the evils of illicit drugs and the problem of money laundering? The official explanation is 
that the FATF was formed to enquire into what the G7 countries could do to prevent the use of 
financial institutions by drug traffickers to launder money. The FATF would then advise these 
countries on the best possible strategies and their implementation. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision had already issued its Statement of Principles on the Prevention of Criminal 
Use of the Banking System for the purposes of Money Laundering in December 1988, urging 
national financial regulators and private banks to adopt measures to safeguard their systems from 
being abused by criminals to launder criminal proceeds653.The Declaration of the G7 Paris Summit 
of Heads of Government recommended that they:   
“Convene a financial action task force from Summit participants and other 
countries interested in these problems. Its mandate is to assess the results of 
cooperation already undertaken in order to prevent the utilisation of the banking 
system and financial institutions for the purposes of money laundering, and to 
consider additional preventive efforts in this field, including the adaptation of the 
legal and regulatory systems so as to enhance multilateral judicial assistance. The 
first meeting of this task force will be called by France and its report will be 
completed by April 1990.”654 
The establishment of the FATF was first mooted in 1988, during the G7 Heads of 
Government Summit in Harrisburgh, Pennsylvania in the US, but France opposed its establishment 
then655. It is unclear why France opposed the formation of the FATF. However, in the following 
year, when a similar summit was held in Paris, the issue was again placed on the agenda by France 
on conditions that it became the first chair of this proposed body and that the FATF would also 
                                                                
653 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 1988. Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for 
Purposes of Money Laundering. (December 1988). http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.pdf   
654 https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1989paris/communique/drug.html. Released by the Summit on July 16 1989. 





tackle tax issues656. However other countries that were invited by France to the Paris Summit, 
particularly Luxemburg, Switzerland and Austria refused to support the formation of the FATF 
unless tax issues fell outside its remit657. Only when a compromise was reached was the FATF 
finally formed in 1989658. In April 1990 the FATF submitted its report to the G7 Heads of 
Government in which it came up with the 40 Recommendations against Money Laundering. It 
proposed that its members should implement and comply with these standards in order to combat 
money laundering more effectively, while also fostering the safety of the global financial system 
from usage by criminals. The FATF also came up with a peer review mechanism known as the 
‘mutual evaluation programme’. This latter programme would help it to assess its member 
countries’ progress in implementing the standards.  
The FATF’s 40 Recommendations focused on five core features of the global AML regime. 
The first three of these features are those already covered by the Vienna Convention, which are 
criminalization of money laundering659, seizure and forfeiture of proceeds of crime (initially 
drugs)660, and international cooperation661. The last two that— for whatever reason— were not 
incorporated into the Vienna Convention are the regulations on financial institutions to combat 
money laundering662 and later the establishment of Financial Intelligence Units663. As discussed 
above, these ideas, laws, policies and practices of regulating businesses started in the 1970s in the 
US. The first proposal for the establishment of an FIU-type institution in the US Treasury was 
mooted in 1979664. The reporting of suspicious, threshold and cross-border transactions, in 
compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, were initially made to the IRS and Customs in the 
early 1970s. Other law enforcement agencies could however not access the reports made to the 
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IRS and Customs because of tax confidentiality issues665. As a result, this function of receiving, 
analysing and disseminating suspicious customer reports to investigating agencies was reassigned 
to the Treasury, which would not be bound by similar tax confidentiality issues as the IRS and 
Customs were666.  
These mandatory suspicious, threshold and cross-border transaction reports then started to 
be channelled to the Treasury in the late seventies and early eighties, as a clearing house for their 
dissemination to law enforcement agencies, which would then investigate them. In 1990, the US 
eventually launched the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) under the US Treasury; 
the first FIU in the world. The concept of FIU’s then became part of the recommendations of the 
FATF and led to the formation of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units in 1994.  
In all this history, we have shown that the original source of the global AML standards was 
mainly the US. The UN and the FATF were just mere agents of US policy transfer to the rest of 
the world, through both hard and soft law mechanisms. This is often overlooked by many scholars. 
It is important to emphasise that nothing substantively new, whatsoever, was proposed by the 
FATF Recommendations of 1990, but the emulation/copying of existent US policies, and infusing 
these with customer due diligence regulations from Switzerland667. If the FATF is to be credited 
with any achievement, it is in the manner in which it packaged these policies into a set of standards 
and put in place the regulatory strategies and techniques of securing world-wide compliance, 
mainly through coercion under its arbitrary NCCT blacklists which targeted non-FATF and mainly 
developing countries.  
We have briefly dealt with the history of the origins of organized crime and drug trafficking 
policies in the US and its official responses to it in light of its influences on the UN Vienna 
Convention of 1988 and the FATF standards. However there are a number of issues that remain 
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unaccounted for in this history. The first one is why would the US desire its internal policies to be 
exported globally? Secondly, why did it use different forums to disseminate these policies - the 
UN, to lobby specifically for the criminal and asset forfeiture aspects of the global AML regime 
and the FATF for the financial regulatory aspects? Was the use of multiple forums to disseminate 
the regime perhaps a classic example of what is referred to as ‘forum-shifting’. Ngaire Woods has 
argued that powerful countries have the luxury of ‘shopping-around’ and shifting global decision 
making to forums most suitable to serve their, mostly, narrow interests?668  
The UN was much more an inclusive body as compared to the FATF, with developed and 
developing countries represented in the conferences and deliberative processes that led to the 
adoption of the Vienna Convention. On the other hand, the FATF was only comprised of developed 
countries and deliberately excluded developing countries from participation. A possible 
explanation is that the US failed to push for the financial regulatory measures through a more 
inclusive forum, the UN but opted instead for a body that it could control in order to further its 
interests.   
Let us tackle the questions raised above using the available evidence, starting with why the 
US seem to have desired its policies to become international, global rules and exported to various 
countries. We refer mostly to Chapter 2 of this thesis and mostly to the work of Bosworth-Davis669. 
The issue at stake here, we argue in agreement with Bosworth-Davis, was ‘regulatory arbitrage’. 
The regulation of banks to perform anti-money laundering functions in the US, we contend, and 
non-regulation of such issues in other competitive jurisdictions was at the core of US’s drive to 
disseminate the regime globally. While the US had regulated its banks to perform anti-money 
laundering roles, through the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, in the 1980s, other major financial 
markets of Europe had not done so670. There was therefore a view among some US Senators and 
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private banks that such stringent and burdensome AML regulations would make them less 
attractive to investment and therefore less competitive as compared with other equivalent markets 
of Europe or other jurisdictions671, particularly the so-called regulatory havens. Bosworth-Davis 
explains this well;   
“The US private banks wanted to be able to compete with the more traditional 
players, the Swiss and the British…but the new anti-money laundering laws made 
the US a less attractive place in which to carry out…business, thus prejudicing US 
banks at the expense of other countries' banks in which such stringent anti-money 
laundering provisions did not apply. The world's super rich were being scared off 
by these new legislative rules…”672 
Bosworth-Davis further quotes Senator John Kerry in a debate at the US Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs where Kerry said  
“…If our banks are required to adhere to a standard…and other banks do not, and 
rush for (to acquire) deposits in those banks, we will have once again taken a step 
that will have disadvantaged our economic structure and institutions relative to 
those against whom we must compete in the marketplace…”673 
Based on this evidence, we can reasonably conclude that the US’s drive in spreading the 
regime globally was motivated by keeping its private banks competitive in globalised and 
liberalized financial markets. This may also explain why the US targeted mainly developed 
countries initially, as these were its direct competitors, especially the Swiss, the British and other 
similarly competitive financial markets. But this still does not explain why the AML regime spread 
to smaller and developing countries. It could be that the US just wanted to secure support for 
financial regulation using the combined market power of itself and other great powers, the EU and 







other developed countries. Its interests and those of other G7 members coalesced and propelled 
the regime beyond them, particularly as the FATF proclaimed the small Islands as regulatory/tax 
havens making them highly susceptible to money laundering.  It was necessary then to demand 
that they observe FATF standards674.  
Regulatory/tax havens were regarded as competition by the major Western powers and 
continue to be the focus of many initiatives by the World Bank and the IMF’s financial surveillance 
programmes as they attract large investments from companies and high net worth individuals for, 
among other things, their low tax rates675. Many developing countries cannot be seen as 
competition for the US and its G7 counterparts. So why were all compelled by the FATF to observe 
its standards? This is a difficult question to answer as most developing countries were not regarded 
as money laundering havens676 but in this case the argument was cleverly turned on its head. 
Without the FATF standards, they would not be able to attract foreign investments and would be 
susceptible to outbound-flows of laundered money, especially from the corrupt political elite. All 
these would affect their much needed socio-economic development. The introduction of FATF 
standards in developing countries, it was claimed by the FATF, was directed at ‘assisting’ them in 
their socio-economic development endeavours by fostering good governance.         
The FATF has played its role in diffusing its standards quite astutely, as shown by the work 
of Drezner677, Hülsse678 and Sharman679. The main issue, however, with the work of these scholars 
is that they seem to view the FATF as the primary driver of the global diffusion of AML standards. 
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This is not completely untrue, but it obscures the origins of this regime and how these AML 
policies developed over time and the interests they camouflage – including the fact that such global 
standards were, substantively, nothing more than US policies. We now turn to look briefly at the 
work of Drezner680, Hülsse681 and Sharman682. This helps us to devise a scheme to determine 
whether South Africa adopted the AML regime voluntarily or coercively. It also helps us to test 
our hypotheses about the incorporation of the global AML regime in South Africa. We start with 
the work of Drezner.      
The work of Drezner is based on a game theoretical model of policy coordination and 
argues that the spread of AML standards to the rest of the world was occasioned by policy 
convergence between the ‘great powers’, the US and the EU683. His argument is that where 
developed countries agree on particular policy objectives and strategies, policy convergence and 
harmonisation will most likely occur684. Where and when they do not agree, they create sharp lines 
of policy divergence or competition, which often lead to polarization or competing global regimes 
which are led by the disagreeing great powers. The example he gives of this latter scenario is where 
the US and the EU are in disagreement on issues relating to Genetically Modified Organisms and 
have created two competing global regulatory regimes685. Drezner identifies the Financial Action 
Task Force as the ‘coordinating forum’ for the US and EU to bring about policy convergence on 
issues of money laundering control. He explains that when the FATF was formed, its task was to 
look at coordinating anti-money laundering efforts among developed countries only (i.e. the US, 
EU, Japan, Canada and Australia). It appears from his analysis that developing countries were 
brought in as an afterthought.  
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Drezner examines what he sees as coercive elements in the regulatory strategies and 
techniques of the FATF concerning the spread of the regime to developing countries. This coercive 
element was punctuated, according to him, by the FATF’s development of NCCT blacklists. These 
blacklists have been unilaterally compiled by the FATF since 2000, naming and shaming some 
countries it had assessed and found non-compliant with its standards. Blacklisting was also 
sometimes backed by overt economic threats by the G7 countries. The G7 issued a statement in 
2000 where it pledged support for the NCCT blacklisting campaign which named and shamed 27 
countries and territories-- all non-FATF members. The G7 threatened these blacklisted countries 
with restricting their financial transactions with institutions based in G7 jurisdictions. It appears 
that many blacklisted countries responded to these threats by incorporating the FATF standards. 
These countries most obviously incorporated the FATF standards under duress. They were 
removed from the NCCT blacklists after they had ‘made progress’ to comply with the FATF 
recommendations.   
This progress was in the form of enacting the FATF regime in their countries. Therefore, 
we can conclude that many other developing countries would have likely sought to avoid such 
sanctions and would have acted proactively before they were named and shamed. As a result, when 
the blacklisted countries were forced in response to pressure to incorporate the FATF standards, 
not only their compliance but also their proactive initiatives of other countries to avert sanctions 
could be interpreted as coercive transfer. What would a voluntary transfer of the AML/CTF regime 
look like?  Hülsse (2007) focuses on the spread of the global AML regime through a variety of 
mainly discursive means, which, he argues, led to voluntary adoption of the FATF standards by 
many countries. He does not discount the coercive role played by the NCCT blacklists but rather 
puts emphasis on the ‘soft power’ dynamics of moral suasion used by the FATF in spreading its 
standards. His main argument is that international regulators engage in various forms of persuasion 




According to Hülsse, these international organisations create a demand for the existence of 
international rules and standards (he calls this ‘problematisation’), which they then promulgate 
and foster regimes to assure compliance. He claims that the FATF and those behind it (the G7) 
initially aimed at securing voluntary compliance with its standards. This entailed, he argues, not 
only persuading countries about the suitability or the relevance of the rules and standards 
themselves, but also persuading everyone about the existence of a ‘problem’ these standards were 
intended to solve686. He argues that it is easier to explain why states comply with international 
rules and standards if they had participated in their making and such rules serve their interests687. 
He further argues that even where inclusive participation is lacking, states are likely to embrace 
rules that serve their interests688.  
However, he asserts that the development of FATF standards lacked inclusive participation 
of developing countries and did not serve their interests689. He argues that in the latter scenario, 
where states see the rules and standards as externally imposed and contrary to their interests so 
that they are unwilling to comply with them, the policy makers (the FATF in this case) could either 
force the unwilling countries to comply or provide inducements /incentives to do so690. Lastly, 
policy-makers can try and persuade such countries that compliance is the “right thing to do”691. 
The discursive ‘problematisation’ strategy used by the FATF, according to Hülsse, was to portray 
the “problem of money laundering” as a global phenomenon that is not limited to the FATF 
countries692. Just as crime takes place in all countries and trans-nationally, the systems through 
which the proceeds of crime can be laundered operate throughout the globe via the interconnected 
global financial system.   
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The second discursive FATF strategy that Hülsse describes was a claim that money 
laundering was not only a global phenomenon, but also a ‘global problem’693. The FATF, 
according to Hülsse, achieved this through rhetoric in most of its communiqués and annual reports 
where the term ‘money laundering’ did not stand on its own, but was qualified by the word 
‘problem’694. ‘Money laundering’ was proclaimed as a ‘money laundering problem’695. Another 
rhetorical technique was to ‘objectify’ the ‘money laundering problem’ through ‘awareness 
raising’ in countries beyond the OECD or FATF membership696. This was to say that those 
countries that had not complied with its standards were depicted as naive and as disregarding the 
risks of money laundering for their economies and the international financial system.  
The last rhetorical technique of the FATF that Hülsse identifies is the characterization of 
money laundering as something of a meta-crime697. With this technique, money laundering is not 
just a crime, but a threat to democracy, economy, financial stability and security - especially after 
the 9/11 incident. Lack of or refusal to comply with standards aimed to combat it was, by means 
of this technique, generally interpreted by the FATF as support for organised crime. The FATF 
would therefore warn non-compliant states and territories that lack of compliance could have a 
dampening effect on their development and foreign direct investment, thus threatening their 
economic growth.698 Having persuaded its targets that money laundering was a global phenomenon 
and its nature highly problematic, the FATF then moved to further convince them that only global 
harmonisation of rules under its leadership would solve the problem699.   
As a result, any country that incorporated the FATF standards because they believed the 
regime would address their interests or concerns could be assumed to have adopted the regime 
voluntarily. However, if there is evidence of undue pressure exerted, such a transfer would no 











longer be voluntary, but rather coercive. There appears to be a thin line between voluntary and 
coercive transfer. Hülsse emphasises the voluntary schemes of policy transfer in respect of the 
AML regime, especially with respect to developing countries that did not participate in the 
deliberative rule-making processes of the FATF.  However, as stated above, he does not discount 
that a coercive role was played by the NCCT blacklist programme. According to him, therefore, 
the FATF primarily used persuasion, which was backed by real threats of coercive economic 
sanctions. 
The work of Sharman700 is most closely related to my own project as it draws on the policy 
diffusion literature to examine the spread of the FATF standards throughout the globe. He argues 
that diffusion of this global regime constituted a clear case of coercive transfer by developing 
countries. He makes an empirical case of how the regime was adopted in three Island countries. 
He argues that the adoption of AML measures by these countries was not driven by any rational 
lesson-drawing, but rather by undue pressure701. He also notes the combination of discursive and 
overtly coercive elements of the NCCT blacklists. These three works by Drezner, Hülsse and 
Sharman suggest in varying degrees that there were clear coercive strategies used to transfer the 
FATF standards to developing countries.  
The coercive strategies of the FATF challenge the legitimacy of its global regime702. All 
these authors (particularly Drezner and Hülsse) admit that some countries appear to have 
incorporated the global AML regime voluntarily. This is, however, often because both the coercive 
and the voluntary schemes of the transfer to developing countries complemented each other. This 
makes it difficult to ascertain which countries adopted the regime voluntarily.  It is also 
questionable whether the response to economic incentives which accompanied the transfer to some 
capital-starved countries can truly be considered as voluntary.   
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Where coercive transfer could be confirmed without doubt is to those countries that were 
on the initial NCCT blacklists and had to incorporate the FATF standards as a pre-condition for 
their removal. This included only 27 countries. However, the FATF regime has now spread widely, 
covering over 170 countries and territories throughout the globe and there are many new cases to 
consider. South Africa, like many other developing countries, was not blacklisted. This makes it 
more difficult to determine whether the transfer to South Africa was coercive or voluntary. There 
is also a very thin line between coercive and voluntary transfer here, because many countries, 
although not on the NCCT blacklists, had not fully complied with the FATF standards and 
therefore faced a threat of blacklisting if they did not take corrective action (or what Hülsse refers 
to as ‘pre-emptive compliance’). What conditions and evidence, then, would help us determine 
whether South Africa’s transfer was voluntary or coercive. 
For the purpose of this study, a transfer would be coercive when there was external political 
and/or economic pressure applied or threatened to be applied during the deliberative processes of 
incorporating the FATF standards to South Africa. There must be evidence of this pressure, backed 
by political or economic sanctions. The sources of this pressure must be identifiable and, at least, 
be acknowledged as one of the reasons for South Africa’s incorporation of the regime. This means 
that even if the South African authorities were fairly convinced that the regime best served their 
country’s interests of combating crime and modernizing of their laws (given South Africa’s 
transition from apartheid to democracy), the existence of fear or practical considerations of 
external sanctions could suggest that South Africa’s regime was externally imposed. Absence of 
any external political or economic pressure used to bring about or justify South Africa’s 







The transfer of FATF standards to South Africa 
In this last part, we enquire into why and how South Africa incorporated the global regime 
against money laundering.  We also show that there was policy transfer of the global AML regime 
by adapting Colin Bennett’s model703. Bennett argues that a proposition that policy adoption in 
one jurisdiction is attributable to similar actions elsewhere can only be substantiated if it can be 
demonstrated that:  
1. idiosyncratic domestic factors are not independently responsible for the policy 
adoption; 
2. the adoption is not the result of the effects of similar modernizing forces having the 
same, but separate, effects in different states; 
3. Policymakers are aware of the policy adoption elsewhere; and 
4. This overseas evidence was utilized within domestic policy debates704. 
Bennett comparatively studied cross-national adoption of ombudsperson agencies and data 
protection laws. He articulates reasons for the above model. He says that some similarities and 
timing of policy adoption could be attributed to chance or “perhaps each state in isolation and for 
independent reasons concluded that these policies should be adopted”705. By tracing the history of 
the AML regime in South Africa, we can show that South Africa’s adoption of the regime cannot 
be accounted for through ‘idiosyncratic domestic factors’ alone. It could rather be explained 
through both domestic and external structural factors, including international pressure and the 
‘problematisation’ kind of persuasive discourse that Hülsse referred to. We also show that 
authorities in South Africa were not only aware of policy developments in the global environment, 
but were proactively and systematically made aware (of such developments) and used that overseas 
evidence extensively and with great aplomb in crafting their domestic AML regime.  
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There was also pressure from local policy think tanks or policy entrepreneurs, some with 
transnational links, in ensuring that the South African lawmakers enacted the regime and did so in 
a way that conformed with the ‘best practice’ ‘international standards’ set by the FATF. These 
local policy entrepreneurs might have had their own interests, which may not be difficult to see 
through. Or, rather, they may have perceived or foreseen that the adoption of these standards was 
inevitable. They may, therefore, have wittingly or unwittingly became the agents of the global 
players in warning the government of the dangers of non-compliance with the FATF standards and 
in persuading it to follow suit or face the FATF ‘sword’.  
The continuous amendments of the AML regime in South Africa have always coincided or 
reacted to similar policy changes at a global level: from the initial AML laws and regulations to 
the counter terrorism financing (CTF) measures that were enacted in response to September 11 
bombings in the United States. We argue that it is therefore neither chance nor choice that South 
Africa’s regime resembles the requirements of the global AML regime as set by the FATF. There 
are domestic and external factors to South Africa’s incorporation of the FATF standards. The first 
domestic factor could be gleaned from the preambles of the legislation establishing the regime and 
could be classified as directed at crime combating. A second domestic factor could be deduced 
from the country’s political transition from apartheid to democracy which took place in the early 
1990s -- necessitating that South Africa amend old laws or enacts new ones to establish or 
transform institutions in line with the new democratic constitution and its social realities.  
In the 1990s, South Africa could and did independently and legitimately “draw lessons” 
from other jurisdictions in order to deal with its social problems or to modernize its apartheid 
inherited laws and institutions. But could South Africa’s adoption of the global AML/CFT regime 
be explained by simply referring to these circumstances at home? The answer to this is No.  These 
conditions created incentives to borrow but do not demonstrate that it actually occurred. There are 
a number of other external factors that influenced South Africa’s incorporation of the FATF 




Trafficking Act of 1992, which created offences of drug-related money laundering. However this 
law was enacted by the outgoing apartheid regime, suggesting that there was an awareness of the 
existence of the Vienna Convention prior to democratic transition even though the apartheid 
government was banned from any participation in the UN due to international anti-apartheid 
sanctions.  
Jordaan706 wrote that the contents of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 1992 and 
Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996 were strongly influenced by the UK’s Drug Trafficking Act of 
1986. The Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996 was passed in the same year with the International 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters Act and the Extradition Amendment Act. These laws were passed 
two years into the democratic government’s tenure in office. During the period of their enactment, 
there was a lot of domestic legislative activity, not only in the area of criminal justice, but also in 
education, health and other areas where old laws were being amended or repealed. But the timing 
of the enactment of these two laws suggests that South Africa enacted them in order to accede to 
the Vienna Convention707. The first Minister of Justice for democratic South Africa clearly 
confirmed this when he told Padraig O’Malley in an interview in 1997 that: 
“South Africa was not in a position to accede to the Vienna Convention on the 
combating of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. It could not because it 
simply did not have the laws in place and so in our very first two or three years in 
office we have developed adequate legislation in that regard, got that legislation 
through parliament and South Africa is now in a position to move forward towards 
acceding to the Vienna Convention.”708  
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The laws enacted in 1996 were enacted to ensure, among others, that South Africa was able 
to accede to the UN Vienna Convention, since the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act of 1992 alone 
was inadequate709. It did not provide for adequate international mutual cooperation, extradition or 
assistance in relation to external matters on areas of extraterritorial confiscation and forfeiture of 
proceeds of crime (which were confined to drugs then). These three 1996 laws came about 
following an investigation by the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) which started 
in 1994710, just before the country’s historic democratic post-apartheid election of 1994. SBP’s 
work that we referred to above found that within the Department of Justice, many of the initial 
processes for legislative changes emanate from research conducted by the SALRC711. It is this 
body that actually proposed the enactment of these laws for South Africa through a research report 
entitled International Cooperation in Criminal Prosecutions712. It is important to introduce this 
body, the SALRC, because a lot of legal policy learning and transfer appears to be facilitated by it 
within the criminal justice sector.  
    The SALRC was formed in 1973 by the apartheid government under the South African 
Law (Reform) Commission Act 19 of 1973. The SALRC survived the democratic transition. Its 
members are legal experts who are appointed by the President of South Africa. The mandate of 
the SALRC, according to its founding Act713, is to do research with reference to all branches of 
the law of the Republic and to study and investigate all such branches in order to make 
recommendations for their development, improvement, modernization or reform, including:- 
repeal of obsolete or unnecessary provisions; removal of anomalies; bringing about of uniformity 
in the law in force in the various parts of the Republic; consolidation or codification of any branch 
of law; and taking steps aimed at making the common law more readily available.  
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The SALRC has played a major role in South Africa’s legal developments over the years. 
It has got research teams/working groups for various fields of law and conducts research and 
advises the government on legal developments.  It proposes new legislation and amendments to 
existing laws. Some of the new laws it has worked on were those emanating from the provisions 
of South Africa’s new constitution. The legislative proposals the SALRC may go to the extent of 
drafting Bills that are then subjected to all the stages of law making from a departmental level to 
the final stages where such Bills become Acts of parliament after being signed by the President714. 
The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development is the primary and major client of the 
SALRC and laws on AML policy came through the Ministry’s initiatives715. The SALRC appears 
to be a major source of policy learning and transfer as it mainly conducts research at the early 
phases before such proposals are even referred to the affected departments. In the area of AML 
laws, it played a major role starting with the passing of the above-mentioned three 1996 Acts which 
brought South Africa into full compliance with the Vienna Convention. 
  South Africa acceded to the Vienna Convention in 1998. At this time there was a parallel 
process at the SALRC, dubbed Project 104, and entitled Money Laundering and Related Matters. 
Three documents were issued by the SALRC for Project 104, namely; Issue Paper No 1716, 
Discussion Paper 64717 and a report718. It is important to analyze these documents because they 
shed some light on South Africa’s policy learning and transfer of the global AML standards. The 
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SALRC normally publishes Issue Papers to publicly make its initial proposals for law reform. In 
these papers it requests the public to make comments and suggestions. After receiving comments 
on the Issue Papers, it would then compile ‘Discussion Documents’, which are usually followed 
by public engagements in the form of workshops and conferences. Issue Paper No. 1- entitled 
Money Laundering and Related Matters- was published by the SALRC in March 1996, requesting 
the public and interested parties to make comments and suggestions on its proposals for the 
establishment of the financial regulatory measures against money laundering719.  
What came out of this process, we submit, was no longer driven by South Africa’s 
intentions to accede to the Vienna Convention. Instead, Issue Paper No. 1 seems to have been 
directed at ensuring South Africa’s compliance with a totally private and non-legally mandated 
regime driven by the FATF and the great powers (G7). However, the SALRC did not disclose this 
in Issue Paper No. 1. Rather, SALRC’s intervention suggests that its research and legislative 
proposals for the financial regulatory measures were mere improvements to South Africa’s laws 
and not responses to external pressure to comply with the FATF standards. The SALRC 
acknowledged, however, that Issue Paper No. 1 was compiled in consultation with “a group of 
diverse experts”720. These experts were not named, which made  it difficult to discern whether the 
FATF or those acting to promote its international best practice standards (or agents) were by then 
involved in the initial stages of the transfer or not721.  
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The SALRC explained in Issue Paper No. 1 that while South Africa had criminalized 
money laundering and given the courts powers to issue orders for the confiscation of proceeds of 
crime, now it was focusing on the “regulatory measures to combat money laundering”722. There is 
no immediate explanation as to why South Africa needed such ‘regulatory measures’ as it had 
already criminalized money laundering. Then the report defines money laundering and explains 
the three stages through which money laundering is believed to occur. These stages include the 
placement of proceeds of crime into the financial system, distribution or layering and reintegration 
stages, where funds are returned for use by criminals723. Issue Paper No. 1 then goes on to explain 
that South Africa’s legal framework does not have a regulatory framework to deal with these 
processes of laundering, except where that money laundering occurs in the context of  drug 
offences (through the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act of 1992)724. Then the report abruptly 
declares that  
“If the principle that laundering of all proceeds of crime should give rise to criminal 
liability is accepted, it follows that administrative measures to combat money 
laundering should not only apply in respect of certain offences. The problem with 
our law is, however, that a comprehensive legislative scheme comprising regulatory 
measures to combat money laundering is lacking”725.  
It is our view that Issue Paper No. 1 should have made a stronger case for the necessity of 
financial regulatory measures for South Africa. It however did not. Instead it loosely claimed that 
criminals needed the business community in order to launder their proceeds of crime726. Because 
of this claim, it proposed that private businesses needed to be regulated so that they could not be 
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used by criminals in that manner727. It further claimed that the establishment of financial 
regulations would assist law enforcement agencies in identifying, investigating, preventing and 
prosecuting money laundering728. That is the gist and the reasoning of Issue Paper No.1 which 
introduced the FATF’s financial regulatory regime in South Africa.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the report did not give an adequate background to the problem 
it aimed to address, the main reasons advanced for introducing the regime seemed to lack any 
justifiable grounds for establishing such a colossal administrative scheme. It is important to 
emphasize that the introduction of the elaborate AML regulatory provisions on financial 
institutions and other businesses was not a recommendation of the Vienna Convention. As a result, 
it can be inferred that the development of these regulatory measures was not informed by South 
Africa’s need to comply with that international convention or any other international legal 
agreement it might have acceded to.  A question might then be asked as to where the researchers 
of Project 104 at the SALRC got this idea of financial regulatory measures? We ask this question 
because there are no apparent references in Issue Paper No.1 itself. There are, however, a number 
of possible entry points for these ideas.  
The SALRC appears to have learnt these ideas while researching their previous project on 
International Cooperation in Criminal Matters. Another source appears to have been experts they 
consulted and/or the legislation of other countries, particularly the US, UK and Australia, where 
financial regulations on businesses were already in place. Other sources could have been the 
Commonwealth Secretariat’s Model Law on Prohibition of Money Laundering (1996) or the 
FATF’s 40 recommendations of 1990. The latter was the first initiative at a global level to 
recommend that countries regulate their private businesses in order to combat money laundering. 
There is no evidence of any contact between the SALRC researchers and the FATF at the time of 
the publication of Issue Paper No. 1. However, late in the year (1996), the FATF and the 
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Commonwealth hosted the Southern and Eastern African Conference on Money Laundering of 
1996 in Cape Town, South Africa729. 
The SALRC then published a discussion document, Discussion Paper 64, where it reported 
that the respondents to Issue Paper No.1’s call for comments were ‘unanimous in their support’ 
for the proposed financial regulatory regime730. The important part of this discussion document 
was that it published a potential draft Bill, with a call for public comments. In August 1996, the 
final report731 of Project 104 was submitted to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development where the SALRC made known its final views and a Bill that it drafted in revised 
form and proposed. This final report proposes the introduction of a regulatory regime and the 
formation of a financial intelligence unit for South Africa732. The regulatory framework would 
require regulated businesses to develop internal rules to combat money laundering, keep records 
of customer transactions for at least 5 years, appoint anti-money laundering reporting/compliance 
officers, report suspicious and threshold customer transactions to a financial intelligence unit and, 
mandatorily train their staff on anti-money laundering duties733.  
In this final report, it appears that the SALRC borrowed all its proposals for South Africa’s 
regime from Australia, the US and/or the UK in that they were virtually identical734. The UK and 
Australia had emulated US laws that were discussed above from 1986 and most of their laws (UK 
and Australia) had been passed prior to the Vienna Convention and the Financial Action Task 
Force’s 40 Recommendations735. The final Project 104 report also, for the first time, made mention 
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of the Basel Committee on  Banking Supervision and the FATF’s “international accepted 
principles” for regulation of private businesses, especially banks, to justify its recommendations 
on ‘know your customer’736.  
However, the report does not disclose that this whole regulatory scheme it proposed sought 
to make South Africa compliant with the FATF’s 40 Recommendations. Although the final report 
does not acknowledge the enormous regulatory costs to consumers that would arise from its 
proposed regulations, it acknowledges the high costs of regulation to government and business but 
justifies them in the “national interest of the Republic”737. According to this report, the regulatory 
measures would deal with “large scale crime” and would make South Africa’s financial system 
“as unattractive as possible to criminals…protecting the integrity of the business community”738. 
Lastly, the authors of the report mentioned that  
“The Minister of Justice has recently indicated that the matter is regarded as one of 
some urgency. The surge of foreign investment in recent months in South Africa, 
and its return to full participation in the international community underscores this 
fact”739.  
This declaration of “urgency” by the SALRC may suggest that the Minister of Justice may 
have been advised of such and the government or the Justice Ministry might have already taken a 
decision to introduce these regulatory measures. Interesting in this message, however, is the link 
                                                                
Financial Transactions Reports Act of 1988. The UK and Australia had emulated US laws that were discussed above 
from 1986 and most of their laws (UK and Australia) had been passed prior to the Vienna Convention of 1988 and the 
Financial Action Task Force 40 Recommendations of 1990 
736 See SALC. 1996. Money laundering and related matters. South African Law Commission, Project 104: Report, 
Pretoria. http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj104_1996aug.pdf, p.17. What is striking is that in respect of 
customer identification, the SALRC steered clear on recommending the verification of customer’s addresses (see Ibid. 
p.16-18), a central feature of ‘know your customer’ provisions. The stricter client identification and verification 
provisions which lead to unintended and undesirable outcomes of financial exclusion in developing countries (see 
next Chapter) seem to have emerged later in secondary legislation (FICA regulations), after the FICA had been passed. 
737 SALC. 1996. Money laundering and related matters. South African Law Commission, Project 104: Issue Paper 1, 
Pretoria. http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers/ip01_prj104_1996.pdf,p. 8. 
738 Ibid. 




between South Africa’s return to the international community and the alleged urgency of the AML 
financial regulations. The link is also drawn between foreign investments and the AML regime. 
Foreign investment continues to be a dear subject to developing countries.  
In promoting the AML regulations, the FATF and such organizations as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, World Bank and the IMF have always emphasized this 
regime as essential to economic growth and development as it allegedly protects financial 
institutions from risks of criminal abuse. If these regulatory measures would help South Africa 
maintain a stable financial system conducive to foreign investment, the Minister would have 
correctly emphasised ‘some urgency’. However, could there have been some political or economic 
pressure on South Africa’s adoption of the FATF standards as early as 1996 or earlier? This is not 
clear. There is, however, evidence that the FATF had already started its worldwide campaign to 
disseminate its standards, even to non-FATF member countries. Its 1996-1997 annual report shows 
that in 1996 it had sponsored and organised several seminars and conferences for various regions 
including Russia, Eastern Europe, Turkey, Southern and Eastern Africa, urging countries to adopt 
its standards740. The FATF was until that stage, as Hülsse741 argues, still on an ‘awareness-raising’ 
mission -- trying to persuade non-member countries of the ‘money laundering problem’ and the 
existence of its international best practice standards to solve it.   
In October 1996 the FATF organized the Southern and Eastern African Money Laundering 
Conference, which was held in Cape Town, South Africa. This is shortly after the final SALRC 
report was submitted to South Africa’s Minister of Justice in August 1996. This conference was 
co-sponsored by the FAFT and the Commonwealth Secretariat742. In its 1996-1997 Annual Report, 
the FATF noted that;  
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“Most countries in the [Southern and Eastern Africa] region have not made money 
laundering a criminal offence nor do they have other anti-money laundering 
measures in place. Those that do tend to be restricted to drug money laundering, 
though countries such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania and South Africa (which has already 
enacted several important pieces of legislation) are further advanced. An 
encouraging development though was the holding of a Southern and Eastern 
African Money Laundering Conference…Most of the countries in the region 
attended and expressed a willingness to develop a unified approach to dealing with 
anti-money laundering issues in the region”743. 
Government representatives from 13 countries744 of Southern and Eastern Africa, including 
South Africa, attended the conference, together with the following representatives from FATF 
‘sponsoring countries’: Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom and the United States. It 
is in this conference where a proposal was adopted, “subject to confirmation by heads of 
government” of the Southern and Eastern Africa states, to establish a Southern and Eastern Africa 
FATF745. At this time, the FATF was on a world-wide charm offensive. Having managed to 
encourage ‘willingness to develop a unified approach in dealing with anti-money laundering issues 
in the region’746, its awareness raising crusade was already bearing fruit.  
There were also developments on the side of transnational policy communities. The Centre 
for the Study of Economic Crime, based at the University of Johannesburg (former Rand Afrikaans 
University), in conjunction with the Centre for International Documentation on Organised and 
Economic Crime of Cambridge University (UK) and the Centre for International Financial Crime 
Studies of the University of Florida (USA), had organized the “first academic symposia on South 
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African money laundering laws” that was held in 1997 at the University of Cambridge’s Jesus 
College in the UK747. A number of senior government officials from South Africa, academics and 
experts attended the symposium. It becomes clear from the speech made by Adv. Selby Baqwa, 
South Africa’s then Public Protector that the South African authorities had become aware of the 
FATF standards and regarded their adoption as necessary.  
For instance, Adv. Selby Baqwa mentioned, citing the FATF/Commonwealth funded 
conference that had been held in Cape Town the previous year, that  
“The 40 Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering have become the internationally accepted standard against which the 
implementation of anti-money laundering measures is assessed”748. 
Referring to the same conference with regards to a resolution to form the Southern and Eastern 
Africa FATF-style regional body and the recommendations that such a body should adopt the 
FATF’s 40 Recommendations, Baqwa mentioned that  
“The South African Government was requested to promote the process that will 
eventually lead to [the] formation of such a body. In reaction to this request the 
South African Government has bestowed the responsibility for this process, 
together with the implementation of an anti-money laundering policy for South 
Africa, on the Department of Finance which is currently continuing with the 
preparations to get this initiative off the ground”749. 
  There is no doubt that at that time the FATF was already directly involved in the policy 
transfer process, not only in South Africa, but in the whole of Southern and Eastern Africa region 
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judging by the number of countries that attended its conference in Cape Town. It appears also from 
Baqwa’s comments above that South Africa was earmarked to play a leadership role in the process 
of disseminating the FATF standards to its neighbours. After the final SALRC report had been 
submitted to the Minister of Justice, it was referred to the Ministry of Finance, which was to be 
the custodian of South Africa’s financial regulatory regime against money laundering750.  The 
location of the regime within the Ministry of Finance seems to follow an international trend, as 
most countries have generally located their financial regulatory schemes under finance ministries, 
although they also pertain to the administration of justice. Some countries have, however, placed 
their FIUs under law enforcement agencies (i.e. the UK) or justice departments.       
There was a long delay (five years) before the SALRC recommendations were introduced 
to the South African Parliament and became an Act of Parliament in 2001751. The Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) of 2001 was passed after a long process at the Department of 
Finance, which culminated in the redrafting of the Financial Intelligence Centre Bill by a task team 
appointed by the then Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel752. The task team consulted the 
industries that would be affected by the regulations753. A redrafted Bill was then submitted to the 
Ministers of Finance and Justice for discussion, more refinements and further consultations with 
‘key departments and agencies as directed by Cabinet, before approval in 2000’754. The 
Department of Finance appears to have had some reservations with the legislation as proposed by 
SALRC. However it is not clear what these reservations might have been. At the briefing of the 
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introduction of the FIC Bill to parliament, the Deputy Minister of Finance then, Dr. Mandisi 
Mphahlwa, explained that the differences between the Department of Finance and SALRC 
appeared to have been ‘technical’ and that the Finance Ministry’s concern was in ensuring that the 
legislation was “appropriate to the South African circumstances”755.   
Looking at the Bill proposed by the SALRC in 1996 and the Bill that was redrafted by the 
Department of Finance, there appears to have been no substantial differences. All the regulatory 
measures suggested were carried through in the final Bill that was introduced to parliament in 2001 
for the parliamentary legislative process. However, while there was this deliberation on the FIC 
Bill at the Department of Finance, a number of parallel AML policy developments were taking 
place. The Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 1998 was quickly developed and passed by 
parliament. The development of the POCA could have been unexpected and a surprise given the 
fact that there was already the Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996 which dealt with almost the same 
issues of asset forfeiture of proceeds of crime. The National Prosecuting Authority was also 
established, housing the Asset Forfeiture Unit and the Directorate of Special Operations.    
In 2001, Pieter Smit, the principal investigator on the SALRC’s Project 104 on Money 
Laundering and Related Matters, wrote a monograph which was published in January, just before 
the parliamentary processes on the FIC Bill resumed in March that year. The monograph was 
published by the Institute of Security Studies, a ‘think-tank’ based in South Africa and an 
influential player in the making of anti-organized crime legislation and policies.  Smit, in this 
monograph, warns that while South African law had created very broad money laundering and 
asset confiscation and forfeiture regimes, its law was  
“…lacking with regards to administrative money laundering control measures. 
South Africa’s current provisions fall short of the international standards set by the 
40 recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force. It is hoped that the 





enactment of the Financial Intelligence Centre Bill will go some way to address this 
shortcoming.”756  
This would seem to have been the first instance that someone involved in the SALRC project 104 
made published comments about South Africa’s needs to comply with the global FATF standards. 
This suggests that despite South Africa’s need for this regulatory framework, as applied in other 
countries that South Africa (or the SALRC specifically) drew lessons from, there was some 
international political pressure to comply explicitly with the FATF framework. Some of this 
pressure is mirrored in the oral and written presentations made to the joint parliamentary portfolio 
committees of the NA and NCOP’s public hearings on the FIC Bill. The Life Offices’ Association 
(LOA), in its submission, mentioned that  
“There is an urgency to place money laundering control legislation on the statute 
book in South Africa. We have the sword of the FATF hanging over our heads and 
the patience of the international community is reaching its end. We believe that the 
issue of the non-cooperative countries listed by the FATF will be addressed by other 
parties in their submissions. At this stage it is sufficient to note the existence of this 
blacklist.”757 
The LOA was correct. The FATF had started publishing a blacklist of a number of countries 
in 2000 and 2001; arbitrarily naming and shaming them for non-compliance with its standards. 
Presenting in the parliamentary public hearings, the Centre for the Study of Economic Crime 
(CenSEC) emphasised the dangers that South Africa was facing if not compliant with the FATF’s 
standards. CenSEC’s oral and written submission concentrated on the urgency of South Africa to 
comply with the FATF recommendations.  
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“It is submitted that the Bill [FIC Bill] should be more consciously compliant with 
the Forty Recommendations of the international Financial Action Task Force…The 
FATF is currently the most important international body which specializes solely 
in combating money laundering”758  
There was also pressure on parliamentarians to consider the negative implications for the 
country if they did not fully implement the FATF Recommendations.  
“The major financial centre countries of Europe, North America and Asia are 
members of the FATF and have adopted the Forty Recommendations as a standard 
for effective money laundering control strategy. They are required by 
Recommendation 22 to treat all transactions with parties in countries that do not 
apply, or insufficiently apply, the Forty Recommendations with circumspection. 
South African businesses therefore find that their transactions are scrutinized by the 
major financial centres, because South Africa has not implemented the Forty 
Recommendations in full.”759   
Some members of the parliamentary portfolio committee might have heard of the FATF 
for the first time that day. With this submission from LOA and CenSEC, parliamentarians could 
barely ignore the warnings. South Africa’s pace and level of compliance with the FATF 
recommendations was already compromising and probably delaying South African international 
business transactions, as claimed by CenSEC above.  While the parliamentary committee 
questioned almost all the submissions of other interested parties during the oral presentations, 
CenSEC’s appears not to have solicited any scrutiny. For instance, CenSEC provided no evidence 
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for the statement that “South African businesses therefore find that their transactions are 
scrutinized by the major financial centres” due to South Africa’s non-compliance with FATF 
standards.  
Most of the recommendations made by CenSEC, in respect to the Bill’s contents, were 
justified on the basis that CenSEC’s recommendations would make South Africa’s regime more 
compliant with the ‘international standards’ or ‘best practices’ of the FATF760. CenSEC itself 
boasts of a colourful profile with links to international anti-money laundering experts in the UK 
and the US761. Even before the passing of FICA, CenSEC appears to have been forward looking, 
anticipating the unstoppable arrival of the FATF’s regulatory regime. It had established a 
university qualification, a “Certificate Programme in Money Laundering Control to train 
compliance officers and risk managers in the corporate environment”, with “the first 16 graduates 
having graduated at the end of 2000” and “a further 40 students…by the end of 2001”762. It further 
adds in its profile that  
“These students will be able to play a leading role in the drafting and 
implementation of compliance policies regarding money laundering in their 
respective companies”763. 
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CenSEC has got quite a good reputation within the banking industry in South Africa. We 
asked a number of compliance officers in various banks what qualifications are required for most 
of their staff working in the compliance divisions, especially for FICA-related money laundering 
control duties. The compliance officers confirmed that students coming out of university with 
professional degrees are hardly aware of the money laundering control regime, since these are 
recent legal and regulatory developments764. However, the ‘Certificate in Money Laundering 
Control’ from CenSEC at the University of Johannesburg was the main academic qualification 
they mentioned as desired, and some as a prerequisite, for their staff working directly in their 
money laundering control divisions.  
This shows that CenSEC was not only forward looking, but has contributed to and reaped 
some benefits from the introduction of the financial regulatory measures through its academic 
courses, research, support and promotion of South Africa’s compliance with the global FATF 
standards. CenSEC’s submission confirms Adv. Selby Baqwa’s assertions, above, that South 
Africa was assuming a leadership role in the exclusive FATF ‘club’;  
“No African country is a member of the FATF. As a consequence the 
Recommendations do not reflect the realities of African economies. There is an 
expectation that South Africa should be a member of the FATF to ensure that the 
standards that are set reflect the unique features of its economy and infrastructure 
as well as that of African countries in general. However, South Africa will also find 
it difficult to take up membership of the FATF if it is not adequately compliant”765 
What this highlights is that in order for South Africa to participate in the FATF, it had to 
first comply with its standards. Ultimately, this expectation was fulfilled when South Africa 
underwent FATF’s mutual evaluation program in 2003 and was invited to become a full-member 
of the club, joining Brazil and Mexico as the only developing countries in the FATF, later followed 
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by India and China. Before 2000, the FATF exercised some restraint, and continues to, in including 
developing countries as members and thus shapers of its standards. It had merely treated them as 
regulation-takers. When they had been convinced or forced to adopt the regime, they were then 
very selectively admitted as members, creating a very unbalanced membership between 
developing and developed countries in the FATF.  
Instead, the FATF seem to have been inclined to incentivize the formation of regionally 
based FATF-style regional bodies (abbreviated as FSRBs). These FSRBs appear to play no 
meaningful role in shaping the global AML regime. Instead they play a role of encouraging the 
dissemination and implementation of the FATF standards by those countries that are not its full 
members766. For instance, while many countries in the Caribbean and other small offshore 
jurisdictions belonged to an FSRB since 1992767, some of them were unilaterally blacklisted by 
the FATF in 2000 and 2001 and being members of the Caribbean FSRB did not shield them from 
the NCCT blacklists.   
FICA came into force in South Africa in 2002. In the same year, the former Minister of 
Finance, Trevor Manuel, convened the inaugural meeting of the Anti-Money Laundering Advisory 
Council (AMLAC). AMLAC is one of the two institutions established by FICA, the second one 
being the Financial Intelligence Centre itself. In this meeting, it becomes clearer that political and 
economic pressure played a deciding role in South Africa’s final domestic adoption of FATF 
standards. In this inaugural meeting Manuel announced that;  
“The formation of the Council [AMLAC] creates a further opportunity to enable us 
to better manage our country’s financial resources- and sends out a strong message 
that crime does not pay in our country. All of this happens in the context in which 
people should be encouraged to go about the business of investing their savings and 
funds – into banks or any other institution…However, there are also certain 
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obligations which go with this right. These obligations require that those 
responsible for managing the system also comply with accepted standards, such as 
those of the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee. These standards 
are becoming increasingly global in their scale and scope. We need to accept these, 
adapt them to our circumstances, and work with, or we will find that they are 
imposed on us.”768  
The Minister had even bought into the rhetoric of the FATF of negatively labelling offshore 
financial centres as money laundering and regulatory havens. To that end, he said  
“In the past there have been some countries which have allowed banking and other 
financial activities to take place with no questions asked…There have also been 
some other blips in this ocean, small islands mainly which have sought to attract 
investment through becoming tax havens. They too have not survived as viable 
sustainable economies.”769  
These statements by the South Africa’s former Minister of Finance sum up clearly that 
South Africa’s compliance, particularly with the regulatory recommendations of the FATF, was 
aimed at avoiding them being ‘imposed on’ South Africa. The small Islands and other developing 
countries certainly did not escape the wrath of the FATF and South Africa could not be allowed to 
follow that route. In his study Sharman770 shows how smaller defenseless countries whose sole 
niche had been to provide financial services were negatively affected by the FATF’s NCCT 
blacklists. The admission by Trevor Manuel clearly points to a coercive policy transfer. For a 
Minister of Finance of a democratic sovereign state to say that his country needs to adopt laws “or 
we will find that they are imposed on us”, as quoted above, seem far from keeping with voluntary 
                                                                
768 Statement by the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, MP, at the inaugural meeting of the Money Laundering 
Advisory Council. 18 October 2002. 
769 Ibid. 
770 Sharman, J.C. 2008. Power and discourse in policy diffusion: anti-money laundering in developing countries.  




policy learning. We can therefore safely conclude that South Africa capitulated and incorporated 
the regime out of fear of possible imposition of sanctions by the FATF, especially on the back of 
its NCCT blacklists programme. Coercive transfer, according to policy transfer theorists, happens 
in two ways; directly or indirectly. When it happens directly, a country is forced to adopt particular 
policies it might not want to771. Indirect coercive transfer772 could take place through persuasion, 
incentives or sanctions.  
It is however our view that South Africa was eventually going to adopt the FATF standards, 
but that the NCCT blacklists facilitated its ultimate decision to incorporate them, especially at the 
time it did. This is a clear case of what Hülsse has referred to as ‘pre-emptive compliance’773. 
South Africa’s incorporation of the regime could therefore be viewed as indirect coercive transfer 
as it complied with the FATF standards in order to avoid being sanctioned. It is important to also 
acknowledge that while South Africa adopted the FATF features of the global AML regime under 
duress, it seems to have adopted the UN Vienna Convention features of the regime through a 
continuous process of voluntary lesson-drawing and out of its international legal obligations as a 
member of the UN. To support the latter point, it is important to look briefly at the processes of 
the making of the POCA of 1998, which was passed besides South Africa having enacted the 
Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996. What, then, was the problem with the Proceeds of Crime Act of 
1996, which led to a speedy enactment of POCA before even the former legislation had been put 
to use?  
 In the introduction of the POCA Bill to parliament, developed countries were used as an 
example that South Africa should emulate in fighting its organized crime. Peter Gastrow of the 
Institute for Security Studies told parliamentarians of the Joint Committee of the NA’s Justice and 
Constitutional Development and the NCOPs Security and Justice that South Africa’s POCA Bill 
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went “a long way in catching up with countries like the US”774. In the development of POCA, 
South Africa was learning from the US, particularly its RICO statutes enacted as part of the 
Organised Crime Control Act of 1970. We have discussed the substantive contents of POCA in 
Chapter 4 and the development South African jurisprudence emanating from its enactment. 
However it is important to make some observations on the making of POCA and the actors that 
played a major role in bringing about its parliamentary passage.  
The making of POCA arises from the Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996 which had been 
developed by the SALRC. While the Proceeds of Crime Act was based on the UK legislation, the 
South African authorities were of the view that it was a non-starter in dealing with organized 
crime775. It criminalized the proceeds of crime beyond drugs, an international trend after the FATF 
had suggested that not only drug money could be laundered, but proceeds of any crime from tax 
evasion, fraud and other profit driven crimes776. This was a new development globally because the 
Vienna Convention had only required UN members to criminalize the proceeds of drugs777. The 
FATF had started with drugs but in 1996, it amended its standards to include proceeds of all 
crime778. In an interview with O’Malley779, Willie Hofmeyr, the head of Asset Forfeiture Unit of 
South Africa, explained that after inheriting ‘old bad laws’ from the apartheid government, the 
new government started learning from other democratic governments from around the world on 
how they were dealing with organized crime. This learning was not only confined to organized 
crime, but criminal law in general in areas such as bail and sentencing legislation780. When it came 
to crime, according to Hofmeyr, parliament had realized   
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“…that in many democratic countries, crime is a real and a big problem and 
democracies have had to find ways, and fairly drastic ways, very often, to deal with 
crime and they've tried to do it in a way that fits in with a rights culture. What we 
started realising is: we have none of that. We had the bad old laws but because 
things were relatively easy for the police781 no attempts had been made to keep up 
with more sophisticated powers that you can give your police and prosecutors that 
are consonant with a rights culture. We think that's the sort of thing that we've been 
looking at…”782    
In this he was referring, in terms of organized crime, to  
“…the civil forfeiture of criminal assets as well as stuff based on the (RICO) 
legislation in the [United] States, the racketeering legislation…”783 
The Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996 only allowed for criminal forfeiture of the proceeds of 
crime. This meant that someone had to be found guilty of an offence before their assets could be 
confiscated or forfeit. The South African authorities became interested in civil forfeiture which 
was not provided for in the Proceeds of Crime Act. In late 1996, a proposal was put to the Minister 
of Justice to look at putting together a government task team to explore introducing civil forfeiture 
into South Africa’s proceeds of crime legislation784. This was initiated by prominent ANC 
members of parliament, among them, Willie Hofmeyr, then a member of the National Assembly’s 
Justice and Constitutional Development Committee, and Adv. Johnny de Lange, the chairperson 
of the same committee at the time785.  
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In 1997 there was a study tour to the US and Canada to study those countries’ civil 
forfeiture laws and practices786. This process resulted in the drafting of Prevention of Organised 
Crime Bill, which was introduced to Parliament in August 1998787. The task team consisted of 
experts, government bureaucrats, academics and private consultants788. Among the members of 
this task team was Peter Gastrow of the Institute for Security Studies- a think tank based in Pretoria 
that had around the same time commissioned and published some early research studies on 
organized crime and money laundering and Adv. Pieter Smit, who had been the principal 
investigator for the SALRC’s Project 104 on Money Laundering and Related Matters. CenSEC 
drafted the money laundering provisions of POCA789.  
 POCA was therefore initiated by parliamentarians because there was a belief that the 
Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996 did not go far enough as far as seizing and confiscating proceeds 
of crime was concerned. There was also a view that it did not go far enough in tackling South 
Africa’s organized crime phenomenon; particularly gang crime in Cape Town and surrounding 
areas. Hence racketeering provisions were introduced in POCA. This means that while the SALRC 
learnt from abroad in developing the Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996, it probably did not draw 
comparisons from jurisdictions with tougher laws on organized crime- such as the US- and POCA 
was enacted to rectify this. The Proceeds of Crime Act was founded mainly on UK legislation 
which then focused on conviction-based asset forfeiture. According to Willie Hofmeyr, South 
Africa found the US provisions appealing mainly because they provided for a non-conviction-
based civil forfeiture of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime790.   
The making of POCA would appear, therefore, to have been an outcome of a rational and 
voluntary policy learning/transfer. There appears to have been no undue external pressure put on 
South Africa to enact POCA. If South Africa had decided not to enact POCA (as it already 
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complied with the Vienna Convention of 1988), it would not have faced a blacklist from the UN 
or the FATF, as would be the case when it had not enacted FICA. Not many countries use the non-
conviction based asset forfeiture system and it is only recently that the FATF and the UN have 
encouraged countries to make use of this system. There is other legislation that forms part of the 
global AML regime in South Africa besides the FICA and POCA. The most important one is the 
POCDATARA of 2004 which was enacted in response to the FATF’s extension of its 40+9 special 
recommendations against terrorism.  POCDATARA was, among others, propelled by pressure for 
South Africa to comply with the FATF standards which had been amended in the wake of US 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. There were, however, also other incidents of urban-terrorism in the Cape 
and in Gauteng, which were attributed to a group of Afrikaners (known as the Boeremag) that 
resented the democratic dispensation. However these local terrorist groups appeared to have no 
links with international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, which POCDATARA was designed 
for, and were easily arrested by the local police.  
 
Conclusion 
South Africa’s incorporation of the global AML regime shows that some features, 
particularly those emanating from the FATF were adopted primarily through coercion. While 
South Africa was eventually going to adopt them (the FATF’s financial regulatory standards) 
through a voluntary process of lesson-drawing, as the SALRC had proposed in its Project 104, the 
pressure mounted by the FATF through its NCCT blacklists played the deciding role in the 
country’s adoption of the FATF standards of financial regulation. The adoption by South Africa, 
and many other developing countries so coerced, or the dissemination of these standards through 
coercive means, has implications for the global AML regime’s legitimacy. This is especially so 
given that the FATF standards were masked as voluntary and thus, non-legally binding. In the 
following chapter we examine whether South Africa’s forced adoption of the FATF’s financial 




the country’s implementation of the regime. We shall also establish whether such negative policy 
outcomes were caused by or had any correlation with the manner in which the FATF standards 
























Implementation: FATF standards in the South African banking sector 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the implementation of the FATF standards within the financial 
sector in South Africa. The focus is on implementation and compliance within the retail banking 
sector. It uses data from various secondary and primary sources such as confidential interviews 
with AML/CTF compliance officers, regulatory supervisors, law enforcement officers and experts 
in South Africa. We ask whether South Africa, as a developing country with many structural socio-
economic limitations, could fully implement the FATF standards within the financial banking 
sector, in the manner in which they were initially enacted and if so would this serve South Africa’s 
public interests (for which they were allegedly adopted). Would this facilitate the detection of 
crime and protection of the soundness of its financial institutions?  Private interest theories of 
regulation argue that regulation comes about as a result of narrow private interests. If such narrow 
interests ever coincide or end up serving the publicly interested goals, this is mere coincidence. In 
the implementation of South Africa’s AML standards, we notice that they conflicted with other 
socio-economic policies and instead of combating money laundering, they could deflect crime by 
excluding large sectors of the population, forcing them into the informal and unregulated sectors 
of the economy which are difficult to monitor for anti-money laundering purposes.  
The implementation and compliance with the FATF standards in many countries, both 
developed and developing, has encountered some practical implementation challenges. This study 
developed from an earlier one by this researcher on the implementation of the AML regime in the 
United Kingdom791. In that study, we found among other things, that a variety of regulated 
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businesses, particularly banks, faced some real compliance dilemmas when it came to re-
identifying and verifying customers in line with the Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements of 
the FATF standards which had been made law in the UK following the second EU Money 
Laundering Directive792. Some banks, struggling to comply with the KYC requirements, were 
sending letters threatening to freeze their customers’ bank accounts, unless these customers 
showed up to prove that they were who they claimed to be.  
These obviously baffled customers would prove themselves by producing proof of identity 
and address documents to the nearest branches of their banks793. Proof of address seemed not to 
be a major problem in the UK. Many UK residents, like others in developed countries, could 
manage to provide a telephone or mobile phone bill or any letter received at their home address in 
order to prove their residential addresses or satisfy the KYC requirements. Most of the problems 
were just miscommunication and confusion as to why banks suddenly required customers who had 
banked with them for many years to prove , under threat of having their accounts frozen, that they 
were who they said they were. Banks were merely trying to comply with the anti-money laundering 
regulations aimed at assisting law enforcement agencies to trace customers in case they were 
involved in laundering proceeds of crime or financing terrorist activities.  
Another main challenge, mentioned earlier, was that in the UK there is no standard identity 
card or document. Some citizens could have passports or driving licenses, both of which were 
accepted as proof of identity. However, many UK citizens might not have a passport or a driver’s 
license since these documents were basically travel documents794. It was and still is highly possible 
for a person in the UK not to have both of these and therefore struggle to prove him or herself to 
be who they claim to be, especially for those who do not plan to travel outside the UK or to drive 
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a car. The UK authorities showed some flexibility in drafting their regulations and allowed people 
to submit a letter from a municipal councillor or other recognised authority as proof of residence. 
The UK is a well-developed jurisdiction, with no informal settlements and an advanced postal 
system that reaches almost every household, including small rural villages.  
The question then was how similar AML regulations would impact on developing 
countries, with sprawling informal settlements, limited postal services, ambiguous and confusing 
addresses and other obstacles to documentary proof of residence. Would banks refuse to open 
accounts for them, or would those who already have them have their accounts frozen? South Africa 
had implemented regulations similar to those of the UK through the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act of 2001 (FICA) and the Anti-Money Laundering Control Regulations (AMLCRs) of 2002. 
These required customers of banks to prove their identity and addresses as a way of proving they 
were who they claimed to be. At the turn of the millennium, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
the FATF had started to blacklist what it called Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories 
(NCCTs); forcing many developing countries to adopt its AML standards.  
These standards were revised after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US and became the 
FATF’s 40+9 Recommendations against Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing 
(AML/CTF). Like many other countries, South Africa moved swiftly to enact the AML/CTF 
regime demanded by the FATF to pre-empt being blacklisted as that was believed to have negative 
economic consequences, especially for foreign investment. It passed the FICA and the Anti-Money 
Laundering Control Regulations (AMLCRs) of 2002. Among other things (see below) FICA and 
AMLCRs provided for Know Your Customer/Customer Due Diligence identification and 
verification requirements as in the UK, US, Australia and many other countries implementing the 
regime. South Africa was one of the first few developing countries to adopt the FATF standards 
of financial regulation, borrowing heavily, as shown in Chapter 5, from the UK, US and Australian 




to emphasise that it was also incorporated in order to enable South Africa to comply with the 
‘global standards’ as set by the FATF. 
The questions that are tackled in this chapter are:  
1. To what extent and how were the FATF standards implemented in South Africa?  
2. What were the experiences with implementation and compliance within the banking 
sector in South Africa?  
3. Could/should South Africa, given its socio-economic conditions of underdevelopment, 
fully implement the FATF standards it enacted in 2001?  
Our analysis here contributes to the growing literature on the topic of AML/CTF 
implementation and compliance in developing countries. It tells a story of South Africa’s 
implementation in more detail, focussing on the forces that shaped this increasing recognition of 
the challenges encountered by developing countries in trying to comply with the FATF standards.  
It does so in a rich institutionally-contextualised way set against the backdrop of the movement 
against apartheid and its tentacles in the financial core of the country in the banking industry. In 
the first part we make some caveats and clarify some concepts. We also briefly acknowledge some 
key research and findings that have recently been published in the area of AML/CTF 
implementation in developing countries. Secondly, we examine South Africa’s implementation of 
its AML regime within the banking sector. In this part we show how, at the very early stages, some 
serious challenges started to emerge, derailing South Africa’s ‘actual compliance’ with the regime. 
The adoption of the laws (FICA) and regulations (AMLCRs) only produced formal compliance 
with the regime. Actual compliance, which entails the implementation and enforcement of the 
enacted regime, is still a work in progress.  
The third part looks at a parallel campaign to extend access to financial services for the 
unbanked South Africans and other residents. In this part we examine how this campaign collided 




implementation of the regime. We examine the role played by a number of players, including the 
South African government, to try and manage this collision. In this part we also observe how South 
Africa’s challenges in implementing the regime have forced a rethink and may offer some lessons 
for other developing countries trying to implement the regime under similar socio-economic 
circumstances. This offers greater opportunities for South-South learning as many developing 
countries may not have to replicate the mistakes made, but rather can build on the positive lessons. 
It also shows why developing countries need to be involved as partners in policy development 
rather than be treated as rule-takers by the powerful Western countries. Finally, we close by 
making some concluding observations of South Africa’s experiences; arguing that developing 
countries need to be involved at the earliest possible stages of policy development at a global level 
to avoid the replication of these developing country-specific implementation problems in other 
policy areas.  
In our analysis we seek to explain how and why things turned out the way they did. This 
approach focuses on the socio-economic conditions of underdevelopment and the political 
dynamics of South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy; the time of the country’s 
overarching democratic transformation. We argue that all these dynamics have influenced the 
implementation and South Africa’s compliance with the global FATF standards. We now offer 
some caveats.   
Firstly, this chapter focuses on the implementation and compliance with the rules directed 
at regulating banks and, later, various private businesses and professions to assist in the detection 
and combating of money laundering.  
Secondly, the focus is on the implementation and compliance with the FATF standards 
within the financial sector, with an emphasis on the ‘banking industry’.  
Thirdly, more focus is on those aspects of the AML/CTF regime which, during 




access to formal financial services, particularly banking accounts. With these caveats behind us, it 
is important to acknowledge some developments in this area based on recent research findings.  
 
Some recently published research 
There have been a number of new studies that have been published that focus on the 
‘unintended consequences’ of AML/CTF implementation in developing countries. These include 
recent work done by Prof. L. De Koker in South Africa795, the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP) and the Genesis Analytics study796, already mentioned in Chapter 1, and that we 
discuss again towards the end of this chapter. The main findings of these studies have been that 
stricter KYC requirements can and did have ‘unintended and undesirable consequences’ of 
blocking access to, or discouraging the use of, formal financial services in developing countries797.  
The main findings of this study were that developing countries tend to adopt their national 
AML/CTF financial regulatory regimes based on templates of developed countries798. However, 
the study further finds, when these developing countries start to realise the negative implications 
of rule-based and strict FATF standards, they have tended to come up with ways of limiting the 
risks of restricting access to basic financial services through regulatory exemptions799. Another 
key finding, which we prefer to call a recommendation, has been that increased access to financial 
services in developing countries should be seen as ‘complementary in the pursuit of an effective 
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AML/CTF regime’800. According to this logic, the more people access and use the formal regulated 
financial system, the more far-reaching and effective the AML/CTF regime would be, as less 
people will be using the informal and unregistered components of the financial system801.  
These findings are an important contribution to the literature and policy development in 
this area as they have, for the first time, made ‘financial inclusion’ a fashionable topic even in the 
FATF circles.  Due to developing country problems of financial exclusion wrought by the 
implementation of KYC regulations, the FATF adopted (in 2008) its first policy towards what it 
calls ‘low capacity countries’802. The former FATF president Paul Vlaanderen (2009/10) started 
his tenure with a visit to Lesotho, where the ESAAMLAG (which is an FATF-style Regional Body 
or FSRB for Southern and Eastern Africa) was having its 10th Anniversary. In his address he stated 
that he believed that the pursuit of financial inclusion by developing countries is complementary 
to an effective AML/CTF regime, as this expands the reach of the regime to more people who 
would now be using formal financial services803.  
In this assertion he had quoted directly from the Genesis study which asserted that an 
effective AML/CTF regime should be viewed as complementary to increased access to financial 
services. However, this depends upon the circumstances prevailing in the particular country. The 
South African banking sector under which the regime was implemented had for many years been 
inaccessible and its services unaffordable for many. This encouraged a very limited usage of such 
formal financial services for many citizens in South Africa, leading to mass campaigns for greater 
access. This happened around the same time that South Africa was trying to implement the FATF 
imposed standards of KYC/CDD.  We now turn to the second part of this paper where we look at 
the implementation of the FATF standards and the interventions that had to be made in order to 
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ensure that they do not collide with other developmental objectives of extending basic financial 
services to the majority of the ‘unbanked’ South Africans.  
 
Implementation of South Africa’s AML/CTF measures 
South Africa is dominated by a few major banks known as the ‘big four’. These banks 
control over 80% of the total banking sector assets and market in South Africa804. Historically, 
these banks have, during colonial and apartheid times, been largely serving a minority of the 
population805 in a country where class and social standing was largely determined by race. At the 
time in which South Africa adopted the FATF standards, social movements were putting pressure 
on the government and the banking sector to transform and to serve the wider population. It is our 
considered view that implementing the FATF imposed regulations of KYC/CDD exacerbated 
historical problems of socio-economic exclusion with real implications for social cohesions, 
economic development and probably did, in some ways, compromise the achievement of the 
alleged goals of the FATF regime of detecting and combating crime as KYC/CDD measures had 
the potential, as has been pointed out, of deflecting money laundering to the unregulated sectors 
of the economy.  
In 2002, when the former Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, convened the inaugural 
meeting of the Anti-Money Laundering Advisory Council (see Chapter 4), he urged its members 
to deliberate on the draft regulations and make comments806. This would allow him to present them 
to parliament for their ratification and publication in the government gazette. The AMLCRs of 
2002 were finally ratified and published in December 2002807. Section 77 of FICA delegated the 
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making of AMLCRs to the executive authority of the Minister of Finance. This means that the 
regulations were not written and enacted by parliament, but were merely approved. It left the 
drafting of the AMLRCs to the Ministry of Finance. This process is applicable to many other forms 
of regulation-- which are regarded as secondary legislation and whose formulation is left to the 
executive authority in charge.  
The AMLCRs started operating immediately after their promulgation in December 
2002808. These were requirements of regulated businesses to: report suspicious transaction to the 
FIC; set up internal anti-money laundering policies; train staff; keep KYC and transaction records 
of customers; and appoint money laundering compliance officers. However other provisions 
started operating on June 30 2003. These related to the identification and verification of clients or 
what is popularly referred to as KYC /CDD809. Let us briefly look at those aspects of the regime 
which were implemented before examining the challenges encountered. South Africa’s AML/CTF 
regime is not substantially different from those of many other implementing countries in the world. 
This is simply because the AML regimes of all countries emerged from a similar source -- the 
FATF standards -- which were transferred mainly from the US, as we demonstrated in Chapter 5. 
Although there might be technical variances among national regimes, all the principles of the 
FATF’s 40 (+9) Recommendations can generally be found in most implementing countries. .  
There are two types of regulated businesses in South Africa. The first group are those that 
are regulated only to report customer transactions and are referred to as ‘reporting institutions’810 
and those that are regulated to adhere to more requirements (see below) and are referred to as 
‘accountable institutions’811. Banks, which are the focus of this Chapter, are ‘accountable 
institutions’.  Here we will interchangeably use this term with that of regulated businesses. 
Accountable regulated businesses are required to: (a) establish and verify the identity of their 
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customers before establishing any business relationship with them; (b) keep records of transactions 
for specified periods of time; (c) prepare and submit what are referred to as Suspicious/Unusual 
Activity Reports (and Cash Transaction Reports) to the Financial Intelligence Centre; (d) develop 
internal rules on the combating of money laundering and terrorist financing; and (e) appoint 
compliance officers (Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Officers) and train staff for discharging 
duties aimed at complying with the regime.  
All these requirements, the FATF tells us, were meant to complement each other in 
achieving the purposes of detecting and combating crime (including terrorism) and protecting the 
integrity of the financial system from being abused by criminals for illicit means and ends. The 
FATF argued that establishing and verifying the identity of customers would help enable regulated 
businesses to profile customers. Profiling customers enables these businesses to identify suspicious 
or unusual patterns in customer transactions which might be linked to the laundering of crime 
proceeds or terrorist financing. Armed with these suspicions and comprehensive data of customer 
transactions, regulated businesses would, it is argued, be better placed to report this financial 
intelligence to the designated financial intelligence units. On receipt of this intelligence, the FIUs 
would assess it and determine which reports must receive further scrutiny of the law enforcement 
authorities and accordingly pass them on. The investigating law enforcement agencies would use 
these reports to detect crime through investigations, arrests, prosecutions and seizure and forfeiture 
of proceeds of crime or funds intended to finance terrorism.  
 
Transaction Reporting Regimes 
Most countries have tended to implement one or both of two main models of transaction 
reporting regimes. The first one requires the reporting of suspicious or unusual transactions 
(Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR) or Unusual Transaction Reports (UTR)), (hereinafter 




or ‘threshold’ and is normally referred to as Threshold Transaction Reports (TTRs) or Cash 
Threshold/Transaction Report, (hereinafter CTRs) among others. The UK and South Africa tended 
to follow the STRs model. South Africa did legislate for CTRs regime but only started 
implementing it nine years later after the FICA was passed. When the FIC started implementing 
the CTRs regime, it circulated a compliance note setting deadlines for regulated businesses to 
comply by December 2010812. Countries such as the US and Australia have almost equally 
employed both the STR and CTR models.  
The reporting of suspicious or unusual activity by banks and other regulated businesses to 
FIUs is one of the ultimate outcomes of the AML/CTF regime. STRs are meant to trigger new 
investigations against money laundering and terrorist financing and therefore assist law 
enforcement agencies to detect and prevent crime. In South Africa, these are submitted to the 
Financial Intelligence Centre. According to the FIC’s latest annual report, about 98 per cent of the 
STRs are reported to electronically via its website, with the rest submitted manually813. Its 
reporting system also allows regulated businesses to send many reports at the same time (batch 
reports)814. Within South African banks, the reporting system is centralised to AML compliance 
divisions which are headed by Group Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Officers (AMLCO) at 
head offices. What this means is that the front-line staff of these institutions working in branches 
are responsible for reporting anything they suspect or see as unusual to their AML Group 
Compliance Divisions. The Group AMLCO and the team would then evaluate these reports by 
conducting further investigations, where necessary, before sending them on to the FIC. However, 
the AML Compliance Divisions may decide that there is no need to send an STR to the FIC and 
rather file it in their database815.  
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Front-line staff would also generally not be barred from reporting their suspicions straight 
to the FIC816. This is simply because, in terms of the law, staff members of banks and other 
regulated businesses could be prosecuted and (imprisoned or fined) for failure to report817. Their 
institutions could also face liabilities for failure to report818. As a legal defence, regulated 
businesses could shield themselves from liability by showing that an employee handling a 
transaction did not report it despite having been trained to discharge this role819. In this case, the 
staff member who failed to file an STR would be personally liable for prosecution820. However, 
staff members have legal defences as well821. They could in their defence show/argue that they did 
not develop a suspicion. They may alternatively provide evidence that they made a report to their 
AMLCO or the FIC822. Lastly they could also argue that they did not receive any of the mandatory 
training that employers are required by law to provide to their staff823.  
In the case where an employee defends him/herself by arguing that they did not see 
anything suspicious or unusual in the transaction that needed reporting, a case may be complicated. 
This is because ‘suspicious’ or ‘unusual’ transactions are not defined in FICA and the AMLRCs. 
A suspicion is much more a matter of subjective judgment and there has been no jurisprudence in 
South Africa that has clarified this issue. However, courts could apply a reasonable person test to 
determine whether a person with the mandatory AML/CTF training and experience that the 
employee possessed should have reported the transaction as suspicious/unusual or not. One Group 
AMLCO told me that they encourage their staff to report suspicions to them when in doubt. He 
says 
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“What we proposed is that where you are in doubt, report it and let us in the group 
office investigate and come to that determination because we have got a slightly 
more elevated level of dealing with these sorts of activities. So we promote “when 
in doubt, report””824. 
Threshold reporting, which was only implemented in December 2010, is viewed to be more 
of an objective criterion as it requires reporting of all amounts above a certain limit which, in South 
Africa, has been set at ZAR 25,000825. Countries are allowed to set their own threshold amounts 
and these vary by jurisdiction. In the US and Australia, for instance, the threshold is US $10,000 
and A$ 10,000, respectively. In the next chapter, we examine the reporting system and how it has 
helped or not to detect money launderers and terrorist financiers in South Africa. Looking ahead, 
there does not appear to be evidence that the reporting regime has helped to detect money 
launderers and terrorist financiers in South Africa (See Chapter 7). 
 
Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Officers 
Banks generally appoint a Group Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Officer who has the 
overall responsibility for the AML/CTF compliance functions of the bank. This is a senior 
management level position which reports to the Group Compliance Officer/Executive of the bank. 
Group Compliance in a bank is responsible for the bank’s overall compliance with all legal and 
regulatory requirements of the bank or what is referred to as the ‘regulatory universe’826. For 
instance, other divisions falling within Group Compliance besides money laundering control 
would be risk management and security, fraud and monitoring, and legal compliance, among 
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others. Group Compliance Divisions generally oversee compliance with the Banks Act of 1990 
and a range of other laws, including AML/CTF laws and regulations that banks must comply with.  
Under the Group Anti Money Laundering Compliance Officer (AMLCO), there may also 
be AMLCO’s for each and every business unit, (i.e. branches, car finance, home loans, credit card 
division etc.) responsible for overseeing compliance within units and reporting to the Group-
AMLCO827. Group AMLCO would also be responsible for internal AML/CTF policies and their 
development within a bank. It is mandatory for regulated businesses to appoint compliance officers 
or else they are committing an offence under section 62 (a) & (b) of FICA.  
 
Mandatory Training    
Staff training is a mandatory requirement for all regulated businesses under section 43 of 
FICA. All operational staff of banks under-go AML/CTF training and write an exam which, at 
some banks, they are expected to pass with more than 80 per cent before the end of their probation 
period828. Old employees also have to undergo such training and to write exams829. This training 
appears to have been internalised by banks and has become part of their staff induction 
programmes. In other institutions, operational staff under-go further AML/CTF training and exams 
before they are promoted to a senior post830. Banks also have to issue training certificates to staff 
members to prove that they have been trained and have therefore met their regulatory obligations 
to staff training.  
They are individually responsible for developing their training programmes, but the 
government has assisted them by developing a standard training module for AML/CTF training 
through the Banking Sector Education Training Authority (Bankseta) programme, a skills 
                                                                







development project run by the government through the Department of Labour831. There is 
however a view on the part of many staff that the training developed through Bankseta was ‘over-
the-top’  and included things which they did not necessarily need to know for their AML/CTF 
duties832. However, there is also a general sense that the banks, particularly, are the most compliant 
of all the regulated businesses when it comes to training.   
 
Internal Policies 
Banks and other regulated business are required to develop internal AML/CTF policies833 
which they must also submit to the Banking Supervision Division of the South African Reserve 
Bank and the Financial Intelligence Centre834. These policies guide the banks’ operational 
measures with respect to all functions they need to perform in combating and detecting money 
laundering and terrorist financing. These are developed mainly by the Group AMLCO and have 
to be approved by the board of the bank. The banks are supposed to report on their AML/CTF 
operations to the FIC and the Banking Supervision Division at the end of each year or half yearly 
by submitting reports of what their divisions have done with regards to training, record-keeping, 
reporting of suspicious transactions and other related AML/CTF compliance matters835. It appears 
that there is always a lot to do within these divisions as the FATF often recommend new practices 
after its typology studies and often recommend changes in laws and regulations following a 
country’s mutual evaluation exercise. One of the major issues that banks were wrestling with at 
the time of this research was issues of local ‘politically exposed persons’836.   
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Mandatory Record Keeping 
Another key compliance issue is the keeping of client information and transactions837. The 
regulations set a standard for the keeping of all KYC information and transactions. When a client 
closes his account in a bank, a bank is expected to keep that information for the next five years. 
Many banks keep some of the information with them. Some record-keeping is outsourced to 
professional data storage companies838. This information can be kept in an electronic format and 
should be produced when needed by authorities. When banks or regulated businesses keep 
information with third parties, they are still responsible for its safety and for its production when 
required by the FIC and LEAs839. The aim of this provision is to assist law enforcement with 
reconstructing the trail of transactions for investigative, prosecutorial and other related purposes 
of tracing criminally tainted assets.  
It seems that banks have gone a long way in trying to comply with these regulatory 
functions, having setup their AML/CTF compliance divisions, appointed the responsible 
compliance officers and put in place policies and controls. The main issues with banks are whether 
the reports they make to the FIC are contributing or not in detecting crime. There was a feeling 
that the FIC and LEAs are following up on the reports they make, but as to whether such reports 
actually contribute to any positive crime detection is doubtful (see Chapter 7). One participant 
retorted that  
“South Africa...has really gone an extra mile on being compliant with the anti-
money laundering regulations...I think the time is right now for us to look at the 
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crime of money laundering and to address the crime rather than just be 
compliant...The reality is that there is a lot of work that needs to be done to actually 
encourage a paradigm shift, to get the money laundering charges used.”840 
We now turn to examine the most challenging areas of compliance with the FATF standards. These 
were requirements for banks to ‘know’ their customers.    
 
KYC/CDD requirements 
From 30 June 2003, all regulated businesses including banks were prohibited from 
establishing business relationships with new customers unless they had established and verified 
their identity841. What this meant, in the context of retail banks, was that they could not open bank 
accounts for customers who had not provided the required documentation, as stipulated in the 
AMLRCs and Guidance Notes 3 on KYC. Regulations 2 to 18 of the AMLRCs covered the steps 
which regulated businesses needed to follow in establishing and verifying the identities of natural 
and legal persons. The focus here is on natural persons -- that is the citizens and residents of South 
Africa. In respect of natural persons, the regulations required prospective customers to produce 
identity documents, bearing that person’s photograph, full names and identity number and a 
document with a physical/residential address which would verify where they lived842.  
In respect of South African citizens, this would be a South African green bar-coded identity 
document and a valid passport in respect of foreign nationals. KYC requirements are believed to 
assist in profiling customers, enabling regulated businesses to detect flows of criminal money 
through the financial system through their deviation from the ‘normal’ pattern for that profile. It 
is reasoned that if the banks do not have up-to-date information about their customers, law 
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enforcement authorities would find it more difficult to trace them should criminal investigations 
be initiated and pursued at a later date. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision also 
compiled the “Customer Due Diligence” report in 2001, focussing on the importance of complying 
with the FATF’s KYC/CDD regulations by banks843. The Basel Committee urged banks not to 
view KYC/CDD only as a crime-combating tool, but also as part of the risk management 
framework of banks844.  
It warned that failure by banks to comply with the KYC/CDD requirements exposed them 
to different kinds of risks including: legal liability, operational, reputational and concentration 
risks845. All these risks, according to the Basel Committee report, could lead to systemic risks that 
had the potential of adversely affecting the financial system846. The IMF and the World Bank have 
also generally endorsed the FATF AML regime urging countries to implement the regulations as 
they would assist in building prudentially sound financial institutions in a liberalised world with 
an interconnected financial system.   
From 2003 onwards, banks in South Africa were required to start implementing these KYC 
regulations on their new customers. Failure to comply with KYC/CDD was made a criminal 
offence, exposing employees responsible for such failures to imprisonment of up to 6 months or a 
fine not exceeding ZAR 100,000.00847. To avoid breaking the law, banks would therefore refrain 
from conducting business with customers who could not provide the required identity and proof 
of residence documents. This would mean that prospective customers without these KYC/CDD 
documents would legally be denied bank accounts until they had produced them.848 While, in 
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South Africa, there appeared to be no major difficulties for customers to produce identity 
documents, there have been major problems in producing proof of residence documents849.  
 
KYC/CDD and its challenges: identity and proof of residence  
As for identity documents, South African authorities opted to use a standard document, the 
South African green bar-coded ID issued by the Department of Home Affairs to every South 
African citizen or naturalised person850.  The reason for insisting on a green bar-coded ID was that 
it was a standard document that every South African adult must have851. The Banking Council of 
South Africa had reservations with other forms of identity documents such as driver’s licenses as 
they did not bear full names, but only initials and surnames that could be shared by many people852. 
While the bar-coded ID is widely accessible, it is also a highly compromised document that career 
fraudsters procure on the black market for as little as less than ZAR 1000.00853. There have also 
been dramatic incidents where, because of administrative problems, some South Africans have 
struggled to get their ID’s from the Department of Home Affairs854. There is however some 
systemic flexibility in accepting a passport or a driver’s license in the event of a customer having 
a reasonable excuse for not producing an ID855. However, bank officials sometimes demand the 
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green bar-coded ID even when other forms of identification, such as a passport, are available. This 
is simply because many banks, in setting up their internal policies, have tended to overemphasise 
the green bar-coded ID over the other forms of identification.  
For foreign nationals resident in South Africa, the requirement is a valid passport. For some 
documented refugees and asylum seekers, the situation has been uncertain. At the time of writing 
there were two separate pending legal litigations instituted by the Lawyers for Human Rights and 
the University of Cape Town Law Clinic against the government to allow banks to open accounts 
for refugees and asylum seekers856. Some refugees and asylum seekers with documents from Home 
Affairs, but without a passport or any other form of ID, are currently barred from opening bank 
accounts based on a Public Compliance Communication (PCC03) issued by the Financial 
Intelligence Centre857. This compliance notice stated that some official documents issued by the 
Department of Home Affairs “did not meet the requirements of an identity document in terms of 
the FIC Act, and its subordinate legislation”858. Despite these issues, there has been an advantage 
in using a form of a common identity document, the green bar-coded ID, which is widely available.  
The main challenge in South Africa, and probably many other developing countries, has 
been the proof of address documents. Customers are required to produce a letter, such as a 
telephone, electricity or water bill, or any other related document bearing a customer’s 
home/residential address and their name859. This is called a proof of residence/address. According 
to the regulations, it proves to the banks that customers actually live at the address stated. There is 
also a general practice that proof of address documents should not be older than three months860. 
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The so-called international best practice standards of the FATF forbid the use of post office box 
addresses as these are not residential. The reason for this is that when law enforcement authorities 
are investigating a crime later, they would, obviously, not find people living in post boxes. This 
could jeopardise police investigations. Proof of residence appears to be a reasonable requirement 
and could potentially go a long way to assist in locating crime suspects.  
In many developed countries, access to proof of residence documents can be taken for 
granted. Almost 100 per cent of UK households, for example, get their post delivered at home or 
work and they may also have bills for water and electricity. On the other hand, many households 
in South Africa receive their mail through the post office box, nearest shop, school or church as 
the infrastructure allows861. While many South African households get their post delivered at 
home, the majority still use the post-office boxes and many do not have official addresses at all, 
either residential or post boxes. In rural and informal settlements nearby shops, schools and 
churches are widely used. The cause of this situation is underdevelopment. The proof of address 
for KYC/CDD and international best standards bring into sharp focus the peculiar, but well 
documented, conditions of infrastructural shortages in developing countries.   
As the dates for KYC approached, the Banking Council of South Africa (BCSA/BASA), 
an association for banks, issued a statement where it announced the deadlines and compliance 
duties of banks862. It noted that  
“[B]anks have both a legal and moral obligation to assist with the prevention of 
money laundering. Most first-world countries have well defined anti-money 
laundering legislation and it is important that South Africa, as part of the 
international community, complies with international best practice. Money that 
originates from illegal sources needs to be identified and the perpetrators of money 
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laundering…prosecuted…all banks are upgrading their internal systems and 
changing their account opening procedures. Branch staff will receive extensive 
training as part of the Know Your Client (KYC) programme.”863 
BASA further warned that the banks’ obligations in respect of KYC/CDD were not only related to 
identifying and verifying new customers, but also the re-identification of all their existing 
customers by 01 July 2004. After 30 June 2003 banks started to deny service to new customers 
who did not possess the required KYC identity and proof of residence documents864. It is difficult 
to estimate the extent of this exclusion as banks say they did not keep any statistics of customers 
who were refused services for this reason. Our field research, however, sheds some light on the 
problem.   
“Having spent time in a branch, just account opening, I would say one in three did 
not have the correct documentation (proof of residence). They get sent back to come 
again, it’s as much as that”865.    
This kind of response was prevalent in the banking industry. However there was a sense 
that customers got ‘sent back to come again’ with the correct documentation. Prospective 
customers would have a limited choice, especially people who had never had a bank account. This 
is simply because if they tried to go to another bank without the correct documentation, they would 
likely be sent back too as all banks were required to apply similar rules. Asked whether it was 
possible that many of the prospective customers that are ‘sent back to come again’ might get 
discouraged and not turn up again, another bank official said,  
“Not really, because if they did not do it with us, they would need to go and do it 
with other banks.”866 
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It is however possible that many of those sent back might not ‘come again’. The introduction of 
KYC/CDD did make it difficult to open a bank account for new customers. As one of the 
interviewees said;  
“If you try hard enough you will always be able to get an account. But it means that 
you find it a lot more difficult than a person who lives in an upmarket suburb and 
they have got a utility bill”867.     
Yet it is also possible that some customers had no way of proving their residence at all and thus 
saw no purpose in ‘coming back’. 
While banks were not opening new accounts for customers without documentation, they 
also were working hard to meet the deadlines of re-identifying their old customers by 01 July 2004. 
In early 2004, the FIC issued FIC Guidance Notes 1 and 2 entitled General Guidance Note 
Concerning Identification of Clients868 and Note on identification of Existing Clients”.  Guidance 
Note 1 gave guidelines on how regulated businesses should go about identifying their clients by 
following a ‘risk based’ approach. Guidance Note 2 reminded regulated businesses that  
“Section 21 (2) of the [FICA] will prevent accountable institutions from conducting 
a transaction in the course of an existing business relation with a client after 30 June 
2004 if it has not established and verified the identity of the client”869. 
This only affected old customers who had been enrolled before 30 June 2003, as anyone after the 
latter date would not have been allowed to open an account without the required KYC documents. 
Guidance Note 2 further warned that  
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“Full compliance with this “Know Your Customer (KYC)” requirement presents a 
particular problem in the banking industry. It may disrupt the business relations and 
transactions between a bank and its clients, and between clients of different 
banks...The Centre [FIC] naturally expects accountable institutions to comply with 
these obligations.”  
It appears from this communication, Guidance Note 2, that the FIC was already anticipating 
a situation where banks would not be able to meet the deadlines for re-identifying old customers. 
It was also anticipating a situation where such non-compliance would cause major problems of 
disrupting the financial system as the accounts of customers were frozen, pending KYC/CDD 
compliance. In Guidance Note 2, the FIC advised that it (the FIC) and the ‘supervisory bodies’ 
would not be in a position “to excuse or pardon non-compliance with the legal obligations” of 
regulated businesses as the prohibition existed in primary legislation, FICA. Only parliament, 
through making an amendment to FICA, or a petition by regulated businesses to the Minister of 
Finance could provide for an extension to the impending deadlines.  
The FIC had issued Guidance Note 2 after numerous alerts by banks who were struggling 
to re-identify their old customers. Shortly thereafter, the BASA issued a media release stating that 
banks were trying all they could to comply with re-identification of old customers but were finding 
it hard to meet the deadlines870. The tone towards KYC/CDD compliance within the banking sector 
was starting to change. In this statement the BASA pronounced that FICA was “effectively 
imposed on South Africa”871 and started lobbying the government to extend its deadlines.  The 
Registrar of Banks, who is the regulator of banks in South Africa and oversees their compliance 
                                                                
870 The Banking Council of South Africa, Bank’s Compliance with the Financial Intelligence Centre act (FICA), 
Media Release, 07 April 2004, Pretoria. According to compliance officers’ that we spoke to from the banks, KYC 
compliance was one of the most difficult and costly processes, especially the re-identification of old customers. One 
of the compliance officers commented that KYC “…was quite a painful process, it costs us hundreds of millions. But 
it wasn’t just KYC. In our bank we have many many systems that we needed to integrate. It was more of the integration 
of the existing systems to get a single view of the customer that cost a bank a significant portion versus the actual 
KYC. Yes we needed to revisit all our old customers… We used letter, smses, e-mails, ATMs…every possible means 





with AML/CTF regulations, issued the Banks Act Circular 4/2004. In this circular, the Registrar 
asked banks to submit to his office (by May 15 2004) their “completed risk matrix of their client 
base coupled with the number of account holders” that had been verified in terms of the KYC/CDD 
requirements. It appeared from these submissions to the Registrar of Banks that many banks could 
not meet the compliance deadlines872. The Registrar of Banks approached the Minister of Finance 
alerting him to the fact that they were unable to comply with the KYC requirements pertaining to 
the re-identification of old customers873. 
    In his address to the National Assembly, the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel acknowledged 
publicly for the first time that the banks were finding it hard to comply with KYC regulations.  
He said:   
“South Africa will meet the international standard to prevent money laundering…The 
‘know your customer’ requirement is one such measure. It is a standard endorsed by many 
international bodies, including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as well as 
the FATF…As the deadline of June 30 this year [2004] approaches, this matter has caused 
some controversy…There is concern that the documentation requirements are too onerous 
and the timeframe may not be achievable. On the former, I am advised that most enquiries 
are based on misunderstandings and I am confident that account-holders and banks will 
find the regulations are sufficiently accommodating. On the time-lines, I have sought 
further advice and I will respond in the near future”874.  
 
What is clear from this speech is that the Minister believed there were two reasons for the 
failure of the banks to comply with the deadlines. The reasons were both that the documentation 
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requirements were ‘too onerous’ – though he was ‘advised’ they were not -- and that the timelines 
were too close to be achievable. He mildly protested that the documentation requirements were 
not as ‘onerous’ as thought by the banks and customers – but that they might prove eventually to 
be ‘sufficiently accommodating’. The BASA issued a statement responding to the Minister’s 
speech. Bob Tucker, the CEO of the BASA said;  
“[T]he regulations are absolutely prescriptive…Moreover, far from struggling to 
measure up to international standards, the requirement that every single South 
African bank customer be re-identified and verified far exceeds all international 
standards and practices, taking as an example the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom”875  
These exchanges seemed to show the brewing frustrations of the banking industry to 
KYC/CDD requirements876. It was, however, incorrect of Bob Tucker to claim that South Africa’s 
KYC/CDD compliance requirements with regards to re-identifying old customers exceeded all 
international standards and practice. When the UK’s Money Laundering Regulations of 2001 were 
implemented there, old existing customers were re-identified. It was the international standards 
that were not ‘sufficiently accommodating’, especially for developing countries877. The fact that 
South Africa’s AML standards were endorsed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
and the FATF did not necessarily translate into them being accommodative. On the contrary, it 
may have been the exclusion of developing country voices and input in their making that made 
them less than appropriate, less accommodative and also wanting in terms of democracy and 
legitimacy. They were not ‘sufficiently accommodating’ because South Africa had informal 
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settlements, townships and rural areas, the majority of which did not have the required proof of 
address. This was the main structural problem that other developing countries would face unless 
they redesigned the FATF-inspired rules to suit their socio-economic conditions.   
Very shortly after this speech in Parliament, Manuel met with the bank representatives and 
took a decision to extend the deadline for KYC/CDD compliance on existing customers to varying 
dates up to September 30 2006.878 He issued a statement in which he acknowledged that; 
“Some of the accountable institutions, mainly banks but also providers of 
investment services have had difficulties in meeting their obligations to know their 
existing customers. As a result they made submissions to me requesting 
exemption…given the difficulties that many of them have had, and not wanting to 
create an unnecessary burden for their clients, the ordinary citizens of our 
country…I have decided to grant banks an extension of time within which they are 
required to do this…This process will be completed by 30 September 2006”879. 
This followed a lengthy process from a protracted process at the Office of the Registrar of 
Banks at the South African Reserve Bank880. What this announcement achieved was to give an 
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extension for customers to find documents that many probably did not have. Those who did not 
have bank accounts yet and could not meet the documentation requirements were effectively not 
given an extension. Even if they were to be given an extension, it would not solve the problem of 
proof of address. We are referring to a country where a conservative estimate of 56 per cent of 
adults in 2004 did not have a bank account881 and several millions lived in informal settlements or 
received no post at their residential addresses. These are not just the poor and unemployed, but 
also workers, members of the middle-class and some relatively well-off individuals living in such 
areas. One Group AMLCO, a middle-class and senior manager of a big South African bank whose 
role is to implement and ensure KYC/CDD compliance for his bank said to us;  
“In the South African environment, everybody is using their PO Boxes…I myself 
get nothing delivered to my house…everything goes to my post box. A significant 
portion of South Africans don’t receive their post at their residential addresses”.  
The KYC issue therefore does not affect only poor South Africans and residents who may 
be living in poor informal settlements, but also some in upmarket suburbs. Also, the issue of human 
settlements in South Africa is complicated and not necessarily class-based but follows the racial 
lines that were drawn up by the colonial and apartheid regimes. This is to the extent, that in all 
these areas (informal settlements, townships and rural/traditional areas), you find a multi-class 
population whose common denominator is race and a shared history of colonial and apartheid 
oppression. It is important, since this is a case study about South Africa, to briefly paint a picture 
of this human settlement landscape. 
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Apartheid spatial distortions 
Apartheid in South Africa created distorted human settlement landscapes. In 1950, the 
National Party apartheid government had passed a law known as the Group Areas Act of 1950. 
Through this law, it partitioned South Africa along racial lines. It designated separate settlements 
for whites, black Africans, Indians/Asians (South Africans of Asian descent) and Coloureds (South 
Africans of mixed race). To successfully implement the Group Areas Act of 1950, the apartheid 
government forcefully removed thousands to millions of South Africans and residents of all races 
from areas not designated for their racial groups882. In this racial hierarchy, black Africans were at 
the bottom of the chain. In urban and industrial centres they were confined to racially segregated 
single-sex hostels and the so-called ‘black townships’ -- settlements with substandard housing and 
limited access to a number of basic facilities and services and typically located on the urban fringe.  
 
Colonial reserves and apartheid homelands 
In the pre-democracy dispensation, settlement reflected a racial hierarchy.  During colonial 
times, the black African population was confined to reserves and later the ‘self-governing’ 
homelands under the apartheid regime. They were only to come to the main cities and towns 
temporarily to provide cheap labour and (be forced to) move back to the countryside once they 
were unemployed883. Then came the Coloured and Indian/Asian settlements, which were typically 
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better serviced townships, compared to most designated black African settlements. At the top of 
the chain were white settlements -- well located and serviced areas in the cities and towns and the 
best arable farming areas.  
Under The Promotion of Black Self-Governing Act of 1958, the apartheid regime 
established homelands for the various black African groups884. To complement the latter Act, it 
also stripped black African groups of their South African citizenship using The Black Homeland 
Citizenship Act of 1970. Under this latter Act, black Africans were generally made citizens of one 
of the ten black self-governing homelands, depending on their ethnicity885. They would also be 
required to carry a ‘pass’ at all times when in the cities and towns. A ‘pass’ was an identity book 
issued under The Pass Laws Act of 1952, doubling as a work permit, with a holder’s full name, 
photograph, address, fingerprints, the name and address of his/her employer and employment 
history886. Had this unpopular document called the ‘pass’ not been abolished, it seems it would 
made an excellent KYC/CDD document. The KYC/CDD requirements of anti-money laundering 
have got a potential in South Africa of making those who were subjected to ‘pass’ laws relive the 
apartheid experiences of racial exclusion.  
It is estimated that between 1960 and 1985, more than 100,000 arrests per annum occurred 
as a result of ‘pass’ violations, with offenders deported to their newly created ‘countries’ within 
South Africa -- the Homelands887. In 1961, the apartheid police killed hundreds of anti-pass 
protesters in the well-publicised Sharpeville township massacre near Johannesburg. Despite this 
suppression and partitioning of South Africa, migration trends from the homelands to the ‘white 
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apartheid’ cities and towns accelerated over time with people searching for jobs, education and 
better life chances. Townships became overcrowded with backyard shacks erected to 
accommodate the extra population and provide rental accommodation for newcomers. Informal 
settlements, or groups of shacks, developed around the townships and other open spaces due to 
lack of government provisions for and non-availability of formal housing. When apartheid was 
near collapse in the 1980s and was abolished in the 1990s, millions of black Africans had made 
informal settlements and townships their homes. Those who could afford it would build decent 
houses in these settlements -- alongside some very poorly built structures.  Thus, it is quite common 
to find some beautiful houses among the sprawling mud houses and shacks in many of these 
informal settlements today. These apartheid settlements were established without any proper social 
and urban development planning. They did not receive any adequate and decent services and 
facilities such as clinics, hospitals, schools, sanitation systems, and other services and facilities 
required for basic modern life from the apartheid local authorities.  
They also had no adequate, if any, shopping centres, recreational facilities, banks and 
ATMs, formal public transport, police stations, and home deliveries of post. When apartheid was 
legally abolished, some black Africans, Indians and coloureds who could afford it moved to the 
better-served former white neighbourhoods. For black Africans there was more mobility and some 
also moved to the better-served Indian and Coloured neighbourhoods. Many remained (including 
those who could afford a choice) in these black townships and informal settlements. They had 
made these settlements, it appears, their homes with some households upgrading their dwellings. 
However, millions of black Africans, due to historical economic exclusion and lack of 
affordability, have had limited choices, if any. But these “citizens of our country”, to use Minister 
Trevor Manuel’s phrase, could describe exactly where they lived though they could not prove it 
with any piece of paper posted to their residences (proof of address) as prescribed by the FATF 





Postal and residential addresses: an organised nightmare 
By the end of 2004, the South African Post Office was delivering mail to 6.4 million 
addresses, 3 million of which were P.O. Box addresses888.  These addresses are considered 
undesirable for KYC/CDD purposes because people do not live in those boxes. This being a total 
number of serviced addresses, it included both households consisting of multiple members and 
business addresses. In 1993, the Post Office launched a project called “Postboxes for all” in order 
to reach more households889. In its 2009 Annual Report, the South African Post Office reported 
that it was by then servicing more than 10 million addresses, more than half (about 6 million) of 
which were post-boxes. South Africa on the last census (2006) had more than 12 million 
households, with a housing backlog, according to government estimates, of about 3 million 
housing units890 -- the same housing shortage as was estimated in 1994 when the post-apartheid 
government assumed office. Having studied various databases of South African addresses, Coetsee 
estimated that there were: 
“...between 7,500,000 and 11,000,000 addresses in South Africa (excluding PO 
Box addresses). Currently, the largest address databases in the country have 
between 3,500,000 and 5,000,000 addresses, implying that the backlog in addresses 
is somewhere between 4,000,000 and 7,000,000 addresses, i.e. around 50%. This 
is arguably a very crude estimate but does illustrate that the backlog is 
substantial.”891 
 It would therefore be difficult to estimate how many South African households and 
individuals might struggle to produce a proof of address – though the share of the population is 
clearly enormous. South Africa’s addressing system seems to be something of an organised 
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nightmare. According to Coetsee, the project leader of South African Address Standards, South 
Africa does not have a single national address database with a complete coverage of the country. 
Address-data is also not regulated by a central authority892. Existing databases are those of the 
Surveyor General, Registrar of Deeds, Directorate Surveys and Mapping, Municipalities, South 
African Post Office – almost half of whose addresses are post boxes, South African Geographical 
Names Council and Utilities -- which are various service delivery addresses for utilities companies 
such as Eskom and Telkom893. 
Even single households in a well-documented former white residential area could have 
different addresses or variations on a single address, listed with each of these sources894. This is 
different to many apartheid era black townships where street names were not assigned895. In tribal 
rural areas, there is communal land ownership where a traditional leader allocates land to members 
of the community and there are, according to Coetsee, generally no records of who lives where896. 
“Formal address allocation does not exist in the informal settlements and dwelling demarcation of 
the informal settlements is dynamic and after, for example, a fire, dwellings can be rearranged 
completely”897. Coetsee’s illustrative examples of addresses that are used in these areas show the 
deepness of the problem. 
  “Opposite the butcher shop, Tsamaya Street, Mamelodi” 
and  
  “1st house on the right after Vodacom booth, Olievenhoutbousch”. 
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Even emergency life-saving services such as ambulances and police are highly affected by 
lack of a proper addressing system. In its 2009 Annual Report, the South African Post Office 
reported that it was extensively expanding its roll-out of mail services to “previously 
disadvantaged communities” to enable them “at least to satisfy the minimum requirements of 
FICA”. While, for the FATF and FICA, an address or proof of it is reduced to the catching of 
money launderers and terrorists, to many South Africans an address would mean much more. As 
Coetsee points out, an address is the most common form of describing a location and its purposes 
are many898.  
They include providing directions for delivery of services -- from visitors to postal mail, 
utility services such as water, sewerage and waste removal, electricity or telecommunication and 
emergency services (ambulances, police), voter registration and household surveys899. In these 
conditions of underdevelopment and infrastructural challenges, having an address does not only 
satisfy the above listed life-enhancing purposes but it could satisfy some very basic social needs. 
“[H]aving an address also has a social status, providing a sense of identity and of being recognised 
as a proper citizen.”900 When South Africa incorporated the FATF standards, authorities may 
appear to have lacked the full appreciation of these local dynamics. They might have had a slight 
idea of the impact of these anticipated challenges as De Koker points out in relation to the 
promulgation of the original ‘Exemption 17’ published with FICA in 2001901. 
Meanwhile, on the global front South Africa appeared to have impressed the FATF. In 
2003, South Africa had undergone the FATF’s Mutual Evaluation process and was found to have 
“developed a comprehensive legal structure to combat money laundering” although it still needed 
to “expeditiously develop a comprehensive framework to combat the financing of terrorism.”902  
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Unlike many other countries that had been put on the NCCT blacklist, South Africa had been 
invited to become a full member of the FATF. It joined a few other developing countries that had 
recently been given this exclusive status. South Africa had also assisted in the formation of the 
Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), an FATF-style 
regional body forming part of the global FATF network. Many non-FATF and FATF member 
countries have become part of the FATF family through these FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) 
which cover all the regions of the globe.  
Not becoming a member of these FSRBs might not be taken too kindly in the FATF circles. 
It may signify a country’s lack of commitment to dealing with money laundering and terrorism 
and could jeopardise a country’s standing with the IMF and the World Bank. These latter 
institutions, through their Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP), rate a country’s 
compliance with 12 global regulatory standards including AML/CTF, securities, insurance and 
banking supervision903. ESAAMLG consists of South Africa and its neighbouring and East African 
countries904. In 2005/6, South Africa was also given the rotational leadership role of the President 
of the FATF. However on the domestic front, implementation had shown some cracks. It was easy 
to implement the global FATF standards and exclude millions of citizens from accessing the most 
basic of financial services. It would prove, however, to be far less easy to explain to these millions 
why they could or should not access these banking services, especially now that South Africa was 
a ‘free’ country.  
Many developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, share a common history of 
colonialism. However, South Africa’s case is compounded by its apartheid legacy of racial 
discrimination and spatial distortions. This South African peculiarity of legislated post-colonial 
(pre-democracy, apartheid) racial discrimination continues to affect social development and the 
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country’s wealth distribution, making South Africa, according to economic data, the most unequal 
society in the world- with a gini-coefficient of 0.78 per cent905. While the AML/CTF regime was 
being implemented, there was a parallel campaign unfolding aimed at extending financial services 
to about 16 million ‘un-banked’ adult South Africans who made up 56 per cent of the adult 
population906. The KYC/CDD requirements, while they might have been well-intentioned to 
combat crime, were about to contribute to and reinforce an already precarious social, political and 
economic problem that South Africa was striving to turn around. This was the volatile issue of 
extending access to financial services to the previously marginalised population.  
 
Making Banks Serve the People 
 As South Africa emerged from apartheid in 1994, the new democratic government set 
itself goals to improve the standard of living for all South Africans, especially those who had been 
marginalised. The country had emerged from apartheid with sharp contrasts. On the one hand, a 
highly sophisticated first world economy with all the characteristics of a developed country in 
financial services and the extractive industries, and, on the other, a third world economy with all 
the characteristics of underdevelopment. The policy emphasis was on improving the latter to catch 
up with the former. This balancing act has not been easy and continues to challenge the post-
apartheid South African government as many analysts believe, at the current pace; it may take 
some time and even generations to accomplish.  
The issue of access to basic financial services, such as transactional and savings accounts, 
arose out of a struggle to source housing loans in order to improve housing conditions in South 
Africa. When the democratic government came into power in 1994, there was and continues to be 
a huge backlog of unmet demands for housing. The Ministry of Housing, under the late Minister 
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Joe Slovo, was to attempt to alleviate the housing backlog, estimated at between 2 to 4 million 
units907. At that time, the limited supply of housing, particularly in urban areas, had caused a 
massive increase of informal settlements908.  In the ‘matchbox’ township houses built under the 
apartheid rule, backyard shacks had mushroomed over the years and resulted in overcrowded 
conditions909. It was estimated then (1994) that between 7.5 and 10 million of the then 42 million 
South Africans lived in informal settlements910.  
Most of these, of course, were people with little or no income. It was estimated that in 
1995, in terms of income per household, out of a total 8.5 million South African households, 7.15 
million, or 86.1 per cent, had an average monthly household income of less than ZAR   3,500.00911. 
Under the new government a goal was set for the building of 350,000 new houses per year912. 
While the government had made a commitment to provide subsidies to those with little or no 
income, those with income would rely on the markets. The latter could, however, only be 
facilitated through access to housing loans from the banks. In South Africa the banks dominate the 
mortgage lending sector913. To facilitate bank lending, the government cajoled banks to extend 
mortgage loans to the low-to-medium cost housing market. Minister Joe Slovo signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Association of Mortgage Lenders in order to 
mobilise and encourage lending to this targeted market914. However, a couple of years after this 
MOU, the government started to express some frustration. The perception was that the banks were 
not lending, and were unwilling to lend, to this market.     
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911 Ibid. The breakdown of households with monthly incomes of less than R3500.00 is as follows; 39 per cent 
(3.3million) households with a monthly income of between R0.00 to R800.00; 29 per cent (2.41million) between 
R800.00 and R1500.00; 11.8 per cent (0.98million) between R1500.00 and R2500.00, and 5.6 per cent (0.46million) 
between R2500.00 and R3500.00. 
912 Ibid. 
913 Ibid. 





In 2000, the Minister of Housing at that time, Dr Mthembi-Mahanyele and successor to Joe 
Slovo, warned the private sector banks that government was “running out of patience with the 
bank’s reluctance” to extend loans to the targeted markets915. In terms of the MOU signed under 
Joe Slovo, the banks had promised to deliver 50 000 loans a year to poor communities. According 
to Mahanyele, “banks had not met this target” and their lending patterns showed that loans to lower 
income areas were declining916. The government was to follow this up with legislative enactments 
aimed at monitoring the lending patterns of financial institutions917. The Home Loans and 
Mortgage Act of 2000, styled on a namesake law in the US, was passed. This Act basically 
compelled private banks to disclose reasons for not granting home loans with the aim of ensuring 
that “discrimination based on reasons other than sound financial underwriting criteria” was 
eliminated918. In the Ministry of Housing’s budget vote of 2001, Mthembi-Mahanyele told 
parliament that her Ministry was sponsoring the Community Reinvestment Bill919. The purpose of 
this Bill was to eliminate ‘redlining’ -- ‘a discriminatory practice by banks not to lend to 
marginalised communities’920.   
It is said that the Community Reinvestment Bill (or CRB) was inspired by a similar law in 
the US, which had been passed there in 1970921. The CRB, when passed, would compel banks to 
cease discriminatory practices in extending loans, backed by criminal and regulatory sanctions922. 
When Mthembi-Mahanyele expressed her frustrations on the low number of housing loans, the 
issue was seized on by the South African Communist Party (SACP), a party in which she was also 
a member. In response to the Minister’s frustrations, the SACP launched what it called the Red 
                                                                
915 Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele. 2001. Budget Speech by the Minister of Housing. National Assembly, 19 June 2001. 











October Campaign in year 2000923.  It broadened the focus on financial institutions beyond 
housing to broader issues of financial access, employment policies and empowerment. Through 
this Campaign, which had many catchy slogans such as “Make Banks Serve the People” and “Red 
October Campaign against Redlining”, 19 marches and pickets were held throughout the major 
cities of South Africa by thousands of protestors on 21 October 2000924.  
A petition was submitted to the government and the Banking Council of South Africa -- an 
association of South African banks. The main demands of the petition were that government must 
intervene through law and regulation in order to ensure access to basic financial services such as 
bank accounts and housing loans925. It called for a legal moratorium on ‘redlining’926 and 
‘classification’ by private banks of ‘black residential areas’ as ‘high-risk or non-creditworthy’927. 
It also called for an ‘immediate end to racism and sexism and discrimination’ and for the regulation 
of the functioning of Credit Bureaus’928. The SACP’s campaign welcomed the introduction of the 
CRB. It mobilised support for its protest from the public and other organised formations such as 
communities, churches, political and labour organisations, and civil society groups. This resulted 
in the formation of an organisation that would take the campaign to a different level, called the 
Financial Sector Campaign Forum/Coalition (FSCF).  
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The FSCF was constituted by about 55 organisations and was led by the SACP with its 
Secretary, Dr. Blade Nzimande929, as the Chairperson930. The FSCF proved an influential 
organisation in taking the campaign to more strategic policy-making avenues of government. It 
introduced the “Make Banks Serve the People” campaign into the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (Nedlac). There, in 2001, a Financial Sector Transformation 
Summit was proposed by Nedlac’s Labour and Community constituencies931. This Summit would 
bring together private banks, government, labour and community organisations represented at 
Nedlac to discuss and agree on how issues of transformation in the banking sector and access to 
financial services in South Africa should be addressed. The Nedlac Financial Services Sector 
Transformation Summit was held in August 2002. It resulted in an agreement between the 
constituencies represented at Nedlac, covering a wide range of issues. This included agreements 
on: ‘the regulation of credit bureaus; introduction of legislation on cooperative banks; support for 
co-operative banks and non-profit micro-credit schemes; ending discrimination; ensuring access 
to basic financial services; expanding access to capital markets and investment; the role of state-
owned financial institutions; regulating the developmental role of the financial sector and; savings 
initiatives’932.  
We focus on the agreement on ‘ensuring access to basic financial services’. In this regard, 
the Summit agreed that: 
1. To engage effectively in the economy, encourage savings and improve the quality of 
life, every South African resident should have access to affordable and convenient 
payments and saving facilities; 
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2. In particular, people should be able to access social grants through accounts rather than 
by queuing; 
3.  Access to basic financial facilities should be ensured.  
      To broaden access to savings and payments requires: 
a.  Location of banking facilities, at least ATMs, should be within walking 
distance of all major settlements; 
b. Affordable costs should be established for small savings accounts, payments 
and the transfer of pensions, relative to the incomes of poor households; and 
c. Education should be provided in the use of ATMs and other basic financial 
services. 
4.  Both the public and private sector financial institutions must play a role in achieving 
these aims. 
5. The parties will jointly research the economics of basic financial services and on that 
basis establish mechanisms and timeframes for achieving universal access’933.  
 Speaking on behalf of the Financial Sector, Derek Cooper, then-Chairman of Standard 
Bank and Liberty Groups, mentioned that the industry was: 
“…fully aware of the need for the economic empowerment of all the people of this 
wonderful country. It would be futile to believe that there can be prosperity for 
some, without there being a reasonable level of prosperity for most…we are 
mindful and supportive of Government’s determination to make appropriate 
changes to the structure and function of South Africa’s economy…we, the financial 
                                                                




services sector, therefore commit ourselves to working in partnership with 
Government, labour and the community to bring about those changes”934. 
Derek Cooper’s talk signalled an unprecedented admission of the shortfalls that the 
financial sector had been accused of. The “well-developed banking system which compares 
favourably with those in many developed countries and which sets South Africa apart from many 
other emerging market countries” that former South African Reserve Bank Governor, Mr. Tito 
Mboweni935 had referred to in a speech he made to a press gala dinner in Pretoria, appeared to have 
been exposed as failing to provide accessible and affordable “24 hours a day, every day of the 
year” banking services to the majority of South Africans. It was, it appeared, only sophisticated 
for a minority of the population as basically had been the case under apartheid. The banks, it 
appears, had realised that they had little choice but to meet the demands which had become very 
glaring and political and were accompanied with real threats of legal intervention by government.  
The last time there had been major political campaigns against banks in South Africa was 
during the apartheid days -- when Barclays, Standard Chartered and other banks ended up 
withdrawing their South African operations as the Anti-Apartheid Movement’s campaigns 
intensified against them in the 1980s936. Derek Coopers’ address was, however, measured.   He 
asked the government, labour and community constituencies to ‘partner’ with the financial 
sector937. This conciliatory approach was markedly different in tone to the gloves-off address by 
the Chairperson of FSCF, Dr. Blade Nzimande, at the same Summit. Speaking on behalf of the 
Nedlac’s community constituency, Nzimande charged that 
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“Since 1994, we have witnessed numerous engagements between government, 
communities and the banks seeking to draw the banks into making a contribution 
to urgently needed transformation in our country. These engagements have 
particularly focussed on the provision of affordable finance to low cost 
housing…and providing affordable basic banking services to our people. Despite 
these efforts, we have witnessed and experienced…a contraction of banking 
services to the workers and the poor, higher charges imposed…to those able to 
access them…continued redlining of areas in which black working people live…” 
Nzimande further declared that  
“We are convinced that neither market forces, nor appeals to goodwill of the 
financial sector, will fundamentally alter this pattern…We…welcome the 
publication of the Community Reinvestment Bill” 
While Nzimande referred to government intervention through law and regulation, Cooper, 
on the other hand, was pushing for a softer approach to the financial sector; which resented the 
CRB. He suggested that out of the agreements reached by the Summit, a Financial Sector Charter 
be developed to facilitate implementation of the Financial Sector Transformation Summit938. The 
reason for the general lack of support for the alternative, the CRB, within the financial sector was 
that it would create mandatory obligations which were to be backed by regulatory and criminal 
sanctions939. In earlier correspondence with the former Minister of Housing, Mthembi-Mahanyele, 
the Chief Executive Officer of the Banking Council of South Africa, Bob Tucker, had written a 
somewhat brusque letter in opposition to the CRB. He reprimanded: 
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“To suggest that the poor should flood the banking halls and demand mortgage 
loans that they cannot afford to repay hardly seems in keeping with the standards 
of good governance and sound business practice…”940 
In 2003, the South African Cabinet, under former President Thabo Mbeki, shelved the 
CRB, citing the ongoing deliberations of the Financial Sector Charter. The legal and regulatory 
interventions that the Minister of Housing and the FSCF had called for were to take a back foot, 
overtaken by the voluntary approach expressed by Derek Cooper. In January 2004, a Financial 
Services Charter (FSC), a voluntary charter developed by the financial sector, where they agreed 
to a number of targets emanating from Nedlac’s Financial Sector Transformation Summit, was 
signed. In this Charter, the financial sector set commitments, targets and timelines through which 
progress of the implementation of Nedlac’s Summit agreements would be measured.     
The FSC of 2004 ‘operationalised’ a number of agreements arising from Nedlac’s 
Financial Sector Transformation Summit. Here we look at this agreement which was directed at 
improving access to basic financial services. It is important to clarify what the Charter itself was. 
The FSC was a voluntary agreement and, therefore, not legally binding, developed by all the 
financial services sector institutions to meet various goals and initiatives of transformation. These 
included the provision of accessible and affordable banking services. Contrary to the legislative 
and regulatory intervention which the Minister of Housing and the social movements in the form 
of the FSCF had supported, the financial sector managed to seize the opportunity to deflect these 
by developing a self-regulating non-legally binding agreement. The FSC was to be monitored by 
and through the Financial Sector Council, a council established by clause 51.1 of the FSC, to 
basically monitor and oversee the implementation of the Charter. The Charter Council was 
described as an independent body composed of industry association representatives who must 
“fairly reflect the interests of all financial institutions”941. Its preamble stated that  
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“We, the parties to this charter…commit ourselves to actively promoting a 
transformed, vibrant, and globally competitive financial sector that reflects the 
demographics of South Africa, and contribute to the establishment of an equitable 
society by effectively providing accessible financial services to black people and 
by directing investment into targeted sectors of the economy”942.  
The attitude displayed in the preamble’s phrase of “providing accessible services to black people” 
seem to suggest a generous, charitable gesture, rather than a financial sector seeing a business 
opportunity in the low-end of the market. It seems to reflect an initiative that the financial sector 
would rather not be involved in were it not for governmental pressure to assist the poor ‘black 
people’.    
In respect of access to financial services, the Charter’s clause 8 and sub-clauses 
acknowledge that ‘access to first order financial services is fundamental to…the development of 
the economy’943. In conjunction with the Nedlac Financial Sector Transformation Agreement, the 
FSC committed the financial sector to “substantially increase access to first order retail financial 
services to a greater segment of the population within LSM 1-5”944. It further clarified what the 
Charter meant by “effective access” to first-order retail financial services. It meant: 
o ‘Being within a distance of 20kms to the nearest service point at which retail 
financial services can be undertaken, and includes ATM and other origination 
points…; 
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o Being within a distance of 20kms to the nearest accessible device at which an 
electronic (other than ATM) service can be undertaken; 
o A sufficiently wide range of first-order retail financial products and services to meet 
first order market needs and which are aimed at and are appropriate for individuals 
who fall into the…categories of LSM 1-5; 
o Non-discriminatory practices;  
o Appropriately priced and affordably priced products and services for effective take-
up by LSM 1-5; and  
o Structuring and describing financial products and services in a simple and easy to 
understand manner.’ 
The FSC further defined what was meant by ‘first-order retail products and services’945. 
These meant effective access to transactional and savings products such as basic current and 
savings bank accounts and cash cards946. These also included insurance and low-income housing 
credit to individuals or households who have a monthly income of at least ZAR500947. In respect 
of first order retail products and services, the FSC committed its signatories to targets and 
timeframes, among others, of 80 per cent of LSM 1-5 to have effective access to transactional and 
savings products and services by 2008. To further enhance the implementation of the FSC in 
respect of access to basic first order retail products and services, the big four banks in conjunction 
with the PostBank, an entity owned by the South African Post Office, launched what became 
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KYC/CDD and the Mzansi Bank Account Initiative  
The Mzansi initiative was launched in October 2004, with the aim of rolling out, in 
practical terms, the banks initiative of providing effective access to financial services pursuant to 
the Financial Services Charter. The Mzansi Bank Account Initiative, as a collaborative venture, 
was launched as an offer to provide an entry-level bank account based on a magnetic-stripe cash 
card. The account was intended for the LSM 1-5 market, providing a current transactional and 
savings account, with an ability to withdraw cash at any of the participating banks’ ATMs and the 
Post Office, without any additional service/transaction charge. A report of an evaluation study into 
the impact of the Mzansi Bank Account Initiative conducted by Bankable Frontier Association 
(BFA) LLP and commissioned by FinMark Trust, a UK-funded financial research institute, was 
released in 2009. The study entitled The Mzansi Account Initiative in South Africa948 evaluated the 
impact of the introduction of the Mzansi Account (hereinafter referred to as Mzansi) from 2004 to 
2008.  
 It found that in that period, more than 6 million bank accounts had been opened949. Prior 
to the launch of Mzansi in 2004, out of the 48 million citizens of South Africa, 32 million were 
adults and could therefore open a bank account on their own. Out of the 32 million, only 13.2 
million (46 per cent) had a bank account(s) and 15.8 million (54 per cent) were un-banked950. This 
was however an improvement on 1994, when only 36 per cent of adults had a bank account951. At 
the end of 2008, after just four years of Mzansi, 20.0 million South Africans ( or 63 per cent) had 
a bank account, 11.9 million (37 per cent) un-banked952  -- a notable improvement. For more on 
Mzansi and another similar initiative of branchless banking aimed at extending access to financial 
services, please refer to Appendix 6.4. Below we explain how the South Africa authorities 
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managed to accommodate the unrolling of the Mzansi and branchless banking initiatives through 
expanding regulatory exemptions in the midst of the restrictive KYC/CDD regulations.   
 
FICA Exemption 17 
The Financial Sector Charter document made no reference to the AML/CTF regulations 
of KYC. However when one of its initiatives, the Mzansi Account was launched, the banks 
requested the former Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, to issue regulatory exemptions which 
would accommodate the issuing of bank accounts to clients who could not prove their addresses953. 
When this exemption was agreed to and passed by the Minister of Finance, it accommodated all 
new customers of banks, not only the Mzansi Account holders. The exemption, popularly known 
as exemption 17, was published just after the Mzansi Launch (October 2004) on 19 November 
2004954. This exemption excused banks from complying with regulations “concerning the 
particulars to be obtained and verified in establishing and verifying person’s identities” and from 
related record keeping requirements955. In the exemption there were also some innovative 
provisions. Those clients who have had their accounts opened using this exemption956:   
 ‘Would be allowed to withdraw or transfer or make payments of an amount not 
exceeding R5000.00 per day and not exceeding R25, 000.00 in a monthly cycle. 
 Would not be able to effect a transfer of funds to any destination outside South 
Africa, except for a transfer as a result of a point-of sale payment or cash 
withdrawal in a country in the Rand Common Monetary Area.  
 The account balance would not exceed R25,000.00 at any time 
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 Would not be allowed to simultaneously hold two or more accounts which were 
opened through this exemption’. 
The exemption also provided that should the provisions, listed above, be violated, 
offending accounts could be frozen until full KYC/CDD requirements were complied with. 
Exemption 17 therefore effectively enabled banks to open accounts for citizens and residents 
without having to provide proof of address, especially for those who did not have it. This might 
seem to have provided some relief to a number of clients who otherwise would not meet the KYC 
address verification requirements. The branchless banking products are also built around 
Exemption 17 to enable those without proof of residence documents to access banking services. 
However, has Exemption 17 solved the relative problems of financial exclusion? Yes and No.  
On the affirmative, many banks are making use of Exemption 17 and in the process, 
accommodating millions of customers who would otherwise be excluded. On the downside, 
Exemption 17, according to compliance officers, tends to be used only for Mzansi and other 
similarly restricted banking services such as branchless banking. This means therefore that if a 
customer does not want the Mzansi Account because s/he needs an account with more functionality 
and less restriction, s/he will not be accommodated unless s/he had a proof of address. Take, for 
instance, the scenario painted by one compliance officer;  
“So for a guy that has upped himself in society and still wishes to remain in an 
informal settlement, he has got a problem. Because his activity is above those 
thresholds, his account gets frozen. But yet he can’t unfreeze an account because 
he does not have a utility bill. There is an alternative way that the bank official can 
physically go and verify (the customers’ address). But who wants to risk employees 
going into informal settlements to verify addresses, except that it’s not 
economically viable.”957  
                                                                




These are practical compliance challenges that regulated businesses face. Another major 
issue with Exemption 17 is that it appears to be non-binding and discretionary. It allows regulated 
institutions to use it or not to use it when they choose to. Some banks have chosen not to use 
Exemption 17958 and could therefore be using more stringent rules than actually required as it is 
discretionary. One compliance officer told us that  
“We have not used exemption 17 and we are still not using it… If you opened a 
DVD contract, they do more stringent checks on your DVD contract than some of 
the banks do on exemption 17. Now why should a bank trust a person more than a 
DVD store, which is why I say there is no real solid reason why someone can’t 
provide proof of address”.959 
In this institution customers, we were reliably informed, are turned down even if they could qualify 
under Exemption 17 because, as the Group Anti Laundering Compliance Officer told us of his 
institutions’ experience.   
“I have seen people…walking in and saying “I have no proof of address”, just to 
be difficult and we have said to them, “then you can’t transact with our bank, 
goodbye” and they get so angry!”960 
He continued, 
“We have normally found that the people that do not want to give us proof of 
address are hiding things…how many people have got TVs? Almost everybody 
even if it’s a little portable TV. Then they are supposed to have TV licenses, if they 
don’t we are rewarding people who are breaking the law by watching TV without 
a TV license. People should be having electricity because there is even electricity 
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in smaller low income areas…which over there you should have an electricity 
bill…It is that simple!” 961 
Since exemption 17 is voluntary, it could allow some banks to deliberately conflate issues 
of KYC/CDD perhaps with the intention of avoiding low-income areas and clients. For instance, 
to argue that low income areas would have electricity bills because they have got electricity is, at 
least, misleading. Many households in these areas have got prepaid electricity meters which 
effectively do not have any billing system and are topped up in the same way that toping up an 
anonymous mobile phone sim-card would be. It is also too optimistic and elitist to expect “almost 
everybody” in South Africa to have a TV set in order to have the paperwork to qualify to open a 
bank account. Weirder is also the experience in this institution that people without a proof of 
address should be hiding something. While many banks apply Exemption 17, some might have 
ignored it, perhaps out of misguided and unrealistic risk aversion or to merely discriminate some 
sectors of the population.  
What does the FATF, the ultimate international body to which South Africa accounts for 
the implementation and compliance with the regime say about the sanitising KYC exemption 17? 
In 2008, the FATF conducted a Mutual Evaluation on South Africa962. With regards to KYC, and 
the exemptions, the report found that;    
“While the provisions of some of the exemptions fit within the FATF framework 
for reduced or simplified due diligence, other exemptions are overly broad and have 
reduced the overall effectiveness of the provisions of the FIC Act and the MLTFC 
Regulations”963.  
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While the FATF had an adverse finding pertaining to some exemptions, it found that 
Exemption 17 was above board as it presents a low money laundering risk964. The South African 
Exemption 17 has become a model that has been hailed and promoted by policy entrepreneurs and 
other issue-oriented organisations as an example of how developing countries can continue to offer 
financial services to the poor while, at the same time, trying to comply with the ‘international’ 
standards of the FATF. In 2008, the World Bank based think-tank known as the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) released a report entitled AML/CTF Regulation: Implication for 
Financial Service Providers that Serve Low-Income People965.  
It noted KYC/CDD may bring additional costs of compliance to financial services 
providers and ‘may restrict formal financial services from reaching lower income people’966.  In 
this paper, the authors recommended that in order to avoid this ‘unintended and undesirable 
consequence’ of reducing access to financial services, developing countries would be advised to:  
1. Gradually implement the KYC measures 
2. Adopt a risk-based approach to regulation 
3. Use exemptions for low-risk categories of transactions 
4. Use transaction caps for low risk products 
These proposals had apparently been borrowed from South Africa’s design in the form of 
exemption 17. The authors wrote that  
“South Africa provides one example of how a country’s AML/CTF regulations can 
be modified to take into account better needs of low-income clients…The South 
African authorities have now adopted a more flexible approach to client 
identification and verification and introduced a compliance exemption that relaxes 
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requirements for a category of clients known as “mass-banking clients:” those 
clients with small balances and small size transactions.”967 
As it appears from this report, South Africa’s response and balancing act to the 
exclusionary KYC regulations has gained acknowledgement and interest from policy 
communities. A number of scholars and policy think-tanks have taken an interest in the manner in 
which developing countries implement these AML/CTF regulations. This interest appears to have 
arisen or intensified after the encountered implementation and compliance challenges, leading to 
the daring and necessary exemptions implemented by South Africa.  
 
Conclusion 
Over the past couple of years, some empirical comparative research has been conducted 
with some interesting findings on the implications of AML/CTF regulations in developing 
economies968. Some of this research has tried to explain why AML/CTF implementation has 
presented problems of financial exclusion in developing countries. In this concluding section we 
critically examine these explanations. We ask whether developing countries such as South Africa 
can and should fully implement the FATF regime (that is without the Exemptions), especially the 
KYC requirements, given their socio-economic conditions of underdevelopment?  
We examine specifically the explanations given by the Genesis study969, referred to earlier. 
This study found that developing countries can implement the regime but need to adapt it to their 
socio-economic circumstances. Adapting this regime to developing country circumstances, 
                                                                
967 Ibid.  
968 Ibid. See also G:enesis. 2008. Implementing FATF Standards in developing countries and financial inclusion: 
findings and guidelines ( Hennie Bester, Doubell Chamberlain, Louis De Koker, Christine Hougaard, Ryan Short, 
Anja Smith and Richard Walker). Final Report, February 2008, First Initiative. 
969 G:enesis.2008. Implementing FATF standards in developing countries and financial inclusion: findings and 
guidelines. ( Hennie Bester, Doubell Chamberlain, Louis De Koker, Christine Hougaard, Ryan Short, Anja Smith and 




according to this report, would mean applying reduced KYC requirements, including compliance 
exemptions such as South Africa’s Exemption 17. The Genesis report, however, makes interesting 
observations that developing countries tend to enact stricter KYC requirements and when they fail 
to implement them, they start to search for solutions which suit their socio-economic 
circumstances970. This appears to be an expensive way of implementing regulation. These 
unintended and undesirable consequences, the report argues, would militate against the goals of 
the AML/CTF regime in a number of ways.  
One of these is that restricting access to formal financial services makes the regime less 
effective as it can only monitor those who use regulated institutions -- leaving larger populations 
to use unregulated informal services971. This makes the fight against organised crime difficult 
when larger sectors of the population are not monitored972. This potentially makes detecting crime 
and terrorist financing more difficult as there is no regulatory surveillance and monitoring in the 
informal and unregulated sectors973. As a result the AML/CTF regime may, as mooted earlier, 
exacerbate money laundering by deflecting it to the underground unregulated markets, making it 
more difficult to conduct investigations by law enforcement agencies974. An effective AML/CTF 
regime should, according to the Genesis study, be attempting to bring as much of the population 
under financial intelligence surveillance as possible. The way this should be done is through 
encouraging more access to the formal regulated institutions than restricting it.  
To rectify this problem of deflection, according to the Genesis report, the regime would 
have to keep on expanding its regulatory reach to cover those parts of the system that have not yet 
been regulated, both formal and informal975. The issue however with this regulatory expansionism 











is how far the regime will need to be expanded and how feasible and practical would this expansion 
be? As shown in Chapter 2, the AML/CTF regime has always been characterised by expansionist 
tendencies since its inception. Initially it focussed on drug offences and regulated only banks. It 
then expanded its reach to include more crimes beyond drugs and even terrorism after the 9/11 
attacks in the US. In terms of the institutions covered by regulation, the regime extended its reach 
to encompass more financial institutions beyond banks, non-financial institutions and 
professionals. This may be caused by the weaknesses of the situational crime prevention approach 
which, as we showed in Chapter 2, instead of combating crime deflects it in a number of ways. 
The weaknesses of the situational crime prevention approach to combating crime seems to account 
for why criminals change their techniques or choose more informal and unregulated sectors in 
order to try and beat the system.  
However, the problem of deflection is not only limited to crime. AML/CTF regulations do 
not deflect criminals and criminal activity only, but also large sectors of the (non-criminal) 
population to using informal and unregulated and sometimes expensive sectors of the economy 
because of KYC/CDD restrictions. This therefore renders the AML/CTF regulations, in general, 
‘bad regulations’ as they are disproportionate, leading to further undesirable and unintended 
consequences of financial exclusion with implications for socio-economic development and 
increased transaction costs. Pushing large sectors of the population into the informal markets 
compounds the problems of accessibility and affordability. This may also seem contrary to the 
goal of the AML/CTF regime of protecting the soundness of the financial system, if it benefits 
only the few and discourages socio-economic development.  
The Genesis study further observed that developing countries should not have implemented 
such strict measures in the first place since the FATF standards were flexible and allowed for every 
country’s adaptation. We partially agree with this observation though it does not go far enough to 
explain why developing countries have tended to act in that manner. Finding explanations as to 




required by the FATF standards, may help us account for why they would adopt measures that 
were otherwise detrimental to them.  
The findings of this study suggest that the global FATF regime was not only imposed on 
developing countries generally, but also rushed. This did not allow developing countries to 
appreciate the regime’s flexibility. It is our view that making developing countries part of 
deliberative processes for policies they would be expected to implement is in their interest and 
would assist in identifying issues that may impact negatively on them beforehand and thus pre-
empt repetition of similar problems in the future. If adopting the FATF framework had been 
voluntary and flexible, as claimed, developing countries would have had an opportunity to evaluate 
the potential costs and benefits of their national AML regimes. Perhaps some of them would have 
decided not to incorporate some of the measures proposed by the FATF. However, the narrow 
hidden interests behind the dissemination of the regime seem to have been directed at having the 
regime incorporated at all costs. It therefore did not matter whether the regime would actually 
provide the alleged publicly interested solutions to the problems that the FATF and its principals 
had publicly articulated. It was a matter of adopt now and complain or find solutions to arising 
problems later.  
That developing countries were pushed into incorporating the FATF standards seems to 
support our private interest hypothesis that the regime emerged to satisfy narrow hidden interests. 
These interests appear to have been those of mainly developed countries (led by the US) of trying 
to prevent regulatory arbitrage, as discussed earlier, by having or forcing everyone to incorporate 
the regime even if such is not in their best interests. It is not in the best interest of developing 
countries to adopt measures that would hamper their socio-economic developmental ambitions by 
excluding large sectors of the population from accessing the most basic of financial services. This 
has the potential of maintaining and exacerbating the status quo of socio-economic inequalities as 
it excludes the poor from accessing essential services. It is also not in the interest of combating 




next chapter, we look beyond KYC in order to examine the practical experiences of its impact in 
the enforcement of crime combating initiatives, looking specifically at the investigation of 
suspicious transaction reports and their effects in detecting and combating money laundering and 
terrorist financing. It becomes clearer that the administration of the FATF standards is far from 
achieving its camouflaged goals of detecting money laundering, let alone protecting the soundness 




















Chapter 7  




The ultimate goal of the global AML/CTF regime is to assist in the detection and combating 
of crime, hence the requirements for regulated businesses to report some client transactions to the 
recently established Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in many countries throughout the world. 
It is believed that the monitoring and surveillance of customer transactions by banks, lawyers, 
accountants and other regulated professionals and businesses would assist in detecting and 
combating serious crimes and, recently, the financing of terrorism. In this chapter, we examine 
South Africa’s experiences with suspicious activity or transaction reporting.  We ask if the 
reporting of financial transactions of customers to the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), South 
Africa’s FIU, has helped in the detection of serious crime and terrorist financing, as claimed by 
the FATF and as envisaged in South Africa’s laws and regulations. We seek to determine what the 
outcomes have been since the implementation of the reporting regime with the passing of FICA in 
2001. Have the reports made to the FIC resulted in new investigations, arrests and prosecutions, 
convictions, confiscation and forfeiture of proceeds of crime; based upon the  detection of money 
laundering and its predicate crimes including terrorist financing? If this transaction reporting has 
helped-- to what extent?  
This chapter is very important in testing our competing hypotheses of public and private 
interests in the global emergence and domestic incorporation of the global FATF standards of 
business regulations. It is important because if the outcomes of the regime show that it helps to 
detect crime effectively and efficiently, it could therefore be shown that it was in South Africa’s 




its principals that the regime really emerged to detect and combat crime and to ensure the 
soundness of the financial system by preventing its abuse by criminals.  
 We found, disturbingly, that the regulation of businesses to file customer’s financial 
transaction reports (FTRs) to the FIC cannot yet be considered to be helping to detect money 
launderers and terrorist financiers. Some may argue that this lack of success, perhaps, could be 
attributed to other factors, such as teething problems or South Africa’s lack of capacity or resources 
and skills to investigate such reports, among others. However evidence shows that even in the 
initiating countries such as the US and the UK, this problem of the ineffectiveness of FTRs in 
detecting crime abounds. Besides that, South Africa’s regime seems to have been well funded by 
the government. We show also that the US became aware of these problems in the late 1970s and 
the UK, in the 1990s. They nonetheless supported and pushed for the dissemination of the regime 
throughout the world, even through force -- as shown in the strategies of the FATF to unilaterally 
blacklist the so called NCCTs. We basically show evidence which suggests that it is only a very 
small portion of FTRs that are made to their FIUs which end up assisting in detecting crime. Rough 
estimates of other research findings of FTR regimes suggest that the numbers of FTRs that end up 
assisting in the detection of money laundering or crime are in the region of less than 11% and 
generally hover around less than one percent.  
It is therefore important and appropriate to critically reflect on whether the global FATF 
regime really emerged and was disseminated throughout the world in order to serve the alleged 
public interest goals of combating crime and protecting the neoliberal global financial system or 
to serve other narrower agendas, such as those of competition and regulatory arbitrage. The filing 
of FTRs by regulated businesses is potentially very expensive as it means that regulated businesses 
must hire staff; train everyone who should assist in ensuring their compliance; monitor and report 
transactions. This clearly requires enormous amounts of human, financial and technological 




the FATF, must also be equipped to assess whether these reports should be referred to LEAs for 
purposes of investigations and asset forfeiture or not.  
1. We find that South Africa’s implementation of the regime has, ten year later, showed no 
signs of a beneficial FTR regime. We find that the regime cannot yet claim to be succeeding 
in detecting money laundering and terrorist financing. It therefore cannot claim to be 
achieving its publicly interested goals of detecting crime and protecting the soundness of 
the financial system against money launders and terrorist financiers it cannot detect. While 
there has been an increasing number of money laundering convictions in South Africa, 
such convictions cannot yet be attributed to the reporting of FTRs. As a result of this 
finding, we propose the review of the reporting regime in South Africa. A cost and benefit 
analysis of the regime is essential to enable the country to decide whether it is necessary or 
not to keep and try to improve it. 
 
FTRs legal and regulatory framework for South Africa 
 The reporting of customer transactions in South Africa is covered by Part 3, Section 27 to 
69 of FICA976. These provisions cover different types of FTRs that must be made by regulated 
businesses and their employees. They also provide for; access to law enforcement agencies of 
customer information held by regulated businesses; internal arrangements within regulated 
businesses for making reports; penalties (and defences) where regulated businesses fail to comply 
with their reporting duties. FTRs must be made to the FIC by all the regulated businesses listed in 
the Schedules of FICA977. Sections 28, 28A, 29, 30, and 31 provide for regulated businesses to 
report to the FIC different types of FTRs including ‘threshold’, ‘cross-border’, ‘suspicious’ and 
                                                                
976 FICA was amended by the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorists and Related Activities of 
2004, to incorporate matters relating to combating terrorism financing. It was also amended by the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Amendment Act of 2008. 
977 South Africa has two different forms of regulated businesses. There are those referred to as ‘accountable 




‘unusual’ customer transactions.. Sections 26, 27, 32, and 35, give powers to the FIC to proactively 
request or gain access to information (KYC/CDD and transaction information) which should be 
kept by regulated businesses or by third parties on their behalf. Section 26 provides for the use of 
a court warrant by the FIC, where needed, to access information kept by regulated businesses and 
third parties relating to KYC and transactions which regulated business are required to keep for a 
period of five years.  
 
Discovery of information requests 
Section 27 provides for what we refer to as the ‘discovery of information request’. It is 
used by the FIC to ascertain if particular subjects whose transactions have been reported to it are 
customers of any particular regulated business or not. Let us make an example of this. When the 
FIC receives a report from Bank A concerning Customer A, it may want to further profile 
Customer A. It may therefore send a discovery of information request (section 27) to Bank B, C, 
D and E in order to determine if Customer A has any other bank accounts with these banks.  
It is envisaged that this would help the FIC to discover new information which may enable 
it to have a broader profile of Customer A and his transactional activities, patterns and behaviour. 
This discovery of information may also assist LEAs when investigating the financial intelligence 
referred to them by the FIC. LEAs, in this regard, would prepare subpoenas in a directed and 
targeted manner rather than making requests for information where Customer A does not have a 
bank account978.  
 
 
                                                                




Further information requests 
Section 32 of FICA enables the FIC to request regulated businesses to supply ‘further 
information’ concerning a transaction report (s) they have made to it under section 28, 28A, 29 
and 30. For instance Bank A may have reported a transaction by Customer A to the FIC and the 
latter requires more information regarding Customer A from Bank A. The FIC may, perhaps, need 
account opening documents and other KYC/CDD related data or a bank statement in order to 
assess and decide whether Customer A’s transaction(s) should be referred to LEAs as suspicious, 
unusual or probably linked to criminal activity or not.  
 
Supervisory bodies reports 
The reporting of FTRs also extends to the AML/CTF regulatory supervisory bodies and 
the South African Revenue Service. Supervisory bodies are, as discussed in Chapter 4, sector-
specific professional, self-regulatory or government regulators that share a regulatory supervisory 
role for AML/CTF compliance of regulated businesses. However, not all regulated businesses have 
a supervisory body979. Section 36 (1) of FICA requires supervisory bodies and the South African 
Revenue Service (SARS) to proactively report transactions they “know or suspect” to be connected 
to proceeds of crime (including terrorism financing) to the FIC. Using section 36 (2), the FIC may 
also take an initiative of requesting supervisory bodies and SARS to report particular information 
which it reasonably believes to be in their possession. The transactions covered in Section 36 must 
have been conducted by or with a regulated business they supervise for compliance. An example 
of this could be the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) detecting a suspicious or unusual 
                                                                




transaction conducted by or with a bank that it supervises980. It could therefore report such a 
transaction to the FIC under Section 36. This duty also extends to SARS.  
While South African tax laws generally place a duty of secrecy/confidentiality on the tax 
information disclosed to or held by SARS, FICA somehow overrides this duty981. It also overrides 
any other similar secrecy or confidentiality duties, agreements, whether arising out of statutory or 
common law obligations, that supervisory or regulated institutions may claim when complying 
with the reporting provisions under FICA982. The only regulated profession that enjoys some 
measure of protection among regulated businesses is the legal profession983. The protections that 
the legal profession enjoy are in relation to their common law client privilege984. Section 38 of 
FICA protects all regulated businesses against any criminal or civil liability for reporting their 
client transactions and KYC/CDD information to the FIC. 
                                                                
980 Author Interview with Lerato Mokhesi of the Banking Supervision Division of the SARB, 23 October 2009. 
According to Mokhesi, the SARB, although a supervisory body that supervises the banking industry’s compliance 
with FICA, it is also obliged to report suspicious transactions to the FIC. The SARB is an account opening institution, 
but its mandate is limited. The Financial Services Division of the SARB offers account facilities to different 
government departments, banks, embassies, among others, but not to household consumers. She explained regarding 
the SARB’s duty to report suspicious transactions that “different government departments have got accounts with our 
Financial Services Department. From time to time they give us a list of signatories. If maybe somebody else [who is 
not listed as a signatory] tries to do something [perform a transaction], that we can report as suspicious.”  
981 See Section 37 of FICA. One of the most controversial issues arising out of transaction reporting has been issues 
of client-confidentiality. The AML/CTF regulations cover a number of businesses and professions whose client-
confidentiality principles have throughout the years been held as sacrosanct. This includes mainly the issues of client-
confidentiality within the legal profession. Bankers, accountants, and others as well, observe some high level of 
professional confidentiality on their clients’ affairs. The AML/CTF regime has, to an extent, been deemed to direct 
them to act against this principle of confidentiality when reporting transactions. This has not been taken very kindly 
by these professions, particularly the legal profession and accountants and bankers. The legal profession, in many 
jurisdictions, and the International Bar Association have challenged these regulations to the level of taking them to 
court in countries such as the UK, Canada and Australia. They have also lobbied the authorities within the regulatory 
space.  Section 37 (1) of FIC ACT provides that ‘no duty of secrecy or confidentiality or any other restriction on the 
disclosure of information, whether imposed by legislation or arising from the common law or agreement, affect 
compliance’ with reporting obligations under FICA. The only exception is given to the common law right to legal 
professional privilege as between an attorney and the attorney’s client in respect of communication made in confidence 
between them or a third party for purposes of legal advice or litigation which is pending, contemplated or which has 
commenced. The privilege does not cover situations where attorneys act as intermediaries in financial transactions 
such as conveyancing.  
982 See South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Centre Act, Act No. 38 of 2001 as amended. Section 37.  
983 See Ibid. Sections 37 (2) (a) and (b). 





 Monitoring orders 
Another important power that the FIC has is that of applying for ‘monitoring orders’ in 
terms of section 35 of FICA. Monitoring orders are issued by a court on application by the FIC 
and order a regulated business to report every transaction of a particular customer to the FIC for a 
period of 3 months. These orders are renewable through further court applications. Related to 
monitoring orders are intervention mechanisms that the FIC has to temporarily delay transactions.  
 
Intervention mechanisms 
Using section 34, the FIC can intervene by delaying transactions of customers of regulated 
businesses for a period of no longer than five working days985. This five day delay allows the FIC 
to notify the NDPP to apply for a freezing order of funds in terms of Chapter 5 or 6 of POCA and 
other similar provisions in terms of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorism 
and Related Activities of 2004 (POCDATARA). The NDPP, as discussed in Chapter 4, has 
delegated this power to the AFU. The responsibility of the AFU is to confiscate and forfeit 
proceeds or instrumentalities of crime in line with POCA and POCDATARA. Within that five day 
Section 34 intervention period, the AFU may apply for a restraint or freezing order, using POCA, 
to freeze or preserve such funds for a longer period (90 days) while investigations take place986. 
 
                                                                
985 In the UK this is referred to as ‘consent disclosures’. They are filed with the UKFIU, giving it an opportunity to 
review and give consent within 7 working days. This is much more relevant on regulated businesses who are alerted 
of future transactions of their clients such as lawyers in divorce matters. For instance the divorce settlement to be 
made may be made with proceeds of crime, such as tax evasion. By carrying on with facilitating a divorce settlement, 
an attorney may be facilitating the acquisition of proceeds of tax evasion, a criminal offence. As a result, solicitors 
and barristers in the UK were advised to seek consent and advice from UKFIU on such matters. See Bowman v Fels 
[2005] EWCA Civ 226 (08 March 2005). http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/226.html 





Section 29 (3) of FICA prohibits what has become known as ‘tipping-off’; that is informing 
a client that his/her transaction(s) has been reported to the FIC and details of such reports. The 
rationale behind the ‘tipping-off’ offence is to guard against suspects taking action that would 
jeopardise investigations such as depleting the funds.  
 
Access to information held by the Centre 
Lastly, Sections 40 and 41 cover issues of access to information held by the FIC and parties 
entitled to access such information such as the designated LEAs987, the South African Revenue 
Service and other supervisory bodies and the country’s intelligence agencies. Other bodies entitled 
to access such information are foreign FIUs, with which the FIC shares information (on request) 
via the Egmont Group’s Secure Web988.  
 
Types of Financial Transaction Reports 
There are two broad categories of FTRs that are prescribed for reporting by regulated 
businesses worldwide. These are ‘threshold’ and ‘suspicious’/’unusual’ transaction reports. 
                                                                
987 The Assets Forfeiture Unit, Directorate of Special Operations (then), South African Police Services, National 
Intelligence Agency, South African Secret Service, Exchange Control Division of the South African Reserve Bank 
(ExCON) and the South African Revenue Service.  
988 This seems to be one of the most interesting aspects of these regulations. Foreign intelligence services do not 
necessarily need to have a mutual legal assistance which goes through the ministry of justice and is authorised by the 
courts in order to access financial intelligence held by the FIC. They only need to send a request to the FIC and the 
FIC sends that financial intelligence to them without a warrant or court order. FICA does not seem to provide for any 
formal legal guidelines or safeguards; making such information open to abuse as the whole operational environment 
of FIUs is shrouded in secrecy. Information held by the FIC may also be accessed by those entitled to it through legal 
proceedings and its production can be ordered through a court order.  Later on here we look at the institutions set up 
in South Africa to investigate organised and serious crime and to whom, financial intelligence, is crucial in their work. 
At the moment we discuss the concept of financial transaction reporting, the practical challenges for complying with 
the reporting requirements by regulated institutions and justifications and uses of financial intelligence for law 




Threshold-based reporting is based on the setting of minimum transaction amounts above which a 
regulated business must report to an FIU. These thresholds differ per jurisdiction and currencies. 
Section 28 of FICA requires the reporting of Cash Transaction Reports (CTRs). This was not 
implemented in South Africa until late 2010. All regulated businesses are now obliged to report 
all transactions above ZAR 25,000 to the FIC989. It is not clear why the South African authorities 
chose this CTR amount as it seems significantly lower than those of other jurisdictions and is likely 
to cause a flood of reports which may be difficult to connect with any criminal activity by the FIC 
and LEAs, as has been experienced in other jurisdictions.  
For instance, in 2009 alone AUSTRAC and FinCEN received more than 14 million CTRs 
each990.  The US has, since the early 1990s, been seeking to address the problem of ‘over-
reporting’, as most of the CTRs it gets, according to the US government’s research, are “useless 
for law enforcement purposes”991.  One of the major shortfalls that has been found with CTRs is 
what is known as ‘smurfing’ or ‘structuring’. This happens when criminals conduct multiple 
transactions which are just below the reporting threshold to avoid being reported. To accommodate 
this flaw, section 29 (b) (i to iii) of FICA requires the reporting of a series of such structured 
transactions as ‘unusual’ or ‘suspicious’.  
Related to CTRs are cross-border – cash, negotiable instruments and electronic transfers. 
Section 30 and 31 of FICA respectively requires the reporting of threshold cash or electronic 
transfers into and out of South Africa. In practice, these transactions are supposed to be reported 
                                                                
989 See Financial Intelligence Centre. 2010. Guidance Note 05 on section 28 of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act, Act 38 of 2001. Guidance notes. Republic of South Africa, Centurion. 
https://www.fic.gov.za/DownloadContent/GuidanceNotes/Guidance%20Note%205.pdf accessed on 30 March 2011. 
Under FICA, section 1, ‘cash’ is defined as physical “coin and paper money” and “travellers’ cheques” and excludes 
‘negotiable instruments’, ‘transfer of funds by means of a bank cheque, bank draft, electronic funds transfer, wire 
transfer or other written order that does not involve physical transfer of cash’. p. 3.  
990 See AUSTRAC Annual Report 2008/09. Australia. http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/ar0809.pdf pp.17 to 30. In 
Australia, 16,325,870 of the 19,771,903 FTRs reported in 2008/09 financial year were CTRs. See Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network Annual Report 2009. United States. http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files. In the US 
FinCEN received 16, 740, 102 FTRs, 14,9 million of which were CTRs.   
991 See Government Accountability Office. 2008. Bank Secrecy Act: Increased Use of Exemption Provisions Could 
Reduce Currency Transaction Reporting While Maintaining Usefulness to Law Enforcement Efforts. Report to 




to the Exchange Control (ExCon) Department of the South African Reserve Bank, which 
administers the country’s reputably strict, but slowly liberalising, exchange control regime. The 
FIC has got an arrangement to access such reports from ExCon992. For the purposes of this Chapter 
we combine both cross-border transfers and CTRs- as they are both threshold based, and refer to 
them as CTRs.      
  Section 29 (a) requires all regulated businesses to report ‘unusual’ and ‘suspicious’ 
transactions when they ‘know or ought reasonably to have known or suspected’ that their business 
has or was about to receive proceeds of unlawful activities or property connected with crime or 
the financing of terrorism. It becomes difficult, however, for regulated businesses to know or 
suspect which transactions flowing through them may fit the bill. However, it is reasoned that if 
they profile their customers through such set requirements as Know Your Customer and the UN’s 
terrorist/sanctions lists, they could be able to form an opinion as to which customer transactions to 
report as suspicious and unusual. FICA does not define what is meant by ‘suspicious’ or ‘unusual 
activity’, but a number of guidelines have over the years emerged with an aim of guiding regulated 
businesses to comply with their reporting duties993.  
The FATF standards have generally allowed some discretion for countries to choose their 
reporting regimes between CTRs and STRs. While many jurisdictions have opted for both, some 
have tended to use mainly the STRs regime. In the early years, the US tended to use mainly the 
CTRs regime. In 1994, however, the US also started to emphasise STRs. The US and Australia 
now apply both these reporting regimes994. In respect of CTRs, the threshold set for reporting in 
the US is US$10,000 and in Australia, A$ 10,000, a significantly larger threshold compared to 
South Africa’s ZAR25,000 (equivalent US$3,000 at the time of writing). The UK has been 
                                                                
992 See FATF. 2009. Mutual Evaluation Report: South Africa. Paris: FATF, OECD, ESAAMLG. 
993 See discussion below  
994 Hinterseer, K. 2003. Criminal finance: the political economy of money laundering in a comparative legal context. 
Kluver Law International: The Hague, London, New York, p.185. See also Montano, E. 2002. Wealth hidden, tax 





reluctant to utilize the CTRs method, favouring STRs instead. It was only with the UK’s Money 
Laundering Regulations of 2001 and 2003 that the CTRs regime was fully incorporated to 
accommodate cross-border transaction reporting requirement-(of EU 15,000 threshold) in 
compliance with the second EU Directive against Money Laundering995.  
The main reason for favouring the STR as opposed to the CTR system has been based on 
the view that CTRs tend to ‘swamp’ the system, making the reporting regime unmanageable996. 
There might be some validity to this view as countries that use it seem to have amassed huge 
databases of CTRs, which research suggests are often legitimate transactions or cannot be linked 
to any criminal activity. For instance in 2001 alone, AUSTRAC, collected about 7, 5 million CTRs 
compared to about 7000 STRs997. At the end of 2008/09 financial year, it received just below 20 
million FTRs (both STRs and CTRs); that is an equivalent of 76000 reports per day998. Only 32, 
449 were STRs999, the rest being CTRs1000.  
In the UK, on the other hand, between 1995 and 2000, the NCIS (NCIS incorporated UK’s 
Financial Intelligence Unit then) had received below 20 000 STRs per year1001. It was only in 2001 
where the numbers started to swell to just above 30 000; 63 000 in 2002 and about 100 000 in 
2003, following the UK’s introduction of new regulations1002. When the number of transactions 
reported to the NCIS started to rise, there was a lot of scepticism about the NCIS’s capacity to 
                                                                
995 Alldridge, P. 2003. Money laundering law: forfeiture, confiscation, civil recovery, criminal laundering and 
taxation of the proceeds of crime. Oxford: Hart Publishing..  
996 Gold, M, & Levi, M. 1994. Money laundering in the UK: an appraisal of suspicious-based reporting. London :The 
Police Foundation.. See also Maylam, S. 2002. Prosecution for money laundering in the UK. Journal of Financial 
Crime, Vol. 10, No. 2, London: Henry Stewart Publications., Editorial pp.157-158. 
997 Montano, E. 2002. Wealth hidden, tax evaded: strategies for revelation. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 
Vol. 5, No. 4, : London: Henry Stewart Publications, p. 264. 
998 See AUSTRAC Annual Report 2008/09. Australia. http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/ar0809.pdf pp.17-30. 
999 Ibid. In Australia STRs are referred to as Suspicious Matter Reports (SMS). .  
1000 Ibid. Cash Transaction Reports are referred to as Threshold Transaction Reports in Australia and include reporting 
of transactions of any currency above AU$10 000 and International Fund Transfer Instruction Reports which 
amounted to 16,325,870 transaction reports (of the 19,771,903 reported) at the end of 2008/09 financial year.  





analyse and disseminate these reports to LEAs promptly in order to detect or prevent crime1003. 
This scepticism arose mainly from the NCIS’s backlog of unprocessed STRs, which were not 
disseminated to LEAs for periods as long as over a year1004. At that time, it was NCIS policy that 
all STRs received should be analysed, allocated and disseminated to designated LEAs1005.  
There are also challenges with the STR system. For instance, studies show that they could 
be ‘swamped’ by regulated businesses who report defensively just to avoid being fined. In 2003, 
the Royal Bank of Scotland was fined £ 750,000 by the Financial Services Authority. Its Chief 
Executive then, Fred Godwin, was quoted as having complained that the penalties imposed by the 
FSA were “so draconian that you might as well report every transaction”1006. The system in the 
UK was reviewed with the formation of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), which the 
UK Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) is now part of1007. According to SOCA’s 2009 Annual 
Report, it received only 228, 834 STRs (which in the UK are referred to as suspicious activity 
reports (SARs). 
The CTR system is, however, regarded as more objective for its clarity on what to report 
as compared to the STR system1008. Many regulated businesses in the UK, for instance, have in 
the past complained that there were no threshold amounts set for reporting. This issue was 
particularly raised in the presentation of the Law Society of England and Wales in the case of P v 
P1009. The judge, Butler-Sloss P, in this case clarified that “an illegally obtained sum of £10 is no 
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less susceptible to reporting…than the sum of £1 million”. At paragraph 56 she stated that: 
“Parliament intended this to be the case. Whatever might be the resource implications, the legal 
profession would appear to be bound by the provisions of the Act1010 in all cases, however big or 
small.”  
Under the STR system, the issue of what transactions should be considered suspicious can 
only be couched in general terms. Hanson1011 states that, generally, a suspicious or unusual 
transaction, especially within the banking sector, would involve the following red-flags; large cash 
deposits; large cash withdrawals; frequent cash deposits; frequent cash withdrawals; pattern of 
visits to a safety deposit box followed by cash deposits; large money transfer -- incoming or 
outgoing, or in combination; a large incoming money transfer followed by an outgoing payment; 
frequent money transfers: incoming, outgoing, or in combination; any money transfer received 
from, or sent to, an offshore bank; frequent financial transactions of any kind involving amounts 
just under any applicable reporting limit; patterns/volumes of financial transactions not in line with 
the account stated purpose and; patterns/volumes of financial transactions not in line with previous 
account history.  
The UK’s Joint-Money Laundering Steering Group’s (JMLSG) Guidance Notes of 1994 
also cited similar issues1012. For institutions to determine suspicion they needed to ask themselves, 
among other things, the following questions;  
 Is the size of the transaction consistent with the normal activities of the customer? 
 Is the transaction rational in the context of the customers’ business or personal 
activities? 
 Has the pattern of transactions conducted by the customer changed? 
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 Where the transactions are international in nature, does the customer have any obvious 
reason for conducting business with other countries involved? 
A litany of items could still be added to these lists by Hanson and the JMLSG. These include; the 
receipt or transfer of funds to and from FATF blacklisted jurisdictions, transactions from or to 
politically exposed persons (PEPs) and terrorist blacklisted individuals and groups, and such 
controversial and prejudicial factors as the ethnicity and nationality of customers, among others. 
The point that needs to be emphasised, however, is that a majority of transactions that may look 
suspicious could well be legitimate and not linked to any criminal activity.  
A landmark case on the latter point is a UK civil case1013 between Dr Hosni Tayeb 
(plaintiff), a Tunisian national, and the UK’s HSBC bank of which he was a customer. Tayeb’s 
account at HSBC received an electronic deposit of UK£ 944,114.27 from Barclays Bank. 
Unbeknown to the bank manager at HSBC, Tayeb had sold a database to a Libyan company known 
as General Posts and Telecommunications Company, and the transfer was payment for the 
database. On receipt of this huge amount, the HSBC branch manager got suspicious of money 
laundering and arranged for the money to be re-transferred back to the sending Barclays Bank 
account. Tayeb sued HSBC for breach of contract. The judge, Mr. Justice Colman, found HSBC 
liable to pay Tayeb the whole database sale amount plus interest from the date of the transaction. 
Mr. Justice Colman held that the transfer of money to Tayeb’s account was legal and the bank 
manager should have simply filed an STR with authorities. On par. 66 Justice Colman held that 
“Giving all due weight to the need to comply…and to the objective of discouraging 
money laundering transactions or transactions involving the proceeds of crime, as 
reflected, for example, in the Basel Committee Report, the argument that in order 
to protect the interests of the bank, the express regime of the CHAPS Rules can be 
ignored by the transferee bank by reference to some overriding concept of banking 





practice designed to achieve disengagement of the bank from a transfer of funds as 
to which it justifiably entertains suspicions can carry little weight unless there is 
cogent evidence of a settled banking practice to this effect… Notwithstanding the 
bank’s justifiable suspicions, the transaction giving rise to the transfer may be 
perfectly lawful and the customer may therefore be entitled to expect performance 
by the bank of its banking contract... If banks are to be entitled to depart from their 
contracts with customers, on the basis of suspicion of unlawfulness and of general 
banking practice, that practice has to be clearly proved. That such alleged practice 
goes well beyond what is necessary to protect the bank from unlawful activity may 
be a strong indication that no such practice exists.” 
This case reflected some operational failures and costly judgments that many regulated 
businesses can get caught up in while trying to comply with the reporting regime.  In this case, it 
seems that the bank manager was either trying to avoid a reporting duty by retransmitting the 
money back to where it came from or simply did not know what to do and acted haphazardly, 
exposing his bank to liabilities, despite his experience of over 20 years in banking1014.  
The South African system has not been tested yet. There have neither been litigation nor 
enforcement fines against regulated businesses for failure to comply with these new reporting 
duties, except in one plea-bargained case of S v Maddock1015. A number of regulatory fines have 
been handed down in the UK and the US for failure to comply. To better equip themselves to make 
reports to FIUs, regulated businesses have turned to technology to help them monitor and identify 
transactions that need reporting. This is simply because in this technologically advanced era, many 
customers of banks are increasingly using virtual electronic payment systems such as internet 
banking, automated teller machines, point of sale terminals (POS), telephone banking, etc. They 
                                                                
1014 See Hosni Tayeb v HSBC Bank Plc and another ([2004] EWHC 1529 (Comm)). 





therefore would not walk up to a teller who has been trained to detect suspicious activity, but to 
virtual transaction systems.      
 
Transaction monitoring by regulated businesses 
A number of transaction monitoring systems aimed at assisting regulated businesses to 
cope with detecting reportable transactions have emerged over the past couple of years1016. These 
have been developed by a number of private firms to assists particularly banks, which most need 
them because of the numbers of customers and transactions they have to process on a daily basis. 
While threshold-based transaction monitoring software has existed for a long time, there has been 
an emergence of systems that allow financial data to be used to build profiles of individual 
customer behaviour - which Schudelaro refers to as “behavioural monitoring systems”1017. 
Schudelaro mentions  how these monitoring software products operate:  
“…behavioural profiling systems in essence compare all characteristics of a 
payment, not only to all characteristics of previous payments by the same individual 
or entity, but also to those of other, similar payers. Transaction monitoring systems 
can keep records of who made what kind of payment, to what amount, when, where, 
and to whom. In this way, a kind of fingerprint of individual customer behaviour 
can be obtained. This in turns enables the detection of patterns that are 
unusual…because of the volume, the amounts, or the persons involved…Nowadays 
systems exist that can handle tens of millions of transactions daily…”1018  
From this explanation, these technologies should make it easier, especially for banks to 
detect unusual activity in their customer accounts. However, there might be weaknesses in these 
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systems. One, they red-flag or highlight those transactions based on the programmers’ rules.  
Professional criminals who acquire enough information on how these systems work can adjust 
their transactions to appear normal and not easily detectable by threshold-based monitoring 
systems. An example of this is on the cash transaction reports where a system is set to flag 
transactions beyond a particular limit, i.e. $10 000, allowing criminals to ‘smurf’ transactions 
below the reporting threshold1019.  
Even those systems that are based on behavioural profiling still require human beings to 
take decisions on whether to report them as suspicious1020 or not. With thousands to millions of 
transactions taking place in any single minute, physically over the counter, via the internet and e-
payment systems, regulated businesses still have to sift through a number of transactions already 
flagged by these systems1021. The use of transaction monitoring software does not absolve 
regulated businesses of their reporting duties. Equally, transactions flagged still need to be 
manually checked as these systems may end up producing many false positives. A major problem 
could also be with transactions that do not get “red-flagged” by the programming filters as they 
may be literally ignored. Many regulated businesses are increasingly making use of automated 
transaction monitoring systems, especially those with higher transaction volumes such as banks.  
The 3rd EU Money Laundering Directive has led the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
of the UK to make transaction monitoring by regulated businesses compulsory1022. Many banks 
were already doing this, although transaction monitoring was not explicitly mentioned as a 
requirement in the regulations1023. Technically, since the regulations require reporting of 
suspicious transactions, such transactions can only be picked up or verified by staff to be 
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suspicious, hence the AML/CTF training requirements for staff to be able to identify suspicious 
and unusual transactions that require reporting. To put in place requirements for automated 
monitoring will force regulated businesses to put these systems in place. This may close some 
technical loopholes, especially where regulated businesses may argue that some transactions were 
not reported because their staff did not detect them as suspicious since they were not carried out 
by tellers, but through the internet or other automated systems. Unlike staff members which the 
regulations require their training, computers cannot be trained, but they can be programmed. There 
could therefore be a loophole when regulations do not explicitly provide for computers/electronic 
transaction systems of regulated businesses to be auto-programmed to detect suspicious or unusual 
transactions.  
There may therefore be a need to regulate businesses to monitor transactions on their 
automated systems. However, there may be some problems with this, as regulations would, 
perhaps, have to prescribe and set uniform parameters for all monitoring systems to comply with. 
Occasional and timely updating of such uniform parameters may also be required in order to 
ensure that they keep up with new money laundering techniques and trends. This may be very 
costly for regulated businesses if it is prescriptive and rules-based.   
 
Uses of FTRs for law enforcement purposes1024 
FTRs have generally been claimed to assist law enforcement purposes in two broad ways; 
tactically and strategically1025. The former refers to their tactical short-term role in assisting to 
detect or investigate crime and the latter, to their strategic uses for longer-term planning and 
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management purposes1026. For tactical, short-term law enforcement or investigative purposes, they 
have been found to be of help in initiating new investigations. They also assist with information 
and evidence leads in ongoing cases1027. For strategic purposes, they could assist the authorities in 
providing strategic information which may not only help with investigations, but with the 
management of the whole regime, including compliance enforcement by non-compliant regulated 
sectors1028. For reasons of space, we have put a more thorough discussion on the uses of FTRs for 
law enforcement purposes in Appendix 7.1. The changes in practices and management of FTRs, 
over the years, in both the UK and the US, seem to paint a picture of regimes which are still 
evolving with a lot of teething problems, despite the number of years in which they have been 
implemented (about 40 years in the US and over 20 years in the UK). The reporting regimes in 
these countries have continuously been undergoing regular reviews which clearly points to the 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency of these countries regimes in detecting crime.   
 
Changes in UK FTRs regime  
In the UK, the NCIS was formed in 1987 and used to send all the FTRs it received from 
regulated businesses to designated LEAs1029. Before doing so it would ‘analyse’ the reports, thus 
adding some value, before sending ‘intelligence packages’ to LEAs for investigations. This value-
adding analysis involved cross-checking FTRs against NCIS and other LEA databases, 
particularly the National Police Computer, a database of everyone who was ever arrested and 
charged by the police in the UK1030. When these checks were returned as a positive hit, an FTR 
would then be sent to a designated LEA. New FTRs which did not return any hit from database 
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checks would be allocated and disseminated using the UK’s post-code system and allocated to the 
LEA of that post-code1031.  
After an evaluation study commissioned by the NCIS and conducted by KPMG1032 in 2003, 
UK’s reporting system was revised. NCIS started analysing all FTRs individually, on a 
“qualitative basis and according to the intelligence requirements” of LEAs and the NCIS1033. 
Those FTRs which did not meet these undisclosed criteria were kept on the NCIS database (known 
as Elmer) and not disseminated to LEAs, as had initially been done prior the KPMG review1034. 
However due to the increased number of FTRs received and backlogs in their processing, 
especially following the passing of the Proceeds of Crime Act of 2002 and the new Money 
Laundering Regulations of 2003, the NCIS reported that it had significantly decreased the numbers 
of FTRs it was proactively sending to LEAs for investigation1035. It started also to send Compact 
Disks of unprocessed FTRs to some agencies1036. The NCIS further reported that the process of 
analysing FTRs ‘one by one’ “risked not revealing the most capable and most prolific of money 
laundering suspects and not highlighting patterns and typologies”1037.  
This process was replaced by ‘the delivery of intelligence assessments, prioritised subject 
lists and targeted’ FTRs1038. Such targeting was to be supplemented by a new system which 
allowed a nationwide read-only access to the NCIS database by LEAs, through an extranet system 
called money web1039. This would allow agencies to search all reports made, except those 
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classified, i.e. terrorist financing related1040. The KPMG study that was conducted to assess the 
effectiveness of STRs in the UK tracked 600 STRs from when they were received by the NCIS to 
their dissemination and investigation by LEAs. It found that only “11% of the total either 
contributed to a successful outcome or are still being investigated”1041. In combining the 
percentage of STRs resulting in successful outcome and those still being investigated, KPMGs’ 
finding as quoted above is even elusive as it could well be 1% (of the 11% STRs) that resulted in 
a successful outcome, i.e. conviction or assets forfeiture. Cases under investigation do not always 
result in convictions or detection of any crime. The KPMG study attributed the low success rate 
to a number of factors, ranging from lack of resources by investigating agencies, to poor quality 
of STRs, and to lack of or inadequate systems to track the outcomes of STRs.  
These findings do not contradict those of a study conducted by Gold and Levi in 19941042, 
Michael Fleming’s study in 20051043 and Hlophe’s study in 2004 of the management and 
effectiveness of FTRs in financial investigations units of two constabularies in the UK1044. Since 
then, however, a number of changes have taken place in the UK. In July 2005, the former 
Chancellor of Exchequer, Gordon Brown and the former Home Affairs Secretary, Ken Clarke, 
asked for the review of the FTRs (SARs- as they are called in the UK) regime1045. This review of 
the reporting regime was conducted in 2006 by the then designate chairperson of the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), Sir Stephen Lander. It concluded with the incorporation of the 
NCIS (now called the UKFIU) into SOCA, which was launched in April 2006.  The Assets 
Recovery Agency was similarly assimilated.  
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The review was to report on how ‘investigations of suspicious transactions could best be 
pursued under SOCA’1046. Its terms of reference were to: 1. “review the operation of the existing 
SARs regime to determine its strengths, weaknesses, costs and benefits” and “to make 
recommendations for the future operation of the regime under SOCA, taking into account the 
views and interests of the regulators, the regulated sectors and the UK law enforcement 
agencies”1047. What triggered the review of the UK regime was the renewed focus there following 
the July 7 2005 terrorist attacks and “continuing concerns in the City and the professions about 
the burdens imposed” by the regime1048. The Lander Report, from its onset, took a defensive 
stance, dismissing the criticisms that were levelled at the regime by the regulated sectors in the 
UK. It rubbished what it called ‘perceptions’ of a ‘broken’ SARs regime1049. According to the 
Lander Report, the regulated sectors had wrongfully accused the UK government of not doing 
enough in investigating SARs, while they were spending millions of pounds complying with 
burdensome legal obligations1050. According to this report, some regulated sectors had further 
accused the regime of having produced “virtually no results in terms of crimes prosecuted and the 
seizure of terrorist or criminal funds as a consequence of their efforts”1051.  
The Lander Report concluded that these criticisms were inaccurate and claimed that there 
were successes. It however seems to have failed to substantiate these claims of success with any 
convincing statistics and cases. It reported that in 2005, 195,000 SARs were received and out of 
these, 2100 (1% of all received) were flagged as of interest for terrorist financing, and 650 were 
disseminated to the National Terrorist Financial Investigations Unit1052. It did not go further to 
claim any victories arising from such investigations, except to proclaim that some SARs do help. 
In this regard the Lander Report did not give any statistics of the outcomes of the less than 1 
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percent (2100) SARs that were referred for investigation. Instead it cited “three specific 2005 
AML examples...to demonstrate the kind of successes being achieved”1053. These pathetic three 
examples given in the report would hopefully not be the best of examples or the overall 
achievement of the SARs regime in the UK in 2005. If they were, then the regime was in limbo. 
The defensive tone of the report seemed to reflect a hopeless regime that was struggling to survive 
and withstand scrutiny. Lander’s report came up with 23 Recommendations for the transformation 
and improvement of the regime in the UK.  
At the time of writing, the Lander Recommendations were being implemented.  They 
included the formation of a SARs Committee, referred to briefly above, which was established to 
independently oversee the recommended changes and to ensure the overall improvement of the 
regime. The SARs Committee is composed of representatives from the stakeholders of the regime:  
the regulated sectors, FSA, SOCA and the LEAs. The Committee has released three annual reports 
and has claimed some victories from the changes being effected, reaffirming the benefits of SARs 
for law enforcement uses.  
 
Evolution of US’s FTRs regime 
In the US, the management of FTRs has undergone a number of changes since the system 
was put in place following the passing of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970; the first legislation 
in the world to introduce FTRs. FTRs in the US were initially filed with various agencies including 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the US Treasury, several federal regulators and regional law 
enforcement agencies. In the late 1970s, the Congressional Committee on Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs ordered the General Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct a review of the reporting 
mechanisms and the uses of FTRs by law enforcement as had been envisaged in the BSA1054. The 
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GAO conducted research, including hearings, and its findings were that the reports filed had “not 
been as useful as the Congress expected”1055. Among its proposals was that FTRs should be 
directed to a single agency to be located in the Treasury1056. The problem with sending FTRs to 
the IRS was that such reports could not be accessed by other law enforcement agencies due to tax 
law secrecy1057.  
The reports started to be sent to Treasury, which was thought to be in a “better position to 
conduct integrated analyses of currency flows”1058. This led to the formation of probably the first 
FIU in the world, the Report Analysis Unit, within the US Treasury. It was renamed Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in 1990. Centralised FTRs were mainly those that were 
threshold-based (CTRs), other than the suspicion-based ones (which were referred to as ‘criminal 
referrals’) that continued to be reported to several federal law enforcement agencies1059. Despite 
this centralisation, the effectiveness and efficiency of the regime continued to be questioned, even 
by top US government officials. 
Former US Federal Reserve Governor (1991 to 1997), Dr. Lawrence Lindsey, who has 
been named an outspoken critic of the AML ‘war on drugs’ in the US said that;  
“Between 1987 and 1995, the (US) government collected 77 million currency-
transaction reports, something in the order of 62 tons of paper.  Out of that, it was 
able to prosecute 3,000 money-laundering cases.  That is roughly one case for every 
25,000 forms filed. In other words, entire forests had to be felled in order to 
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prosecute one case. But it gets worse: Of the 3,000 money-laundering cases 
prosecuted, the government managed to produce only 580 guilty verdicts. In other 
words, in excess of 100,000 reports were filed … [about] innocent citizens in order 
to get one conviction.  That ratio of 99,999 to one is something we normally would 
not tolerate as a reasonable balance between privacy and the collection of guilty 
verdicts”1060.  
In the early 1990s, as shown in this quotation, there were concerns that FTRs filed with 
FinCEN were generally useless in detecting or solving crime. As a result of this, the Congress 
enacted provisions to enable regulated businesses to exempt some customers from being reported, 
as their reports were of ‘no use’ for law enforcement purposes1061. In 1992, the US centralised the 
reporting of STRs to FinCEN, by amending the BSA in the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money 
Laundering Act of 19921062. This would help deal with the problem of ‘smurfing’ or transaction 
structuring.1063.  Through this reform, it was envisaged that unusual or suspicious transactions 
which escaped threshold reporting would be detected and reported1064. Unlike the UK SARs, 
where transaction reporting could be any amount of money, even £1 as held by Justice Colman in 
the P v P case1065, the US has some thresholds for STRs. Requirements set were that STRs must 
aggregate to at least US $5,000 for them to be reported1066. Around the mid-2000s, Congress 
instructed further research regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of FTRs. Concerns of the 
early 1990s of over-reporting had not dissipated when it came to CTRs.  
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Two reports were produced by the GAO in response to the Congress’s request -- one 
looking specifically at CTRs1067 and the other at STRs1068. For CTRs, the review was conducted 
to assess: the obligations and costs imposed by regulation on regulated businesses, the  usefulness 
of CTRs for crime combating purposes and ways to encourage regulated businesses to use 
regulatory “exemptions to avoid unnecessary CTRs”1069. This latter objective of the review 
reported on the concerns about the FTR regime’s inefficiencies and costs. These regulatory 
exemptions, which were introduced in the US in 1992, had not worked as businesses saw them as 
adding more costs due to their requirements1070. The regulated businesses were on an annual basis 
required to fill in and file forms for all eligible customers in order to excuse them for reporting 
CTRs that were seen to be of no use to law enforcement purposes. They were also expected 
biannually to update this exemption information to ensure that exempted customers still 
qualified1071. This added more bureaucracy for regulated businesses to the extent that they could 
as well file all CTRs in order to avoid any confusion1072.  For instance, some of the concerns raised 
by the interviewed businesses pointed to some lack of clarity about the appropriate documentation 
that was required to exempt customers and their fears that they could be fined for non-compliance 
if the exemptions filed were incorrect1073.    
In the year ending in 2009 FinCEN had more than 180 million FTRs in its database, 
collected over the years. It also had 14.9 million and 1.8 million CTRs and STRs, respectively, 
collected in 2009 alone1074.  GAO’s STRs report was conducted with similar concerns of ‘over-
reporting’, quality and usefulness of STRs1075.  Its findings on the causes of over-reporting were, 
among others, the fear of sanctions by regulated businesses after several well-publicised regulatory 
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enforcement fines on a number of big banks and other institutions were imposed. As Fred 
Godwin1076, quoted above, noted the AML compliance fines were “draconian” and that a bank 
might be best off simply reporting every transaction1077. Having reviewed the evolution of these 
reporting regimes in the US and the UK, we now look at South Africa’s reporting regime.  
 
South Africa’s FTRs regime 
South Africa’s FTRs regime has not been dramatic as yet. There has, as mentioned above, 
been only one plea-bargained conviction for non-compliance with the FICA regulations. There 
have been no studies conducted in South Africa to assess/review the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the regime by academics, the FIC or government, except for the Mutual Evaluation Report 
published by the FATF in 2009. We draw heavily on the data presented in this Mutual Evaluation 
Report and the FIC’s annual reports. We also draw from interviews with regulated businesses 
(mainly banks) and supervisory bodies to law enforcement officers (investigators and prosecutors) 
and other private sector experts with an interest in AML/CTF and crime prevention issues in South 
Africa. This variety of sources helps us to fill some gaps and to corroborate various accounts- 
given that attempts to talk to the FIC and the Department of Finance were not successful1078.  
Above, we have discussed the provisions of FICA pertaining to the requirements for the 
reporting of FTRs and for access to information held by regulated businesses, supervisory bodies, 
                                                                
1076 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fred_Goodwin. By the way, it was under “Sir Fred the Shred”, as Godwin is 
affectionately known, that the Royal Bank of Scotland almost collapsed and was saved by the government, while he 
retired with a ‘platinum handshake’ which incensed some taxpayers to break his house’s windows in Edinburgh in 
March 2009 
1077 The Daily Telegraph: 23 December 2003 cited in Hlophe, Z. 2004. Assessing the effects of anti-money laundering 
regulations in the UK: Suspicious Transaction Reports and their effect in detecting money laundering. Unpublished 
MSc Dissertation. University of Leicester, UK. 
1078 Interviews were arranged and agreed to with the Department of Finance. However on arrival, we were informed 
that the Ministry of Finance does not participate in academic research conducted by students. We were taken aback 
by this backward stance. But this is not the way in which the government of South Africa, in general, views 
participation on academic studies, perhaps not even the Department of Finance. We managed to secure interviews 
with very high level officials from various government and semi-government institutions of South Africa without the 




and the South African Revenue Services by the FIC. With those issues discussed, we now turn to 
examine the FIC statistics and to evaluate whether there are any differences when it comes to 
successes of the South African reporting regime, as compared to UK and US cases which we just 
discussed above. In this comparison we do not seek unfairly to compare South Africa to these two 
countries given that their reporting regimes were set up more than 20 (in the UK) to 40 (in the US) 
years ago. We merely seek to tell a story of South Africa’s reporting regime and its outcomes since 
the FIC was set up in 2002. Most of the statistical data used here cover the period between 2002 
and 2008. Some major issues highlighted by research are that FIUs should have enough powers 
and capacity to manage the AML regulatory regime to ensure its effectiveness. This means, among 
other things, that they must have the necessary powers, mandate, staff and resources to perform 
their functions. In this regard we start with FIC resources.   
 
Budget allocations, resources, and structure of the FIC 
Between 2003 and 2010, the FIC has continuously received very generous budget 
allocations to enable it to perform its functions. In its annual reports, the FIC has itself shown some 
satisfaction on the budget allocations and has grown to employ more than 140 personnel in 2010, 
compared to just about 20 when it started operating in 2003. One of the major problems the FIC 
has identified is its failure to attract appropriately qualified or skilled personnel – a problem that it 
claims has delayed its recruitment drive1079. For instance in 2009/10, it approved 108 vacancies 
and was only able to fill 30 percent (32) of them1080. The Auditor-General’s report also shows that 
the FIC under-spent its previous year’s allocated budget by more than ZAR 15 million1081. There 
were also concerns from the Auditor-General of unauthorised or irregular expenditure which 
                                                                
1079 Financial Intelligence Centre: Annual Report 2009/2010, Republic of South Africa, Centurion, pp.6-16. 





resulted in its Chief Financial Officer being suspended and another staff member being criminally 
charged1082.  
The FIC Director, Mr. Murray Michel, attributed the FIC’s under-spending to “cost-saving 
measures and sound financial decision making”, and to “slower-than-anticipated progress to 
complete” the implementation of its “business continuity programme”1083.  The FIC is headed by 
a Director who is appointed by the Minister of Finance for a renewable period of five years. The 
Director is the accounting authority of the FIC and reports directly to the Minister of Finance and 
to Parliament for the Centre’s performance1084. The FIC has three main operational units: the Legal 
and Policy Unit, Compliance and Prevention Unit and the Monitoring and Analysis Unit. It also 
has the Administration and Support Services Unit. The Legal and Policy Unit is responsible for 
administering FICA, maintaining liaison and strategic cooperation with “international and regional 
organisations such as the FATF and ESAAMLG” and policy advice concerning improvement of 
South Africa’s AML/CTF strategies1085.  
The Head of this Unit is Pieter Smit, the former South African Law Reform Commission 
(SALRC) researcher who drafted the initial FIC Bill for SALRC’s Project 104 that we referred to 
in Chapter 5. The Compliance and Prevention Unit oversees compliance by regulated businesses 
with FICA1086. In this regard it issues guidance notes and provides training to regulated businesses, 
law enforcement and other affected institutions. It is also its task to enhance the general public 
awareness of the country’s AML/CTF measures to encourage public compliance with such 
programmes as KYC1087. The Monitoring and Analysis Division is responsible for receipt, analysis 
and dissemination of FTRs to LEAs. It is the work of this latter division that the remaining parts 
of this Chapter address.   










The outcomes of FTRs in South Africa 
Although FICA legislated for CTRs and STRs, from 2002 to 2010 the FIC only 
administered the STRs regime during that period. The CTRs were only phased in during 2010. 
FICA took over the FTRs reporting regime from the Commercial Crimes Branch of the SAPS, 
where these were previously reported under POCA, as discussed above.   
 
TABLE 7.1: STRs reported to the Commercial Crimes Branch of the SAPS 1997-2002 
Year  Number of STRs 





To May 2002 635 
 Total 2999 
Source: Reconstructed by author from De Koker, L. 2002. Money laundering in South Africa. 
Centre for the Study of Economic Crime. Rand Afrikaans University: Johannesburg. 
Not much is known about the administration of the reporting regime under POCA except 
that FTRs were made to the Commercial Crimes Branch. There are, however, some statistics that 
relate to numbers of cases filed prior to the formation of the FIC. They cover the period between 




laundering convictions recorded in South Africa, perhaps only 2 in all1088, and they may not have 
resulted from the STRs1089. 
Between 1997 and 2003, only 41 criminal investigations were initiated as a result of 
STRs1090. These 41 investigations had by 2003 led to 5 criminal convictions for offences other 
than money laundering1091. The FIC has been receiving a fair number of FTRs per annum since 
May 2002. These statistics have been presented in the Financial Action Task Force’s Mutual 
Evaluation Report on South Africa, published in 2009. Below we analyse these statistics to 
determine the outcomes of the reporting regime in South Africa between 2002 and 2008. The 
information flow process of the STRs regime is as follows. Regulated businesses report to the FIC. 
The FIC, on receiving STRs, is supposed to analyse them and to use its discretion to decide whether 
to disseminate them to LEAs or file them in its database for possible future use, if at all. 
When it decides to make referrals, the FIC forwards them to the end users, which are the 
AFU, SAPS, DSO (prior to disbandment), SARS, ExCon, NIA and SASS. Alternatively, these 
designated agencies, as discussed earlier above, can request the FIC to send them specific FTRs 
which may relate to their ongoing investigations. Between 2003 and 2008 the FIC sent 2510 (1919 
referrals, 470 requests, and 121 Counter Terrorist Financing (CTF) referrals) FTRs to its end users. 
CTF referrals only started in 2007 (11 STRs) and increased to 110 in 2008. All these disseminated 
STRs resulted in 184 investigations, 79 of which were closed/finalised and 105 were still ongoing 
at the end of 2008. Out of these 184 investigations, 17 arrests were made, resulting in 4 criminal 
                                                                
1088 Author Interview with Adv. Willie Hofmeyr. Adv. Hofmeyr says one of these money laundering convictions 
emanated from the Bathgate matter in Cape Town and was prosecuted by adv. Billy Downer. Another one concerned 
the R31 million armed robbery case and was prosecuted by Adv. Anton Steynberg in KwaZulu-Natal. Both Adv. Billy 
Downer and Adv. Anton Steynberg went on to prosecute one of the most publicised cases in South Africa history, the 
S v Shaik and Others where Jacob Zuma’s erstwhile financial advisor Shabir Shaik was convicted and implicated 
Zuma in the arms deal related corruption. For more on the arms deal See Holden, P. 2008. Arms deal in your pocket. 
Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers. See also Crawford-Browne, T. 2007. Eye on the money. Cape Town: Umuzi 
Publishers. 
1089 See International Monetary Fund. 2004. South Africa: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes-FATF 
Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism. IMF Country Report No. 
04/119, April 2004, Washington DC p.3. 
1090 Ibid.  




convictions on charges of money laundering and 1 conviction each year between 2004 and 2008. 
None of these arrests and criminal convictions were counter-terrorist related1092. This low arrest 
and conviction rate of FTRs is appalling, to say the least, given the huge but yet unspecified costs 
of the regime. A general defence advanced by FIUs for these low achievements of the regime is 
that LEAs do not provide feedback on how STRs have helped them or not. 
 
TABLE 7.2: FIC statistics between 2003 to 2008 
Suspicious Transaction 
Reports 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total  
Received by FIC1093 993 7480 15757 19793 21466 24580 90069 
Referred to LEAs 1094  - 36 134 191 559 999 1919 
Requested by LEAs1095   - 4 6 7 232 221 470 
Ongoing investigations1096  - 3 12 25 13 52 105 
Finalised investigations1097  - 17 19 35 6 2 79 
Arrests1098  - 3 5 8 1 0 17 
Convictions1099  - 0 1 1 1 1 4 
CTF related referrals1100  - 0 0 0 11 110 121 
LEA feedback to FIC1101  - 26 43 76 253 276 674 
Source: FATF. 2009. Mutual Evaluation Report: South Africa. FATF, OECD, ESAAMLG: Paris, pp.67-
69. Reconstructed by author. 
 
However in the South African case, as shown in the table above, LEAs are providing this 
feedback to the FIC. For the 2510 STRs disseminated between 2003 and 2008, the FIC got 647 
                                                                
1092 FATF. 2009. Mutual Evaluation Report: South Africa. Paris: FATF, OECD & ESAAMLG.  
1093 These are STRs received by the FIC from regulated businesses. 
1094 STRs referred by the FIC to LEAs. These STRs are not related to terrorist financing, but money laundering and 
other predicate offences which are not related to terrorism. 
1095 STRs referred to LEAs on request by LEAs.  
1096 These are investigations opened and were still ongoing by the LEAs after receiving STRs from the FIC.  
1097 STRs which have been investigated and either amounted to arrests or no arrests, but do not form part of active 
investigations. 
1098 Arrests made by LEAs following from STRs they received or requested from the FIC. 
1099 Convictions achieved made by LEA following from STRs they received from the FIC. 
1100 Counter-terrorist financing STRs disseminated by the FIC to LEAs. 




updates from LEAs. Within LEAs, referrals are sent to ‘authorised officers’1102. The latter is a 
liaison point between the FIC and specific law enforcement agencies. This is done for security 
reasons, to preserve the trail and to protect information. For instance the AFU would have two 
‘authorised officers’ in each of its offices across the country1103. When the AFU or other LEAs 
need information from the FIC, they would ask an authorised officer to send and receive such 
information. 
According to the FIC, when it receives a request from anyone other than an authorised 
officer, it would not comply with such a request until it is sent through the formal channels of 
authorised officers of an LEA1104. When the FIC sends this information back to an investigating 
agency, such a referral must be authorised by the FIC Director or a senior manager authorised by 
the Director1105. On receipt of a referral, an LEA must file an acknowledgement of receipt form1106. 
This process seems to preserve an audit trail of information flow between the FIC and LEAs. This 
process could also be used to feedback to the FIC on the outcomes of these referrals. Whether it is 
through authorised officers or not, the statistics in the table (Table 7.2.) above show that there is a 
fair level of feedback provided by LEAs to the FIC to get an idea of what is happening. The 
complaint that LEAs do not provide feedback would therefore not be plausible in the case of South 
Africa. Whereas the reporting regime is the centre of outputs of the overall AML/CTF regime, at 
the rate of arrests and convictions, South Africa’s regime cannot be said to be achieving its goals.  
                                                                
1102 Financial Intelligence Centre: Annual Report 2009/2010, Republic of South Africa, Centurion, pp.6-16 
1103 Author Interview with Adv. K. Molelle, October 2009. 






When the reporting regime fails to produce convictions, we can safely conclude that it is 
failing to achieve one of its primary goals of detecting and combating crime so far.  Therefore it 
can be said to be ineffective and also inefficient. The other incidental goal of the AML/CTF regime 
that is little discussed is the protection of the financial system from abuse by criminals and 
terrorists. The achievement of this latter goal could only be substantiated when money launderers 
and terrorists are actually found through the filing of FTRs. If it does not yet find these enemies of 
the financial system in South Africa, then the regime loses its output legitimacy claims. It would 
be difficult to advance an argument about protecting the integrity of the financial system against 
threats and enemies that the regime is dismally failing to expose. Not that the situation is different 
elsewhere. Arrests, convictions and asset forfeiture orders that are directly attributed to FTRs 
appear to flow from only a tiny fraction of the reports that these FIUs receive from regulated 
businesses.  
Our submission is that while there is some money laundering being uncovered, and such 
assets are being seized and forfeit, all these successes cannot or can barely be attributed to the 
filing of FTRs. For instance, statistics from the South African Police Services’ CAS system1107 
show that between 2003 and 2008, 64 cases with a money laundering charge were registered1108. 
Out of those cases, only 16 money laundering convictions were achieved; 3 in 2005 and 13 in 
20081109.  A total of 15 of these 64 cases were pending before the courts and several other cases 
could have had the offence of money laundering added in the charge sheet because of the nature 
of the crimes1110. Work from the Special Commercial Crimes Unit1111 also shows that cases of 
                                                                
1107 The South African Police Service’s CAS system is the database of all cases and investigations registered in the 
national police database.  
1108 FATF. 2009. Mutual Evaluation Report: South Africa. Paris: FATF, OECD & ESAAMLG, p. 36. 
1109 Ibid. 
1110 Ibid. 
1111 The Special Commercial Crimes Unit was established by the National Prosecuting Authority in 2002 to work 
closely with the South African Police Service’s Commercial Crimes Branch in prosecuting Commercial Crimes in 
South Africa. As a result of this initiative, Special Commercial Crimes Courts were established in the major centres 




money laundering are receiving a lot of attention and have been successfully prosecuted1112. Also, 
the AFU appears to be doing a lot of work in seizing assets using Chapter 5 and 6 of POCA.  
Statistics reflect that between 2002 and 2008 April, the AFU successfully obtained 1070 
freezing orders amounting to a monetary value of just above ZAR 2, 4 billion1113. Out of these 
freezing orders, the AFU successfully got 926 orders with just below ZAR 700 million (ZAR 697, 
951,372.42) of criminal assets forfeit. About ZAR 560 million of the ZAR 700 million, resulted 
from 389 confiscation orders. Confiscation orders are, roughly, granted as a result of a criminal 
conviction of accused persons or entities for an offence (s) from which they derived a benefit1114. 
The AFU statistics only reflect the broader categories of predicate crimes such as corruption; 
economic crimes; drug related offences; gambling; precious metals and stones; violent crimes such 
as cash in transit heists; robberies and racketeering1115. 
There could well have been money laundering convictions for most of the cases where 
confiscation orders were achieved, but the AFU did not record this in its statistics1116.  In all the 
broader crime categories mentioned in the AFU statistics, all these offences where criminal assets 
were forfeit, an offence of money laundering could, arguably, have been part of the charges, but 
was not pursued, perhaps, in favour of more familiar offences such as fraud, theft, robbery, etc. 
This view was shared also by Susan Coetzee of SABRIC that  
“…there are very few commercial crime cases where there is not an opportunity to add 
money laundering charges. The reality is that there is a lot of work to be done to actually 
encourage a paradigm shift, to get the money laundering charges used.”1117 
                                                                
1112 See FATF. 2009. Mutual Evaluation Report: South Africa.Paris: FATF, OECD & ESAAMLG, p. 37-40, for a list 
of cases of money laundering that have been prosecuted by the Special Commercial Crimes Court. 
1113 See Table 7.3. 
1114 See Chapter 4 above for a discussion of confiscation orders. 
1115 See FATF. 2009. Mutual Evaluation Report: South Africa. Paris: FATF, OECD & ESAAMLG. p.49-50. 
1116 See TABLE 7.3 for the different types of offences mentioned. 




This may reflect a need for more training for investigators and prosecutors to start encouraging 
them to use these new organised crime instruments for, among others, the heavier penalties that 
they provide for and to develop the law. Susan Coetzee did mention that SABRIC was on a drive  
“…to identify money laundering cases and to encourage the prosecutors to add a money 
laundering charge to the charge sheet”1118 
It appears that South Africa may not be achieving money laundering convictions simply because 
investigators and prosecutors are still grappling with these new laws and may need to be 
encouraged to start using the provisions of POCA in order to achieve them rather than relying on 
the popular predicate offences of money laundering. About ZAR 138 million of the ZAR 700 
million forfeit was the outcome of in rem proceedings which resulted from 535 forfeiture 
orders1119.  
TABLE 7.3: AFU Orders between 2003 and 2008 
POCA Freezing & Restraint 
Orders  
Total No. Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter. 5  Chapter. 6 
Corruption 74 44 30 ZAR 183,114,529.78 ZAR 10,602,684.14 
Economic Crime 566 316 250 ZAR 1,797,700,094.18 ZAR 207,494,571.13 
Drug Dealing 126 26 100 ZAR 40,084,898.40 ZAR 42,434,740.63 
Drug House 15 0 15   ZAR 4,086,641.65 
Drug Money 84 3 81 ZAR 826,193.74 ZAR 11,198,815.27 
Car (majority Chpt 6) 8 1 7 ZAR 102,145.00 ZAR 363,000.00 
Brothels 3 0 3   ZAR 1,030,100.00 
Gambling 2 0 2   ZAR 1,042,655.19 
Precious Metals and Stones 24 4 20 ZAR 9,082,000.00 ZAR 4,326,844.05 
Natural Resources 142 7 135 ZAR 3,805,881.00 ZAR 21,063,575.30 
Violent Crime 24 10 14 ZAR 7,986,226.00 ZAR 4,812,331.00 
Racketeering 2 2 0 ZAR 60,000,000.00   
Total 1070 413 657 ZAR 2,102,701,968.10 ZAR 308,455,958.36 
                                                                
1118 Ibid. 




           
POCA Confiscation/ 
Forfeiture Orders 
Total No. Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 
Corruption 62 34 28 ZAR 110,163,460.67 ZAR 6,005,783.77 
Economic Crime 486 293 193 ZAR 269,524,845.03 ZAR 84,746,422.71 
Drug Dealing 94 18 76 ZAR 10,194,194.56 ZAR 13,153,204.13 
Drug House 12 0 12   ZAR 2,118,605.92 
Drug Money 79 5 74 ZAR 121,700,874.00 ZAR 11,039,238.06 
Car (majority Chpt 6) 3 0 3   ZAR 65,000.00 
Brothels 2 0 2   ZAR 730,100.00 
Gambling 2 1 1 ZAR 1,419,209.00 ZAR 42,655.19 
Precious Metals and Stones 16 4 12 ZAR 9,027,000.00 ZAR 1,128,214.05 
Natural Resources 151 26 125 ZAR 35,728,640.82 ZAR 17,665,232.80 
Violent Crime 16 7 9 ZAR 1,535,631.71 ZAR 1,763,060.00 
Racketeering 1 1 0 ZAR 200,000.00   
Total 924 389 535 ZAR 559,493,855.79 ZAR 138,457,516.63 
Source: FATF. 2009. Mutual Evaluation Report: South Africa. FATF, OECD, ESAAMLG: Paris, pp.49-50. 
Reconstructed by author. 
 
All this information and statistics from the SAPS CAS system, Commercial Crimes Unit 
and the AFU shows that a number of actual or potential money laundering cases are being 
prosecuted in South Africa and there are some successes being recorded. However, very few of 
these successes are yet attributed to the enactment of FICA and the establishment of the FIC, 
particularly the reporting of customer transactions. Some of the successes might well have had 
‘referred’ or ‘requested’ FTRs contributing; perhaps without these LEAs noticing or properly 
recording such contributions. This is simply because FTRs are just one source of information out 
of many other sources that LEAs use for evidence gathering purposes1120. For instance, LEAs may 
                                                                
1120 This point is also made in the GAO report with respect to the US where LEAs make use of many sources of 
evidence without having to provide any feedback. See United States Government Accountability Office (2008) Bank 
Secrecy Act: Increased Use of Exemption Provisions Could Reduce Currency Transaction Reporting While 




receive some relevant information from the FIC, but they still need to subpoena such information 
from its original source; perhaps from a bank or other regulated institution. 
This means that if a bank reports an FTR and the FIC sends it over to an LEA, the 
investigating officer still has to subpoena the original documents from the reporting bank for court 
purposes. The process of collecting original documentary evidence becomes even more 
cumbersome when the FTRs referred to LEAs are intended to initiate new investigations. For new 
investigations, the police, for instance, need to open a docket. One officer explained to me that  
“...it is not possible for us to actually do an investigation, unless we open a docket. 
The FIC perhaps do not understand just what is involved in opening a docket. Their 
suspicious transaction reports are a folio...They can send you reams and reams and 
reams and reams of suspicious transactions from their computer system, but there 
is no manpower to go and look up everyone of them, to investigate them...Those 
are not dockets yet. You have to take them, go and approach the banks and say 
“look, you reported a suspicious transaction to the FIC, can we have more 
information.” They say “we want a 2051121”...Then you would have to take that 
suspicious transaction back to your office, you open a docket, you prepare a section 
205 notice, you take it to the prosecutor, the prosecutor signs it, you take it to the 
magistrate, the magistrate authorises it, serve it on the bank and you wait for six 
weeks before you get the information. Then you find that it was a businessman who 
transferred money to his wife’s account and it was really not so suspicious after 
all”. 
                                                                
1121 ‘205’ stands for the subpoenas used by the police to acquire documents or evidence in terms of section 205 of 
South Africa’s Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. Investigators used the section 205 notice to subpoena bank statements, 




This false positives situation, on top of skewing crime statistics, may in a way lead LEAs 
to place little value on FTRs. After investigating a couple of reports which turn out to have been 
legitimate transactions some investigators may start to give them less priority. 
 
Section 34 Interventions 
In its 2009/10 annual report, the FIC revealed that it received 29, 411 FTRs and only 
referred 331, compared to the 13301122 that were sent to LEAs in 20081123. The decline in the 
number of referrals, according to the FIC, is due to its “new approach that takes into account the 
priorities, capabilities and human resource constraints facing different law enforcement 
agencies”1124. We could therefore assume that were it not for these constraints, the FIC would be 
referring more FTRs to LEAs for investigations. There is another excuse or justification for the 
diminished numbers of referrals. It is the FIC’s “substantially increased...ability to interpret and 
identify money laundering schemes, proceeds of crime and potential terrorism financing.”1125 As 
a result of this “improved data analysis, law enforcement agencies are now better positioned to act 
on reports that we supply”1126, the FIC claimed.   
The FIC further claimed that its improvements in analysing FTRs were also due to the 
improved quality of data, rather than quantity. To this end, the FIC showed that although the 
number of FTRs referred to LEAs declined by 79% in 2009/2010, the monetary amounts in the 
331 referred reports increased to ZAR 61.6 billion, as compared to ZAR 5.6 billion (of the 1330 
referred FTRs) a year earlier. The FIC appears to use these big amounts in a rather creative way in 
its annual reports. For instance as a result of this increase in the monetary amounts of these referred 
                                                                
1122 This includes the 999 AML and 110 CTF referrals and 221 STRs sent by the FIC to LEAs following LEA requests 
in 2008.  
1123 See Financial Intelligence Centre: Annual Report 2009/2010, Republic of South Africa, Centurion, p. 14-15. 
1124 Ibid. p. 28. 
1125Ibid. 




FTRs, we may be led to believe that such big amounts end up being seized and forfeit. It would 
not be surprising to find that most of these amounts probably do not end up being linked to crime. 
They may just be mere suspicious transactions which, in the majority, do not amount to the 
detection of money laundering or terrorist financing. Let us look more closely at the amounts that 
ended up being frozen, using the FIC’s section 34 intervention1127 to demonstrate this point.    
While ZAR 61.6 billion FTRs were identified and referred to LEAs as suspicious, the FIC 
only managed to use its section 34 interventions on ‘43 matters’ (of the 330 referred FTRs in 
2009/10 financial year) resulting in the freezing of ZAR 128 million “in the bank accounts of those 
involved”1128. This amount (ZAR 128 million) is substantially smaller than the ZAR 61.6 billion 
identified and referred to LEAs in 2009/10. There may well still be more freezes of this monetary 
value (ZAR 61.6 billion) of referred FTRs, but such freezes are merely meant to enable the AFU 
to bring court action before such moneys are depleted or transferred to other accounts or laundered. 
Even the amounts frozen (ZAR 128 million) do not necessarily mean that all frozen funds end up 
being forfeit by the AFU1129. It simply means that the owners of such frozen assets still have a 
chance to challenge the freezing orders. However, when the FIC declares its victory in freezing 
assets, it has often not reported in its subsequent annual reports on how much of those frozen funds 
ended up being forfeit1130. We can look at the previous years’ freezes to substantiate this point. For 
instance, between 2005/06 and 2007/08 financial years, the FIC used section 34 interventions on 
11 matters, amounting to over ZAR 7,6million, This represents just above ZAR 3,3million in 
2005/06, ZAR 1,5 million the following year and ZAR 2, 7 million in 2007/08. 
                                                                
1127 Section 34 of FICA allows the FIC to intervene by temporarily freezing funds suspected/ known to be proceeds 
of crime in bank accounts or possession of regulated businesses. See discussion of Section 34 intervention above.  
1128 See Financial Intelligence Centre: Annual Report 2009/2010, Republic of South Africa, Centurion,  p. 14-15. 
1129 Section 34 of FICA allows the FIC to freeze such transactions for 5 days, while the Asset Forfeiture Unit (see 
discussion later and more on Chapter 4 of this thesis) applies for permanent freezing or confiscation orders using 
Chapter 4 or 5 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 1998.  
1130 In Financial Intelligence Centre: Annual Report 2009/2010, Republic of South Africa, Centurion, p.30, the FIC 
reported the “...we froze bank accounts and worked with other government agencies to confiscate the financial benefits 
of criminal activity. The FIC froze just over R128 million in bank accounts to enable investigators from the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit to forfeit the amounts.” This vagueness of the FIC report makes it difficult to discern whether such 




TABLE 7.4: Section 34 Interventions by the FIC between 2005/06 and 2007/081131 
Year No. of Interventions Amounts Frozen 
2005/06 3 ZAR 3,365,724.94 
2006/07 4 ZAR 1,546,127.31 
2007/08 4 ZAR 2,700,000.00 
Total 11 ZAR 7,611,852.25 
Source: FATF. 2009. Mutual Evaluation Report: South Africa. FATF, OECD,    ESAAMLG: Paris 
 
While 2009/10 amounted to ZAR 128 million, a substantial increase over the assets frozen 
(ZAR 7,6 million) through section 34 intervention between 2005 and 2008 (as shown in Table 7.4 
above), the FIC does not report whether the latter freezes ended up in forfeiture or not. Freezing 
amounts and reporting that they have been does not translate automatically into them being forfeit. 
Below we look at how the FIC has been using its other instruments such as section 27 ‘discovery 
of information’ and section 32 ‘further information requests’1132.  
 
Discovery of Information and Further Information Requests 
Between 2005 and 2008, the FIC made about 4000 section 27 ‘discovery of information 
requests’ to regulated businesses1133 and just over 1500 section 32 ‘further information requests’. 
The South African Banking Risk Centre (SABRIC), an organisation set up by South African banks 
in 2002 to assist them in the analysis and prevention of bank related crimes, also has a similar 
facility where investigating agencies can request information leads before they send out 
subpoenas1134. We asked compliance officers in banks whether they felt the FIC ever acted on the 
STRs they send to it. All of them felt that the FIC does take some action, although they are not 
informed of the ultimate outcomes of the reports they make.  
                                                                
1131 FATF. 2009. Mutual Evaluation Report: South Africa. Paris: FATF, OECD & ESAAMLG. p.62. 
1132 See discussion of these provisions above.  
1133 FATF. 2009. Mutual Evaluation Report: South Africa. Paris: FATF, OECD & ESAAMLG.  




“Yes they do, because they ask us for further information on the reports we submit. 
They often ask for additional information. We often get a lot of section 27s asking 
whether we bank this customer and that can only be as a result of some other bank 
reporting a matter as suspicious. And we get a lot of that, sometimes 20, 30 a day. 
So it depends, but the average is 10 of those requests [a day]. But we also get a fair 
amount of freezing orders and those sorts of things. The question is yes there is 
work being done at the FIC.”1135   
Another compliance officer in another bank echoes similar sentiments.  
“I find that they do, because a lot of time you find that things that are reported over 
to the FIC, like, let’s say, we report Mr. Smith today to the FIC, you might find in 
three weeks’ time the Commercial Crimes Unit of the SAPS...gives us a subpoena 
for Mr. Smith’s documents, which obviously means that it has come full circle”1136 
However, the FIC does not normally give feedback to regulated businesses on whether the 
STRs have helped in uncovering criminality or not. There is a sense that the FIC should give some 
feedback to these institutions. Others felt that this feedback was not so necessary. Those who felt 
that feedback is necessary pointed out that it may help them to refine and improve their systems. 
“That is the kind of feedback we could use to do statistical analysis on our side and 
to understand whether or not our system needs improvement. We do not know 
whether our analysts are properly trained, whether we are looking for the right 
things. It would be very helpful (to get some feedback).”1137   
 
Feedback is an important issue with FTRs. The issue of the FIC not providing feedback 
was also raised in the FATF’s Mutual Evaluation Report on South Africa as earlier quoted. But 
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what the FATF referred to was not feedback to each and every institution for each FTR that is 
reported. The reference to feedback seems to be much more on providing sanitised cases that were 
solved through FTRs. The view is that such typologies help to assure reporting institutions that 
these FTRs do work and to encourage reporting and cooperation, as argued in the Lander report 
we referred to above1138. Banks and other financial institutions accounted for over 90% of FTRs 
filed with the FIC in 2009/10 financial year1139. This trend has remained the same over the years 
with non-financial regulated entities such as lawyers, estate agents and others accounting for the 
other approximately 10% of all the FTRs made to the FIC1140. It is important that while banks 
account for a large number of FTRs made to the FIC, not all types of banks report. According to 
Ms. Lerato Mokhesi of the Banking Supervision Division (BSD) of the SARB, while banks report 
FTRs to the FIC, they also send information to the SARB which is their supervisory body under 
FICA. According to her, branches of foreign banks tend to report far less than the local retail banks 
because of the nature of their business1141. 
  
 Is South Africa starting to see the results of the reporting regime? There are mixed views 
within the LEAs as to the benefits of FTRs. Some are of the view that the presence of the FIC and 
its FTRs has added some value in solving crime. Others were however of the view that the FIC 
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1141 Author Interview with Lerato Mokhesi of the SARB, 21 October 2009.  
Author (ZH): Are you getting any trends of banks who are reporting less than others?   
Lerato Mokhesi (LM): Most of them just give us a nil return.  
ZH: On a monthly basis?  
LM: Yeah, they report on a monthly basis.  
ZH: Does it happen that one bank would not report a suspicious transaction for the whole month?  
LM: For the whole year.  
ZH: For the whole year?! What kinds of banks would be those, what kinds of activities or business are they involved 
in?  
LM: Branches of foreign banks…I think the number of suspicious reports that a bank would report depends on the 
activities of that bank. A bank that does retail banking would report more than a bank that concentrates on tranche 





was still establishing itself and it was too early to expect any substantial benefits. It appears that 
LEAs are encouraging investigators to request information regarding their ongoing investigations 
from the FIC. This practice, however, may still need to be internalised by LEAs and be made 
official policy so that for each and every relevant serious profit-driven crime investigation, FIC 
intelligence is requested at the early stages. It is not clear whether such a practice has been 
internalised within the LEAs or not.  
 
TABLE 7.5: Requests made by LEAs to the FIC between 2005 and 2008 
 Year AFU DSO SAPS NIA SARS SASS Totals 
2005/06 77 32 91 1 5 1 207 
2006/07 128 37 101 12 5 7 290 
2007/08 185 43 52 27 20 0 327 
Total  390 112 244 40 30 8 824 
Source: FATF. 2009. Mutual Evaluation Report: South Africa. FATF, OECD, ESAAMLG: Paris, p.62 
 
Within the now disbanded DSO, according to some study participants, this practice was 
starting to be internalised. The AFU also seems to have done the same. Statistics from the FIC also 
show that LEAs are proactively making such requests. A total of 824 such proactive requests were 
made by agencies between 2005 and 2008 (see Table 7.5). In response to these requests, the FIC 
disseminated 628 information packages to the agencies as listed in Table 7.6. It appears from these 
data that the AFU sent and received more information packages proactively as compared to the 
other agencies. AFU’s mandate enables it to work with different agencies in ensuring that all 
proceeds and instrumentalities of crime are seized and forfeit.  
 
TABLE 7.6: Intelligence packages disseminated following requests by LEAs  
Source: FATF. 2009. Mutual Evaluation Report: South Africa. FATF, OECD, ESAAMLG: Paris, p.62   
 
Year AFU DSO SAPS NIA SARS SASS Totals 
2005/06 62 21 68 1 3 1 156 
2006/07 122 33 92 10 5 5 267 
2007/08 126 19 30 13 17 0 205 




This information supplements the ordinary referrals discussed above. The information 
contained in the intelligence packages is generally not raw FTRs, but processed information. As 
one investigator explains:  
“They (the FIC) will give you a comprehensive report. The report would contain 
all the bank accounts that are held by your subjects, the regular deposits that are 
made into those accounts, by whom. And if that particular subject has got other 
business interests...they will give you information about all his business interests, 
his associations if he is director of a certain entity...If other institutions have made 
inquiries about your subject, they would give you that data as well.”1142  
When the FIC finally refers or disseminates reports to LEAs, it is no longer raw FTRs but 
processed information or intelligence. This has implications for the FIC’s governance since it is 
not necessarily an intelligence organization. While there was a general view among our 
interviewees that the information they received from the FIC was useful in providing a general 
overview about the subjects being investigated, there was also a sense that the intelligence 
packages provided by the FIC were useful mainly in ongoing investigations rather than in initiating 
new ones.  
As one officer says;  
“I never used to get any cases (that were initiated by FTRs). What happened was- 
If I am investigating certain subjects, I would then have to log a request with the 
FIC to find out if they had received any reports about any of my suspects...The 
information was useful...you pursue that information. Maybe it will help your 
investigation...”1143 
                                                                





Maybe it will more often not help, as one Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions1144 told me.    
Author: Are there any cases that have been finalised by your unit that emanated 
from the Financial Intelligence Centre referrals?  
DDPP: No Sir, No Sir, none that I know of. No. 
Author: As a manager of this place...? 
DDPP: Maybe, let’s take a classical example. The FIC receives a suspicious 
transaction report. They refer it to the police. They investigate and they see, oh, this 
guy is a fraudster, put a docket together and bring it to us, we prosecute it and 
convict a guy. No one (case) has happened where I can go back to the FIC and say 
“thank you for your suspicious transaction report, based on that we got this.”  
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Above we have discussed the FTRs regime in South Africa examining its outcomes. It 
appears from the evidence presented that the regime has so far made an unsatisfactory progress 
towards its alleged goals of detecting crime. This is despite perceptions of high levels of crime and 
corruption in the country, which such a system should be exposing. FTRs could potentially provide 
valuable information in this regard. It appears however that the FTRs are not yet contributing 
consistently to these publicly interested outcomes of detecting crime, despite efforts and resources 
expended on the regime.  They clearly do not, however, appear to be playing a meaningful role.  
As also shown above in the cases of the US and the UK, South Africa’s situation is not so peculiar. 
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Several reviews have been conducted in these countries and they have been struggling to make 
their regimes more effective and efficient.  
In conclusion, it is important to make some recommendations for South Africa’s FTRs 
regime. We make these recommendations despite our findings that the regime might not have been 
incorporated for crime detection purposes, but for other narrow interests. Perhaps the regime could 
still be rescued as South Africa appears not to have much choice but to continue implementing it. 
We say this because, as we show in Chapter 8, the global AML regime has been merged with the 
IMF and World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programmes which determine a country’s 
credit rating and thus affecting its ability to issue debt at reasonable costs. Since these measures 
would be implemented, there might therefore be a need to fine-tune those that work since South 
Africa also faces, according to this study’s participants, a formidable problem of organised crime 
and corruption. Advocate Willie Hofmeyr retorted during our interview that his experience has 
been that  
“A lot of the regulations around anti-money laundering measures have sought of 
got caught up in this sort of Cold War debates about developing and imperialist 
countries in the colonial world and all of that. Some aspects of it are true, but I 
mean it is sort of a debate that we have to get beyond and see what is the real value 
of using the anti-money laundering tools to combat organised crime, but quite 
importantly also, corruption.”1145   
These are very instructive and challenging words. They urge South Africa, and developing 
countries in general, to try those systems that work while also trying to see what the problems may 
be with those systems that do not yet assist. They also do encourage developing countries to start 
to own up and take responsibility. He explained this in the context of South Africa’s position in 
                                                                




Africa, as a financial centre, and the world, as an investing destination, when it comes to organised 
crime. He said that the fact that South Africa is a    
“…sort of a financial centre in Africa means that we are both a country in which 
proceeds may be exported and invested in Europe and so on, but we are also actually 
an investing country. A lot of African dirty money comes to South Africa. Cape 
Town especially has become a little bit of a Monaco-type destination. So you find 
a lot of high profile European white-collar-criminals or drug people investing in the 
Western Cape wine farms or golf estates or Clifton bungalows. We are also not in 
the traditional developing country place where you are only making requests to 
other countries to please send back the money that has been stolen here and 
exported. But we get a lot of incoming requests for asset forfeiture from other 
countries, both developing and developed. Actually we probably get more requests 
from Europe to help them with people who have hidden their money here than we 
make requests to Europe.” 
All participants in this study did express some concerns about organised crime and 
corruption. The schemes which were mentioned as prevalent within the private sector, especially 
in the banking industry, were issues of credit card fraud, particularly in relation to card skimming 
and counterfeiting. Susan Coetzee of SABRIC told us that   
“Even now with the recession, with the economic downturn, there is an average of 
25 million Rands per month that is being lost on credit card fraud. Last year there 
were months where it went up to 40 million Rands a month… If you take credit 
card crime in this country, at the moment there has been a huge decline in actual 
successful frauds. We do not have any figures with regards to what the attempted 
frauds are because our system does not cater for that. The reason why there has 
been a decline in the frauds, in actual losses, is not necessarily because there has 




So if you try and do fraud with it [a counterfeit card], it would not go through 
because there is no money in it and that for me it is why it’s down and because of 
the roll-out of chip-and-pin.  But if you look in last year, at the peak, there were 
80,000 incidents of credit card fraud in any one month. Now if you thought it was 
opportunistic crime, you should be changing your mind now.”1146 
Compliance officers from the South African banks that we spoke to did emphasise card 
skimming and counterfeiting as a major crime issue within the banking sector1147. While the figures 
that SABRIC had only related to credit card fraud, there were issues about debit card fraud as well, 
whose statistics were not centralised by then.  
“The size of debit card fraud is unknown because of the fact that the information is 
not centralised within all of the banks. Definitely all attempts are being made to get 
the information into SABRIC now…So if I am telling you that at the peak last year 
there were 80,000 incidents of credit card fraud and that for every one credit card, 
there are 17 debit cards, you can do your own deductions with regards to what the 
potential of debit card fraud is in this country.”1148   
On the issue affecting the public sector, most participants from within the criminal justice 
system decried the scourge of fraud and corruption against or within government. I asked a Deputy 
Director of Public Prosecutions attached to the Asset Forfeiture Unit about the nature of organised 
crime, generally.   
Author: What would you say are the main organised crime activities in South 
Africa right now?  
Participant: Drugs and corruption 
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Author: Government corruption or just corruption everywhere. 
Participant: Government. Of course, we have others like human trafficking and so 
on, but the main ones are drugs and government corruption.  
Author: Are you having a lot of cases on government corruption?  
Participant: Ja, there is quite a lot.  
Author: Finalised cases as well? 
Participant: We have a few finalised cases involving government corruption. We 
are currently busy with a lot of them…Right now, South Africa is doing a lot of 
activities in reconstruction and development, you know. A lot of infrastructure is 
being built, you know, tenders are out. So in that area, among others, private 
individuals and government officials develop close working relationships and 
interests, you know, where big value tenders are awarded…  
Author: How big are the sums involved in some of these government corruption 
cases?  
Participant: The R219 million case I am doing currently involves fraud and 
corruption. It relates to a tender that was awarded. So that is a case in point that I 
am telling you about. The R88 million case that we did last year was again linked 
to government fraud and corruption1149.  
All these issues of organised crime and corruption call for a concerted drive to fix South 
Africa’s mechanisms to fight organised crime and corruption. It would therefore be very important 
to deal with issues around the FTRs as they have shown to be less beneficial to the fight against 
crime in South Africa. Many of my interviewees who deal with the FIC were of the view that there 
is still room for improvement in South Africa’s FTRs regime, generally. By this improvement they 
meant, among other things, that the regime should start to provide information that could be used 
to detect and solve crime. To this end we offer the following recommendations.  
                                                                




The South African government should consider an independent review of its regime in 
order to find out where the problems might be with the low success rate of FTRs. South Africa’s 
reviews have only been done by the FATF through its Mutual Evaluation Programme. While the 
FICA regime was itself imposed by the FATF, South Africa needs to start assuming full ownership 
of the regime.  
There needs to be a shift of mindset from pleasing the FATF, IMF and World Bank (who 
have made the adoption of AML/CTF measures part of the conditions attaching to extending loans 
and assistance to developing countries (see discussion on this in Chapter 8 below)), into making 
the regime work for South Africans. It is ordinary South Africans who foot the bill for this 
expensive regime. At a local level, the costs of running the regime are borne by local businesses 
and the government. Both business and government have the luxury of passing down these costs 
to ordinary South Africans in a number of ways, especially via their pricing schemes of businesses 
and taxes, respectively. At the end of the day, the effectiveness and efficiency of the reporting 
regime should be in their interest and thus help to solve and reduce crime. The South African 
government has, of course, showed some tremendous commitment to meeting these so called 
international best practice standards through its laws and implementation efforts.   
The independent review that we are proposing should investigate the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the reporting regime in South Africa since 2003, when the FIC was formed. This 
would entail enquiring into the costs of the regime, from compliance to enforcement. It should also 
entail an inquiry into the benefits of the regime, including the extent to which the FIC’s intelligence 
has helped to detect crime internally and in other jurisdictions with which the FIC shares its 
intelligence. This review should enjoy the support of government to enable independent reviewers 
to access adequate resources and information to carry out such a task. It would also provide a more 





The FIC cannot be expected objectively to review itself, for obvious reasons. Its employees 
and managers may have a vested interest and incentive in portraying a cost-efficient and effective 
regime and thus lack objectivity. On the other hand, although the FATF has, in a way, contributed 
to the understanding of South Africa’s regime,  its mutual evaluations seek to assess everything 
(all the components of its 40+9 Recommendations) in a rather schematic way; shedding little light 
on the effectiveness and efficiency of the FTRs regime1150.  The FATF may have a bias towards 
legitimating, defending and extending the regime, whether it works or not -- as it has always done 
through NCCT naming and shaming blacklists. Independent reviewers would ideally be 
unencumbered by such biases, and therefore be able to propose drastic measures or changes with 
a view of improving matters, where feasible, for South Africa and its people.  
There are other issues that still need to be clarified about the FIC itself. These are broader 
issues of accountability, its role (whether it is an intelligence organisation or investigative body or 
just a repository of information) and functions. If the FIC is an intelligence organisation, 
parliament may need to consider whether it should fall under some oversight like other intelligence 
oriented organisations in the country or not. If not, clear justifications may need to be advanced, 
especially since the FIC shares this intelligence across borders with limited or no judicial oversight 
of its activities. The problem with lack of oversight is that it poses a risk of FIC intelligence being 
used for reasons other than those of detecting crime. Although there is no evidence that this has 
happened, financial intelligence in the wrong hands could be used selectively. It could be used as 
a fishing expedition in targeting political rivalries and in gathering intelligence for purposes of 
‘regime change’ as this information is shared with foreign FIUs without any binding requirements 
for such information sharing to happen via the courts as happens with subpoenas in criminal 
investigations.  
Fixing accountability mechanisms of the FIC proactively would help to prevent 
apprehensions similar to those that attended the now disbanded DSO (Scorpions) when human 
                                                                




rights violation incidents were alleged to have occurred there -- giving ammunition to those who 
campaigned successfully for its disbandment. If such incidents ever happen while the FIC tries to 
fulfil its mandate, there should be proper safeguards in place.  Feedback should also be given to 
regulated institutions to enable them to improve their transaction monitoring and reporting 




















 Claiming and contesting legitimacy:  





An increasing amount of evidence regarding the global FATF standards points, as 
mentioned earlier, to efforts that have not yet achieved their alleged objectives and purposes of 
detecting and combating crime. Nor have they been satisfactorily shown to preserve the integrity 
and soundness of the financial system from abuse by criminals. Fairly recently major banks in the 
US, the UK and other industrialised jurisdictions nearly collapsed, needing enormous amounts of 
taxpayers’ money in bailouts. This appears to challenge the neoliberal orthodoxy of self-correcting 
markets. The interesting thing about the entire calamity of the so-called global financial crisis is 
that it did not originate from the largely imagined external sources of systemic risk such as drug-
trafficking money launderers, terrorists and others that much of the global financial regulatory 
regime has targeted in the recent decades. Its sources appear to have been internal and to have 
originated from the market players whose greed and excesses at profit-making were often 
encouraged by neoliberal capitalism1151.  
The past couple of decades have seen more regulation directed at combating money 
laundering and terrorist financing than to the badly needed prudential regulation, which has been 
found to be lacking in the midst of this recent crisis1152. The lack of focus on the latter has brought 
the global financial system to the brink. Instead of more efforts on prudential regulation, more 
energy has been focused on the FATF standards. In developing countries, the FATF standards, as 
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of prudential regulation which, he argues, led to the collapse of this market. 




has been established, were imposed through coercion, and have become part of the neoliberal 
structural adjustments of the IMF and the World Bank -- which these countries must now 
implement or risk having their funding and credit lines compromised.   
Despite concerns about the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the FATF standards of 
financial regulation, many countries continue to forge ahead with their implementation. The FATF 
also carries on conducting peer reviews (mutual evaluation) on both its members and non-members 
through the so-called “FATF-Style Regional Bodies” (or FSRBs) that have mushroomed over the 
past two decades. The compliance industry has seized on the benefits brought by the FATF 
standards with civil servants, auditing, accountancy, information technology, security and law 
firms cashing in on such services as forensic investigations, compliance management, automated 
transaction monitoring systems, training, and market research. There are a number of explanations 
and justifications that have been advanced to try and rationalise the limitations of the regime in 
achieving its goals. Key among them has been that the regime is new, thus too early to be judged 
or expected to produce any meaningful outcomes. This is despite the four decades of its 
implementation in the US and more than two decades in other major developed countries. In 
developing countries the FATF standards were incrementally introduced in the 1990s, but 
earnestly started to be implemented after the FATF’s NCCTs blacklisting campaign. The drive to 
incorporate the FATF standards, it appears, has been further propelled by their merging with the 
global anti-terror initiatives after the 9/11 terrorist bombings in the US.   
In this work we have probed competing explanations and justifications for the global 
emergence and domestic incorporation of the FATF standards in developing countries, based on 
the public and private interest theories of regulation. The powerful discourse of transnational crime 
and the management of systemic risk were propounded by the FATF (and its principals) in order 
to legitimate or justify the need and existence of the regime. Since the regime has already been 
incorporated by many countries, even under pressure from those who promoted it, the custodians 




the regime initially emerged to serve publicly-interested goals. Nor may they be faulted for 
believing that since the regime was incorporated to serve these publicly interested goals of 
detecting crime, it might soon start delivering its expected or promised outcomes. Were the regime 
to begin to show positive signs in the detection of crime, it could then be said that its enactment 
serves the public interest as it may help to solve some pressing social problems of crime. This 
could provide the regime with some ‘output legitimacy’. It would even justify the expenditures 
from all sectors of society in implementing and complying with it if it yielded benefits that, at 
least, balance, or perhaps even outweigh, the costs.  
However, as we have seen above, the regime appears not to have done this in South Africa.  
The situation is broadly the same in countries that we have drawn some comparisons from in 
assessing the outcomes of FTRs in Chapter 7. We have also seen the challenges the regime presents 
and the grave implications it potentially has when implemented under developing country socio-
economic conditions. These challenges relate to issues of socio-economic exclusion which have 
serious consequences for socio-economic development. Greater socio-economic exclusion could 
further undermine social cohesion, especially in a society such as South Africa that is seeking to 
heal a variety of social ills that were brought about by apartheid. Further, excluding large sectors 
of society from using formal financial services could militate against the very alleged objectives 
of the regime of monitoring the abuse of the financial system and of detecting crime. All these 
problems tend to challenge the implementation of the regime in developing countries.  Counting 
against the regime as well is that it was imposed from outside. Most importantly, the regime itself 
does not yet help to detect crime even as it potentially alienates the poor. How then does South 
Africa justify its further implementation of these financial regulations? What legitimacy claims 
does this regime have? Was it legitimate for South Africa to adopt it? Is the global FATF regime 
legitimate?  
In this chapter, we explain the claimed legitimacy of the FATF regime and suggest 




continue to implement these globally imposed standards despite their lack of legitimacy, along 
with the absence of any encouraging and substantial evidence of their effectiveness and efficiency.  
The global FATF regime lacked legitimacy when it was adopted by South Africa and other 
developing countries that were not its members when the regime was conceived. We argue that 
because of its lack of legitimacy at a global level, the regime’s adoption in South Africa lacked 
legitimacy. The main reason for its lack of legitimacy, we claim, is that the regime was, first and 
foremost, not extended by its founders for the alleged publicly interested goals of detecting crime. 
Crime was merely incidental. Other reasons for lack of legitimacy concern issues of democracy 
and the coercive manner in which the regime was extended to developing countries. We argue, 
however, that despite the regime’s inefficiencies and ineffectiveness, it will continue to be 
implemented.  This is because the FATF standards have been merged with the neoliberal structural 
adjustments of the IMF and the World Bank and compliance with them has become one major 
criterion by the private sector agencies that develop credit ratings for countries.    
 
Imagining legitimacy for non-state transnational regulatory regimes 
Here we start by examining the concept of legitimacy within the context of transnational 
non-state (or non-legally mandated1153) regulators, which the FATF is. There are many other 
organisations operating at a transnational level in various areas and with different levels of state 
involvement. These include such organisations as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), which plays a major role in setting banking regulatory and supervisory standards; 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which sets standards for the 
regulation of securities and stock exchanges; and the Financial Stability Board, which was recently 
set up by the G20 to devise strategies for what has been referred to as the global economic recovery 
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since the start of the global financial crisis which began in late 2007. There are many more similar 
non-state bodies that play a governance role. Julia Black has meticulously described the 
environment under which these non-state organisations operate. She tells us that non-state 
transnational regulators share a characteristic in that their activities ‘are not based on or mandated 
by national, supranational or international law’1154.  While they are founded by nation-states, they 
have no statutory bases and claim their legitimacy, if at all, from the states that establish them. 
Other characteristics1155 of such non-state regulators are that there are no existing structures such 
as courts, legislative committees, national auditors, ombudsmen and so on through which recourse 
and accountability can be sought. They have no clear jurisdictional boundaries nor there any easily 
identifiable set of potential democratic participants in their processes1156.  Another important 
characteristic is that states play a role in many of these non-state organisations as members, 
principals and regulatees/subjects. In other words, these are soft law regimes. Alexander, et al., 
have explained that soft law “generally presumes consent to basic standards and norms of state 
practice, but without the opinion juris necessary to form binding obligations under customary 
international law.”1157 Soft law, therefore, exists outside the traditional legal arena of treaty or 
uniform customary state practice1158. 
Organisations operating without a legally binding mandate are referred to throughout this 
chapter as non-state actors/organisations. This may seem contradictory and confusing since the 
FATF and other similar organisations are formed and dominated by states. However, non-state is 
used to denote their non-convention, non-treaty and therefore non-legal mandate. The legitimacy 
of non-state organisations, and their activities, can be questioned on the basis of their non-legal 
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status1159. There is also a widespread tendency to exclusivity of membership that is biased against 
developing countries in these non-state organisations. This leads to charges of non-
representativeness and lack of ‘input legitimacy’ on some of these organisations and their 




Mark Suchman observed that legitimacy tends to be more invoked than described and more 
often described than defined1161. The etymology of the word suggests it to be a concept rooted in 
law. For instance, according to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, legitimacy is “the state of 
being legitimate or valid” and being legitimate means “conforming to the law or to rules” 1162. 
However, this may be too similar to legality. Another conception is of “being able to be defended 
with logic or justification” 1163. However legitimacy is used in various contexts other than legal. 
The latter meaning of ‘being able to be defended with logic and justification’ means the concept 
of legitimacy can be used to defend non-legal rules and even illegal action, when such is done with 
‘logic and justification’. For instance, South Africa’s apartheid statutory laws were legally valid 
and judges applied them, although many others who opposed the system of apartheid regarded 
them as illegitimate. They disrespected them because they perceived them to violate some basic 
values and norms, such as freedom, democracy, non-discrimination, and justice.  
Writing on organisational management theory, Suchman defines legitimacy within a 
sociological context to mean “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
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are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, or definitions.”1164 In a governance or regulatory context, Black says a regulator is 
legitimate when s/he is “perceived as having a right to govern by both those [s/he] seeks to govern 
and those on behalf of whom [s/he] purports to govern”1165.  In this exercise, as we examine the 
FATF, we use the latter definition, which seems to blend in with a broader concept of regulation. 
This conception of legitimacy accommodates the regulatory context where both legal and non-
legal authority is exercised.  
Legitimacy, according to Julia Black, is rooted in the acceptance of an organisation by 
others, and ‘more particularly in the reasons for that acceptance’1166. There could be various 
reasons, beyond the legal ones, for the acceptability and credibility of a regime. These reasons 
could be ‘pragmatically-based’, ‘morally-based’ or ‘cognitively-based’1167. Pragmatically-based 
reasons involve perceptions on the part of subjects that the regulator ‘would pursue their interests 
directly or indirectly’1168. Morally-based reasons are based on perceptions of regulatees that the 
goals and/or procedures of the regulator are morally appropriate1169. Cognitively-based reasons 
refer to the acceptance of an organisation as necessary or inevitable, based on its knowledge or 
expertise and capability to provide solutions to the problems identified or achieving the end or 
ends desired1170. The reasons may still be legally-based ones for legitimation. Max Weber argued 
that law can be a basis of legitimation of authority, but also charisma and tradition1171. It is 
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1166 Ibid. p. 144. 
1167 Ibid. 
1168 Ibid. 
1169 For instance, the FATF seeks to deal with problems of crime and safeguard the financial system from criminal 
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important to say a word on these two later forms of legitimation as traditional legitimation applies 
in the case of the FATF. On charisma, Weber argued that a people or community may obey 
authority based on the charisma of a leader1172. Traditional legitimation relies on respect for age-
old traditions and customs where a community obeys orders of elders and children, their parents. 
Julia Black has correctly observed that using law or legal validity to assess the legitimacy of 
transnational non-state regimes, such as the one of the FATF, would be futile as they would out-
rightly be found to be illegitimate1173. This is simply because these regimes are non-legally 
mandated. As she puts it,   
“When regulatory regimes are largely non-legal and where, as in transnational 
regimes, infusing them with law is problematic, using only a legal concept of 
legitimacy will lead us to a dead end: such regimes will necessarily lack legitimacy 
and any potential for legitimacy, in legal terms. They may, however, still be 
regarded as perfectly legitimate by others.”1174  
In assessing the legitimacy claims of the FATF, we follow this advice from Black; 
otherwise we would have to conclude our analysis and brand the FATF regime, which is not 
founded on binding law, as out-rightly illegitimate. We start from a premise, then, that non-legally 
based regimes may still enjoy other forms of legitimation and be socially and politically 
acceptable. In assessing such non-state regimes therefore, we may find that their legitimacy 
fluctuates with the fulfilment (or otherwise) of various acceptable justifications/reasons. Put 
differently, the reasons which form the basis of legitimacy assessments affect either positively or 
negatively the thresholds or levels of legitimacy in a regime. This means that some subjects may 
perceive a regime to be legitimate based on different sets of values, norms and beliefs, reasons and 
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interests than others1175. Norms, values, reasons, interests and beliefs may not be widely/equally 
shared, thus making the regime perfectly legitimate for some and less so or completely illegitimate 
for others1176.  
 
Significance of legitimacy 
The question of legitimacy is key to any attempt at behavioural change at any level of 
governance, but more so at a transnational non-state level where systems are not as developed as 
within liberal-democratic nation-states1177. At a global level, the systems are at their formative 
stage, having been developed to fill the governance gap left by the recently increased economic 
neo-liberalisation and the globalisation of markets1178. An interesting reality at this level is that 
there is presently no sovereign world government. This absence of sovereign authority has led to 
various forms of governance arrangements. It is argued that transnational non-state regimes 
strongly need legitimacy as ‘they have to promote a strong motivational response from those 
whose behaviour...they seek to change, but often without the legal infrastructure of legal authority 
to fall back on’1179.    
It is widely believed that the governed tend to voluntarily comply with authority they 
believe to be legitimate. Legitimacy may therefore motivate not just voluntary compliance, but 
commitment and ownership. Voluntary compliance is important as it is generally believed to be 
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more cost efficient than coercion1180. Coercion is believed to necessitate greater costs of 
enforcement which could be avoided when compliance is voluntary1181. However this view of cost-
efficiency of voluntary compliance might be dependent on cases under consideration as coercion 
may be a cheaper and easier option for regulators to disseminate regimes that tend to be unpopular 
or illegitimate. Seeking consent may lead to protracted deliberations which may end up in 
deadlocks and thus compromise the speed at which such regimes can be diffused to their intended 
recipients.  
Rainer Hülsse has explained quite convincingly how voluntary compliance may facilitate 
and encourage ‘actual compliance’ as opposed to ‘formal compliance’1182. Formal compliance 
could be likened to ‘window-dressing’; something that is fashioned to deceivingly appease.  Actual 
compliance, on the other hand, carries connotations of a real belief in something, which may in 
turn facilitate ownership of norms, values and rules and commitment to their implementation and 
enforcement. Transnational regimes, more so non-state, are thought to require ‘actual compliance’ 
as their regulatory standards depend on their regulatees/subjects for implementation and 
enforcement. Transnational regulators could therefore be regarded as primary regulators because 
they regulate states which are then expected to do the same with their constituencies for the regimes 
to be effective. As a result of this reliance on their subjects, these regulators do not just need 
‘passive’, but ‘active’ support from their subjects1183. If their subjects do not believe in their 
legitimacy, their goals and programmes may end up getting lip-service, if adopted at all.  
This may compromise the potential effectiveness of such regimes, as national governments 
resource-starve implementation and enforcement efforts. Rainer Hülsse believes that effectiveness 
of ‘club’ (non-state) regimes cannot be achieved without winning actual compliance which, in 
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turn, is better achieved through voluntary compliance than force1184. According to him, while 
formal compliance can be achieved through coercion, actual compliance cannot be guaranteed1185. 
The question of legitimacy is therefore very important in this context of multilevel regulatory 
regimes characterised by interdependence of regulatory functions and roles. Even at national level, 
national governments may strongly need and rely on the legitimacy of transnational regulators to 
motivate voluntary compliance from their subjects (local constituencies)1186. While governments 
often establish laws and regulations, which back and legitimate their governance efforts, they may 
also need to convince their local constituencies that the agreements they enter into, on their behalf, 
are accountable and in their best interests. This may especially be true when such standards could 
have a negative impact on these constituencies. We are not arguing that all agreements entered 
into by countries should always represent a win-win situation. International agreements often do 
entail compromises, especially in an interdependent world coloured by a variety of interests, 
values, norms and reciprocity.  
The obligations or agreements that national governments observe at a transnational level, 
whether based on soft or hard law, have a long chain of accountability. This chain tends to get 
weaker and weaker the furthest it is from the source of original delegation1187. Transnational 
governance in many liberal democracies is delegated authority, which is usually given to the 
executive arm of government (i.e. cabinet ministries), which, very often, further delegate to the 
concerned departments or non-departmental regulatory bodies. Normatively, those mandated to 
exercise this authority on behalf of the state within democratic states should not, although this 
often happens in small and developing countries, overstep the trust put on them by their electorate 
by entering into often compromising agreements.  
                                                                
1184 Hülsse, R. 2009. Even clubs can’t do without legitimacy: why the anti-money laundering blacklist was suspended. 
Regulation and Governance, Vol. 2, 459-479.  
1185 Ibid. 
1186 Black, J. 2008. Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes. 





This is simply because it is the local constituencies that bear the costs of such commitments 
either through the public purse or through costs passed on to them in other ways, i.e. businesses 
passing down compliance costs, directly or indirectly, to consumers. In the worst scenario, such 
obligations may have negative implications for social development and economic growth. There 
might therefore be a need to account for, justify and defend the adoption of such informal 
standards, which are not part of international law obligations, in which governments enter into. 
Entering into forced arrangements may therefore be untenable and be correctly viewed as 
illegitimate.  
There has been an increasing amount of literature that analyses issues of legitimacy above 
and beyond the state. Some of this literature is normative and some empirical1188. Normative means 
literature that is inclined towards ideals or things as they ought to be, as opposed to reality or things 
as they actually are; which empirical literature contributes to. These strands of literature often 
intersect. For instance normative enquiries may rely on empirical literature to make more informed 
suggestions on how things should be1189. We attempt to contribute to both these approaches in the 
area of the global AML regime and developing countries, in general, and South Africa in particular.  
Our intention is to show how the FATF tried and failed to build its legitimacy from its early 
years and totally lost it when it started to apply coercive measures of blacklisting non-members to 
adopt and implement what was supposed and proclaimed to be voluntary and flexible standards. 
We also argue that the FATF did not just fail to legitimate itself and its standards, but it might have 
done so deliberately. On the other hand it might not have failed deliberately, but did not need 
legitimacy in respect of its non-members, but force, as the regime was not formed for the purposes 
that needed legitimation. By this we means that the standards were inherently illegitimate to the 
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extent that they could not be rescued by any means except coercion as the FATF was not primarily 
formed to deal with crime, but to use public sentiment about crime in order to ‘govern’ competition 
(regulatory and tax arbitrage) issues1190.   
Julia Black has correctly observed that new organisations often have a mammoth task of 
actively constructing their legitimacy from scratch and, old ones, maintaining it1191. When their 
legitimacy gets challenged, they may and often do actively engage in activities to reclaim or repair 
it1192. Our argument here is that the FATF failed to build its legitimacy from the start, with regards 
to its non-members. It may have been regarded as legitimate by its members (as its principals) but 
it clearly was not to its non-members, who were treated as mere rule-takers1193. The legitimacy 
question here is with regards to its non-members since 1992 until the regime was effectively 
disseminated throughout the world by the early 2000s.  
Although a few of these countries were later slowly and carefully recruited for membership 
in the FATF, which now brings its total membership to 36 countries, from 28 in 1992, these 
countries nonetheless appear to have been forced to incorporate the regime, as shown in the case 
of South Africa in Chapter 5 and as argued by others1194.  It is however important to distinguish 
between the legitimacy of the FATF as an organisation and the legitimacy of its standards. While 
non-members might not accept the FATF because it has been inherently undemocratic, they might 
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still support its standards if they are morally, pragmatically or cognitively justifiable. The support 
for standards does not necessarily make the FATF democratic or legitimate.   
 
FATF strategies: building or destroying legitimacy? 
When considering issues of legitimation and the FATF, it is important first to analyse the 
nature1195 of this dynamic body and what it sought and seeks to achieve1196. It is the FATF’s nature, 
goals and activities that have, over the years, enhanced its legitimation crisis. From the start, 
instead of building its legitimacy, it seems to have worked against itself. To start with, we view 
the FATF primarily as a transnational non-state ‘regulatory body’1197 that claimed and largely grew 
to be viewed as the primary custodian of the global AML (and later AML/CTF) standards1198. 
Secondly, its primary activity, in short, has been to regulate countries and territories1199 to adopt, 
implement and comply with its standards. It is important to decode these two broad statements.  
We start this by reminding ourselves on what is meant by ‘regulation’. This is central to 
what the FATF is and does as a global/transnational regulator. In its website and reports, the FATF 
incompletely describes itself as a ‘policy-making body’1200. Although it does loosely mention its 
other activities, there is a more encompassing description for its nature and broad range of 
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activities. We view the FATF as a non-state regulatory body. In defining regulation, we return to 
Julia Black’s broad definition we saw earlier which defines regulation as   
“…sustained and focused attempts to change the behaviour of others in order to address a 
collective problem or attain an identified end or ends, usually through a combination of 
rules or norms and some means for their implementation and enforcement which can be 
legal or non-legal.”1201 
The FATF sought to change the behaviour of its subjects, which are governments, to attain 
compliance with its standards. It initially did this through encouraging and monitoring its subject’s 
implementation of standards, through its programmes of mutual evaluation1202. These mutual 
evaluations also helped it to enforce compliance by identifying changes or reforms that needed to 
be undertaken by those it found to be non-compliant. Embedded in its standards were also 
sanctioning mechanisms that it could apply to members who failed to comply, such as suspension 
of membership1203. However this labelling, naming and shaming mechanism has never been used 
against members, but threatened against Turkey in 1996 and Austria in 20001204.  
With all these regulatory enforcement mechanisms, the FATF is a full regulatory body and 
even more given that it also sets the standards (policy-making) that it monitors and enforces. Also, 
although without any legal backing, its sanctioning mechanisms have made it achieve a high level 
of compliance among non-members, which had no legal obligation at all to follow or support it.  
On its standards, it is important to acknowledge that while a portion of the FATF standards were 
borrowed from binding international law, particularly the UN Vienna Convention of 1988, its main 
contribution were standards which do not emanate from any international hard law convention or 
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treaty1205. The contribution we are referring to here are its set of standards that recommended the 
regulation of financial and nonfinancial businesses for purposes of combating money laundering 
and the conceptualization of what has become known as financial intelligence units (FIUs).  
The business regulations of the FATF have been transformed from being soft law norms 
into international and national binding law through their incorporation into subsequent UN 
conventions and protocols and other regional conventions of the Council of Europe and the EU 
Directives1206. They have also become part and parcel of many countries’ legal and regulatory 
frameworks through voluntary and also coerced adoption. While the FATF standards are 
themselves soft law, they have therefore evolved into becoming binding international and national 
law1207. It is however important to mention that much of the elevation of these standards into 
international hard law occurred after they had been coercively disseminated by the FATF to many 
developing countries and made national laws. This is very important to highlight as it was the 
coercive transfer of soft law standards (then) which exacerbated the legitimacy crisis of the FATF 
regime1208.  We have briefly analysed the FATF and its activities. Now we move to deal with 
issues of membership. This helps us to clarify whom the FATF seeks to govern (subjects) and on 
whose behalf (principals), as this affects its legitimacy and accountability.  
 
FATF’s principals and subjects 
The FATF’s subjects are those countries (and jurisdictions) that the FATF regulates, while 
on the other hand, its principals were those who formed it or were its members, in the context of 
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this analysis, when it closed accession to its membership in 1992. There is therefore an overlap in 
that its principals were also its subjects. There is also a disparity in that not all of its subjects were 
its principals, as it sought to regulate all countries even those that were not its members. The 
disparity in the FATF’s subjects and principals has, we believe, enhanced its legitimation crisis. It 
is however not this disparity alone, but also the hidden interests in the emergence of the regime 
which added to its problems of legitimacy. We have already identified these interests that 
shadowed the emergence of the regime in Chapter 5, but it is important to reiterate them.  
 
Private interests: regulatory and tax arbitrage  
While the FATF standards were portrayed as efforts at combating crime, we have found 
them to be coloured by some specific narrow interests. As early as 1970, the US took a decision 
to regulate its banks through the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. It desired other countries to do the 
same to prevent regulatory arbitrage as this would affect the competition of its banks with those 
of other unregulated jurisdictions1209. Secondly, there were sentiments among the G7 countries 
that the UN Vienna Convention was substantively inadequate and would take longer to be effective 
due to the delaying formalities of treaty ratification processes1210. The Vienna Convention was 
also viewed to be substantively inadequate1211 in the sense that it did not come up with a financial 
regulatory regime of the sort that the FATF was to propose, an issue of great interest to the US 
which already had a financial regulatory regime while other developed and competitive countries 
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did not have1212. This was believed to have created regulatory arbitrage at the expense of the 
competitiveness of its financial institutions1213.  
Thirdly, France had proposed that the FATF should also deal with issues of tax (which 
basically involved cutting the competitive advantage of off-shore financial centres), which created 
issues of regulatory and tax arbitrage for on-shore financial centres1214. While France raised the 
issue of tax, other G7 countries, and their financial sectors may have stood to benefit from 
diminished off-shore financial centre competition in a number of ways. Regulation would 
decrease, if not eliminate, the competitive advantage of the so-called offshore regulatory havens, 
leading to repatriation of their business onshore, as there would be limited incentives to investing 
in offshore havens1215.  
While tax issues were not explicitly included in the FATF’s mandate in 1989, as France 
and other (threatened) countries would have so desired, the standards changed in 1996 to directly 
incorporate issues of tax evasion, among many other serious crimes, as a predicate offence of 
money laundering1216. As early as 1991, the FATF had started to stigmatise these small countries 
as ‘regulatory havens’ who posed a serious risk of money laundering, laying a platform for further 
onslaughts on them1217. Issues of regulatory havens were to later become a programme of many 
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other FATF-linked organisations such as the OECD and other programmes of the IMF and the 
World Bank. This labelling led to some of these so-called regulatory havens to be blacklisted 
through the FATF NCCT programme1218.  
The FATF discourse on money laundering would appear to have been a smokescreen and 
a springboard to later tackle issues of tax arbitrage. While the regulatory havens were a more direct 
threat, developing countries in Africa and elsewhere were easily patronised. The AML standards, 
according to the FATF and others supporting it, would help them establish stronger financial 
institutions which would in turn assist them to develop as institutions (see discussion on this in 
Chapter 2). They would also assist them to monitor their corrupt leaders who siphon-out money 
to developed countries and offshore regulatory havens1219. Dictatorships and corruption are, of 
course, serious issues of concern in many parts of the world, particularly developing countries, but 
require more open and inclusive forums to reach decisions on how to tackle them rather than a 
patronising discourse aimed at spreading undemocratic regimes.  
 
Extending the standards to non-principal subjects  
The FATF was not keen to extend membership to all countries from the start. Its members 
were to be ‘all OECD and financial centre countries’1220. “All other countries were invited to 
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participate in the fight against money laundering and to implement the recommendations of the 
FATF”1221 but were excluded from membership and any meaningful deliberative processes. The 
membership was therefore extended selectively based on a non-transparent criterion. In addition 
to its initial members1222, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Turkey, Hong Kong and the Gulf Cooperation Council (collectively representing the Persian Gulf 
states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) were invited 
for membership in 19911223.  
In 1992, Singapore and Iceland were invited to become members, bringing the total 
membership to 28 (including the two regional organisations, the European Commission and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council). The FATF then concluded that its membership “should not be further 
widened, in order to preserve the efficiency of the Task Force”1224. Excluding countries whose 
compliance was sought would seem to have been a less than strategic move in trying to build and 
claim legitimacy. The FATF did not just need passive, but active support from non-members. This 
is simply because of the dependence of the FATF on these subjects to actively implement and 
enforce its standards at national level. What legitimation strategy, therefore, was the FATF using 
by closing membership and participation but yet seeking support from those it excluded? 
Some financial centres or those countries it labelled as ‘regulatory havens’ and developing 
countries were not represented at all in this 28 member body when it decided to close its admission 
to new members in 1992. The main reason advanced by the FATF for its exclusivity was that it 
needed to preserve its ‘efficiency’1225. Efficiency was therefore prioritised above democratic 
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participation and representativeness in a drive to keep the costs of running the FATF ‘low’1226, and 
‘expediting’ decision-making1227. Democratic representativeness and participation are normally 
associated with embracing dissenting viewpoints which may in turn lead to delays and deadlocks 
in decision making where there are disagreements. This fear or avoidance of dialogue and 
inclination to expeditious decision making, justified as grounds for ensuring or preserving the 
efficiency of the FATF, should be viewed sceptically and critically. We may ask therefore if the 
FATF, perhaps, suspected that its standards would not be so widely received or accepted and be 
opposed-- leading to delays in diffusing them to the countries it excluded.  
It is important to ask this question, with the benefit of hindsight, given that the FATF 
standards are now considered to have had serious negative, but undeclared, economic impact 
particularly on developing countries and the so called regulatory havens1228. For some smaller 
countries stigmatised as regulatory havens, the implementation of FATF standards has led to, 
among other things, loss of business1229, while causing unintended and undesirable consequences 
of financial exclusion in developing countries1230. Ironically, there is still no evidence that can be 
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Pragmatic, normative and cognitive legitimacy claims 
What did the FATF rely on therefore in building and claiming its legitimacy during its 
early years, since it abandoned any effort to achieve democratic legitimation? We suggest that 
since it was unwilling to extend its membership and ensure participation and representativeness. 
or deliberative democracy, the FATF relied on strategies that rather corroded than affirmed its 
legitimacy. In doing this the FATF started by separating the organisation (or institutional 
hardware) from its standards (or institutional software)1231. It appears that the strategy was 
deliberately to delay legitimising the organisation (institutional hardware) but initially push for the 
worldwide diffusion of the standards (institutional software), using a combination of pragmatic, 
normative and cognitive legitimation claims. In its 1992 Annual Report the FATF, for instance, 
declared that it was  
“...the only body whose focus is exclusively on money laundering. Its substantive 
legitimacy stems from the political and moral obligation to implement the forty 
recommendations drawn up in 1990. On the one hand this implies a continuing 
emphasis in the FATF in verifying the implementation of the recommendations in 
a fair and objective manner. On the other, it is crucial to keep abreast of the evolving 
money laundering techniques in a rapidly changing international environment. 
These priorities are complemented by an integrated strategy designed to address 
systematically the interface with non-members and to coordinate efforts fully with 
other relevant international bodies in its pursuit of worldwide mobilisation against 
money laundering.”1232 
The moral/normative claims of the FATF rested on its goals of providing solutions to issues 
of transnational money laundering and protecting the soundness of the global financial system. 
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Very few, if any, modern democratic countries would oppose these noble goals even if they are 
camouflaging narrow, hidden, and self-serving interests of dealing with issues of competition and 
arbitrage as discussed above. They resonate with similar other pressing global issues such as saving 
the environment, with which many progressive countries may be sensitive and sympathetic 
towards. A single politically incorrect word when dealing with these issues, even if merely 
questioning the strategies and methods that are being deployed to address them often elicits some 
emotionally charged rebukes and stigmatisation of those who seem to deviate from widely held or 
orthodox opinions. For instance, those dissenting with the FATF views, Daniel Drezner observed, 
risked being labelled as criminal havens or as “out of touch with reality”.1233  The FATF’s 
cognitive claims were that it was the only body ‘whose focus is exclusively money laundering’ 
and it had the necessary expertise to bring about solutions to the problems that needed solving.   
Its pragmatic claims were that developed countries had realised that there were no other 
ways to solve issues of money laundering in a globalised world than through cooperation at a 
global level. The hypocrisy of this cooperation arose, however, from the manner in which the 
FATF appears to have shunned the input of developing countries in its deliberative processes by 
excluding them from membership. According to the FATF, non-member governments had only to 
be ‘sensitised’ and ‘made aware’ that developed countries had taken this route and they should 
also follow suit1234. As also discussed by Hülsse1235, using its discursive strategy of 
‘problematisation’, the FATF not only painted money laundering as morally bad, but as damaging 
to every country’s economy as crime was a global issue. According to this claim, money 
laundering could lead to continued underdevelopment for developing countries1236. Adopting 
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AML standards was therefore patronisingly directed at protecting these countries from mainly self-
harm and at encouraging their economic development1237. 
Over the years, it has not only been the FATF, as an organisation, that has faced a 
legitimacy crisis, but its standards have also been questioned as adequate means to combat crime 
and to protect the financial system against money launderers and terrorist financiers1238. The many 
flaws of the FATF standards remain largely unacknowledged by the group and appear to be largely 
ignored, often justified or explained away1239. The actions of the FATF of not seeking legitimacy, 
as it tried to extend its standards seem to confirm our private interest hypothesis that those who 
founded the FATF did not have the combating of crime as their primary motive, but rather that 
they instead used the powerful discourse of combating crime and protecting the integrity of the 
global financial system in order to govern narrow issues of competition.  
The G7 countries, through forming the FATF, shifted the issue of money laundering from 
the UN which, although with its own structural flaws, had a far more heterogeneous 
representativeness and participation among countries than the FATF. In its 1992 Annual Report, 
the FATF wrote with regards to its membership that: 
“Any discussion of the role and identity of the FATF must inevitably involve taking 
a view on its own membership. The FATF now has twenty eight members. For an 
organisation that prides itself on its informality of procedure and ready ability to 
achieve consensus, this is clearly approaching the maximum membership possible. 
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The FATF has, therefore, decided not to accept any new members for the time 
being” 1240. 
To further cement this exclusivity, the FATF was offered in 19911241 secretariat services 
by the United Nations, an organisation with a broader membership through which it could reach 
out for participation. The FATF turned this offer down and instead approached the OECD, an 
exclusive organisation of mainly developed countries, for such services because the OECD had 
‘experience in areas related to those covered by the FATF: multi-disciplinary nature; and 
compatibility with the aims of the FATF’1242. This was however not clarified further. However, 
choosing to form a new body, rather than using more inclusive and broader forum of the UN is 
akin to what has been referred to as ‘forum-shifting’, where issues for deliberation are shifted to 
forums that are less likely to oppose them1243. 
 
Traditional legitimacy      
To extend the regime to its non-members and to attempt to gain legitimacy, one of the 
strategies exploited by the FATF was to rely on age-old, neo-colonial and neo-imperial ties. This 
happened, notably, in extending the regime to the Caribbean and smaller off-shore jurisdictions 
and then to other parts of the world, particularly Africa-- a continent with deep colonial and 
imperial ties with some of the G7 countries. In its 1992 annual report, the FATF announced its 
strategy of getting non-members to support its standards. The FATF members, particularly the G7 
countries, took it upon themselves to encourage the implementation of the FATF standards with 
“dependent, associate or otherwise connected territories with which they have constitutional, 
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historical or geographical links”1244. Some of these ‘dependent, associate or otherwise connected 
countries’ were described by the FATF to form a diverse grouping which included “some 
significant offshore centres, and other areas of financial activity”1245. Despite the acknowledgment 
of these countries as significant areas of financial activity, they were deemed not to qualify for 
membership in the FATF and were accordingly excluded when the FATF decided to temporarily 
suspend accepting new members in 1992.  
Instead those FATF members (or what the FATF called ‘sponsoring countries’) who had a 
‘constitutional, historical or geographical links’ with these non-FATF ‘dependent, associate or 
otherwise connected’ countries, would serve as guardians or ‘sponsors’. The FATF referred to 
them as ‘sponsoring countries’1246.  These were basically those countries that had historical or 
other forms of domination over non-member countries. It is these ties which were to be exploited 
to fashion some allegiance or buy-in into the FATF standards. The sponsoring countries, who were 
mainly the G7 countries, volunteered on behalf of the FATF, to use such traditional links of 
association or domination to extend its standards. This is akin to Max Weber’s1247 ‘traditional’ 
legitimation. Max Weber categorized legitimation under three-ideal types; ‘charismatic’, 
‘traditional’ and ‘rational-legal’ authority1248. In a traditional system, according to Weber, orders 
to comply with old-age traditional norms or rules or patriarchal customs could play a role in 
gaining legitimacy. While Weber analysed a traditional system in sub-national, village, community 
or family contexts1249, it could be used to analyse some developed-developing country 
relationships-- especially those with colonial, imperial or other ‘dependency’ or neo-colonial links 
in today’s world. These relationships could be perceived as ‘traditional’, especially for the 
                                                                
1244 FATF.1992. Annual Report FATF 1991-1992, Paris, 25 June 1992.   
1245 Ibid.  
1246 Ibid. 
1247 See Giddens, A. 1971. Capitalism and modern social theory: an analysis of the writings of Marx, Durkheim and 
Max Weber, Cambridge University Press, pp. 154-162. 
1248 Ibid.  




dominant that have for years imposed their will on the weak by various means of control through 
colonial subjugation, imperial exploits and post-independence neo-colonial economic dependency.  
In the case of the FATF, we argue that traditional/historical, colonial, neo-colonial or other 
dependency ties based on some old forms of ‘centre-periphery’ complexes whether economic, 
political or territorial were relied upon to try and gain support from non-members. The FATF could 
not gain ‘rational-legal’ or charismatic legitimacy as it was itself an informal, non-legally based 
club, run by some probably less known officials of the G7 countries whose world-changing 
charisma we have not yet heard of. However age-old ties have been persistent, fuelled mainly by 
neo-colonial economic dependency and ‘third world’ underdevelopment in a Western dominated 
capitalist world economy. Exploiting these old widely discredited colonial and imperial ties was 
an odd choice for seeking legitimation by the FATF. However this may not be an isolated incident 
for the many bodies founded through the channels of informal non-state groups of countries, 
especially the G7. These informal forums seem to have become a powerful locus for global 
decision-making. Their decisions can be followed through into international organisations such as 
the UN, EC, World Bank, WTO, and so on, where they become part of the international binding 
conventions or informal standards of such bodies as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(formed by the G10) and the Financial Stability Review (G20).       
Using ‘traditional’ dependency ties, in the early 1990s, the FATF reported triumphantly 
that in the Caribbean, ‘with the support of the FATF sponsoring countries (Canada, France, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States), a permanent secretariat for the Caribbean 
Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) has now been established’1250. This body was to be a vehicle 
for the transfer of the FATF standards into these ‘dependent, associate or otherwise connected’ 
Caribbean countries. Many of these countries had been stigmatised as ‘regulatory havens’ that 
posed a great risk of money laundering by the FATF. Endorsing the FATF standards to the extent 
of establishing a quasi-FATF body would appear to be a voluntary and a mutually inclusive 
                                                                




process. However using dependency and other similar ties of subordination, these countries may 
have been left with little choice but to oblige. Hülsse has argued, for instance, that although 
developing and small financial centre jurisdictions were legally free to ignore the FATF standards, 
it could not have been a very wise move for them to do so1251. He explained that;  
“The fact that they (non-FATF countries) depend on the member countries of the 
FATF in a number of ways means that turning against them in the realm of money 
laundering could quickly become disadvantageous in other issue areas. Hence, 
there surely exists a shadow of hierarchy, which explains why non-member 
countries comply even in the absence of explicit threats and coercive measures. Yet 
voluntary compliance hardly seems the correct label for such rule following 
behaviour.”1252 
We fully agree with Hülsse’s argument here. The CFATF was just the first ‘sponsored’ 
body to be established by the FATF sponsoring countries. Other regions such as Asia, Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, and Africa followed. In Southern and Eastern Africa, for instance, the 
sponsoring countries used the Commonwealth, which refers to itself as the ‘family of nations’. The 
Commonwealth is made up of mainly former British colonies and was used to spread the word and 
seek compliance with the FATF standards1253.  In a conference held in South Africa in 1996, 
organised and sponsored by the Commonwealth and the FATF, a decision was taken to form the 
Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a body similar to the 
CFATF, to convey the FATF standards to these countries1254.  
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ESAAMLG was finally established and launched in 1999 in Tanzania as a FATF-style 
regional body of 14 Southern and Eastern African countries1255. From June 1990 to the end of 
1996, the FATF claimed to have participated in or organised 44 conferences and missions with 
FATF non-members, to encourage adoption and implementation of its standards1256. While the 
FATF was generally satisfied with its progress on awareness-raising and was, as it claimed, 
gaining support and willingness for the adoption of its standards, it later claimed that many 
countries and territories were unwilling to cooperate1257. In 1996, it adopted a policy of assessing 
compliance with its standards by non-member governments1258.  
 
Naming and Shaming: the NCCT blacklists 
It is this policy of assessing its non-member governments that provoked its legitimacy 
crisis, especially when applied to states linked through some dependency ties. Countries would 
through the sponsored Commonwealth conferences and workshops (or what J.C. Sharman refers 
to as ‘seminar diplomacy’1259), pledge support to the standards, it seems, but not move swiftly to 
enact laws and regulatory provisions to comply with the standards. Using a policy of evaluation 
on non-member states, the FATF started publishing its findings and applying its naming and 
shaming techniques in the middle of 2000. Between 2000 and 2003, the FATF blacklisted a total 
of 23 so called Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories (NCCTs), who all were not its 
members. Many of these countries belonged to the CFATF, but also Russia, Israel, Egypt and 
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Lebanon were on the list1260. In the following year, four jurisdictions (Cayman Islands, 
Liechtenstein, Panama and Bahamas) were delisted after having taken steps to implement the 
standards1261. A couple of other new countries (Indonesia, Guatemala, Hungary, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, (2001) Grenada and Ukraine (2002)) were also added to the blacklist1262.  
The blacklists entailed the FATF naming and shaming these countries and demanding that 
they make specified reforms in line with its standards. These sanctions were contained in 
Recommendation 21 of the standards which required financial institutions in FATF member 
countries to “give special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons, 
including companies and financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently apply 
the FATF Recommendations”1263. When these countries did not comply as required by the FATF, 
‘countermeasures’, which are basically economic sanctions contained in Recommendation 22, 
could be applied. The countermeasures had the effect of restricting or cutting off international 
financial transactions-- thus affecting cross border transactions to and from them with the richest 
developed countries (FATF members). Countermeasures were only applied against Nauru and 
Myanmar, as they failed immediately to respond to FATFs demands after they were blacklisted1264. 
The countermeasures were lifted again when these countries relented and passed legislation to 
comply. By 2006 all countries had been removed from the blacklists and the FATF suspended its 
blacklisting campaign1265. However the suspension appears to have been temporary as the FATF 
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continues to name and shame such countries as Iran and the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Korea on an ongoing basis1266.   
Blacklisting is believed to have been a very effective tool of spreading the standards to 
non-members. It has also been viewed by those countries at the receiving end and many scholars 
as highly illegitimate and with no basis in law. Many scholars have covered blacklisting as a direct 
coercive tool of securing compliance. Rainer Hülsse has covered this aspect very admirably 
concerning issues of compliance. He argues that although coercion led to a high level of 
compliance, such compliance should be viewed as just ‘formal compliance’, which does not 
guarantee the effectiveness of the standards themselves or ‘actual compliance’1267. Following the 
blacklists, many other non-FATF countries that were not blacklisted are believed to have engaged 
in ‘pre-emptive compliance’; that is adopting the standards in order to avoid blacklisting1268. This 
was the case in South Africa where the government moved swiftly to introduce a piece of 
legislation which had been drafted in 1996 and only introduced in parliament towards the end of 
2000 and then swiftly passed as the Financial Intelligence Centre Act in 20011269.  
However it is important to acknowledge that perhaps many countries were eventually going 
to adopt the standards, even without the blacklists. This might have taken longer and could possibly 
have been done more cautiously by such adopting countries, taking into consideration their 
interests, the costs and benefits including the possible negative impact of such standards under 
their socio-economic circumstances. Some countries might have well chosen not to implement 
some aspects of these standards altogether, had they had a choice and a chance to evaluate their 
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possible negative impacts. We have so far focussed on the FATF and how it sought to spread the 
regime without any credible attempts at gaining legitimacy. The question that arises out of this is 
why the FATF avoided all credible avenues of legitimation. Why would it not attempt more 
credible avenues of legitimation, such as inclusiveness, democracy, and respect for sovereignty, 
but rather chose the opposite?  
In order to answer these questions we need to invoke our private interest hypothesis which 
brings the hidden motives for the emergence of the FATF and its standards to the fore. According 
to this hypothesis, the regime was not established to deal with issues of crime combating, but 
competition issues (regulatory and tax arbitrage). These were not so much issues of crime, but 
issues of competitive advantage which could not be dealt with as speedily through diplomatic 
channels or other more inclusive international organisations because they could lead to 
disagreements and delays. Merging them with the rhetoric of crime appears to have been a means 
to camouflage the real interests behind the dissemination of the regime. That some of these 
regulations could perhaps assist on issues of money laundering and now counter-terrorist financing 
was, in large part, a coincidence.  
The financial regulatory measures have, on their own, been very weak when it comes to 
detecting crime -- not only in developing countries, but also in developed countries1270. The 
suspicious transaction reports which emanated from the regulation of businesses have not been 
shown to yield much output when it comes to detecting money launderers and terrorist financiers 
that we are told threaten the stability of the financial system. The failure of FTRs regimes has, as 
discussed in Chapter 7, led the US and the UK to review the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
regimes several times. These reviews have largely emanated from frustrations on the part of both 
the regulated businesses and governments. The several US and UK enquiries were established 
                                                                
1270 See, for instance, Geiger, H., & Weunsch, O. 2007. The fight against money laundering: an economic analysis 
of a cost-benefit paradoxon. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 10(1), 91-105 on how even developed countries  




because businesses were making complaints about the costs of regulation and they were 
demanding some accountability1271.  
Had the FATF sought credible legitimation before attempting to disseminate the regime, it 
might have faced opposition or might have been ignored, not because such countries necessarily 
supported criminals, money launderers and terrorists or cared less about the integrity of the global 
financial system, but because such measures were ultimately aimed at eliminating their 
competitive advantage, especially in respect of the so-called regulatory and tax havens. In order to 
unroll these regulatory measures speedily, the FATF therefore did not seek legitimacy, but relied 
on power. This explanation offers us more plausible reasons as to why the FATF may not care so 
much about the implications and the negative outcomes of these business regulations on 
developing countries.  
In his work, Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Laundering in 
Developing Countries, Jason C. Sharman1272 narrates a story of how, after being commissioned to 
conduct a study in Barbados, Vanuatu and Mauritius, an unnamed commissioning organisation 
expected legitimating findings about the global AML standards. He wrote that  
“The finding that AML standards had a significant net negative impact on these 
three developing countries generated a hostile response from the organisation 
funding the study, as well as from all developed countries providing feedback. The 
objection was that such a conclusion could jeopardise the further diffusion of AML 
standards in the developing world, and thus that the findings should be re-written 
to reflect this imperative.”1273    
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Altering research findings to reflect a point that is contrary to them should be viewed with 
some level of scepticism. This is all the more true when the real and hidden motives behind the 
diffusion of the FATF standards, as we have argued, seem to have been accomplished at all costs, 
even if detrimental to the receiving countries. The countries behind the global diffusion of the 
regime appear not to have cared about the negative impact of this regime on the receiving 
countries, as long as it served the narrow interests for which the FATF was created. This is not an 
isolated incident, but a common feature of neo-liberalisation, where models of good governance 
are imposed on developing countries in a variety of ways and sometimes with grave socio-
economic consequences1274. The administering of structural adjustment programmes by the IMF 
on developing countries over the past couple of decades has led to vicious cycles of debt, poverty 
and underdevelopment, which the main donor countries seem to exploit to further maintain the 
status quo of the industrialised countries over those of the poorer developing world.  
Our private interest hypothesis helps us to explain why the FATF chose to be undemocratic 
and not to engage in any credible attempts in legitimating itself. Although the FATF has created a 
number of FATF-style regional bodies (the so called FSRBs) to try and portray an inclusive quasi-
membership, such structures, at the beginning, were nothing more than mere vehicles of extending, 
imposing, and now preserving the regime. Now we turn to look at South Africa in order to explain 
why it will continue to implement the regime even if it shows no signs of being effective and 
efficient in detecting crime. In doing this, we also argue that the regime will not just continue to 
be inefficient and ineffective, but may lend itself to abuse either by local politicians who may want 
to settle political scores or by foreign powers. The latter may indirectly seek to manipulate the 
national FIUs by gaining access to politically sensitive transactions for purposes of ‘regime 
change’ or for influencing future power relations within satellite countries of interest. South Africa, 
like many other natural resource-rich but less-developed countries, is an interesting case for 
                                                                





analysing issues of legitimacy, because of the vested Western interests in the natural resources of 
the country.  
There are a number of justifications or factors that may today give the global FATF and its 
standards some semblance of legitimacy. In Chapter 5 we explained how the regime was adopted 
in South Africa. Our main finding was that South Africa was coerced into adopting the FATF 
standards in order to pre-empt a real threat of being blacklisted, as other countries had been, under 
the NCCT campaign. We also found that even without the FATF pressure, South Africa was 
eventually going to adopt the standards. The question, however, is whether South Africa would 
have adopted a different regime to the one it did under pressure from the FATF. In other words, 
did the South African authorities know that adopting the FATF standards, through emulating 
developed country models of KYC/CDD, would lead to unintended and undesirable consequences 
of financial exclusion?  
According to Louis de Koker, South African authorities did have an appreciation of the 
potential negative impact of KYC/CDD1275. However, they might have had imperfect information 
on the actual impact since the regulations were new and no developing country lessons could be 
drawn on. The countries from which the SALRC borrowed were all developed economies which 
did not have the exact socio-economic underdevelopment dilemmas of South Africa and other 
developing countries. To this end, when FICA was passed, it had regulatory exemptions (the initial 
‘exemption 17’) which attempted to waive regulatory compliance with the KYC/CDD so as to 
minimise the risk of financial exclusion1276. But the initial exemption 17, according to de Koker, 
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did not work1277.  According to him the exemption ‘was not of much practical use or did not shield 
potential poor clients from unwarranted FICA impact’1278.   
With the introduction of the ‘Mzansi Banking Account Initiative’ in 2004, a new exemption 
17 was promulgated1279. These regulatory exemptions and similar other measures put in place to 
mitigate the risks of financial exclusion have gained some recognition from the FATF following 
the passing of its first ever policy on developing countries in 20081280. South Africa was therefore 
aware of the potential dangers of KYC/CDD and did try to put mitigation measures in place. There 
was, however, lack of guidance from the FATF on how developing countries should deal with 
KYC/CDD. This lack of guidance may have added enormous costs of implementing these 
standards for developing countries as they later, after satisfying the FATF’s demands to 
incorporate the regime, had to take steps to rectify or find a more suitable KYC/CDD regulatory 
design for their socio-economic circumstances.  
 
Contesting legitimacy 
It is our view that non-member countries of undemocratic bodies such as the FATF should 
challenge such bodies until they have reformed themselves to be more democratic. However, this 
cannot be achieved without any form of coordination and organisation among such aggrieved 
countries, especially when they face an organised group of countries such as the G7, which has the 
capability to use its economic power. However many countries who were directly (through the 
NCCT blacklists) or indirectly (through pre-emptive compliance) coerced to adopt the FATF 
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standards did not make any coordinated attempts to challenge the FATF. Those who did 
individually resist risked huge economic costs. Jason Sharman has recounted the story of Nauru.  
“...the Pacific island of Nauru had point-blank refused to accept the FATF’s 
ultimatum unless it was compensated to the tune of $10 million. The effect of the 
FATF blacklist led to a de facto financial blockade by private institutions and the 
complete collapse of the country’s financial system. Currently, Nauru has not a 
single functioning bank, and the country has so successfully been stigmatized that 
now, even after complying with the FATF’s demands, no bank is willing to take 
the reputational risk of opening a branch in the country”1281. 
The economic damage caused to Nauru by this blacklisting and incorporation of the FATF 
standards seems not to matter to the FATF and its founders. What this shows it that the lack of a 
coordinated effort by developing countries did rather make individual defiance against the 
powerful and organised interests unsustainable. Nauru was stigmatised despite the absence of any 
empirical evidence which suggested that money launderers may have used it more than they used 
those countries that were not stigmatised. While developing countries should ideally defend their 
freedom, many structural factors linked to their immediate interests or vulnerabilities (particularly 
economic dependence) may seem to coalesce and blur the bigger picture of their fight for equal 
treatment and involvement in global policy making.    
 
Submitting to FATF’s legitimacy claims 
We have to acknowledge that the FATF did invite a few developing countries to become 
its members when it again reviewed its membership position in 1998. Three of these (Argentina, 
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Brazil and Mexico) were given membership in 2000, while South Africa, Russia, India and China 
were invited later, after the FATF had resumed its blacklisting campaign. Russia is the only 
country from those that were blacklisted that ended up being invited for membership. Both these 
factors point to some reasonable justification for the incorporation of the FATF standards by these 
countries as they were already being offered membership. The invitation and acceptance of 
membership by these countries would appear to have given the FATF some form of ex-post 
legitimation. This had a further confirmatory effect on its standards which these countries had 
already domesticated prior to their formal inclusion as members1282. (Many other countries were 
made members of the so-called FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs), with FATF members or the 
so-called ‘sponsoring countries’ overlooking/supervising their compliance). Since these countries 
had already legitimated these standards by making them national laws, it therefore made some 
sense for them to join the FATF and to try and influence change from within— especially 
concerning the implementation of these standards in developing countries.    
There is a strong view that developing countries need to participate in these global forums 
to try and influence change from within. Those who encourage this view believe that it is precisely 
because these countries are excluded that they need to push for inclusiveness in these forums in 
order to advance their interests. Giandomenico Majone has, for instance, observed and argued that 
“..the importance of these international organisation is growing continuously, and no government 
can afford to ignore them or to be a purely passive member”1283. Issues of democracy affect not 
just non-state, but other more inclusive international organisations, such as the UN where the 
Security Council voting rights are skewed in favour of developed countries. However, to expect 
developing countries to disengage from all these institutions based on strict adherence to principles 
and values of democracy, sovereignty and legitimacy would be somehow unrealistic. Instead 
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developing countries should strive for inclusiveness. It is when they are inside these institutions 
that they could bargain and influence global policy-making. The participation of South Africa and 
other developing countries in the FATF might have facilitated some change in the manner in which 
the FATF conducted itself and, perhaps, now thinks about its standards, especially with regards to 
their implementation in developing countries. It might also have been the FATF’s strategy to seek 
ex-post legitimation once its goal of diffusing the regime had already been achieved.  
In 2008 the FATF acknowledged for the first time that developing countries needed to 
implement the regime in a manner that did not lead to unintended consequences of financial 
exclusion1284. This acknowledgement did not come automatically, but followed from the Genesis 
and the CGAP research that we referred to earlier (see Chapter 1 and 5 and 6) which showed that 
implementing strict KYC/CDD measures in developing countries had its own negative 
implications. As shown in Chapter 6, these experiences and solutions of regulatory exemptions do 
not yet fully shield those who might be negatively impacted by the KYC/CDD regulations in areas 
of access to banking but do go some way in minimising the risks of financial exclusion. We now 
turn to the concluding part of this Chapter where we offer an explanation as to why South Africa, 
and many other developing countries that might be in a similar position, will continue to implement 
the global FATF standards of financial regulation despite lack of evidence as to their effectiveness 
and efficiency in the detection and combating of crime.  
 
Why developing countries continue to implement the FATF standards? 
It appears that there is one overarching reason for the continued implementation of the 
FATF standards. This reason is that the FATF standards have been merged with the neoliberal 
structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank (the International Financial 
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Institutions (IFIs)) 1285. It is important to show how the FATF standards have become part of the 
IMF/World Bank conditions for loans and aid. The FATF standards, together with many other 
financial regulatory and supervisory standards of similar non-state transnational bodies, have 
become the new structural adjustment programmes overseen by the IFIs. Alexander, et al., have 
meticulously analysed the role of these non-state bodies, which they refer to as “international 
financial supervisory bodies”, in setting regulatory and supervisory standards1286.  
In their work Global Governance of Financial Systems, they analyse how some of these 
bodies, particularly the BCBS, FATF, IOSCO, IAIS and their standards are being used by IFIs to 
set ‘conditionalities’ and minimum standards that need to be observed and complied with by 
governments and market players1287. Making these various forms of standards part of IFI 
‘conditionalities’ and financial surveillance programmes have effectively made them more 
mandatory and institutionalised even beyond the blacklists that the FATF utilised to demand 
compliance. The FATF standards became part of the IFI programmes in 1999 when the IMF and 
the World Bank started the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP)1288. This joint 
programme is aimed at evaluating the IFI members (about 185 countries) on the implementation 
and compliance with the 12 different sets of global standards and codes made by a variety of these 
standard setters. These currently include, among others, the standards of the BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS, 
and the IFIs themselves1289.  
The list of standards, codes and principles1290 are as follows; IMF’s, Special Data 
Dissemination Standard/General Data Dissemination System (SDDS/GDDS- (data 
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transparency)), Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, Code of Good Practices on 
Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies; the Basel Committee’s Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision; IOSCO Objectives and Principles for Securities Regulation, the 
IAIS Insurance Supervisory Principles; the Committee on Payments and Settlements Systems 
(CPSS) Core Principles for Systemically Important Payments Systems; CPSS-IOSCO Joint Task 
Force’s Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems; FATF’s 40+9 Recommendations; 
OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance; International Accounting Standards Board’s 
International Accounting Standards; International Federation of Accountants’ International 
Standards on Auditing; and the World Bank’s Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency 
and Creditor Rights Systems.  
The FSAPs evaluate IMF members’ financial sectors1291. The IMF does these assessments 
under Article IV and this involves consultation of its Articles of Association in jurisdictions with 
financial sectors it deems to be ‘systemically important’1292. In these countries the IMF’s Article 
IV financial stability assessments and surveillance takes place every five years and are 
mandatory1293. For other jurisdictions (or the less systemically important jurisdictions), FSAP 
assessments are allegedly ‘voluntary’1294. While these are conducted by the IMF in developed 
countries, in developing and emerging economies they are conducted jointly by the IMF, focussing 
on financial stability, and the World Bank which does financial development assessments1295.  
These assessments result in reports which are published on assessed countries known as 
Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) and Financial System Stability 
Assessment Updates. These reports are one of the sources used by private Credit Rating Agencies 
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(CRAs) (such as Moody’s, Standards & Poor and Fitch-IBCA) to assign a credit rating to sovereign 
and private sector borrowers of a country for debt issuing purposes in the capital markets1296. This 
means therefore that if countries do not comply with some of these standards, sovereign and private 
sector borrowers may have unfavourable ratings which can adversely affect their ability to raise or 
issue debt at affordable rates. Developing countries and their private sector institutions rely heavily 
on foreign investments and IFIs in raising capital. As explained by Ferri et al., credit ratings offer 
financial markets an estimate of the probability that borrowers will not fulfil their obligations in 
their debt issues1297. Financial markets further rely on CRAs constantly to update credit ratings 
they have assigned to issuers1298. When the ratings are low, issuers pay higher interest rates, 
embodying larger risk premiums than high-rated issuers1299. Ms. Lerato Mokhesi of the SARB’s 
Banking Supervision Division told us that  
“Although the FATF standards are not binding in the strict sense of the word, they 
are binding because compliance to FATF standards or lack thereof affects your 
[credit] rating as a country. Remember that the World Bank and the IMF conduct 
what they call the Financial Sector Assessment Programs, the FSAPs. In according 
a rating to a country they do recognise the level of compliance of your country or 
lack thereof with the FATF and other standards. So though they may not be binding 
on a strict sense, they do affect your rating as a country…” 
The Director of South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Centre, Mr. Murray Mitchell, 
explained the importance of adhering to international standards in parliament while presenting his 
organisation’s annual report. Referring to the FATF standards and their benefit to South Africa, 
he said;   
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“The benefit of this system (FATF standards) essentially...centres around good 
governance and integrity of...financial institutions and the business 
community...the system is designed to protect the integrity of that financial 
community- to lead to market stability, ultimately...it’s a component part of 
reducing the costs of borrowing; credit rating, in other words. It ultimately increases 
investor confidence, and then banks with integrity have the ability to then transact 
and transact internationally...South Africa is a member of the FATF and 
membership means a country has committed itself at a political level to work within 
the FATF and aligns itself to FATF policies. This includes implementing the best 
standards and practices within the country and to also enable this to happen in the 
region. It also means implementing FATF decisions.”1300   
A number of issues are highlighted by this statement concerning South Africa’s rationale 
for implementing the standards. However, the emphasis here is that the FATF standards are viewed 
as “a component part of reducing the cost of borrowing” or “credit rating”. That appears to be the 
main legitimating reason for them. As Murray Mitchell further states in the same presentation, 
issues of financial integrity and credit rating “are a component of the tranche of issues that the 
Minister of Finance will be responsible for in order to ensure that financial systems work as a 
foundation for economic and social development within the country”. He continued to enlighten 
the MPs that  
“These same issues apply [not for just banks but] for financial institutions. Certainly 
we would want those institutions in our country to have the utmost integrity...They 
too benefit from the process. So it becomes a dynamic interaction between the 
institutions and the governance structures within the country. The law enforcement 
community benefits...by using the information [suspicious transaction reports] sent 
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to it on organised crime, terror networks-- and obviously, this impacts on the levels 
of financial crime in the long term.”1301  
We get from this statement therefore that in the short term, the FATF standards impact on 
the country’s credit rating and, in the long term, “on the level of financial crime”. However, as 
shown in Chapter 7, more than 90,000 FTRs were reported to the FIC and thousands referred to 
LEAs. Of all these FTRs only 4 convictions could be linked to them. This means that the FTRs 
measures have ‘obviously’ not impacted on ‘financial crime’. After a long presentation by Murray 
Mitchel, one Member of Parliament exclaimed to him that 
“We are missing success stories here! May you be having a problem of getting how 
many of these cases that have been referred [by the FIC to law enforcement 
agencies] were favourably concluded?”1302  
  Instead of answering this question, Mitchell assured the members of parliament that South 
Africa was making headways and would soon start to produce results. He also lectured them that 
the country’s regime was new - compared to those of other countries - and was not doing badly1303. 
On whatever assessment, the achievements of the FATF regime in South Africa and many other 
countries cannot be called effective and cost-efficient in detecting crime. The main legitimacy 
claim of the FATF standards and the reason why they continue to be implemented is that they are 
aligned to the FSAPs. They do not yet claim their legitimacy from their output as they appear to 
be not assisting in the detection of crime. This is however not a peculiar situation for South Africa 
and, probably, other developing countries. Evidence increasingly shows that many developed 
countries are struggling to identify tangible outputs of these standards when it comes to the fight 
against crime.  
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The several FTRs regime reviews carried out by the UK and the US governments, as 
discussed in Chapter 7, show clearly that even the originating countries are struggling to identify 
the positive outcomes of the FATF standards, despite their enormous costs to consumers as 
taxpayers and as patrons of regulated businesses. While the business community has often 
mounted challenges to the national regulatory regimes, calling for accountability of the standards, 
consumers have not. The latter group remains unorganised and cut out from any form of 
representation from the deliberative processes of the regime though they are the ones who 
ultimately fund it.  
The FSAP programme has implications for countries needing to raise capital from the 
capital markets and also to those countries that rely heavily on the IMF and the World Bank for 
financial assistance and loans. The FATF standards have become part of the neoliberal structural 
adjustments and are being used as a yardstick or incentive for determining sovereign and private 
sector credit ratings by the international CRAs. The acceptance of FATF standards in developing 
countries are, therefore, due to these attached market incentives of maintaining a good credit record 
and minimising the costs of borrowing. Developing countries are generally vulnerable to neoliberal 
economic pressures of creating market-friendly environments which are believed to establish an 
attractive space for foreign direct investments. These neoliberal pressures are thought to be 
essential in driving social development and economic growth. As explained by Ferri et al., “besides 
affecting the cost at which issuers can borrow, ratings determine the extent of potential 
investors.”1304  
Non-adoption of these standards, therefore, does not only affect a country’s credit rating, 
but applies in areas of extraterritorial regulation which are aimed at managing and minimising 
systemic risks in the global financial system and within countries1305. For instance, financial 
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regulators in G10 countries may require that foreign banks seeking a licence to operate in their 
jurisdictions come from jurisdictions which meet these standards1306. The merging of standards 
developed by private and non-state bodies with those of IFIs and market players (CRAs) create 
market (dis)incentives for (non)-compliance1307. It has indeed been observed that organisations, 
especially non-state, facing a legitimation crisis, tend to align their programmes with those of other 
bigger and more recognised organisations in order to build or repair their legitimacy1308.  
In aligning its programmes with those of the World Bank and the IMF, the FATF and its 
standards has become widely viewed as legitimate in South Africa. Most countries would therefore 
do their utmost to protect their sovereign and private sector lines of credit. However as known with 
other forms of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes of IFIs, which have left a trail of 
underdevelopment in many countries throughout Africa since being introduced a couple of decades 
ago, they have hardly led to the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment1309.   
 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter has looked at issues of the legitimacy of the FATF regime in 
relation to developing countries. The interest of this study on developing countries was largely 
motivated by their exclusion in deliberative processes of the FATF and the coercive manner in 
which the FATF standards were imposed on them. The FATF has, after imposing these standards 
to more than 160 jurisdictions started to open up to issues of participation by extending 
membership to some developing countries and creating additional vehicles (the FSRBs) which it 
uses to spread and preserve the regime. All this ex-post inclusion of developing countries seems 
to be attempts aimed at repairing the FATF’s credibility. However, the FATF and its founders 
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deliberately did not seek legitimacy in the early years because they could not effectively spread 
their standards without their questionable practices of blacklists and of merging them with the 
neoliberal adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank. This compels many countries 
to implement these standards even though they hardly address the problems which some may have 


















Summary and Recommendations 
 This work sought to determine why and how the global FATF regime emerged and was 
incorporated in developing countries -- using South Africa as an empirical case study of 
incorporation and implementation. This was in light of the view emerging from research conducted 
in Europe which pointed to a regime that has failed to achieve its goals of detecting money 
laundering and of protecting the global financial system from such alleged threats from money 
launders and terrorist financiers. This was done in the context of developing country socio-
economic conditions of underdevelopment, which are markedly different to those of developed 
countries. This chapter draws the key conclusions reached mainly in the four findings in chapter 
5, 6, 7 and 8 and makes some recommendations around the key themes tackled in them.  It is the 
hope of this researcher that the findings and recommendations of this study will help the 
government of South Africa and other countries mainly in the developing world, policy makers, 
regulators and law enforcement agencies and academics who may pursue further research on some 
of the issues arising from this study.    
Chapter 1 of this work introduced the topic of regulating money laundering in developing 
countries. It reviewed the background to the emergence of the global anti-money laundering 
regime which comprises hard (UN Vienna Convention of 1988) and soft (FATF standards) law 
features. We showed how the soft law FATF standards have ultimately become hard law through 
their infusion into binding international UN Conventions against organized crime, corruption and 
terrorism, among others. While the UN hard law components of the global AML regime focused 
on criminal law (criminalization of money laundering), civil law (asset seizure and forfeiture) and 
international cooperation (mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties), the FATF standards 
added an innovative pillar of financial regulation. It is the financial regulatory aspects of the global 
regime and their coerced diffusion and implementation that were the focus of the study. We 




implementation and the tensions they brought about under the socio-economic conditions of 
underdevelopment in developing countries.  
In Chapter 2 we conceptualized and contextualised the business financial regulatory 
standards of the FATF through which governments have regulated different types of private 
businesses and professions to perform various anti-money laundering and counter-financing of 
terrorism functions. These include; the reporting of suspicious, unusual, cross-border and threshold 
transactions of customers to FIUs, the training of staff, the KYC/CDD regulations, record keeping 
and the appointment of Anti-Money Laundering Reporting/Compliance Officers. These regulatory 
measures required business to play an active role in the detection and combating of crime. We 
argued that the regulations are based on the situational crime prevention and risk regulation 
strategies. We highlighted the weaknesses of basing these regulatory measures on situational crime 
prevention and risk regulation strategies, especially in developing economies.  
We argued that situational crime prevention bedevils the regime with fundamental flaws 
and may militate against the alleged objectives and goals of the regime as these regulatory 
measures do not necessarily help in the combating of crime but rather deflects it to unregulated 
sectors of the economy. We also argued that this problem of crime deflection may explain the 
incremental expansion of the financial regulatory regime from initially banks to other financial 
and non-financial institutions and professions. We further argued that this would ultimately lead 
to a costly and endless cycle of regulation where the list of regulated private businesses kept on 
expanding without any tangible evidence of its benefits. The major difficulty of this is that the 
regime may not only deflect crime to the informal sectors of the economy, which do not easily 
lend themselves to regulation, but may deflect large sectors of the population into using costly 
informal financial services and thus increase the already enormous transaction costs for the poor. 
We also stated our research questions and hypotheses.  
Chapter 3 dealt with the theoretical framework. This was a study of financial regulations 




transformed the manner in which law enforcement deals with crime by extending its roles to the 
boardrooms of private businesses. This has transformed the manner in which the regulated 
businesses operate by imposing law enforcement duties of policing and monitoring their 
customers. In light of this, we used the theories of regulation to determine why regulation emerges. 
With respect to regulation theory, two competing theories of regulation of public and private 
interest were discussed and led to the development of our competing hypotheses which guided our 
research design and methodology.  
In Chapter 4 we discussed the South Africa’s legal, regulatory and institutional framework 
against money laundering, We focused on three main pieces of legislation; POCA, FICA and 
POCDATARA, the regulations and the institutions that play a major role in the implementation 
and enforcement of the domesticated regime. We also looked at the jurisprudence that has 
developed, noting that there has been a tendency to over-apply measures aimed at dealing with 
organized criminal activities to other peripheral issues such as drunken driving. We observed that 
this over-application of laws directed at combating terrorism and serious organized crime has also 
been experienced in countries such as the UK, where the government froze the assets of Icelandic 
banks in the wake of the global recession in 2008. The over-extension of these laws to areas that 
they were not tacitly intended for may create problems of abuse and possible affront to civil 
liberties. We however noted that while the POCA has extensively been used by the AFU to seize 
proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, the other pieces of legislation have hardly been tested in 
court in South Africa. While the first four chapters laid a foundation for our empirical research, 
Chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8 started to test our competing regulatory hypotheses of public and private 
interest.  
In Chapter 5 we examined the global diffusion and the incorporation of the FATF standards 
in South Africa, probing whether this served to advance their alleged public interest goals and 
objectives (of detecting crime and preserving the global financial system from abuse/misuse by 




especially the US, who pushed for the diffusion of the regime throughout the globe at all costs 
even through the use of force. We traced the development of the financial regulatory regime to the 
US in the early 1970s, showing that the US had expressed disquiet concerning regulatory arbitrage 
and desired other countries to implement similar measures in order to level the playing field. This 
led to the global spread of the US’s financial regulatory regime which gained momentum with the 
formation of the FATF in 1989. This led to the diffusion of these regulatory standards to the so-
called regulatory and/or tax havens and developing countries through the controversial campaigns 
of NCCT blacklists of the FATF, which many scholars have questioned. The NCCT blacklists 
were critiqued in light of the lack of a legal mandate by the FATF and given that these countries 
were deliberately excluded from the membership of the FATF and thus could not participate in the 
shaping of such regulations.  
While many countries were not blacklisted, including South Africa, we nonetheless found 
that the FATF standards were adopted under some tremendous undue pressure. They were adopted 
in order to pre-empt a potential blacklist, as attested to by South Africa’s then Minister of Finance, 
Mr. Trevor Manuel and others who warned, during FICA parliamentary deliberations, of South 
Africa’s non-compliance with the standards and the consequent potential economic hazards1310. 
Another important finding is that although the standards were portrayed as voluntary soft law 
mechanisms and flexible to adaptation to various socio-economic conditions, the coercive manner 
through which they were extended cancelled that out. As a result of this forced adoption, the 
flexibility and adaptability of these standards to conditions of underdevelopment could not be 
appreciated, let alone acted upon promptly in order to mitigate their potential unintended 
consequences of financial exclusion. It was only during implementation that these tensions 
between the FATF standards, especially those of financial exclusion wrought by KYC/CDD, 
clearly came to the fore, leading to the necessary delays in implementing the regime, especially 
within the banking sector.  
                                                                




Our main recommendation regarding global regulation is that where policy making is 
genuinely intended to solve global issues of concern, global forums - formal or informal, state or 
non-state - should at least be democratic and representative of developing countries in the earliest 
phases. This would help in bringing to the fore the pressing issues of developing countries. 
Excluding developing countries while over-representing developed countries may result in skewed 
policies which may perpetuate global inequalities between developed and developing countries 
and national inequalities. They may tend further to alienate the poor in these countries and 
perpetuate the ever-widening socio-economic inequalities. 
We showed this in Chapter 6 with the implementation of KYC/CDD regulations within 
South Africa’s banking sector. We found, as other recent studies1311 have, that South Africa had 
adopted a regime that was in tension with its socio-economic realities. These were conditions 
where more than 56% of its adult population had no bank account at the turn of the century and 
most of them could not meet the documentary requirements of KYC/CDD1312. We showed how 
around the same time that KYC/CDD regulations were being introduced, there were also 
widespread campaigns directed at the banking sector to reform and extend its services and 
infrastructure and to be more accommodative given its discriminatory and exclusionary tendencies 
under apartheid and well into the democratic dispensation. 
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The KYC/CDD requirements were on a collision course with such a campaign and forced 
the government to come up with regulatory exemptions (Exemption 17) in order to mitigate the 
unintended and undesirable consequences of financial exclusion.  We found however that even 
though there are these regulatory exemptions, they are discretionary and some banks may waive 
them in order to exclude some population groups that fail to source the prescribed documentary 
requirements such as proof of residence. It is our recommendation that the South Africa 
government might, where feasible, make the application of regulatory exemptions compulsory to 
mitigate this risk of exclusion. To avoid all these problems that developing countries face when 
implementing international best practice standards, it is necessary for policy making at that level 
to be as inclusive and as representative as possible.   
In Chapter 7 we focused on the outcomes of regulating private businesses to report 
customer transactions (FTRs) to FIUs. Our main finding was that the regime was neither efficient 
nor effective in assisting to achieve its alleged objectives, those of crime detection. Although any 
regime would have reasonable regulatory costs, it must also have some benefits- otherwise it 
constitutes bad and disproportionate regulation. Out of more than 90,000 FTRs that were filed with 
the FIC by regulated businesses since its formation to 2008, only 4 convictions had been achieved 
from investigations initiated by FTRs. LEAs were also generally of the view that the FTRs were 
not very useful in initiating new investigations, but sometimes assisted with providing information 
on ongoing investigations. We argued that the lack of positive benefits from this regime were 
rather disturbing given the costs that have been expended on it by government, regulated 
businesses and society - which funds the former two. We recommend that South Africa needs to 
do an independent review of its FTRs regime with a view to identifying where the problems lie 
and of making its regime efficient and effective. Such a review should track what happens to the 
FTRs that are received by the FIC, those that are referred to LEA, both locally and abroad.  
Another finding in relation to the FIC and the FTRs regime is that the FIC receives raw 




LEAs1313. Although the FIC is referred to as an ‘intelligence centre’, it is not, in our view, an 
intelligence agency or organization in a legal sense. South Africa may need to relook at the 
accountability and oversight mechanisms of the FIC as it is involved in intelligence activities 
without the full requisite mechanisms that other national security and crime intelligence agencies 
are subjected to. This could assist in preventing any potential abuses of power by the Centre, 
although these issues are partially covered by Section 40 and 60 of FICA. Another 
recommendation is with respect to the keeping of information by the Centre. South Africa may 
look at introducing data protection laws (through its Protection of Personal Information Bill) and 
data retention regulations regarding the continued keeping and controlled destruction of personal 
information in the form of FTRs reported to it but which have, for a considerable period of time 
(perhaps 5 or 10 years), been neither used nor yielded any positive results.        
In Chapter 8 we tackled the issue of legitimacy of the FATF and its standards. We argued 
that from the start, the FATF failed to build its badly needed legitimacy when it came to seeking 
compliance with its standards by developing countries. We showed how it used old discredited 
colonial and imperial, but yet effective, ties to try and extend its regime to non-FATF countries. 
This was followed by the naming and shaming blacklists, which worsened its legitimacy crisis. It 
then tried to repair its legitimacy by extending and merging its standards with those of stronger 
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. We argued that the merging of the FATF 
standards with those of the IMF and World Bank is the main reason why many developing 
countries would continue to implement the regime despite its failure to achieve the alleged public 
interest goals of combating crime. This is because they have become part of the whole package of 
standards that are taken into account by credit rating agencies in order to determine credit ratings 
for countries. Developing countries are therefore justified on these grounds to implement the 
regime. However, merging bad FATF regulations with other prudential regulatory measures does 
                                                                




not make them effective in achieving their alleged primary objectives. It merely creates a 
regulatory burden for these countries.  
 In conclusion, it is important to emphasise that not all aspects of the global AML regime 
were imposed on South Africa. Some aspects appear to have come about in a rational attempt to 
develop South Africa’s laws that deal with organized crime post-apartheid. Such aspects as asset 
forfeiture appear, in the main, to be working quite well given the outcomes of the AFU since its 
formation that we discussed in Chapter 7. It is the business regulatory aspects of the regime that 
need revisiting in order to ascertain why FTRs account for such a low number of successes. A 
cost-benefit analysis is important to ascertain whether the regime can still be rescued in the public 
interest. This is not out of much concern for regulated businesses, but for the ordinary consumer 
who funds the government and private sector compliance through increased transaction costs. 
Developing countries do need anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism laws and regulations, but 
they must be good laws. Where they are not achieving their goals or bringing about unintended 
and undesirable consequences, global standard-setters and national governments need to be open-
minded and flexible to review their systems with the view to improving them.  
Lastly, there can be other objectives attached to the AML/CTF laws, as long as such objectives are 
legitimate and are not aimed at achieving narrow interests at the expense of others, especially 
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Appendix 1.1: Categories of Participants Reached 
Table 1: Categories of participants 
Type of Institution Number of Interviewees Rank or Job Position 
Private Banks  4 banks and 5 individuals 4 Group AML Compliance Officers 
1 trainee in one of the 4 groups. 
Regulatory Supervisory Body 
South African Reserve Bank 
1 2 interviews 
Regulatory Supervisory Body: 
Independent Regulatory Board of 
Auditors 
1 Head of Compliance 
Professional Association: South 
African Insurance Association 
(SAIA) 
1 Manager  
Professional Associations: South 
African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants 
3 Group interview with Senior 
Manager, Researcher and 
Consultant from KPMG 
Law Enforcement Agencies: SAPS, 
NPA, AFU, Commercial Crimes 
Unit 
10 6 Directors- both investigations and 
prosecutions. 4 Middle level 
investigators. 
Private Organizations: South 
African Banking Risk (SABRIC) 
1 Director: Commercial Crime 
Compliance & Risk Resources Pty 
Ltd. John Symington 
1 AML compliance specialist 














Appendix 4.1: A short summary of some cases cited in Chapter 4.  
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Kyriacou  
 In this case, a High Court Judge refused to make a restraint order on the grounds that the stolen 
property of about R4,5 million in the possession of the defendant had already been seized in terms 
Section 34 (1) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and paid back to the rightful owners. 
On top of this, the NDPP applied to the High Court for a restraint order, which was provisionally 
granted by Cillie J, pending the return of service. However on the return day, Judge Cillie J set the 
provisional order aside. He was of the view that no proper grounds had been established for making 
a restraint order because: 1. the 4.5 million stolen property had already been paid back to the 
rightful owners in terms of Criminal Procedure Act, and 2. it was highly unlikely that a confiscation 
order would be made against the defendant. On appeal by the state, Mlambo J, sitting at the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, held at par 11 that “A court that convicts an offender is not restricted to 
making a confiscation order in relation only to offences which the offender has been 
convicted…the Act authorizes a court to make a confiscation order once it has found that the 
offender has benefited either from an offence of which he has been convicted, or from any criminal 
activity which the court finds to be sufficiently related to those offences. A finding that the offender 
has benefited in any of those respects constitutes the jurisdictional fact that is necessary for a court 
to exercise its discretion to make a confiscation order. 
 
 
S v Shaik and Others    
Mr. Shabir Shaik and his companies had corruptly been given shares worth ZAR21 018 000. Over 
a period of time, dividends declared on these shares were to the value of over ZAR12 million. 
These dividends were used to acquire more shareholdings on another company. The question 
before the court was whether only the initial shareholding should be confiscated or the dividends 
as well. Shaik’s counsel argued that the confiscation order was disproportionate in that the 







National Director of Public Prosecutions v R O Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd   
The summary and background of this case is in par 2 of the judgment and is as follows; “NDPP v 
RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd (‘Cook Properties’) concerns a suburban house in Randburg, 
Gauteng (‘the property’).  The owner (a private family company) let it under a written lease as ‘a 
guest house’.  The NDPP alleged that the lessees used it as a brothel ‘in contravention of Section 
20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 31 of 1957’; and that persons kidnapped by one Michael Zinqi 
and his cohorts were assaulted and held hostage on the property.  The owner opposed the 
application.  In the Johannesburg High Court, Willis J found that it had not been proved that the 
property was an instrumentality of an offence and dismissed the NDPP’s application”.  
 
 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v 37 Gillespie Street Durban (Pty) Ltd and Another   
The summary and background of this case is in par 3 of judgment, as follows; “…the NDPP alleged 
that drug and prostitution offences were committed on the property, which was operated as a hotel 
known as ‘the Blenheim’ at 37 Gillespie Street in the Point area (‘the hotel’).  The respondents – 
a property-owning company the sole asset of which is the hotel and the bond-holder – anticipated 
protracted proceedings and so the owner applied for legal expenses to enable it to resist the 
forfeiture application. When this application came before Magid J in the Durban High Court, he 
insisted that the instrumentality question be argued first, since he thought that might dispose of the 
litigation.  It did.  He found that the NDPP had not discharged the onus of proving that the hotel 
was an instrumentality of an offence.  He set aside the preservation order and dismissed the 
forfeiture application with costs…” 
 
 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Seevnarayan   
The summary and background of this case is, in par 4 of judgment, as follows; “NDPP v 
Seevnarayan concerns investments totalling R4 115 738.58 that a taxpayer had made under false 
names with a life insurance company (Sanlam).  His purpose was to conceal the moneys and their 
proceeds so as to evade income tax.  The scheme came apart at the end of 1999 when, fearing 




demanded authentic proof of identity.  The conduct of the attorney, Mr Yusuf Mohammed Essack 
of Durban, was referred to the Law Society for investigation, while the NDPP sought forfeiture of 
the investments and the interest on them as instrumentalities of offences and proceeds of unlawful 
activities.  Griesel J in the Cape High Court dismissed the application, holding that the money was 
not the means by which the frauds and tax evasion were committed, and that the NDPP had not 



















Appendix 4.2: Some notes and analysis on the interpretation of ‘instrumentality of an offence’ and 
‘proceeds of criminal activity’ under POCA 
Interpreting ‘instrumentality of an offence’ 
Section 1 of POCA defines the phrase ‘instrumentality of an offence’ to mean “any property which 
is concerned in the commission of an offence”. Such an event/offence might have occurred before or after 
the coming into force of POCA. Further, such an offence may have been committed within South Africa or 
anywhere else in the world. In interpreting this definition, Mpati DP and Cameron JA noted that it was too 
wide, but stated that the legislature intended it to be so. However, they opined that there has to be some 
restriction. They noted that a literal interpretation of this definition could  
“…lead to forfeiture of property whose role in or utility to a crime is entirely incidental to 
its commission, such as a public vehicle on which a passenger steals an item from another, 
or a building in whose recesses a fleeing criminal finds refuge, or a flat rented by a thief 
who stores loot under a mattress”1314.  
Mpati DP and Cameron JA argued that this ‘unbounded literalism’ would be inappropriate. According to 
them at par 13, the words ‘concerned in’ in the definition of an ‘instrumentality of an offence’ were never 
intended to be used in their ‘wide, literal sense’. They then outlined two principles that guided their 
interpretation of the ‘instrumentality of an offence’ phrase. The first is the purpose of POCA and then the 
guiding principles of legislative interpretation as contained in the South African constitution. With regards 
to the former, they reasoned that POCA’s purpose, as stated in its preamble, suggested some restriction to 
the ‘instrumentality’ phrase. The part of the preamble they particularly referred to is that which states that 
“…no…person (is) entitled to use property for the commission of an offence” (POCA Preamble) 
They reasoned that the words ‘use’ of property ‘for’ the commission of an offence “denotes a 
relationship of direct functionality between what is used and what is achieved”1315.  On par 14, and in the 
light of this direct functionality, they argue that the ‘vehicle, building and flat posited in the examples earlier 
                                                                





could not be said to have been ‘used for’ the commission of an offence’. According to them, the words 
‘concerned in the commission of an offence’ must be interpreted so that  
“…the link between the crime committed and the property is reasonably direct, and the 
employment of the property must be functional to the commission of the crime…the 
property must play a reasonably direct role in the commission of the offence…the property 
must facilitate or make possible the commission of the offence…the property must be 
instrumental in, and not merely incidental to, the commission of the offence”1316.  
They further note that crime always occurs somewhere. Perhaps this quotation from Erasmus J, in an 
unreported case regarding instrumentality, succinctly clarifies that  
“Every [scheduled] offence must be committed on some piece of property. But it would be 
absurd to infer that the legislature had intended every property on which such an offence 
had been committed to be liable to forfeiture to the State. A closer connection must be 
shown than mere presence. It must be established that the property was ‘concerned’ in the 
commission of the offence, and not merely that the offence was committed on the 
property”1317. 
With regard to the second principle that Mpati DP and Cameron JA used to interpret the 
instrumentality phrase is the construction of the provisions of POCA in line with the South African 
Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights. They note that Section 39 of the Bill of Rights in the South 
African Constitution requires that the courts, when interpreting statutes, promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bills of Rights. In this light, they argue that a literal interpretation of an instrumentality of an 
offence, as discussed in the examples of a vehicle, building and flat above, would not be consistent with 
the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution, which requires that ‘no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property’1318.     
                                                                
1316 See par 31 of National Director of Public Prosecutions v R O Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd (260/03) [2004] ZASCA 
36 (13 May 2004). 
1317  Ibid. 
1318 See Ibid. par 15. See also (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 106 of 1996 ). The South 
African Constitution is the supreme law of the republic and any law inconsistent with it would be declared 
unconstitutional by the courts, forcing the legislature to amend or repeal such a law.  The South African political and 




As a result of this analysis, Mpati DP and Cameron JA further reasoned that in determining whether 
property should be forfeit in terms of Chapter 6 of POCA, a two stage enquiry by the courts should be 
followed1319. The first stage is to ascertain whether the property concerned is indeed an instrumentality. At 
this stage, the property owners ‘guilt or wrongdoing, knowledge or lack of it’ is not the focus. What is 
important, at this stage, is to ascertain whether there is a functional relationship between the property 
concerned and the crime. The first stage may help determine whether such property was an instrumentality 
of the offence alleged, in the first place, or not. Where it is determined that the property is indeed an 
instrumentality, the second stage kicks in. The second stage involves the actual determination of whether 
such property concerned should be forfeit or not. The forfeiture would normally be automatic where no 
other party challenges the NDPP in his application for forfeiture. However, forfeitures have been widely 
challenged in South Africa. People lose such property fighting, or, in a number of cases, manage to defend 
their interests.  
It is at this stage that anybody with an interest in the property concerned is given a chance to either 
oppose the forfeiture or to request that his/her interests be excluded1320. It is also at this stage where the 
court examines the culpability of those who have an interest in the property concerned. This is taken from 
the provisions of POCA (s 52 (2A)) which require that a party that opposes forfeiture or applies for 
exclusion of an interest shall state that s/he acquired the property legally and- (a) neither knew nor had 
reasonable grounds to suspect that the property in which the interest is held is an instrumentality… or (b) 
where the offence concerned had occurred before the commencement of POCA, the applicant has since 
taken reasonable steps to prevent the use of the property for the commission of the alleged offences.  
This therefore means that those who apply for exclusion of their interest or oppose forfeiture have 
an onus to convince the court on the balance of probabilities. They bear the responsibility of defending their 
interests. This is bearing in mind that in Chapter 6 proceedings it is possible that no one could have been 
charged with any criminal offence. The respondents may defend their property by arguing and proving that 
they did not know or had no reasonable grounds to suspect that their property was being used to commit 
crime. If they knew or had suspicions, they must show that they took ‘reasonable steps’ to try and prevent 
                                                                
1319 This two stage inquiry is attributed to Ackerman J in his judgment in the Mohammed case; National Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Mohamed NO and Others  




such illegal usage of their property, such as reporting their knowledge or suspicions to the police. These 
have become known as the ‘innocent owner’ and ‘ignorant owner’ defences.  
For instance, a property owner who rents his property out may not be aware that his/her tenants are 
using the house to harvest or sell illegal drugs; therefore s/he is an ignorant owner. Or, s/he may have been 
informed by neighbours or someone else of such suspicions or knowledge of drug dealing by the tenants, 
which s/he was not involved in; therefore s/he would be an innocent owner. The property owner would in 
these instances have to prove on balance of probabilities that s/he did not know or that s/he did not have 
reasonable grounds to suspect and that s/he was not involved. However, it does not end there. S/he still has 
to show the court that, where s/he was innocent but suspicious or knew, s/he took reasonable steps to remedy 
or prevent the usage of his/her property in illegal activities. S/he may, for instance, say that s/he reported 
his/her knowledge or suspicions to the police and provide such details as a case or incident report number.  
In the judgment by Mpati J and Cameron JA, the issue of reverse onus of proof and its 
constitutionality in POCA was never been dealt with1321. It still remains to be challenged in future cases. 
However, what POCA does in Chapter 6, is that it effectively regulates property owners to play an active 
role in ensuring that their property is not used to commit crime. This active role and responsibility may be 
problematic, especially in the absence of any guidelines or explicit regulations in this regard in POCA or 
the judgment by Mpati J and Cameron JA. Consider the example of a rented property owner above. He has 
been informed by some of the neighbours who reside where his/her property is located. The neighbours 
inform him that they suspect that his/her tenants either grow or sell drugs from the rented property. POCA 
does not specify what exactly the property owner needs to do when they come to know or suspect that their 
property is being used to commit crime. POCA just states that s/he may adduce evidence in his/her forfeiture 
defence that s/he took “all reasonable steps to prevent the further use of the property concerned as an 
instrumentality of an offence…”1322  
It begs the question as to what is meant by ‘all reasonable steps’?. One sensible thing perhaps may 
be, for the rented property owner, to inform the police of his suspicion or knowledge. However, what if the 
                                                                
1321 National Director of Public Prosecutions v 37 Gillespie Street Durban (Pty) Ltd and Another; National Director 
of Public Prosecutions v R O Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd and; National Director of Public Prosecutions v Seevnarayan 
par 26. 




property owner believes that it is also reasonable to confront the tenants as well and tell them to desist from 
their activities as the neighbours are complaining about it? Would that not be reasonable in the 
circumstances? The short answer is that it may well be reasonable for a landlord to confront his tenants if 
there are problems regarding the leased property. However, confronting the tenants in such serious matters 
as drugs may put his/her life and the neighbour’s lives in danger. It is important to consider that offences 
relating to ‘instrumentality’ and terrorism as provided for in POCA are not petty, but rather serious, with 
elements of violence in some instances.  
The law itself is meant to prevent organized crime and terrorism financing—not minor 
misdemeanours. This is quite different from dealing with tenants who sometimes play their radios loudly, 
causing a nuisance to immediate neighbours. However Mpati DP and Cameron JA argue that POCA is 
legitimate in requiring property owners to play an active role over their property. They state, at par 29, that 
they agree that ‘the Act requires property owners to exercise responsibility for their property and to account 
for their stewardship of it in relation to its possible criminal utilization’. Perhaps it is fair to quote the judges 
at length so as understand their reasoning with regards to this ‘stewardship’. They write, at par 28, that  
“We agree that property owners cannot be supine. In particular, we endorse the notion that 
the State is constitutionally permitted to use forfeiture, in addition to criminal law, to 
induce members of the public to act vigilantly in relation to goods they own or possess so 
as to inhibit crime. In a constitutional state law-abiding property owners and possessors 
must, where reasonably possible, take steps to discourage criminal conduct [while 
refraining] from implicating themselves or their possessions in its ambit. And the State is 
entitled to use criminal sanctions and civil forfeitures to encourage this. Here constitutional 
principle recognizes individual moral agency and encourages citizens to embrace the 
responsibility that flows with it.” 
The intentions of this stewardship and the active role that property owners are supposed play may, 
no doubt, be well intended, i.e. to assist in combating crime. However the lack of guidelines as to what 
acting ‘vigilantly’ or taking ‘reasonable steps to prevent property from being used to commit crime’ mean 
precisely presents some complications for the general public as in the case of the property owner above. 




a property owner who rents out property aware of the provisions of POCA. S/he may be aware that his/her 
property may be forfeit if s/he rents it out to people who would use it for criminal purposes. This may mean 
that s/he has to take extra-ordinary measures to vet his/her prospective tenants and, even so, may incur an 
unsupportable level of risk.  
This may not only mean checking his/her prospective tenants for affordability, but also for such 
things as criminal records. This could end up leading to various forms of discrimination. For instance some 
property owners may choose to discriminate against rehabilitated people with criminal records. They may 
choose to discriminate against certain groups that their society has stigmatized or stereotyped, correctly or 
not. For instance, in Britain, generally, Muslims and people of Asian and Arabic origin seem to be 
stigmatized as potential terrorists based on the way they look or based on their religious leanings. Would 
the property owner be reasonable in discriminating against these groups of people as tenants out of fear that 
they might be terrorists and, therefore, might expose him to forfeiture of his property? Would the property 
owner who fails to act thus be less than vigilant and fail to exercise their stewardship role, as the Judges 
argue above?    
Another scenario could be that the rented property owner comes across ‘reasonable suspicions’ that 
his tenants are involved in crime, i.e. storing and selling drugs in his property. Without any proof, but a 
reasonable suspicion after being informed by neighbours, of such allegations, s/he orders his or her tenants 
to vacate the property concerned. S/he may reasonably not want to be associated with or be exposed to any 
possible forfeiture in the future. Would s/he be ‘reasonable’ in ordering his/her tenants to vacate the 
premises without clear evidence of wrongdoing? What if such suspicions were unfounded? What if the 
claims were motivated by a grievance on the neighbour’s part so that the evidence is false or wrong? What 
skills or even guidance could have been given to this landlord in order to evaluate these suspicions? The 
rented property owner would most probably not have been trained to do this, but is expected to, as POCA 
places a stewardship role on him/her, to take reasonable steps.       
POCA and the Honourable Judges (Mpati DP and Cameron JA) seem to consider this concept of 
reasonableness rather vaguely and without delineating it. Such vagueness may lead ‘vigilant’ property 
owners, as members of the public, to interpret the standard of reasonableness very subjectively and then act 




expect but, in the absence of any guidelines, the property owner may argue that s/he acted ‘reasonably’ in 
all these scenarios presented above. Are the POCA requirement of ‘stewardship’ and an ‘active role’ of 
property owners fair in these scenarios, especially for people who may be exposed to forfeiture of their 
property? POCA may have good intentions, but it is important that the regulatory roles prescribed for the 
members of the public are more clearly defined, fair and do not expose them and their neighbours to 
significant dangers. This is not to argue that the public should be passive or supine with respect to combating 
crime. But where the law expects them to be active it must be clear and not expose them to harm or demand 
the impossible. .  
Interpreting ‘proceeds of unlawful activities’ 
It is important to reiterate that, in terms of Chapter 6, the proceedings are against the property, not 
‘in personum’.  As a result of this, when the NDPP applies for forfeiture, s/he must apply against a specific 
property which is either an instrumentality of a crime or the proceeds of crime. This is different from the 
POCA Chapter 5 criminal proceedings where the NDPP applies for confiscation and can execute against 
any realizable property to satisfy a confiscation order. In Chapter 5, if the offender’s benefit from a robbery 
(and related criminal activities) that s/he has been convicted of is one million Rands, the state can execute 
against his/her house, money in the bank, shares in a company, an ‘affected gift(s)’ or any other interests 
that can be linked to him/her. The purpose of executing against any property of a convicted criminal may 
have been ‘to avoid the difficulty of tracing particular assets which may have been the proceeds of [a] crime 
and so to facilitate the recovery of the value of the proceeds’1323.   
However in Chapter 6 in rem proceedings, the authorities have to execute against a specific property 
that is alleged to be the proceeds of unlawful activities. Particular assets that are most probably the proceeds 
of crime must be forfeit, not simply any property of commensurate value linked to the respondent. However, 
the wide-net cast by the definition of proceeds of unlawful activity offers a lot of room to manoeuvre for 
the authorities. To reiterate, POCA defines the ‘proceeds of unlawful activities’ as  
“…any property or any service advantage, benefit or reward which was derived, received 
or retained, directly or indirectly, in the Republic or elsewhere, at any time before or after 
                                                                




the commencement of this Act, in connection with or as a result of any unlawful activity 
carried on by any person, and includes any property representing property so derived1324”. 
In his survey of forfeiture legislation in many countries, Anthony Kennedy noted that South Africa 
had the broadest definition of ‘proceeds of unlawful activities’ compared to any of the jurisdictions he 
surveyed1325.  It appears that in South Africa, just about anything could be proceeds of crime. The purpose 
of this broad cast of the definition is that “sophisticated criminals will seek to avoid proceeds being 
confiscated by creating complex systems of “camouflage”1326. Reagan ADCJ, in the Shaik judgment, 
highlights how the definition of proceeds of unlawful activities makes it clear ‘that proceeds of crime will 
constitute proceeds even if “indirectly obtained”’1327.  The definition speaks of “…any property…derived, 
received or retained, directly or indirectly”. This, for instance, could mean that, if someone bought a house 
with money earned through selling drugs, the money concerned would represent direct proceeds and the 
house bought with it could be indirect proceeds.  
Let us say that two years after the house was bought, it had doubled in value. What does this added 
value to the property represent? It may again represent still more ‘indirect’ proceeds. However, the 
definition goes even farther to mention property that was unlawfully derived as including “any property 
representing property so derived“.  Let us further assume that this house was rented out, earning the owner 
of the property more money and that the NDPP can prove that the tenants deposited such moneys in a 
particular bank account belonging to the owner of the property, perhaps in the form of rent. Would such 
rental amounts also represent ‘proceeds of unlawful activity’ in terms of this wide definition? This is 
unclear, but the answer could most probably be in the affirmative; such rental amounts may represent 
proceeds or “property representing property “,so unlawfully derived. Reagan ADCJ, in the Shaik case, 
wrote that,  
“…a person who has benefited through the enrichment of a company as a result of a crime in which 
that person has an interest will have indirectly benefited from that crime…when a shareholder 
                                                                
1324 See POCA 
1325 See Kennedy, A. 2006. Designing a civil forfeiture system: an issues list for 
policymakers and legislators. Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 13(2), 132-1632006). 
1326 See par 25 of S v Shaik and Others (CCT 86/07) [2008] ZACC 7; 2008 (5) SA 354 (CC) (29 May 2008). 




commits a crime by which his or her company is enriched, the shareholder may well benefit from 
the crime in two ways. The value of his or her shares will increase, as will the dividends generated 
by those shares, because the company is now more profitable1328.”  
From the reading of the above passage, it could be inferred that, in the example of rental earnings 
from the proceeds of a house bought with drug money above, the property owner will have benefited from 
the property representing proceeds of unlawful activity. However tracing property so directly or indirectly 
linked to proceeds of crime in Chapter 6 proceedings may prove very daunting for the authorities, especially 
where no one is convicted of any offence. However, it is important to mention that Chapter 6 proceedings 
can be set in motion even in instances where the owner of property had been charged with a criminal offence 
but was not convicted due to the lack of evidence ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, as expected in criminal 
proceedings.  
POCA further defines property as “money or any other movable, immovable, corporeal or 
incorporeal thing and includes any rights, privileges, claims and securities and any interest therein and all 
proceeds thereof”. This definition would literally suggest that anything that represents proceeds of crime 
can be forfeit in terms of POCA. It does not limit itself to the Schedule 1 predicate offences of POCA. 
Judges support the view that POCA confiscation and forfeiture provisions do not only apply to organized 
crime offences only1329. This has been found in NDPP v Van Staden1330 where Nugent JA of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal said:   
“It has been said, at times, that the purpose of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 
of 1998 is to combat the special evils that are associated with organised crime, but that is 
not entirely correct. That is certainly one of its purposes, and perhaps even its principal 
purpose…its provisions are designed to reach far beyond organised crime and apply to 
cases of individual wrongdoing1331”.  
                                                                
1328 Ibid. par 26. 
1329See National Director of Public Prosecutions v Van Staden and Others (531/05) [2006] ZASCA 107; [2006] SCA 
135 (RSA) (9 November 2006).  
1330 Ibid. 




In this case, the Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide whether a vehicle driven on a public road 
while under the influence of alcohol was an instrumentality of an offence and could therefore be forfeit or 
not. This case showed the manner in which the authorities are willing to stretch and over-interpret the laws 
that were intended to deal with organised crime to achieve other ends. This stretching and over-
interpretation still remains to be tested.    
Another important definition is that of ‘unlawful activities’ (see earlier above). Unlawful activities, 
to reiterate, means ‘conduct which constitutes a crime or which contravenes any law’ of South Africa. This 
wide-casting of the meaning of unlawful activities has meant that proceeds of any crime, even if such a 
crime was not performed in an organized fashion, can be targeted for confiscation and forfeiture under 
POCA. Like in the instrumentality proceedings, in proceeds of unlawful activities, the NDPP needs to prove 
on balance of probabilities that if he seeks forfeiture of a car, that particular car is most probably proceeds 
of unlawful activities or represents property so derived. It is not any car that belongs to the respondent that 
is seized, but the specific one which is proceeds of crime. This writer is not aware of any case that involved 
proceeds of unlawful activities under Chapter 6 of POCA. Chapter 6 has tended mainly to be used on 
instrumentality cases. There is however a recent British case concerning proceeds of crime based on the 
equivalent legislation to South Africa POCA Chapter 6.  
This case involved South Africa’s fourth richest citizen, Dr. Christo Wiese, the chief executive of 
Shoprite Supermarkets. He allegedly travelled from South Africa with over GBP 674,920 (about ZAR7, 
million), which were found in his luggage by the UK Border Agency at the London City Airport. This 
money was seized and preserved by the UK Border Agency on suspicion that it was proceeds of crime1332. 
Wiese was reportedly travelling via London to Luxembourg to invest this money which he had smuggled 
out of South Africa as traveller’s cheques and in violation of South Africa’s foreign exchange controls1333. 
It is reported that he did not defend the preservation and forfeiture orders and the Westminster Magistrates’ 
Court issued a forfeiture order.  
 
                                                                
1332 Moneyweb 2010 “Christo Wiese’s R7m travelers cheques mystery”, Lindo Xulu, Moneyweb Holdings Limited, 






Appendix 4.3: A brief comparative discussion of FICA business regulations 
  Since there is lack of jurisprudence on regulations against money laundering in South African law  
we draw on jurisprudence regarding similar provisions in other countries, particularly the UK, in order to 
enrich our understanding of these provisions and the practical implementation dilemmas they pose for the 
regulated businesses and persons. There are five key broad regulatory obligations that FICA and the 
Counter-Money Laundering Regulations place on regulated businesses, or the so called ‘accountable 
institutions’, in FICA. To some extent they parallel the duties of the FIC mentioned earlier. These duties, 
discussed in some length below, are: 1. a duty to identify clients, 2. a duty to keep records, 3. a duty to 
report various types of customer transactions to the Financial Intelligence Centre, 4. a duty to establish 
internal compliance systems which include the training of staff and 5. a duty to appoint compliance officers. 
All these duties are aimed at ensuring that regulated businesses and professionals assist law enforcement 
initiatives to combat crime. This they will do through knowing who their customers really are, making 
records available to law enforcement agencies in case there are investigations later on, and monitoring the 
transactions of their clients and reporting those who they view as suspicious, unusual or prescribed (i.e. 
above set threshold amounts).  
Failure to comply with these duties is backed by a range of sanctions, from fines to custodial 
criminal sentences. The institutions and persons regulated by FICA and its regulations are referred to as 
‘accountable institutions’. These institutions and persons include banks, insurance brokers and agents, 
attorneys, auditors, real estate agents, financial instruments traders and a host of other persons and private 
institutions1334.  
                                                                
1334 See Ibid. The list of accountable institutions as contained in Schedule 1 is as follows: 1. An attorney as defined in 
the Attorneys Act, 1979 (Act 53 of 1979), 2. A board of executors or a trust company or any other person that invests, 
keeps in safe custody, controls or administers trust property within the meaning of the Trust Property Control Act, 
1988 (Act 57 of 1988), 3. An estate agent as defined in the Estate Agents Act, 1976 (Act 112 of 1976), 4. A financial 
instrument trader as defined in the Financial Markets Control Act, 1989 (Act 55 of 1989), 5. A management company 
registered in terms of the Unit Trusts Control Act, 1981 (Act 54 of 1981), 6. A person who carries on the 'business of 
a bank' as defined in the Banks Act, 1990 (Act 94 of 1990), 7. A mutual bank as defined in the Mutual Banks Act, 
1993 (Act 124 of 1993), 8. A person who carries on a 'long-term insurance business' as defined in the Long-Term 
Insurance Act, 1998 (Act 52 of 1998), including an insurance broker and an agent of an insurer, 9. A person who 
carries on a business in respect of which a gambling licence is required to be issued by a provincial licensing authority, 
10. A person who carries on the business of dealing in foreign exchange, 11. A person who carries on the business of 
lending money against the security of securities, 12. A person who carries on the business of rendering investment 




We now turn to the duties placed on these institutions and persons. Below we interchangeably use 
the term ‘accountable institutions’ and ‘regulated businesses’. In this usage we include both institutions and 
persons that are regulated. We refer to them as ‘regulated businesses’ to denote the fact that they were/are 
regulated as a result of the business or professional services that they provide to the general marketplace. 
However, it is important to clarify that there are other businesses that come before the regulatory 
prescriptions of FICA but less so as compared to ‘accountable institutions’. These others are referred to in 
FICA as ‘reporting institutions that are only regulated to identify their customers and to report suspicious 
and related transactions to FIC. They are therefore not expected to appoint compliance officers or keep 
records for extended periods of time and so on, as are “accountable institutions”.    
 
FICA: Duty to Identify Clients 
In Part 1, FICA prohibits regulated businesses from establishing a business relationship or even 
concluding a single transaction with a client that it has not properly identified1335.  If that client acts for 
somebody else, that somebody else must also be properly identified as is prescribed in the Counter-Money 
Laundering Regulations1336.  The Counter-Money Laundering Regulations (or the regulations) give detailed 
guidelines on how regulated businesses should identify and verify the identity of their customers. The 
regulations specify how the identity of natural and resident foreign nationals, local and foreign companies, 
partnerships and trusts should be identified and verified1337.  
Among these are requirements for identity documents, income tax registration certificates, 
residential addresses (as opposed to postal) and contact details.  While these requirements may seem 
                                                                
Act, 1991 (Act 80 of 1991), who carries on such a business, 13. A person who issues, sells or redeems travellers' 
cheques, money orders or similar instruments, 14. The Postbank referred to in section 51 of the Postal Services Act, 
1998 (Act 124 of 1998), 15. A member of a stock exchange licensed under the Stock Exchanges Control Act, 1985 
(Act 1 of 1985), 16. The Ithala Development Finance Corporation Limited, 17. A person who has been approved or 
who falls within a category of persons approved by the Registrar of Stock Exchanges in terms of section 4 (1) (a) of 
the Stock Exchanges Control Act, 1985 (Act 1 of 1985), 18. A person who has been approved or who falls within a 
category of persons approved by the Registrar of Financial Markets in terms of section 5 (1) (a) of the Financial 
Markets Control Act, 1989 (Act 55 of 1989), 19. A person who carries on the business of a money remitter. 
1335 Ibid. s. 21 (1) (a) and (b).  
1336 Ibid. s 21 (2) (a) to (d). 




modest, some of them are more difficult to supply for people living in informal settlements with no unique 
and verifiable residential address. This has presented a number of challenges for regulated businesses their 
customers and government as many South Africans live in informal settlements and have no proof of 
address (see more on this in Chapter 6).  
However, as was seen when the implementation of the AML regulations was discussed in Chapter 
6, the authorities have promulgated some exemptions to try and accommodate clients without the required 
documentation. However, AML customer identification and verification requirements, in the early years of 
implementation of FICA, meant that if identities and addresses of clients could not be verified, no bank 
account could be opened in case of banking institutions. While the intention of the FICA was to detect and 
combat organized crime, it became clear that it could have undesired consequences of financial exclusion 
for a large number of citizens in the country.     
One of the questions for this research therefore has been whether FICA laws and regulations have 
had to be bent, in South Africa, in order to accommodate clients that cannot provide some types of 
documents for verification. If they have been bent, to what extent? If not, why? A further question is what 
implications any of these answers have for South Africa’s compliance with the global anti-money 
laundering regime of the FATF. And, lastly, what implications do these answers have for economic growth 
and social integration in South Africa? t What exactly did the FICA and its regulations provid for when it 
was enacted. 
 
FICA: Duty to Keep Records 
Part 2 of FICA set out requirements for regulated businesses to keep various forms of client records 
for extended periods of time1338.  These are records relating to identity and addresses of customers and 
transactions that clients conduct with them. The regulations specify the period for the keeping of such 
                                                                




transaction records, which is five years after a transaction was concluded. They should keep these records 
(for five years) even after the businesses relationship has been terminated1339.  
In section 24, FICA allows regulated businesses to keep these sensitive records of personal data 
with third parties. It also allows these records to be kept in an electronic format. This may solve some of 
the logistical data storage nightmares that might arise were institutions only allowed to keep these records 
as hard copies. This would be much more of a burden, even in electronic form, for institutions which have 
millions of customers such as banks and insurance companies. In terms of costs, this duty to keep records 
does present regulated businesses with some overheads and a number of logistical and risk management 
challenges. Even where records are kept with third parties, FICA does not absolve regulated businesses of 
their obligations should such information get lost or corrupted in any way1340. FICA requires these 
institutions to give access to a FIC employee who may be allowed access to the data where FIC requires 
additional information relating to reports made by the businesses to the Centre or through the production 
of a court warrant.  
 
FICA: Unusual, suspicious, cross-border and threshold transaction reports 
The South African regime for reporting money laundering transactions and financing of terrorism 
activities requires the regulated businesses to report four types of transactions. These are unusual, 
suspicious, electronic and cash cross-border, and cash transactions. They report these transactions to the 
Financial Intelligence Centre, based in Pretoria, Tshwane. With regards to cash, electronic and cross-border 
transaction reports, the regulated businesses are expected to report any transaction conducted through or 
with them by their clients exceeding a prescribed amount set by FIC.  The reporting of threshold transactions 
only started in late 2010. The reporting of cash and electronic cross-border transactions is reported to the 
exchange control division of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) as it coincides with the exchange 
control regulations of the Reserve Bank.  
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SARB is then supposed to send these cross-border reports to FIC. Both unusual and suspicious 
transaction reporting tend to be problematic since there is no definition of what these transactions mean. 
The reporting of these transactions relies on internal policies of each of the regulated businesses and the 
extent to which they have trained their staff. This is because these transactions are not defined either in 
FICA or the attendant regulations (the AMLCRs). This leaves all these types of institutions with discretion 
and a legal defence. The defence is that they may argue that they did not report a transaction because it was 
not unusual or suspicious to them.   
  After reporting a transaction, FIC can direct the reporting business not to proceed with such a 
transaction1341. This happens in the event where FIC suspects that there are suspicions or money laundering 
taking place and wants law enforcement agencies to investigate further1342. This intervention by the FIC 
can only stop the regulated business from undertaking such a transaction for only five working days1343. 
This  allows, for instance, the Asset Forfeiture Unit to bring a preservation or restraint order FIC and 
investigating agencies can determine if such transaction or funds involved do constitute the proceeds of 
crime or not. This also allows them the necessary time to apply for court orders to freeze such funds.  
In terms of section 35 of the Act, the Centre can also initiate the reporting of all transactions in 
relation to a particular account or entities or persons, when it suspects money laundering or is requested by 
a law enforcement agency for such monitoring. This is done through what is referred to as ‘monitoring 
orders’. These are issued by a judge on application by the Centre. These monitoring orders are valid for a 
period of three months, and are extendable (on further application) for further periods of three months as 
long as the reasons they were issued for still exist1344. In practice these provisions allow law enforcement 
                                                                
1341 Ibid. Section 34 (1). 
1342 See further discussion of this in Chapter 7. 
1343 See FICA, Section 34 (2). 
1344 Monitoring orders are issued by a judge who is designated by the Minister of Justice for the purposes of the 
Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act, Act No. 72 of 1992. The judge may issue these orders (see Section 35 of 
FICA) if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that: 
(a) that person has transferred or may transfer the proceeds of unlawful activities or property which is 
connected to an offence relating to the financing of terrorist and related activities to the accountable 
institution or is using or may use the accountable institution for money laundering purposes or for the 
financing of terrorist acts or for the purpose of any transaction contemplated in section 29 (1) (b); or 
(b) that account or other facility has received or may receive the proceeds of unlawful  activities or property 
which is connected to an offence relating to the financing of terrorist and related activities or is being or may 
be used for money laundering purposes or for the financing of terrorist or related activities or for the purpose 




agencies to request the Centre to apply for such monitoring of accounts or facilities on their behalf. This 
happens mainly in cases that these investigating agencies are already probing.  
It is not only the regulated businesses that are obliged to report. In FICA and the related regulations, 
there are other businesses that are required to report the types of transactions mentioned above, although 
they are not required to perform all the regulatory functions. They are referred to as “reporting institutions” 
and include casinos, vehicles dealers, and dealers in high value goods as listed in Schedule 2 of FICA. 
Further, the reporting duties are, to an extent, also extended to supervisory bodies and the South 
African Receiver of Revenue (SARS). The supervisory bodies and SARS ‘must’ advise and supply the 
Centre with all information and records regarding any knowledge or suspicion they may have relating to 
the usage of a regulated business for money laundering and terrorism financing purposes1345. The Centre 
may also proactively request assistance from the supervisory bodies and SARS if it believes that they may 
have information about the usage of ‘accountable institutions’ for the perpetuation of money laundering 
and terrorism financing1346.  
One of the most controversial provisions of FICA relates to issues of confidentiality and secrecy 
between the regulated businesses and their clients. FICA provides that ‘no duty of secrecy or confidentiality 
or any other restriction on the disclosure of information, whether imposed by legislation or arising from the 
common law or agreement, affects compliance by any accountable institution, supervisory body, reporting 
institution, the South African Receiver of Revenue or any other person with provisions of reporting’ 
contained in Chapter 4 of the Act. However, these confidentiality provisions, to an extent, absolve the legal 
profession. The exemption applies to the common law right to legal professional privilege between an 
attorney and a client in respect to communications made in confidence between  
a) the attorney and the attorney’s client for the purposes of legal advice or litigation which 
is pending or contemplated or which has commenced; or 
b) a third party and an attorney for the purposes of litigation which is pending or 
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contemplated or has commenced.  
The issue of confidentiality has elicited a lot of debate among regulators and regulated businesses 
and various authors have written about it in various jurisdictions. The complaints have been that regulated 
businesses are being asked to violate one of their historical and contractual relationships with their clients; 
that of client confidentiality or privilege.  
It is claimed that this client-confidentiality doctrine is very strongly guarded within the banking, 
legal and accounting professions. While the legal profession is required to report transactions, such legal 
professional privilege cannot be claimed, for instance, where lawyers act as intermediaries in a financial 
transaction on behalf of their client. In relation to banking, the legal position, particularly in the UK, has 
been that lawyer-client confidentiality is not absolute but qualified by four exceptions. This is where a 
disclosure is; mandated by law, demanded by public duty, in the best interest of the bank, or made with the 
express or tacit permission of a client1347.  Although these exceptions were developed in an English case in 
1924, South African judges, according Van Jaarveld, have normally used these exceptions in taking 
decision pertaining to bank-client confidentiality1348.  However, there has been no court case that has looked 
into these matters directly from the standpoint of the responsibilities imposed by FICA and its regulations.  
The information which may be held by the Centre could be very confidential as it relates to people’s 
transactions and other personal data. FICA, therefore, provides for a number of safeguards in relation to 
this information. For instance regulated businesses making reports to the Centre are protected from any 
liability as a result of the reports they make to the FIC1349. Should the information they supply end up being 
used in court in a prosecution, they are not obliged to give evidence1350. The mere production of a statement 
from the Centre, certifying the source of information, is admissible in court1351. There are also other 
                                                                
1347 See Van Jaarsveld, I. 2001. The end of bank secrecy? Some thoughts on the Financial Intelligence Centre Bill. 
South African Mercantile Law Journal. These exceptions were developed from the Tornier case in England. See 
Tournier v National Provicial & Union Bank of England (1 KB 461) 1924). 
1348 See Van Jaarsveld, I. 2001. The end of bank secrecy? Some thoughts on the Financial Intelligence Centre Bill. 
South African Mercantile Law Journal. 
1349  Ibid. Section 38. 
1350  Ibid. Section 39. 




safeguards built into FICA regarding access to information held by the Centre1352 and protection of 
confidential information1353.  
 
FICA: Duty to develop and implement compliance measures and train staff. 
The accountable institutions are required by FICA to develop, compile and implement internal rules 
regarding the identification and verification of their customers, the manner in which records should be kept, 
the guidelines relating to identification and reporting of transactions and steps to be taken for such reporting 
by their employees to the FIC1354.  A copy of these internal rules, must, on request by the FIC or a 
supervisory body, be supplied1355. It is also a legal requirement for regulated businesses to train their 
employees with regards to their duties and internal rules1356. They are also required to appoint a compliance 
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1353  Ibid. Section 41. 
1354  Ibid. Section 42. 
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Appendix 6.1: A short history of South Africa’s banking sector1358 
The South African banking sector under colonial-apartheid dispensations 
The FATF standards of AML/CTF were implemented within a banking sector beset by enormous 
problems of inefficiency and ineffectiveness. It is our view that implemented in such a sector the KYC/CDD 
requirement could further exacerbate these politically charged problems. It is important to give a brief 
history of this sector in South Africa spanning from early colonial to apartheid and to the transitional era in 
order to fully appreciate the issues of exclusion and competition which greatly affected the extension of 
banking services to the poor.   
In his speech to the end of year media gala dinner in 2004, the then Governor of the South African 
Reserve Bank, Tito Mboweni remarked that  
“South Africa has established a well-developed banking system which compares favourably with 
those in many developed countries and which sets South Africa apart from many other emerging 
market countries…we find ourselves with a more mature banking sector , with a moderate level of 
private sector indebtedness and a reputable and first rate regulatory and legal framework”1359. 
  In support of this statement, Mboweni cited, among others, South Africa’s regulatory and risk 
management practices which complied with ‘international best practices’ of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the nation-wide access of customers to their bank accounts “24 hours a 
day, every day of the year”1360. He also referred to South Africa’s liberalisation which had reintegrated the 
new democracy into the global economy. South Africa, as a country, and its economy -- including its banks, 
had suffered some isolation during the apartheid regime’s reign. This was due to UN sanctions imposed on 
South Africa in the world-wide protest against apartheid. These sanctions were lifted in the early 1990s 
when the country established a democratic government.  
This changing political environment and post-apartheid government policies provided an enabling 
environment for South African-controlled banks to establish a presence and operations abroad. International 
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banks were also increasingly establishing operations in South Africa -- some for the first time and others 
returning after pulling out in the 1980s following, mainly, international anti-apartheid campaigns and 
sanctions. With liberalisation and the gradual easing of foreign exchange controls, South Africa, according 
to Mboweni, was now also open to the occasional shocks taking place in the global financial system1361. 
This means that when there is turmoil in other parts of the world, as happened in 1998, with the East-Asian 
crisis and, recently, with what has become known as the ‘global financial crisis’, the South African economy 
as whole somehow has to absorb such shocks.  
In 2007, when the global financial crisis started in the US and spread throughout the Western world, 
the impact was, in some instances, directly felt by the developing market economies. With failure of banks 
in a number of developed countries which had to be saved by governments from collapse, South African 
banks did not escape the upheaval untouched. Some South African banks were reported to have been 
exposed to toxic debt through their operations abroad. Some took a hit and faced slumping profits. These 
banks were consistently looking for ways to clean their balance sheets amid rising global campaigns by 
governments to reform banking regulation.  
Although no South African bank needed a government bailout or collapsed, some have had to 
cautiously review and streamline their operations, amidst the prevailing uncertainty. Below we look at 
South Africa’s banking sector with the aim of examining the environment under which the FATF’s financial 
regulatory regime was implemented when FICA was passed in 2001. A bank is “a financial institution 
whose main activities are borrowing and lending money”1362. Banks borrow money by accepting deposits 
and lending that money out to individuals, firms and governments1363. Within this definition, there are two 
main categories1364 of banking activity: ‘commercial banking’ and ‘investment banking’. Nowadays, many 
                                                                
1361 Ibid. 
1362 Black, J. et al. 2009. The Oxford Dictionary of Economics. Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 3rd Edition, p.25.    
1363 Ibid.    
1364 Both these forms of banking activity are regulated by the AML laws in South Africa, as in many other countries 
observing similar laws. While at a global level, the regulation of banks against money laundering as propounded by 
the FATF was, initially, mainly focussed on commercial banking activity rather than on investment banking, later 
developments have also focussed on investment banking; seeking to bring this elite sector under regulation. For 
instance, while the European Union’s (EU) First and Second Directives against money laundering seem to have been 
designed for commercial banking activities; the Third Directive has brought investment banking and capital markets 
more into the fold. With respect to the implementation of the AML laws and regulations in South Africa, my focus is 
on commercial banking activity as this directly affects individuals and households in direct ways more than wholesale 




banking groups, or holding companies of banks, are comprised of subsidiaries engaged in both these 
functions and more activities1365.  
A commercial bank offers services to the general public, ‘accepting deposits and making loans to 
large numbers of households and small firms’1366. Commercial banks are variably referred to as retail or 
high street banks. They also provide various services for depositors such as transaction facilities, credit 
cards, foreign exchange, mortgage and car finance1367. Investment banks, on the other hand, provide 
services to large firms, rather than the general public, providing such specialist services as ‘financing 
foreign trade by accepting bills of exchange; providing hire purchase and industrial finance; underwriting 
new issues; advising on and arranging finance for mergers and takeover bids; and managing investment for 
institutions and wealthy individuals.’1368 Investment banking is also invariably referred to as merchant or 
wholesale banking. There can however be no neat categorisation as most banks nowadays seamlessly 
engage in both these functions and more through their subsidiaries1369.  
For legal and regulatory purposes, the South African Banks Act of 1990 classified banks according 
to their registration and reporting regulatory requirements. The Office of Banks headed by the Registrar of 
Banks, is given powers by the Banks Act to register, supervise and regulate all institutions involved in a 
‘business of a bank’1370. According to these categories, there are locally registered/incorporated banks, 
mutual banks, branches of foreign banks and representative offices of foreign banks.  They have different 
prudential regulatory requirements.  
 
Different categories of banks in South Africa  
By locally incorporated banks is meant South African owned banks (local banks) and subsidiaries 
of foreign banks which are controlled by locally registered public companies in terms of the South African 
Companies Act of 1973 (Act No 61 of 1973)1371.  Mutual Banks are banks incorporated under the Mutual 
                                                                
1365 See Ellinger, E.P., et al. (2002). Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law. Oxford University Press, 4th Edition, p.1-25.  
1366 Black, J. et al. 2009. The Oxford Dictionary of Economics. Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 3rd Edition, p.69.    
1367 Ibid. 
1368 Ibid. p.289 
1369 See Ellinger, E.P., et al. (2002). Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law. Oxford University Press, 4th Edition, p.1-25. 
1370 See Banks Act of 1990, (Act No. 94 of 1990), South Africa 




Banks Act, Act 124 of 1993. They are the equivalent of building societies in jurisdictions such as England. 
They are required to maintain minimum capital and reserve funds as contemplated in the Regulations 
relating to Mutual Banks issued by the Minister of Finance of South Africa under Section 91 of the Banks 
Act, Act 94 of 19901372.  
Branches of foreign banks are regulated by the Conditions for the conducting of the business of a 
bank by a foreign institution by means of a branch in the republic issued by the Minister of Finance of 
South Africa under Section 90 of the Banks Act 1990. They operate as deposit-taking and lending 
institutions and are therefore required to, among other things; register with the Registrar of Banks, obtain 
and pay annual banking license fees, meet specified prudential capital and liquidity requirements and submit 
annual financial statements to Registrar of Banks1373. The last category is the representative offices of 
foreign banks.  
The representative offices of foreign banks are offices engaged in secondary banking activities for 
banks incorporated in foreign jurisdictions. For instance Santander Bank may choose not to open a branch 
or a subsidiary in South Africa, but a recognised and registered representative office, with the purpose of 
engaging in investment activities. These offices are regulated by the Regulations relating to representative 
offices of foreign banking institutions1374. These regulations require them to register with the Registrar of 
Banks. Representative Offices are however not permitted to accept deposits from the public but allowed to 
engage on such activities as: advisory services to their network customers, asset securitisation and principal 
finance, asset management, corporate finance, correspondent banking, project finance, structured finance, 
syndicated lending, trade and export finance, property finance, among others1375.  They are required to 
submit annual reports to the Registrar of Banks on their operations in South Africa1376. They are also 
required to submit a copy of financial statements of their parent banks to the Registrar. Lastly, they have to 
inform the Registrar of Banks of any material changes in their legal status in other foreign jurisdictions.  
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1372 See Regulation Gazette No. 7181 05 October 2001 http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/Publication.nsf/LADV/ 
1373 See Regulation Gazette No. 8814 1 January 2008.  http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/Publication.nsf/ 
1374 See Regulation Gazettee No 7227 13 December 2001.  
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The main difference between these types of banks is the level of their operations and the manner in 
which they are regulated. Locally incorporated banks are fully regulated by the authorities as they pose 
more systemic risk than, for instance, the representative offices. The latter are not permitted to take deposits 
and, as a result, do not pose any liquidity or systemic risk. A one-branch small operation of a foreign bank 
would pose a lesser systemic risk than, for instance, a subsidiary of a foreign bank with extensive operations. 
The latter are locally publicly listed companies which may have to be rescued by the South African Reserve 
Bank, as lender of last resort, should they face a liquidity crisis, while branches of foreign banks may have 
to rely on their parent banks oversees to rescue them. The regulations on locally incorporated banks (which 
include local banks and subsidiaries of foreign banks) include; the conduct of business, corporate 
governance and prudential and reporting requirements.1377   
 
South Africa has long been dominated by a few major banks: Standard Bank, Absa Bank, First 
National Bank and Nedbank. That has long been the case. The consolidation of market positions and power 
by these four banks spans sometimes over different political regimes whose policies constrained the 
participation and access by large sectors of the population, especially those marginalised by colonial and 
apartheid policies. Three of these banks trace their history back to the mid-1800s. At the beginning of the 
20th Century, three of these banks -- Standard Bank, First National Bank and Nedbank -- were already well 
established1378. ABSA’s history is traced to the formation of an Afrikaans bank known as Volkskas Bank 
in 1942. Banking history in South Africa can be traced back to 1793, when Lombard Bank, the first ever 
bank in the country, was opened in the Cape1379. By 1861, the Cape had no fewer than 29 banks1380. The 
opening of banks in the Cape is linked to farming and the discovery of minerals, especially diamonds, in 
Griqualand (later renamed Kimberly) around the same period. Goosen et al tells us that the year 1861 was 
noteworthy in the evolution of banking in South Africa. It is the year in which an English company called 
The London and South African Bank opened branches in Port Elizabeth, Durban, Cape Town and 
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and treasury activities; interest rate risk; equity risk in their banking books; derivative instruments; operational risks 
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Grahamstown1381. This was followed by the opening of the Standard Bank of British South Africa Ltd in 
Durban and Grahamstown in 18621382.  
While the latter bank was formed in South Africa, it was incorporated in London. In 1877 these 
two imperial banks, the London and South African Bank and the Standard Bank of British South Africa, 
merged to form what became known as the Standard Bank of British SA Ltd1383. This commercial bank 
exists today as Standard Bank Limited, a subsidiary of the Standard Bank Group. The word “British” in the 
name of the bank was dropped in 1883. In the early 1960s, the group was partly owned by Standard Bank 
Limited of London, a holding company which later became Standard & Chartered Bank plc. In 1987, 
Standard & Chartered Bank plc sold its 39 per cent shares to make the Standard Bank Group a 100 per cent 
South African owned entity.  
The Standard Bank Group (SBG) describes itself as a ‘global bank with African roots’ and it is 
reportedly South Africa’s largest bank of the ‘big four’ in terms of assets and headline earnings1384. By the 
end of December 2009, the group had total assets of over R1, 345 billion (about US $ 183 billion) and 
employed over 50 000 people worldwide1385. The bank now has operations in 17 African countries1386 and 
16 other countries outside Africa1387. In Africa, Standard Bank has expanded through acquisitions, 
providing personal and business banking services, with more than 348 branches and over 770 automated-
teller machines (ATMs) outside South Africa1388. In other parts of the world, SBG has focussed on corporate 
and investment banking franchises. However, in countries such as Argentina and Brazil, it provides full 
personal and business banking services1389 
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Another old bank, First National Bank, traces its history from the formation of the Eastern Province 
Bank of Grahamstown in 18381390. The history from then onwards is filled with mergers, acquisitions and 
several name changes. First National Bank, which started using this name only in 1986, was previously 
known as Barclays National Bank and largely owned by the Barclays Bank of Britain since 19261391. 
However, in 1986, Barclays sold its shares to South African shareholders, making it 100 per cent locally 
owned. Barclays later exited the South African market1392 due to the anti-apartheid campaigns.   
Nedbank’s history is traced to 1888 with the formation of the Nederlandsche Bank en 
Credietvereeniging voor Zuid Africa in Pretoria1393. It was renamed in 1902 to Nederlansche Bank voor 
Zuid Africa and in 1971 as Nedbank1394. The Bank is currently owned by Old Mutual and HSBC was 
recently reported to be making a bid to acquire up to 77% of its shares -- a purchase which HSBC later 
abandoned. All the above three banks, Standard Bank, FNB, and Nedbank, were prior to World War II 
largely English owned. It is reported that the Afrikaner elite was not happy with the English domination of 
South African banks1395.  
ABSA has its roots in Volkskas.  In 1942, a bank known as Volkskas, which became the banker 
for the Broederbond, a secret society of the Afrikaners, and the apartheid government, was formed1396. 
Volkskas merged with a number of other mainly Afrikaner controlled banks such as Bankorp, United Bank 
to form the Amalgamated Banks of South Africa or ABSA in 19921397.  
 
Changing banking composition and market dominance post-apartheid   
The statistical information in this part, especially on the number of banks operating in South Africa, 
is from the Banking Supervision Division Annual Reports of 1994 to 2009. In December 2009 there were 
                                                                
1390 Goosen, W., Pampallis, A., Van Der Merwe, A. & Mdluli, L. 1999. Banking in the New Millenium, Juta & Co 
Ltd. 




1395 Gidlow, R. 2008. Foreign banks, exchange controls and the future of four pillars bank policy in South Africa. 






33 South African registered banks as compared to 60 in 2000 and 41 in 19941398. Two of these 33 were 
mutual banks, three in 2000 and two in 1994. Thirteen were branches of international banks1399. In 2009, 
there were 42 authorised representative offices1400 of foreign banks, compared to 61 in year 2000 and 40 in 
1994. There was an almost 50 per cent decrease in the number of registered banks and representative offices 
between 2000 and 2009, while the number of foreign bank branches and mutual banks remained almost the 
same1401.   
Between 1994 and 2000, there was a 2 per cent increase in the number of locally incorporated banks 
and 20 percent increase in the total number of representative offices. The decrease in the number of banks 
between 2000 and 2009 happened mainly between 2002 (30 registered banks- from 41 in 2001 and 42 in 
2000) and 2003 (22 registered banks). During that period a number of smaller to medium banks were 
squeezed out of the market and some taken over by others. This was mainly due to the liquidity crisis at 
Saambou Bank, South Africa’s 6th largest bank by assets then1402. Saambou Bank collapsed, reportedly 
causing a ‘run’ on other smaller banks and systemic concerns to regulators and government. 
                                                                
1398 The 33 South African-registered banks as of December 2009  were: ABSA Bank Limited, African Bank Limited, 
Albaraka Bank Limited, Capitec Bank Limited, FirstRand Bank Limited, Habib Overseas Bank Limited, HBZ Bank 
Limited, Imperial Bank Limited, Investec Bank Limited, Marriott Merchant Bank Limited, Mercantile Bank Limited, 
Nedbank Limited, Peoples Bank Limited, Rennies Bank Limited, Sasfin Bank Limited, Teba Bank Limited, The South 
African Bank of Athens Limited, The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, MEEG Bank Limited, GSB Mutual 
Bank, VBS Mutual Bank, Islamic Bank Limited and Regal Treasury Private Bank Limited. 
1399 In December 2009, Branches of international banks were:  ABN AMRO Bank N.V., Bank of Baroda, Bank of 
China Johannesburg Branch, Bank of Taiwan South Africa Branch, Barclays Bank Plc South Africa Branch, Calyon 
Corporate and Investment Bank, China Construction Bank, Citibank N.A., Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft, 
Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC Bank Plc Johannesburg Branch, JPMorgan Chase Bank Johannesburg Branch, Societe 
Generale, Standard Chartered Bank Johannesburg Branch, State Bank of India.  
1400 In December 2009 Authorised representatives of foreign banks were:  American Express Bank Limited, Banca di 
Roma, Banco BPI SA, Banco Espirito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa, Banco Privado Portugues SA, Banco Totta & 
Acores SA, Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM, Bank of Cyprus Group, BNP Paribas Johannesburg, Barclays Private Bank 
Limited, Bayerische Hypo - und Vereinsbank AG, Belgolaise Bank, China Everbight Bank, Commezbank AG, Credit 
Industriel et Commercial, Credit Suisse (South Africa) (Pty) Limited, Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Limited, 
Dresdner Bank AG, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein Limited, Export-Import Bank of India, First Bank of Nigeria, 
Fortis Bank (Nederland) N.V., Gerrard Private Bank (Isle of Man) Limited, Gerrad Private Bank (Jersey) Limited, 
Hellenic Bank Limited, ING Bank (Switzerland) Limited, Kredietbank SA Luxembourgeoise, Laiki Banking Group, 
Millenium BCP, NM Rothschild & Sons (CI) Limited, Netexis Banques Populaires, National Bank of Egypt, Royal 
Bank of Canada Europe Limited, Societe General Representative Office for Southern Africa, Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking Corporation, The Bank of new York, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Limited, Southern and Eastern Africa 
of the Export-Import Bank of China, The Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS AG, Union Bank of Nigeria, 
Vnesheconombank, Wachovia Bank- NA, WestLB AG.  
1401 See Figure 6.1.    




Figure 6.1: Number of Banks Operating in South Africa: 1994 to 2009 
 
Source: Compiled by Author from the South African Reserve Bank’s Banking Supervision Division Annual 
Reports of 1994 to 2009. 
 
The four largest banks, which are generally referred to as the ‘big four’, currently control more than 
84% of South Africa’s total banking sector assets and market1403. This means that these banks have 
generally had the most clients and this shows high levels of ‘concentration’ in the South African market. 
Highly-concentrated markets are generally viewed as less competitive, in economic terms. Since 1994, 
these big four banks have consistently dominated the balance sheet of the total banking assets and market 
with important implications for access to financial services.  
In 1994 they controlled 77% of the market, moderating to 65% in 2000 and consistently re-gaining 
more control up to 2006 (84%) -- a position they have maintained until December 2009, when the 
annualised balance sheet data was released by the Banking Supervision Division of the South Africa 
Reserve Bank. The strength of these banks since the 1994 transition, in terms of banking assets and market 
share, has only improved1404. Many critics argue that the liberalisation of South Africa’s economy and 
                                                                
1403 See Banking Supervision Division Annual Report 2009, South African Reserve Bank, Pretoria. 
1404 See Figure 6.2 for summary of banking dominance. 
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financial markets and the entry of new and re-entry of old international banks into the South African 
banking scene in the 1990s onwards has not brought about any meaningful competition. 
Until the mid -1980’s South Africa’s banking sector was largely foreign owned. However due to 
anti-apartheid campaigns initiated by the exiled ANC, particularly in England, these foreign banks were 
pressured to disinvest in South Africa by divesting their shareholding, making these banks fully South 
African owned. One of the biggest ever anti-apartheid campaigns was waged against Barclays Bank in 
Britain by the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) of Britain1405. The AAM in Britain encouraged everyone 
including students, local authorities, companies and universities as well as the wider population to close 
their accounts with Barclays Banks as it was viewed as a major financier of the apartheid regime in South 
Africa1406. 
According to Nerys John, British banks operating in South Africa were accused of “redirecting 
‘blacks’ savings into the white economy”1407. This campaign started in the early 1970s, until Barclays 
relented in 1986 and sold all its shares from Barclays National Bank1408.  It is reported that Barclays lost a 
lot of accounts from students, universities, local authorities and the general public1409. This was to the extent 
that after Barclays’ withdrawal in 1986, the Chairman of Barclays Bank in London, Sir John Quinton, had 
to travel to Lusaka to meet the President of the then exiled ANC, Oliver Tambo, to urge him to convince 






                                                                
1405 See John, N. 2000. The campaign against British bank involvement in apartheid South Africa, African Affairs, 
Vol. 99, 415-433. 
1406 Ibid.  
1407 Ibid. 
1408 Ibid. 
1409 Ibid. John writes that in 1985 Barclays in Britain lost accounts with an estimated turnover of £6000m. Prominent  
organisations that had closed their accounts in the 1970s included the Student Union Movement, the Lambeth Council, 
Nottingham Teachers Organisations, the Junior Common Room of Christ Church College in Oxford University. In 
the 1980 other organisations followed suit and included the Methodist Church, Catholic Institute for International 
Relations, the Balliol and Corpus Christi Colleges at Oxford University, Oxfam, National Association for Mental 





Figure 6.2: Big Four Banks versus Other Banks: Market Dominance 
  
Source: Prepared by author from Banking Supervision Division Annual Reports covering statistics 
of 1994 to 20091411. 
 
 
Gidlow (2008) attributes the exit of these banks not only to the anti-apartheid campaign, but also 
to historic policies and laws pertaining to foreign banks in South Africa1412. He argues that while during the 
1970s and 1980s, many countries encouraged their banks to diversify in different geographical locations, 
the Afrikaner apartheid ėlite was suspect of foreign (or English) control of South African banks1413. The 
Afrikaners and the English had fought a gruelling war (the Anglo-Boer War) at the turn of 20th century and 
that hostility seems to have lingered on even when the Afrikaners had assumed some political control of 
South Africa. The Afrikaner élite, in the early 1970s, according Gidlow, adopted banking policies that 
restricted entry of new foreign banks into the country while also pushing for a reduction of foreign 
                                                                
1411  See Banking Supervision Division Annual Reports 1995. South African Reserve Banks, Pretoria. Banking 
Supervision Division Annual Reports 1996. South African Reserve Banks, Pretoria, Banking Supervision Division 
Annual Report 2005. South African Reserve Banks, Pretoria. Banking Supervision Division Annual Report 2006. 
South African Reserve Banks, Pretoria. Banking Supervision Division Annual Report 2009, South African Reserve 
Bank, Pretoria.  
1412 See Gidlow, R. 2008. Foreign banks, exchange controls and the future of four pillars bank policy in South Africa. 

















shareholding in South African banks1414. In 1970 a government Commission known as the Franzsen 
Commission released a report which recommended that  
“[I]f the combined shareholding of foreigners in a South African bank or bank holding company 
exceeded 50 per cent, such banks and holding companies should take systematic and positive steps 
to reduce the combined foreign shareholding to 50 per cent within a reasonable period.”1415 
 This Commission further recommended that only banking institutions that were incorporated as 
companies in South Africa should in the future be allowed to conduct business in the country1416. These 
recommendations, according to Gidlow, were legislated into the South African Banks Act of 1972. Gidlow 
observed that these protectionist policies served to restrict competition from foreign banks, stifled foreign 
investment and meant that branches of foreign banks could not be set up in the country unless they were 
subsidiaries1417. According to him, all these restrictions and the anti-apartheid campaigns led to Barclays 
and Standard Chartered and the American owned Citibank to pull out of South Africa in the late 1980s1418. 
It was only in 1992, when the apartheid regime was negotiating a transition with South Africa’s liberation 
movements (prominently the African National Congress) that the shareholding and entry restrictions of the 
1972 Banks Act were scrapped by the Deposit Taking Institutions Act of 19921419.   
 
Re-entry of foreign banks and investors in South Africa amidst democratic transition 
Foreign banks started entering South Africa again in the 1990s following the country’s transition 
and the legal relaxation of restrictions. In 1994 and 1995, the South African Reserve Bank Banking 
Supervision Division’s data shows no presence of foreign bank branches1420. There were however 
                                                                
1414 Ibid. p.37. 
1415 Ibid.  
1416 Ibid. 
1417 Ibid. 
1418 Other banks that ceased their operations or lending included US investment banks Chase Manhattan and Hill 
Samuel.  See Ibid.  See also John, N. 2000. The campaign against British bank involvement in apartheid South Africa, 
African Affairs, Vol. 99, 415-433.  
1419 See Gidlow, R. 2008. Foreign banks, exchange controls and the future of four pillars bank policy in South Africa. 
South Africa Journal of Economic History, Vol. 23 (1), p.37. 
1420 See Banking Supervision Division Annual Reports 1995. South African Reserve Banks, Pretoria. See also Banking 




subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in the country by then1421. Only in 1996, do we see six branches of 
foreign banks in the Banking Supervision Division’s statistics1422. As foreign banks were coming in, South 
African banks were also seizing the moment, like other big South African corporations, to expand their 
operations beyond South Africa’s border. They have done that mainly through acquisitions. At a local level, 
these acquisitions and consolidations partly account for the decrease in the total number of locally 
incorporated banks.  
There have also been a few liquidations and some collapses1423. On the issue of acquisitions and 
mergers locally, the South African authorities appear to have been very reluctant to allow such between the 
big four banks1424. In 2001, Nedcor Bank of the Nedbank Group Limited made a bid to acquire Stanbic, a 
division of Standard Bank Group. The authorities, it is reported, did not approve of this acquisition and the 
deal collapsed1425. The reason for this, according to Mboweni, was that the authorities believed there should 
be a minimum number of ‘substantial banks (so called ‘pillars’) on which the domestic banking industry 
relies’1426 (ibid.). The thinking is that this ‘four pillar’ policy assures the ‘minimum levels of competition, 
in the interest of prudential and systemic stability’1427. Expansion by South African banks, locally and 
abroad, has to get regulatory approval from the Registrar of Banks as required by Section 52 of the Banks 
                                                                
1421 Ibid. 
1422 See Banking Supervision Division Annual Reports 1996. South African Reserve Banks, Pretoria  
1423 See Mbuya, J. C. 2003. The rise and fall of South Africa’s fifth largest bank (Saambou): The rise and fall of 
Saambou Bank. LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, on the collapse of Saambou bank. According to Mbuya, Saambou 
Bank Limited collapsed in 2002 due mainly to liquidity problems after two international credit rating agencies Fitch 
and CA Ratings downgraded the bank’s credit rating. According to him, Fitch had concerns about Saambou’s 
profitability, asset quality, capital adequacy and liquidity and downgraded Saambou Bank’s rating on 08 February 
2002. Fitch released (on 09 February 2002) further credit downgrades for six other smaller South African banks 
including the African Bank and the African Merchant Bank. Amid these announcements, two of Saambou’s executive 
directors are reported to have sold their shares, leading to a drop in the banks’ shares. It is reported that this led 
depositors to lose their confidence and started withdrawing their money in numbers, causing a bank run and a liquidity 
crisis. On 11 February 2002, the South African Reserve Bank put the bank under curatorship and this caused further 
panic, where depositors withdrew their funds against smaller and even large banks (See Tito Mboweni, Address to the 
End of Year Press Gala Dinner, 14 December 2004, Pretoria). One of the banks that were gravely affected by the run 
was the Board of Executors (BoE) which was then the sixth largest bank by assets in South Africa (see ibid.). The 
South African Reserve Bank, together with the National Treasury, according to Mboweni (ibid.) acted decisively in 
quelling a possible systemic collapse of the country’s banking system. They issued a statement where the National 
Treasury guaranteed banking deposits of customers in all banks, an onerous assurance in a country with no bank 
deposit insurance (ibid.).    
1424 See Tito Mboweni, Address to the End of Year Press Gala Dinner, 14 December 2004, Pretoria. 
1425 Ibid. 
1426 Ibid. 
1427 Ibid. In his speech Tito Mboweni mentioned that this ‘pillar’ policy is practised in other countries like Australia 




Act of 1990. In terms of this provision, the Registrar of Banks and the Minister of Finance, for mainly 
prudential and competition considerations, may refuse to grant such regulatory approval, as happened in 
the case of Nedcor-Stanbic deal cited above1428. Substantial foreign and local acquisitions by foreign banks 
are also subjected to regulatory approval. While the ‘big four’ banks have largely been locally owned since 
the exit of major international banks in the 1980s, this trend seems to be slowly reversing.  
 
Table 7.7: Number of approvals for local and international expansions granted in terms of section 52 
of the Banks Act, Act 94 of 1990 
. 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Local  72 47 28 16 29 16 12 15 10 
Foreign 44 43 31 20 17 8 25 19 28 
Total 116 90 59 36 46 24 37 34 38 
Source: Banking Supervision Division Annual Report 2009. South African Reserve Banks, Pretoria. 
In 2004, the Registrar of Banks approved the purchase of majority shares (55.5 per cent) by 
Barclays Bank of Britain at ABSA Bank1429. This made ABSA the first of the ‘big four’ banks to be majority 
controlled by a foreign bank post-apartheid. In 2006, another major regulatory approval was granted to the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China’s acquisition of 33 per cent shares of the Standard Bank, bringing 
foreign shareholding at the latter to more than 40 per cent1430. In August 2010, HSBC made an 
announcement that it was working on acquiring about 77 per cent of Nedbank, pending regulatory 
approval1431. However, in October 2010, HSBC announced that it was no longer acquiring shares of 
Nedbank. The acquisitions of local South African banks are, according to Mboweni, being treated with 
some caution and generally come with conditions between the foreign shareholders and the local banking 
regulators1432.  
Among these conditions are that: the acquired banks continue to be fully and primarily regulated 
by South African authorities; they are run by South Africans; and commit to adhering to the post-apartheid 
policies of transformation of the industry such as employment equity, improving access to the underserved 
                                                                
1428 Ibid. 
1429 Banking Supervision Division Annual Report 2005. South African Reserve Banks, Pretoria. 
1430  Banking Supervision Division Annual Report 2006. South African Reserve Banks, Pretoria. 
1431 Financial Mail 25 August 2010. 





populations and advancing the ANC government’s policy of black economic empowerment1433. These 
transformation policies normally apply not only to banks, but also to other significant industries which, in 
the past, racially discriminated or excluded large sectors of population from ownership, management and 
control.  
When the South African economy opened up and foreign banks (re)entered the market, there were 
hopes that the big international banks would enhance the level of competition within the country’s retail 
banking sector. However, as it appears, the big foreign banks have not set up any ‘greenfield’ retail banking 
operations in South Africa1434. For whatever reasons, they have preferred to cement the dominance of the 
big four banks by buying controlling shares in them. Barclays and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China’s deals on ABSA and Standard Bank respectively were the first such acquisitions since 1994.  
Whether this is good, in terms of competition, for the South African consumers and the economy at large 
has been an ongoing debate. In an interview with the Financial Times, Tito Mboweni criticised the ABSA-
Barclays deal by accusing Barclays of being interested only in ‘repatriating’ dividends out of South Africa 
to Britain1435.  He also criticised ABSA, saying he was yet to see it introduce new products and competition 
in the South African market as a result of its relationship with Barclays1436.  
It seems a popular view that smaller new local banks trying to break into the retail banking market 
in South Africa have found it highly concentrated and hard to penetrate because of the dominance of the 
‘big four’1437. A Banking Enquiry Report into retail banking competition instituted in terms of South 
Africa’s Competition Act of 1998 opined that unless the government updated its laws and regulations on 
bank fees and charges and barriers to entry, it was unlikely that South Africa will see any ‘Greenfield’ 
investments in the retail banking sector1438. According to this report, South African banking laws and 
regulations promoted uncompetitive and non-transparent pricing of banking products1439. They further 
promoted barriers to entry for new banks and monopolised access to the national payment system through 
                                                                
1433 Ibid. 
1434 See also Gidlow, R. 2008. Foreign banks, exchange controls and the future of four pillars bank policy in South 
Africa. South Africa Journal of Economic History, Vol. 23 (1). 
1435 Mboweni fires confounding salvo at Barclays. Business Report, 03 March 2007. The Star Newspaper (South 
Africa- Johannesburg) . 
1436 Ibid. 






high fixed fees1440. The report concluded that while South African banks did not operate as a cartel and 
there had been no evidence of price collusion, the ‘big four’ formed an ‘oligopoly’ to the disadvantage of 
South African consumers1441.  
This continuing trend of acquisitions by returning and new investors in the South African retail 
banking market, it appears, is likely to continue unless there are some drastic reforms. Despite being 
proposed by the Banking Enquiry Report, they have so far not been implemented by the authorities. This is 
especially true of those reforms relating to bank charges which are claimed to be some of the highest in the 
world. The Banking Enquiry Report further observed that South African banks, on top of levying monthly 
administrative charges on bank accounts, seem to charge for everything else, including the making of 
deposits and withdrawals, checking account balances at ATMs, internet and telephone banking, point of 











                                                                
1440 Ibid. 
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Appendix 6.2: Regulations 3 (1), 4 (1) and 4 (2) of the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations of 2002 
Regulation 3 (1) prescribed that; An accountable institution must obtain from, or in respect of, a natural 
person who is a citizen of, or resident in, the Republic, that person’s--- 
a) Full names; b) date of birth; c) identity number; income tax registration number, if such a number 
has been issued to that person; and e) residential address.  
 
Regulation 4 (1) prescribed that; An accountable institution must verify the full names, date of birth and 
identity number of a natural person referred to in regulation 3 (1)…by comparing these with – 
a) (i) an identification document of that person; or (ii) in the case where that person is, for a reason 
that is acceptable to the institution, unable to produce an identification document, another document 
issued to that person, which, taking into account any guidance notes concerning the verification of 
identities which may apply to that institution, is acceptable to the institution and bears; (aa) a 
photograph of that person; (bb) that person’s full names or initials and surname; (cc) that person’s 
date of birth, and (dd) that person’s identity number. 
 
Regulation 4 (3) reads as follows; “An accountable institution must verify the residential address referred 
to…by comparing these particulars with information which can reasonably be expected to achieve such 
verification and is obtained by reasonably practical means, taking into account any guidance notes 









Appendix 6.3: List of global standards and codes of International Financial Institutions  
The global standards and codes include; IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard and General Data 
Dissemination System; IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency; IMF’s Code of Good 
Practicces on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies; Basel Committees’ Code Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision; International Organisation of Securities Commission’s (IOSCO) Objectives 
and Principles for Securities Regulation; International Association of Insurance Supervisor’s (IAIS) 
Insurance Supervisory Principles; Committee on Payments and Settlements Systems’ (CPSS) Core 
Principles for Systemically Important Payments Systems; CPSS-IOSCO Joint Task Force’s 
Recommendation for Securities Settlement Systems; FATF’s 48 AML/CFT Recommendations; OECD’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance; International Accounting Standards Board’s International 
Accounting Standards, International Federation of Accountants’ International Standards on Auditing and 
the World Banks’ Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems.  















Appendix 6.4: More on Mzansi Account and Branchless Banking 
It is important to note that not all the accounts opened during this period were as a result of the 
Mzansi initiative but rather were due to the FSC. We say this because while the Mzansi initiative was a 
collaboration of the big four and the PostBank, the FSC was an agreement involving all other commercial 
banks and financial sector players. The smaller, and mostly newer, commercial banks deemed this not a 
suitable product for them1443. The reason for this was that, contrary to the big four, they had already been 
exclusively targeting the low-income market with various transactional products, including loans1444. Their 
share in that market was growing substantially.  However their combined effort was not far-reaching enough 
to bring the all or even most of those millions of un-banked South Africans into the fold1445. It would appear 
that the big four banks, hiding behind the legitimacy of the FSC and collaboration with the PostBank, had 
colluded to introduce the Mzansi account. Although a far reaching initiative, it also served to re-assert the 
‘big four’ market power and oligopoly in the face of competitive challenge from the new commercial banks.  
It could well be argued that the Mzansi initiative, if scrutinized in the light of the country’s 
competition laws, could be found wanting as South Africa’s Competition Act of 1998 prohibits price 
collusion. Firstly, the Mzansi Initiative not only established a common brand between the competing 
dominant South African banks but also exhibited common features and an almost identical pricing 
structure1446. The common features were the issuance of a debit card, a ceiling on balances and transaction 
values, and restrictions on certain electronic payment services1447.  
The common pricing arrangements included the absence of monthly administration fees and no 
difference in pricing between withdrawals on a bank’s own ATM and withdrawals using another Mzansi 
participating bank’s ATM1448. The functional features of the product were therefore similar and the product 
cost structure almost the same. The similarities were to the extent that it made no material product and price 
difference for a customer to open an Mzansi account at FNB as opposed to Nedbank, for instance. In a 
                                                                
1443 Bankable Frontier Association, LLP. 2009. The Mzansi Bank Account Initiative in South Africa. FinMark Trust. 
South Africa, 20 March 2009, p.19. Retrieved from:  http://www.finmarktrust.org.za/documents/R_Mzansi_BFA.pdf, 
1444 Ibid. 
1445 The Banking Enquiry Report 2008, Competition Commission of South Africa. 
1446 Bankable Frontier Association, LLP. 2009. The Mzansi Bank Account Initiative in South Africa. FinMark Trust. 






competitive market, consumers should be able to choose a product and a supplier of that product based on 
costs. Mzansi did not provide this choice to the consumers, further asserting the market dominance of the 
big four banks -- possibly at the expense of other smaller players such as Capitec and Teba Banks who had 
already targeted the low-income market1449. The market power that the big four banks already enjoyed 
would, therefore, have made competition with them in that market by the smaller players difficult. However, 
this collusion appears to have been tolerated, marketed and later justified on the back of its outcomes.  
The BFA report shows that the Mzansi initiative has so far been one of the products that contributed 
a lot in enabling and giving access to first order financial services to many South Africans who would 
otherwise have not been reached so quickly without the cooperation, the marketing drive and the combined 
infrastructure of the big four banks and the Post-bank1450. The study further shows that two thirds of the 6 
million accounts opened under the Mzansi initiative between 2004 and 2008 were opened by customers 
who had never had a bank account before1451. The Mzansi account holders had an increased access as they 
could use facilities of any participating bank, without additional costs, as compared to holders of other entry 
level non-Mzansi accounts offered by the big four banks and their competitors1452. Other features which 
were not offered at the introduction of Mzansi are now on offer at some of the banks, such as the use of 
debit order facilities, internet and mobile-phone banking1453.  
Despite all the successes of Mzansi, however, the BFA research found that of the 6 million Mzansi 
accounts opened, only 3.5 million remained active at the end of 2008. Nonetheless that is 18 per cent of the 
total number of banked South Africans and 11 per cent of the adult population1454. This means that about 
42 per cent of the Mzansi accounts opened were ‘inactive’ four years later. Recent news articles claim that 
more and more Mzansi accounts are becoming inactive. Inactive accounts, according to the BFA report, are 
those that have been closed by customers or are dormant1455. Dormant accounts are those that had not been 
used for a consecutive 12 calendar months period1456. The BFA Mzansi report finds that while this number 
                                                                
1449 Bankable Frontier Association, LLP. 2009. The Mzansi Bank Account Initiative in South Africa. FinMark Trust. 
South Africa, 20 March 2009. Retrieved from:  http://www.finmarktrust.org.za/documents/R_Mzansi_BFA.pdf  
1450 Ibid. 









of inactive Mzansi accounts may seem huge, it is still lower than the average rate of inactivity of other 
nearest entry-level bank accounts1457.  
 
The report further suggests that the inactive 42 per cent of the Mzansi accounts should not only be 
viewed negatively1458. There were positive explanations to the closure and dormancy of these accounts, as 
some are a result of customers upgrading to better products1459. The FSC, with the introduction of Mzansi 
and encouraging others who did not participate in the Mzansi initiative to introduce new mass market 
products has been viewed by many to be a major success in bringing financial services to the people. There 
are other services beyond the Mzansi initiative that have been unrolled in order to try and extend financial 
services access in South Africa. These are such new services as branchless banking which are directed at 
serving the unbanked1460. These services use mobile phones and retail outlets to let consumers deposit, 
transfer and withdraw cash and have proved very transformational in extending financial services in Africa 
and other developing countries where there is a shortage of brick and mortar banks, while at the same time, 
there is a mobile phone revolution1461. 
 
Beyond Mzansi: Branchless Banking  
One important development in recent years is the appearance of branchless banking.  Branchless 
banking is defined as “the delivery of financial services outside conventional bank branches using 
information and communication technologies and retail agents.”1462 There are two models of branchless 
banking -- the ‘bank-based’ and ‘non-bank based’ model1463. The former involves customers having a 
contractual relationship with a bank -- through a bank account or to access financial services through retail 
agents such as merchants, supermarkets and post offices1464. This access may enable such transactional 




1460 See below. 
1461 Ibid. 
1462 CGAP .2008. Notes on Regulation of Branchless Banking in South Africa. CGAP Technology Program, 
Washington. p.1. 





facilities as cash withdrawal, deposit and transfer through the use of hand held devices, particularly a mobile 
phone or a point-of-sale (POS) terminal1465.  
The non-bank-based model involves access to financial services by customers with no direct 
contractual relationship with a fully prudentially licensed and supervised financial institution1466. Through 
this model, the customer is enabled to exchange cash at a retail agent such as a merchant, supermarket or 
post office in return for an electronic record of value1467. This value is stored in an electronic server of a 
non-banking institution such as a mobile phone operator or an issuer of a stored value card1468.  The balance 
in this virtual account can then be used for making payments, storing funds for future use, transferring or 
converting this value back to cash at retail participating agents1469. With stored value cards, customers 
would therefore use the participating agents to transfer, withdraw and deposit cash1470. However with 
mobile phone operator services, customers would use their registered sim-cards in a mobile phone in order 
to transfer money1471.  
They would however have to visit a participating agent to top-up (deposit) or convert any portion 
of the balance1472. David Porteous refers to the bank-based models as ‘additive models’ as they merely add 
another channel of transacting on an existing bank account/service1473. They are more like accessing a bank 
account via the internet or ATM as opposed to visiting your branch. He refers to the non-bank-based models 
as ‘transformational models’ as they target the un-banked in developing countries, who are largely low-
income customers1474. These services have grown in South Africa, as they have in many other developing 
countries, mainly tapping into the innovative software of mobile phones to extend access to financial 
services.  
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These mobile banking (m-banking) services in South Africa emerged just after the adoption of the 
Financial Services Charter, discussed earlier , with a focus on the un-banked masses. Researchers in this 
area of financial inclusion argue that m-banking services offer opportunities for access to financial services 
which are transformational in places like Africa and other developing regions. This is because more people 
have mobile phones in Africa than have bank accounts. They also have limited access to traditional banking 
infrastructure such as ATMs and branches. Tapping into the already extensive infrastructure and coverage 
of the mobile phone networks and devices, a number of schemes are emerging throughout Africa, East Asia, 
Middle-East and Latin America that focus mainly on the un-banked. In South Africa, there has also been 
this revolution with a number of non-bank service providers forming alliances with banks and mobile phone 
companies to extend these services. This includes such services as WIZZIT1475, MTN Mobile Money1476 
and M-PESA1477. 
 These three non-bank initiatives are offered by mobile phone network operators (MTN) and 
Vodacom (M-PESA) and a private company (WIZZIT), at the back of registered bank licenses of their 
partners, Standard Bank (MTN MobileMoney), Nedbank (M-PESA) and the South African Bank of Athens 
(WIZZIT). Due to South African regulatory requirements which prohibit non-banking companies from 
deposit taking, they had to collaborate with registered banks1478. The question, however, is whether these 
banking initiatives comply with South Africa’s AML/CFT KYC regulations?  
These innovative and transformational products could be vulnerable to identity theft and money 
laundering due to their non-face-to-face account opening procedures. Obviously, no address verification is 
conducted with these products. For instance, a criminal could steal and assume many identities of 
economically inactive victims and use them to virtually open bank accounts and enjoy the use of these 
facilities. All s/he needs is to punch a valid ID number of a person who does not have an active MTN 
MobileMoney or M-PESA in his/her mobile phone and start banking. 
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Appendix 7.1: Uses of FTRs for law enforcement purposes  
Here we look at the claimed and known uses of FTRs by LEAs in more depth. An issue arising 
from the reporting of customer transactions is whether they actually assist in detecting and combating crime. 
If so how and to what extent? Can such benefits be quantified? The quantitative model used by the FATF 
and other studies, as discussed below, have shown that a very low number of FTRs are directly linked to 
positive crime detection outcomes, such as convictions and asset seizures, confiscation and forfeiture. This 
is not to say that they do not assist in the detection of crime. They do, but, it appears, to an extremely limited 
extent. If that is the case, why do countries subject themselves to such extensive systems of regulatory 
surveillance and reporting? Let us look at the claimed uses of FTRs for law enforcement purposes.  
Matthew Fleming has discussed these very meticulously in a study he conducted in the UK1479.  
According to him, FTRs are used for ‘tactical reasons’ to; identify previously unknown 
criminal(s)/terrorist(s); identify the previously unknown criminal/terrorist activity of a known 
criminal/terrorist; corroborate known criminal/terrorist activity; identify criminal/terrorist networks; 
enhance existing criminal/terrorist investigations (e.g. with new avenues for investigations); identify/locate 
assets for cash seizure/forfeiture, restraint/confiscation and so on; assist in confiscation order enforcement 
(and potentially, fine enforcement); prevent dissipation of assets and/or disrupt current criminality/terrorist 
funding and; to identify patterns of high- or low-volume reporting for regulated entity for self-assessment 
or regulatory/LEA follow up1480. 
They are also used for ‘strategic reasons’ to; identify the potential duplicity of regulated entities 
(where institutions report same FTRs); contribute to strategic assessment (such as crime threats 
assessments); identify the main threats, risks, patterns, and emerging trends in money laundering/financial 
crime, including identifying typologies to better understand the problem and; to satisfy international 
commitments1481 
We are not going to explain all of these, as they seem pretty straightforward. We would however 
say a word about what ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’ uses refer to in the context of criminal or financial 
intelligence. By tactical uses is meant short-term operational uses to investigate and prosecute crime 
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(including asset forfeiture)1482. Strategic uses refer to their utilisation to analyse and understand patterns, 
trends and typologies which could be used to target particular syndicates or areas of crime and influence 
management decisions1483. To an extent, the reporting patterns and nature of FTRs could help FIUs and 
authorities to take strategic decisions to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the regime. In our view, 
FTRs that assist in tactical operations could also be used for strategic analysis or assessments. This is simply 
because from such FTRs, the FIUs and LEAs get to know what crimes these FTRs have helped to solve. 
From this knowledge they can then draw trends, patterns and typologies for future planning. 
The hundreds and millions of other FTRs that have achieved no tactical outcome would arguably 
be less useful for any law enforcement purpose. They can however be very useful for management purposes 
in that they can show the administrators of the reporting regime that a lot of money is being spent filing (by 
regulated business), assessing (by FIUs) and investigating (by LEAs) them to no avail. Their ineffectiveness 
can therefore encourage change or perhaps embolden decision makers to, (although this seems highly 
unlikely), abandon the reporting regime altogether as it fails or does not assist in the combating and 
detection of crime.  
Research and practice show that not all FTRs end up being assessed by FIUs or referred for 
investigations to LEAs1484. This means, therefore, that not all FTRs end up initiating new investigations or 
helping in the gathering of evidence or as intelligence in ongoing investigations1485. By investigations is 
meant evidence collection for court-directed actions such as prosecution and assets forfeiture1486. According 
to Fleming, FTRs should not always lead to the initiation of investigations1487. The reasons he advances for 
this are that when FTRs are received by FIUs, they are not necessarily ‘intelligence’ but just information. 
In this respect, he defines ‘intelligence’ as “processed and corroborated information which may be of 
tactical or strategic use for law enforcement and management purposes”1488. To be turned into intelligence, 
they therefore need to be corroborated through various database checks. This initial assessment helps to 
determine whether they could be of any immediate tactical use or they could otherwise be used later, if at 
all. 
                                                                
1482 Ibid. 
1483 Ibid. 
1484 Ibid.  
1485 Ibid.  
1486 Ibid. p. 15. 
1487 Ibid. 




He argues that it would be uneconomic for LEAs to turn every single FTR into an investigation. 
The “deployment of investigative operational teams to fully investigate each and every [FTR] as received 
is almost certainly not the best use of limited resources”1489. A practice he advocates is that, unless an FTR 
“clearly indicates serious criminality”, it is better to deploy full investigative resources on cumulative, 
multiple FTRs1490. However, Fleming also acknowledges that such a practice could be problematic in that 
potentially useful FTRs could end up being overlooked because they did not clearly indicate any serious 
criminality1491. There are therefore these serious practical management dilemmas for FIUs and LEAs which 
are daily flooded with hundreds to millions of FTRs. The problem is how to prioritise some and not others. 
Another major issue is whether it is justifiable enough for regulated businesses to be expected to spend so 
much of their resources monitoring and filing FTRs that would not be assessed and investigated because 
FIUs and LEAs have capacity and resource constraints. In other words, why promulgate laws and regulatory 
prescriptions that cannot effectively and efficiently be enforced? Implementing unenforceable regulations 
renders them obsolete and inefficient. 
Even those FTRs that end up being assessed by FIUs and investigated by LEAs, either on their own 
(single FTRs) or cumulatively (multiple FTRs), as evidence from various sources show, end up revealing 
neither money laundering nor its predicate offences and terrorist financing. Statistics have always shown 
that FTRs that end up helping to detect crime; either through, at some stage, having new investigations 
initiated or helping in ongoing investigations are between less than 1 and 15 percent at most, per annum. 
Some governments are looking for ways to minimise the filing of FTRs which are known to be useless for 
crime detection purposes1492. There have been reasons given to justify such insignificant successes of FTRs.  
These reasons are mainly that; 1. LEAs do not provide feedback to FIUs nor keep statistics on the 
outcomes of FTRs; 2. the quality of FTRs received from regulated businesses is poor and; 3. the lack of 
capacity and resources by FIUs and LEAs to assess and investigate FTRs1493. On the latter issue, as 
discussed above, the issue is are that both FIUs and LEAs lack the capacity and resources. What affects 
FIUs the most could be issues of shortage of well-trained staff dedicated to analysing and disseminating 
good quality and actionable intelligence to LEAs. On the side of LEAs, the issue of capacity relates to 
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issues of priority, where officers have got court deadlines to meet on pending cases rather than giving 
priority to suspicions which may well turn out to be legitimate transactions.  
On the second issue of feedback and statistics, which appears frequently in country Mutual 
Evaluation Reports of the FATF, the charge is that LEAs do not provide feedback to FIUs nor keep track 
and statistics of the outcomes of FTRs. This reason seems to suggest that FTRs do have some beneficial 
outcomes but lack feedback and record keeping by LEAs and FIUs. It appears that lack of proper 
management practices to provide feedback and keep statistics may make it difficult to assess the 
effectiveness and efficiency of FTR regimes. Recommendation 32.2 of the FATF, for instance, requires the 
maintenance of “comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
systems for combating money laundering and terrorist financing”1494. This recommendation requires the 
keeping of annual statistics on FTRs received by FIUs and disseminated to end-users (LEAs). It requires 
that there is a breakdown of types of regulated institutions who are making these reports. This may show 
which institutions are not reporting and assist in directing regulatory supervision, among other things.  
The latter Recommendation also requires the keeping of statistics on outcomes of FTRs, i.e. 
investigations, arrests, prosecutions, and convictions for money laundering and its underlying offences and 
terrorist financing. A number of FATF mutual evaluation reports of many countries show that this 
information is not kept by some FIUs, due to lack of feedback from LEAs. This is therefore a management 
issue, where FIUs need to put mechanisms in place to ensure that all FTRs referred to LEAs are traceable 
and their outcomes are recorded. The former head of SOCA (UKFIU), Sir Stephen Lander, formed a 
Suspicious Activity Reports Committee in order to ensure that LEAs provide feedback and keep statistics, 
among other issues1495. LEAs across the UK provide the SARs Committee with feedback twice per 
annum1496. This allows the Committee to compile a report on the successes achieved by SARs and to 
propose areas of improvement1497.   
According to Sir Stephen Lander’s UK SARs Review Report, the keeping of statistics and provision 
of feedback are important because they enable SOCA to “provide assurance to those [regulated businesses] 
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expending effort and resources to disclose the information that it is being put to good use”1498. Other 
advantages mentioned by Lander are that feedback enables SOCA to; provide “examples of success to help 
encourage continued effective cooperation”; “help reporters develop an accurate view of the risks to their 
business from laundered money and terrorist financiers”; “enable the tracking of outcomes in relation to 
specific types of SARs or different reporting sectors, thus allowing lessons to be learnt about what should 
be reported in the future”; “provide evidence on the relative merits of different methodologies used to 
identify leads from the database, thereby assisting with future database design”; “aid continuous regime 
improvement, enabling insights into not only the quality of SARs inputted, but also the support SOCA is 
providing to users”; “enables SOCA to disseminate examples of good practice throughout the use 
community” and;  “contributes to SOCA’s ability to build the overall serious organised crime intelligence 
picture”1499.    
On issues of quality of FTRs, regulated businesses are often blamed for not filing good quality 
FTRs1500. This means that when filing a report, they would not provide, among other things, clear reasons 
for their suspicions1501. Another problem identified with regards to quality is that regulated institutions, as 
discussed earlier , sometimes file reports which they would otherwise not file, just to avoid being on the 
wrong side of the regulators1502. This has been referred to as ‘defensive reporting’ and results from the 
regulated businesses’ pre-emptive measures to avoid legal/regulatory sanctions. In this process, businesses 
start to flood the system, even with poor quality FTRs. The uses of FTRs could therefore be divided into 
two main categories. Firstly, they assist law enforcement on their investigations. This could be through 
starting new investigations or assisting in on-going ones. Secondly, they assist FIUs and LEAs by providing 
strategic information which may not only help with investigations, but also with the management of 
financial surveillance regimes.  
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